

# Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104  
RECORD SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)

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October 20, 1997

**Status of Document:** Postponed in Part

**Number of releases of previously postponed information:** 0

**Number of Postponements:** 5

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Postponement # 1 (Page D]SM-909-62,25 July 1962, pg 2):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 2 (Page JCS 1969/347, 2 May 1962, pp 6-8): *B* *DA*

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 3 (Page JCS 1969/347, Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose, 8 May 1962, pg 1):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : NORTHWOODS  
DATE : 00/00/62  
PAGES : 197  
SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

UPRISINGS IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA

CARIBBEAN SECURITY

PATROL POSTS

INVASION OF CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to JCS recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify US military intervention.



Substitute Language: Operational Details

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Postponement # 4 (Page JCS 1969/389, 23 July 1962, pp 14-15):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 5 (Page OP605F/br, Ser 000374P60, 24 April 1962, pp 2-4):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

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**Board Review Completed: 10/14/97**



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

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\* Paperclip

202-10002-10104

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: JCS / NORTHWOODS 3360 (7 Feb 62)  
CASE NO.

Date: Multi

Subject: Mongoose & Cuba

Original Level of Classification: TS

Third Agency Equities: CIA OSD ~~NSC~~ JCS ~~SEC~~ ~~State~~ ~~Army~~

Remarks: Review only Mongoose material & Mongoose related  
"Berlin" documents not responsive

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

OSD: NO OBJECTIONS

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Exemptions  
EXEMPTED FROM DECLASSIFICATION  
BY JOINT STAFF AT TABS  
EXEMPTION: 6 (1)(C)  
DATE: OCT 07 1997

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)  
Reviewed on 10/9/97 mya

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
10-8-97 LMG

DECLASSIFIED BY USIA-GC/D  
MONTH 8 DAY 6 YEAR 97  
AUTHORITY: JFK Act

No objection to release



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

DECLASSIFICATION UNIT



NORTHWOODS  
(JCS CASE NO.  
3360,  
7 Feb '62)

THIS AGENCY HAS DECLASSIFIED ALL OF  
USIA'S HOLDING IN THIS DOCUMENT IN  
COMPLIANCE WITH  
THE JFK ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY USIA-GC/D  
MONTH 8 DAY 6 YEAR 97  
AUTHORITY: JFK Act  
*No objection to release.*



## JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCS RECORD CASE NO. 3360 (7 Feb 62)		SECTION NO. 1		SEE SEC. NO.	IR ACCESS NO.	PREPARED BY
SUBJECT NORTHWOODS		UNCLASSIFIED				
DATE	SOURCE	SC	CY	JCS PAPERS	REMARKS AND/OR SUBJECT	XX
8 Feb 62		T		JCSM 103-62		
28 Feb 62		T		JCSM 158-62		
28 Feb 62	DepSecDef	T				
1 Mar 62		T		SM-240-62		
1 Mar 62		T		SM-241-62		
1 Mar 62		T		SM-242-62		
1 Mar 62		T		SM-243-62		
8 Mar 62		T		JCSM-166-62		
13 Mar 62	CJCS	T				
10 Apr 62		T		JCSM 272-62		
8 May 62		T		JCSM 365-62		
8 May 62		T		JCSM-365-62		
8 May 62	DOD rep CSG	T				
8 May 62	DOD Rep CSG	T				
8 May 62	DOD R p CSG	T				
8 May 62		T		JCSM 367-62		
13 Jun 62	CJCS	T				
25 Jul 62		T		DJSM 909-62		
27 Jul 62		T		JCSM 564-62		
7 Aug 62		T		DJS Unnumbered		
8 Aug 62		T		CJCS Unnumbered		
31 Aug 62		T		CJCS Unnumbered		
31 Aug 62	DepSecDef	T				
CLASSIFICATION SPECIAL ACCESS UNCLASSIFIED						



## R&amp;RA BR., JOINT SECRETARIAT

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## JCS CASE FILE COVER SHEET

FILE NO. 62  
3360 (7 Feb 61)

CROSS INDEX NO'S  
Code - NORTHWOODS  
Name - CRAIG; B/Gen.  
3330  
5740

## REQUEST INITIATED BY

SUBJECT- NORTHWOODS (S)

	DATE	AGENCY PAPER NO.	JCS PAPER NO.
Report by Gen. Craig; Referred to JCS	7 Feb 62		1969/303 *
Decision on JCS 1969/303	8 Feb 62		
A Report; Referred to JCS	13 Feb 62		1969/306 *
Decision on JCS 1969/306	15 Feb 62		
A Report - Referred to the Chiefs	20 Feb 61		1969/310 *
A Report - Referred to the Chiefs	20 Feb 61		1969/311 *
Decision on JCS 1969/311	20-Feb-62		
Decision on JCS 1969/310-	20 Feb 62		
A Report - Referred to JCS	27 Feb 62		1969/313 +
A Report - Referred to JCS	27-Feb-62		1969/314 *
<del>A Report Referred to JCS</del>	5 Mar 62		1969/315 *
A Report Referred to JCS	5 Mar 62		1969/316 *
Decision on JCS 1969/314 & 1969/315	7 Mar 62		
A Report - referred to JCS	12 Mar 62		1969/321 +
Decision on JCS 1969/321	13 Mar 62		
Decision on JCS 1969/313	7 Mar 62		
A Report Referred to JCS	20-Mar-62		1969/324 *
Decision on JCS 1969/324	21-Mar-62		
A Report - Referred to JCS	23-Mar-62		1969/325 *
Decision on JCS 1969/325	27-Mar-62		
A Report Referred to JCS	29 Mar 62		1969/327 *
A Report referred to JCS	29 Mar 62		1969/328 *
Decision on JCS 1969/327	27 Mar 62		
Decision on JCS 1969/328	30 Mar 62		

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JCS FORM NO. 2

REFERENCE PAR. 4B(2) JCS 1210.1

GDS Review 16 SEP 1974



3360 (7-Feb-62)  
page 2

CROSS INDEX NO'S

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REQUEST INITIATED BY SUBJECT	DATE	AGENCY PAPER NO.	JCS PAPER NO.
NORTHWOODS (S) Paper			
A Talking Referred to JCS	9-Apr-62		1969/334 X
A Report Referred to JCS	9-Apr-62		1969/335 *
Decision on JCS 1969/334	10-Apr-62		
Decision on JCS 1969/335	10-Apr-62		
Report Referred to JCS	27-Apr-62		1969/343 *
Report Referred to JCS	27 Apr 62		1969/344 *
A Report Referred to JCS	2-May-62		1969/347 *
Decision on JCS 1969/343	8-May-62		
Decision on JCS 1969/344	8-May-62		
Decision on JCS 1969/347	9-May-62		
A Report referred to JCS	12-June-62		1969/366 *
A Report Referred to JCS	12-June-62		1969/367 *
Decision on JCS 1969/366	13 Jun 62		
Decision on JCS 1969/367	15 Jun 62		
A Report Referred to JCS	23 Jul 62		1969/389
Decision on JCS 1969/389	27-Jul-62		
A Report Referred to JCS	2 Aug 62		1969/392
Decision on JCS 1969/392	8 Aug 62		
A Report - "eferred to JCS	31 Aug 62		1969/411 *
A Report - Referred to JCS	31 Aug 62		1969/412 *
Decision on JCS 1969/411	31 Aug 62		
Decision on JCS 1969/412	31 Aug 62		
A Report Referred to JCS	1 Sep 62		1969/413 *

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10 JUNE 60

REFERENCE PAR. 4B(4) JAI 3799.1

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

22 1969/392

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8 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention  
in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962, the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation Mongoose, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction."

2. It is recommended that you approve the attached memorandum for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented). If more specific and detailed information is required by the Group, I will be prepared to provide it orally.

*L. L. Lemnitzer*

L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON *21 May 64*  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

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REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10  
DOES NOT APPLY

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Re 1464/392

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7 August 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention  
in Cuba (TS) (JCS 1969/392)

1. Pursuant to the discussion of the subject item at today's meeting of the Operations Deputies, the following material is submitted for addition to Enclosure A (page 4) of the subject paper:

"3. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, while agreeing that positive and successful military intervention in Cuba is fully within current US capability, is of the opinion that the attached memorandum is unduly optimistic in its appraisal of the force requirements, duration, and consequences of such an action. He has expressed the following reservations with respect to the several elements of the analysis:

" 'a. Cost (personnel, units, and equipment)

I notice that this element is treated in terms of the magnitude of force commitment and no specific estimate is made of cost in terms of personnel casualties, material consumed, and equipment to be replaced or rehabilitated. Even if this treatment is considered acceptable, I do not consider that the ground forces now shown are adequate for the intended purpose within the indicated time frame. If the Castro regime is to be confronted with the prospect of overpowering force, and casualties reduced by early capitulation, I consider that a minimum of three (3) infantry divisions should be introduced immediately after an entry point has been seized by amphibious/airborne assault.

" 'b. Level of National Mobilization Required.

(1) Adequate ground combat forces are available in our current force levels even if the scale of intervention

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
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If Castro's Cuba is only partially successful in the execution of its defensive plans, combat operations could be of considerably longer duration than anticipated with personnel and materiel casualties increasing proportionally.

" 'e. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation. The present wording makes no mention of the very real probability that a US provisional military government would be required for an extended period of time. Considering the size (44,206 sq. mi.) and population (6,743,000) of Cuba, its long history of political unrest, and its tradition of sustained and extensive guerrilla and terrorist resistance to constituted authority, the estimate that only a division-size force will be required subsequent to the assault phase appears modest. I consider it more probable that a clean-up and occupation force of three infantry divisions and associated support units would be required for a considerable period. This is in addition to the need for a military government/civil affairs establishment capable of directing the civil and economic affairs of Cuba until we can organize and install a successor regime capable of responsible self-government. This period of transition, re-organization, and economic rehabilitation might well continue for several years.' "



C. H. HAYES  
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)

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THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON *31 May 64*  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

DJSM-909-62  
25 July 1962

*Filed  
Wed 25-7-62*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: US Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. I have reviewed subject paper (JCS 1969/389) and recommend that the following changes be made in order to take full cognizance of the possible requirement for reducing military reaction time to less than eighteen (18) days.

2. Page 12, paragraph 3a(3), change to read as follows:

"(3) US Military Reaction

(a) With no prior warning . . . result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. ~~if there is a requirement . . . delete remainder of paragraph through (d)-weather-(to-a limited-extent)-~~

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. The time required to gain essential US military control may be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, an airborne assault could be initiated in five (5) days followed by air-landed units as soon as airfields are

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secured. Navy/Marine amphibious forces could be committed within eight (8) days; follow on forces would be committed as they become available. Incremental commitment of forces increased the risk of heavier casualties on both sides.

(c) The Cuban situation could demand more immediate reaction than employment of airborne/amphibious forces can provide, possibly to forestall drastic reprisal actions by the Communist Cuban Government. US military plans will provide for a rapid commitment of air power, naval gunfire and initiation of a blockade prior to the airborne/amphibious assault."

3. To be consistent with changes recommended above, page 14, paragraph 3b(3) should be changed in the first two sentences as follows:

"(3) [REDACTED]

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HERBERT D. RILEY  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director

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25 July 1962

NOTE TO CONTROL DIVISION:

Subject: JCS 1969/389 - NORTHWOODS (S)

At their meeting on 25 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the subject paper along with CSAFM 226-62, DJSM-909-62 and a Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 25 July, all of which were tabled at this meeting, and agreed to defer this item. It was also agreed to refer the subject paper and all purples to General Harris for revision in the light of the discussion held at the meeting. Further, it was agreed to have this revision circulated with a view toward obtaining approval from each of the Joint Chiefs on an individual basis; should such approval not be obtained, this item will be rescheduled on the Friday, 27 July agenda.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Secretary

Copy to:

General Harris *File*

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JCS 1969/389

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30 July 1962

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DECISION ON JCS 1969/389  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on  
NORTHWOODS (S)  
Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 27 July 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 9 of JCS 1969/389, subject to the following amendments:
  - a. A change to subparagraph 3 b (3) (a) of the Appendix to Enclosure A.
  - b. Changes to subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d of the Appendix to Enclosure A.
  - c. CSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal of paragraph 1 b.
  - d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 27 July 1962, itself amended in paragraph 2 by changes to the proposed paragraph 2 c.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/389.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS CH *21 May 68*  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

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M. J. ENGELDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/389

23 July 1962

Page 2324

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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\* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE  
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

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US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested\* by the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, to develop an interagency contingency plan for US military intervention in Cuba.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is possible that a spontaneous uprising could occur in Cuba. A resistance movement against the Communist Cuban government could develop a situation that the United States may desire to exploit.

3. The United States will pursue the overthrow of the Communist Cuban government.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

4. The Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the Caribbean Survey Group is responsible\* for the preparation of a contingency plan for US actions which include military intervention, in a situation of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba.

5. Normal readiness of forces will permit execution of CINCLANT Operations Plan No. 314-61\*\* at any time subsequent to eighteen (18) days after the decision to implement the plan.

6. For additional facts bearing on the problem see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

7. For discussion see Enclosure C.

CONCLUSIONS

8. The plan attached at Enclosure A provides suitable response to the requirement for a contingency plan.

\* Memo for representatives of State, Defense, CIA, USIA, from B/G Lansdale, subject, "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning," dated 14 June 1962; on file in Gen Harris' office.

\*\* CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan No. 314-61 (Cuba) (S), dated 22 July 1961, as amended; on file in Joint Secretariat.



RECOMMENDATIONS

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9. It is recommended that:

a. The contingency plan at Enclosure A hereto be approved and forwarded to Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, through the Secretary of Defense.

b. A copy of this paper be forwarded to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. As requested in memorandum for representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning," dated 14 June 1962, the attached plan is forwarded for your approval, prior to delivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.
2. It will be noted that the alternative methods of military intervention dealt with in this plan take three principal forms. These are, in descending order of magnitude:
  - a. A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation capable of confronting the Castro regime with the prospect of over-powering force.
  - b. An accelerated initial reaction by lesser airborne and amphibious forces building up as feasible to the scale of the primary plan. This method entails greater risk, longer time to establish fully effective control, and the probability of greater casualties on both sides.
  - c. An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro military forces and facilities to support and assist the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent operations.
3. The above described alternative methods conform essentially to current CINCLANT plans for contingency operations in Cuba.
4. This plan was coordinated with the Department of State during preparation in order to be consistent with and

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Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)



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complementary to the alternate plan prepared by State which addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban revolt but is limited to US actions less than military intervention.

5. Operations outlined within this plan for the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and US Information Agency were prepared by each agency concerned.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

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~~TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN~~

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

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UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

Appendix to  
Enclosure A

5

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5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Central Intelligence  
The Director, US Information Agency

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. The attached plan delineates the course of action to be pursued by the United States in the event that US military intervention is undertaken in support of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba.

2. Subject plan is effective for planning on receipt and for the conduct of operations when directed.

3. This document requires special handling and is not releasable to foreign nationals.

FOR THE 5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED):

EDWARD G. LANSDALE  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Chief of Operations,  
Operation MONGOOSE

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TITLE PAGE

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1. The title of this document is:

UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

2. The title of this document is classified SECRET. The plan may be referred to as the Caribbean Survey Group (or, CSG) Plan No. 2, which name is unclassified unless related to Cuba.

3. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Section 793 and 795, title 18, U.S.C.). Its transmission or revelation of the contents thereof in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

4. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without permission of the Director of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE is prohibited except as necessary for the preparation of supporting plans. Distribution will be restricted to those US government agencies specifically requiring knowledge of the plan on a "Special Handling - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis.

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US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

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US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA, (S)

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UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

Reference: Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962.

Task Agencies: Department of State  
Department of Defense  
Central Intelligence Agency  
US Information Agency

1. Situation.

a. The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US Government in the event that a decision is made that the United States undertake military intervention in Cuba.

b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit the situation include the use of US military force.

c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditions, and would be considered for implementation under situations less severe. An internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in Cuba where:

(1) The revolution is open and threatens the Communist regime;

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(2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and;

(3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).

d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent before actual outbreak. However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.

e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of unfriendly forces will be assumed to be as described in current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

## 2. Mission.

The United States will support and sustain the rebellion in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

## 3. Execution.

### a. Concept of Operations.

(1) When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community it will be immediately brought to the attention of the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Office of the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE. Evaluation of the situation by the Special Group will determine whether

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or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan.

(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary, but maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt fail. In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.

(3) US Military Reaction.

(a) With no prior warning and with eighteen (18) days of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack in support of the rebel Cubans with little delay from the time a decision is made. An air assault could be initiated within eight (8) hours, an airborne assault could be initiated within five (5) days and a Navy/Marine amphibious force could be committed three (3) days later with

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a build up to the full-scale effort to follow.

(4) Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases:

(a) Phase I. After Presidential decision, this phase will be undertaken by the Department of Defense supported by other agencies of the government. It will be initiated by overt US military assault on Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be terminated at such time as essential military control is gained over the island. The operation is to be conducted as rapidly as possible, quickly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to resist and to reduce risk to US units initially deployed, with a view toward early capitulation of Cuban military units and avoidance of needless loss of life.

(b) Phase II. Following the establishment of essential US military control of the island, this phase will be primarily concerned with the restoration of law and order and the establishment of a new Cuban government friendly to the US. US military efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil affairs and military government in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. Military operations essential for the elimination of small pockets of resistance and restoration of law and order throughout the island will continue. Major US combat forces will be withdrawn as early as security may permit. Operational responsibility of the Department of Defense will cease at the time the Department of State assumes responsibility for civil administration of Cuba.

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b. Department of Defense Operations.

(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans.

(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability.

[illegible]



[REDACTED]

1c [REDACTED]

(5) At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations.

c. Department of State Operations.

(1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States in as broad a multilateral context as possible.

(a) Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.



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(b) If 2/3 majority is available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organization of American States (OAS) decision authorizing use of force.

(c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin American nations (preferably not Nicaragua or Guatemala) to provide token forces to join United States forces.

(d) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and, in response to its appeal for help, come to its assistance with United States military forces and whatever foreign token forces have been made available.

(e) Keep key members of Congress informed of significant developments.

(f) Inform all friendly governments of our actions and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-Castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directed violence and offer them assistance.

(g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend them in these international bodies.

(h) Engage in all-out psychological warfare and propaganda stressing the morality of United States action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off the bonds of communist enslavement.

(2) Phase II - (Post Invasion)

(a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the Cuban populace.

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(b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration of the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests.

(c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance.

(d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.

(e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.

d. Central Intelligence Agency Operations.

(1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.

(2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.

(3) When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement, whether it is implemented or not.

(4) Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.

(5) CIA will support military operations by clandestine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations.

(6) After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces and objectives. Ultimately, the bulk of CIA Florida based personnel will be transferred to Cuba to establish a permanent CIA station and bases.



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e. United States Information Agency Operations.

(1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.

(2) In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency will:

(a) Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations.

(b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.

(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.

(3) Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:

(a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action, massive medium wave broadcasting should begin. A beefed-up Guantanamo

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transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.

(b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid and complete defeat.

(c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to avoid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.

(d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable.

(e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.

(f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible

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any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

f. Department of the Treasury

Department of Justice

Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Department of Agriculture

Federal Aviation Agency

Bureau of the Budget

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and

b. As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.

b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.

c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.

d. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.



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e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

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ENCLOSURE B

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 22 May 1962 approved CINCLANT Operational Plan 318-62\* which provides cover for US preparations for military intervention in Cuba.

2. Planning for US military intervention in Cuba with a reaction time reduced to five (5) days is currently in process but has not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\*\*

3. CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by Commander, Task Force "W" which is a component of CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. The primary operational element is the CIA unit located in the vicinity of Miami, with sub elements at other Florida locations. CIA will support the military operation in the event US military action is taken against Cuba.

4. Sub-paragraphs of the execution paragraph of the basic plan, outlining separate departmental and agency participation, were provided by the agency concerned.

---

\* CINCLANT Operations Plan No 318-62; on file in Joint Secretariat

\*\* CINCLANT Operations Plan No 316-62; on file in Joint Secretariat

Enclosure B

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ENCLOSURE C

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## DISCUSSION

1. The approved military plan for US intervention in Cuba can be executed in eighteen (18) days from a condition of no warning. It is not anticipated that funds will be expended nor units pre-positioned to reduce this reaction time, unless, of course, such preparatory measures can be clearly related to imminent military action. Extensive troop training at this time for a Cuban operation which may not be executed within the next few years is of questionable value. Similarly, prestockage of supplies, pre-positioning of forces and activation of ships from the reserve fleet does not appear justified if such preparations have no likelihood of being required in the foreseeable future.

2. It is unlikely that a spontaneous uprising in Cuba could develop and sustain itself for an appreciable length of time without active and positive US military support. It is expected that the United States would maintain an appearance of non-involvement prior to any decision to intervene. It is therefore important that US forces be capable of more rapid response than eighteen (18) days, first, to sustain a revolt and, second, to react adequately to irrational acts or reprisals by the Communist Cuban government.

3. Although there are increased risks involved in committing US forces in incremental deployments such risks may have to be faced. The most rapid reaction possible would be to employ air power, which is currently being planned by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This air plan could be the difference between success or failure of any popular uprising in Cuba. The use of air power should be followed as rapidly as possible by the air-dropped/air-landed assault as planned in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, with follow-on amphibious forces introduced as soon as feasible, and a build up to the full-scale effort of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61.

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13 June 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/366  
(NORTHWOODS) (S)

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;  
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At their meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

a. Substitution, in the second sentence of paragraph 2, of the words "urgency for" for the words "complexity of" and deletion of the words "and increase the risk of Soviet retaliation elsewhere." from the end of the sentence. Additionally, paragraph 2 is redesignated as paragraph 3.

b. Deletion of paragraph 3.

c. Deletion of the word "However" from the beginning of the first sentence of paragraph 4 and of the words "in the face of increased risk of Soviet countermeasures elsewhere." from the end of the sentence. Additionally, all of the last sentence of paragraph 4 is deleted and the paragraph is redesignated as paragraph 2.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

*M. J. Ingeledo*  
M. J. INGELEDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy Secretary

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13 June 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/366

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of BGEN Craig as set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

- a. Changes to paragraph 2 and redesignation as paragraph 3.
- b. Deletion of paragraph 3.
- c. Changes to paragraph 4 and redesignation as paragraph 2.

*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

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12 June 1962

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE  
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA (S)

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SOVIET BASE IN CUBA (S)

PROBLEM

1. In response to a request\* from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, to determine an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in event that the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The problem stated above was initially posed by Mr. Robert Kennedy at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on 22 March 1962.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, noting the increased complexities attending the delay of US intervention in Cuba, have previously recommended\*\* that a national policy of early military intervention be adopted by the United States which should be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces on active duty.

4. US military intervention will be required to assure the final and successful overthrow of the Communist Cuban government.\*\*\*

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion see Enclosure B.

CONCLUSIONS

6. The United States cannot tolerate the permanent existence of a communist government in Cuba.

7. Military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the Communist Cuban regime.

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\* Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June 1962, on file in Gen. Craig's office.

\*\* JCS 1962/335

\*\*\* "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose", dated 14 March 1962, on file in Gen. Craig's office.

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8. The establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba will increase the complexity of US military action in Cuba and increase the risk of Soviet countermeasures elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:

a. The Memorandum at Enclosure A, with its Appendix which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval in order that the Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) may be tabled at the meeting scheduled for 14 June 1962.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June. This memorandum requested the opinion of all participating agencies having membership in the Special Group concerning the appropriate course of action for the United States to take in the event the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the attached memorandum as the position of the Department of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Enclosure A



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## APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

1. In response to a Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Director of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose," dated 8 June 1962, the Department of Defense has considered the problem of an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in event that the Soviets should establish a military base in Cuba.

2. In the event that a Soviet base is established on the island, the choice of US counteraction is between long term acceptance of a communist state in the Caribbean with an increasing military threat to the United States from the South, or US military intervention. It is considered that the latter course of action would be the only solution compatible with the security interests of the United States.

3. It is believed that military intervention by United States forces will be required to successfully overthrow the Communist Cuban regime. Establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba would increase the urgency for US military action in Cuba.

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## ENCLOSURE B

## DISCUSSION

1. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.\*

3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversion efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.\*

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\* JCS 1969/335

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3. There is nothing to prevent the Soviets from eventually establishing their own base in Cuba. US acceptance of a Soviet base, or bases, in Cuba might avoid the risk of Soviet retaliation to US military action but such acceptance would also generate a greater eventual risk to the United States from the improved Soviet general war posture.

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14 June 1962

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DECISION ON JCS 1969/366  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on  
NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 13 June 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 9 as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

- a. Change to paragraph 2 and redesignation as paragraph 3.
- b. Deletion of paragraph 3.
- c. Change to paragraph 4 and redesignation as paragraph 2.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/366.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

E. J. BLOUIN  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/366

12 June 1962

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. ENGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

\* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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13 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brigadier General Lansdale, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June. This memorandum requested the opinion of all participating agencies having membership in the Special Group concerning the appropriate course of action for the United States to take in the event the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the attached memorandum as the position of the Department of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*L. L. Lemnitzer*

L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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BY JCS ON *21 May 84*  
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28 June 62

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

1. In response to a memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from the Director of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June 1962, the Department of Defense has considered the problem of an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in event that the Soviets should take steps to establish a military base in Cuba.

2. In the event of such a contingency, the choice of US counteraction is between long term acceptance of a communist state in the Caribbean with an increasing military threat to the United States from the South or US military intervention. Our present view is that the latter course of action would be the only solution compatible with the security interests of the United States.

*W. H. G. H. G. H.*

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DECISION ON JCS 1969/347  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on  
NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 9 May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations contained in JCS 1969/347.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/347.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. ENGELDO

Joint Secretariat

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BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
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JCS 1969/347

2 May 1962

Page 2213

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

\* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE  
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

MARITIME SUPPORT, OPERATION MONGOOSE (TS)

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MARITIME SUPPORT, OPERATION MONGOOSE (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a request by the Secretary of Defense for a report on ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense requested\* a report on ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action.

3. On 16 March 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations was requested to submit a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff\*\* on ways of putting Cuban PT boats out of action.

4. On 3 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that the Navy was studying means to put the Cuban PT boats out of action and that report would be submitted when the study was completed.\*\*\*

5. On 26 April 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations submitted the requested report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\*\*\*\* Copy attached (Appendix to Enclosure).

CONCLUSION

6. The Memorandum, Enclosure, for the Secretary of Defense, together with its Appendix, is an appropriate response to the request from the Secretary of Defense for possible ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that:

a. The Enclosure, together with its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusion, be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

\*Memorandum on file in General Craig's office.

\*\*CM 610-62 dtd 16 Mar 1962

\*\*\*JCS 1969/325

\*\*\*\*On file in General Craig's office.

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b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose (TS)

1. In response to your question\* of whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action, the enclosed memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is forwarded for your information.

2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action but states in substance that none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of security protection afforded the boats and a pattern of operations has been established.

3. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

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\*Memorandum on file in Brig General Craig's office. EXCLUDED FROM GDS

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Enclosure



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## APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to  
OP6057/br  
Ser 000374P60

April 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)

References: a. CM 610-62 of 16 Mar 1962  
b. CNO memo for the JCS Ser 000314P60  
of 20 Mar 1962

1. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to provide specified information on PT type craft, maritime support needs, and ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain data on PT craft and specified maritime support.

2. The Cuban PT's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuverable, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm (twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes) and from 12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war operations these boats would be put out of action quickly, although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT's were eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would be aircraft delivered rocket/gunfire and surface ship gunfire.

3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban PT's. They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana, offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight boats are presently located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered in early April, were still in Havana at last report, but are expected to move to Mariel in the near future. The only way to put these boats out of action while they are in port is by means of agents or swimmer (UDT type) sabotage. Operations

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within harbors to put these PT's out of action are risky in that there is a probability that agents/swimmers would be captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them outside of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with less risk should become practical after their pattern of operations is established.

4. Possible covert/clandestine ways and means of putting Cuban PT craft out of action include the following:

[REDACTED]

1c [REDACTED]

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Appendix to Enclosure



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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1c

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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10  
[REDACTED]

5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

/s/ George W. Anderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

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Appendix to Enclosure



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8 August 1962

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Decision on:

JCS 1969/392

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 8 August 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose as set forth in paragraph 7 of the subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

- a. Substitution, in the heading of paragraph 2 on page 5, of the word "Requirements" for the word "Cost".
- b. Insertion, in subparagraph 2 a on page 5, of the words "key strategic areas in" after the words "seize control of".
- c. Substitution, in the first sentence of subparagraph 3 c on page 6, of the words "were originally" for the word "are" as well as the addition of the words "prior to D-day" at the end of that sentence. Additionally, deletion of the last sentence of that subparagraph.
- d. Changing the end of the first sentence of paragraph 4 on page 6 so as to read:- "...achieving control of key strategic areas of Cuba within 10-15 days. Further, in the second sentence of the same paragraph, the word "such" is substituted for the word "essential".

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BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

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8 August 1962

(Dec on JCS 1969/392 - Contd)

e. Changing subparagraph 4 b on page 7 by:

(1) Deletion, in the first sentence, of the word "only".

(2) Insertion of a new second sentence to read as follows:- "There may be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counter-guerrilla activities until order has been restored."

(3) Substitution, in the present second sentence, of the words "30 to 45" for the words "approximately 20".

f. Insertion, at the beginning of the first sentence of subparagraph 4 c on page 7 of the words "It is estimated that the".

g. Deletion, in subparagraph 4 d on page 7, of all after the words "would be fully committed".

h. Deletion, in the second sentence of subparagraph 5 o on page 8, of all after the words "targets in Florida".

i. Deletion, in the last sentence of subparagraph 5 d on page 8, of all after the words "constantly increasing capabilities".

- 2 -

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8 August 1962

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(Dec on JCS 1969/392 - Contd)

1. Changing the end of the first sentence of subparagraph 6 c on page 9 so as to read:- "...will consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with such other sea and air support as may be required."

*M. J. Ingelido*

M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Secretary

Copy to:

General Harris

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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7 AUG 62  
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BY JCS/STN 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: JCS 1969/392 - The Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. I have reviewed the subject paper and recommend the following changes be made in order to amplify selected paragraphs therein as requested by Mr. Gilpatric on 6 August 1962:

a. Page 7, paragraph 4 d - add new last sentence as follows:

"To replace the airborne troop drop capability represented by 14 Air Reserve squadrons, it will be necessary to degrade theater airlift capabilities to the following extent for approximately 15 days:

"(1) Loss of 93% of PACAF total airlift and 15% of USAFE airlift; or

"(2) Loss of 100% of USAFE airlift and 50% of PACAF airlift; or

"(3) Loss of 70% of PACAF airlift and 50% of USAFE airlift."

b. Page 15, paragraph 4 - change to read as follows:

"4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The strength of the Cuban opposition and the resultant length of the operation will determine the total effect upon the US capability to react elsewhere. When the assault forces have been committed to the Cuban operation, the strategic Army forces in CONUS would be short the supporting forces such as engineer, medical, military police, signal and helicopter units for the remaining five divisions. Presuming achievement of . . . It is recognized, however, that certain combat and support elements will have to be retained in Cuba for counter-guerrilla and military government operations; and that engineer, medical, military police, signal and civil affairs units will be required to support these and military government operations. These support units . . ."

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c. Page 15, paragraph 4, last line - add new sentence as follows:

"committed to a Cuban operation. To replace the airborne troop drop capability represented by 14 Air Reserve squadrons, it will be necessary to degrade theater airlift capabilities to the following extent for approximately 15 days:

"a. Loss of 93% of PACAF total airlift and 15% of USAFE airlift; or

"b. Loss of 100% of USAFE airlift and 50% of PACAF airlift; or

"c. Loss of 70% of PACAF airlift and 50% of USAFE airlift."

The readiness posture of SAC, . . .

HERBERT D. RILEY  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director

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7 August 1962

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON *21 May 84*  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

Tentative Decision on:

JCS 1969/392

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED**

(NORTHWOODS) ~~NOT~~ RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN

On 7 August 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation Mongoose, as set forth in paragraph 7 of the subject paper itself amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

- a. Substitution, in the first sentence of subparagraph 3 a, of the words "in lieu of" for the words "to obviate the necessity for".
- b. The addition, to the end of the first sentence of subparagraph 3 a, of the words, ", however, CINCLANT and Headquarters USAF have been requested to prepare alternative plans not involving any mobilization." Further, in the second sentence of subparagraph 3 a, the word "other" is substituted for the word "additional".
- c. The insertion, as a new first sentence to subparagraph 4 a, of the following:- "When the assault forces have been committed to the Cuban operation the strategic Army forces in the CONUS would be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divisions."
- d. The insertion, in subparagraph 4 d, of the word "CONUS" before the words "MATS airlift" and the words ", if mobilized, would be" before the words "about 30 per cent

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<sup>7 August</sup>  
e. The substitution, in subparagraph 6 b of the word "may" for the word "will" in the first sentence and the deletion of all of the last two sentences.

The Marine Corps requested a "hold" on implementation and indicated that it would phone-vote either (a) its final approval, or (b) its desire to add to the Enclosure a paragraph delineating the Commandant, Marine Corps' reservations concerning the draft memorandum contained in the Appendix to Enclosure A (in this event, these reservations will be submitted in writing by the Marine Corps). It was also agreed that the Joint Staff should dispatch an appropriate message implementing the action called for by the revision to the first sentence of subparagraph 3 of the Appendix to Enclosure A. (NOTE: Subject message was subsequently dispatched as JCS 5602).

Should the Marine Corps confirm that it desires to include the Commandant's reservations as cited above, please reschedule this item as Agenda Item 1 for the Wednesday, 8 August meeting.

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*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Secretary

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General Harris ✓

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Pe 1969/389

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

JCSM-564-62  
27 July 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2,  
Cuba (S)

1. As requested in memorandum for representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962, the attached plan is forwarded for your approval, prior to delivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.

2. It will be noted that the alternative methods of military intervention dealt with in this plan take three principal forms. These are, in descending order of magnitude:

a. A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation capable of confronting the Castro regime with the prospect of over-powering force.

b. An accelerated initial reaction by lesser airborne and amphibious forces building up as feasible to the scale of the primary plan. This method entails greater risk, longer time to establish fully effective control and the probability of greater casualties on both sides.

c. An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro military forces and facilities to support and assist the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent operations.

3. The above described alternative methods conform essentially to current CINCLANT plans for contingency operations in Cuba.

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4. This plan was coordinated with the Department of State during preparation in order to be consistent with and complementary to the alternate plan prepared by State which addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban revolt but is limited to US actions less than military intervention.

5. Operations outlined within this plan for the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and US Information Agency were prepared by each agency concerned.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure:  
Plan

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27 July 1962

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Decision on:

JCS 1969/389  
(NORTHWOODS) (S)

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

At their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper as amended by:

- a. The deletion, from the beginning of the last sentence of subparagraph 3 b (3) (a) of the Appendix to Enclosure A, of the words "when relieved by Army units".
- b. Substitution, in subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d of the Appendix to Enclosure A, of the word "CINCLANT" for the words "the designated unified commander".
- c. CSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal of paragraph 1 b.
- d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 27 July 1962 itself amended by revision of the proposed paragraph 2 c, contained in paragraph 2, so as to read:-  
"c. An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro military forces and facilities to support and assist the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent operations."

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*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Secretary

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27 July 1962

Decision on:

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JCS 1969/389

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of BGEN Harris as set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper as amended by:

- a. A change to subparagraph 3 b (3) (a) of the Appendix to Enclosure A.
- b. Changes to subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d of the Appendix to Enclosure A.
- c. CSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal of paragraph 1 b.
- d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 27 July 1962 itself amended in paragraph 2 by changes to the proposed paragraph 2 c.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

*M. J. Ingeledo*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Secretary

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8 May 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/344

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

On 8 May 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 11 of the subject paper.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

General Craig

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8 May 1962

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Decision on:

JCS 1969/344

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

On 8 May 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved  
BGEN Craig's recommendations as set forth in paragraph 11  
of the subject paper.

*M. V. Ingelido*

M. V. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy Secretary

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*at 1969/344*

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JCSM-365-62

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: DOD Task No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE

1. Pursuant to the requirements set forth in DOD Task No. 38 the Department of Defense was requested to review the present arrangements for granting asylum to Cuban refugees at Guantanamo Naval Base, with the view of granting asylum to all Cubans so desiring it, at the Naval Base.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the recommendations outlined in the attached memorandum be approved.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

G. H. DECKER  
Acting Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: JCS 1969/347 - Maritime Support,  
Operation Mongoose (TS)

1. On 14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense inquired whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban PT boats out of action.

2. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense forwards a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance that it is not practicable to carry out the operations at this time and that appropriate recommendations will be submitted at a later date.

3. Some possible ways of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action enumerated are [REDACTED]

4. The Operations Deputies approved the attached memo for the Secretary of Defense, together with its enclosure, on 7 May 1962 for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense. It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards the CNO report.

*21 May 62* William H. Craig  
WILLIAM H. CRAIG  
Brig. General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative  
Caribbean Survey Group

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: DOD Task No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE

1. In accordance with Task No. 29 the Department of Defense was requested to undertake a review of the present arrangements for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base for asylum. The review included all legal, political and security aspects in addition to development of recommendations on the feasibility and desirability of granting asylum to all Cubans so desiring at Guantanamo Naval Base.

2. The Operations Deputies approved such a document responsive to this task on 8 May 1962. It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached memorandum forwarding the results of this review to the Secretary of Defense.

*William H. Craig*  
WILLIAM H. CRAIG  
Brig General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative  
Caribbean Survey Group

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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JCSM-367-62  
8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose (TS)

1. In response to your question of whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action, the enclosed memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is forwarded for your information.
2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance that none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of security protection afforded the boats and a pattern of operations has been established.
3. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

G. H. DECKER  
Acting Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Encl:  
Memo from CNO

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to  
OP605P/br  
Ser 000374P60

24 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)

References: a. CM 610-62 of 16 Mar 1962  
b. CNO memo for the JCS Ser 000314P60  
of 20 Mar 1962

1. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to provide specified information on PT-type craft, maritime support needs, and ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain data on PT craft and specified maritime support.

2. The Cuban PT's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuverable, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm (twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes) and from 12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war operations these boats would be put out of action quickly, although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT's were eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would be aircraft delivered rocket/gunfire and surface ship gunfire.

3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban PT's. They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana, offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight boats are presently located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered in early April, were still in Havana at last report, but are expected to move to Mariel in the near future. The only way to put these boats out of action while they are in port is by means of agents or swimmer (UDT type) sabotage. Operations

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within harbors to put these PT's out of action are risky in that there is a probability that agents/swimmers would be captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them outside of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with less risk should become practical after their pattern of operations is established.

4. Possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of putting Cuban PT craft out of action include the following:

[illegible]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1c [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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1c  
[REDACTED]

5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

/s/ George W. Anderson  
GEORGE W. ANDERSON

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10 April 1962

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 DECISION ON JCS 1969/335  
 A Note by the Secretaries  
 on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 10 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 6 of the report submitted by JCS 1969/335, after making amendments to the memorandum in Enclosure A thereto.
2. The memorandum, as amended, was forwarded as JCSM-272-62, to the Secretary of Defense.
3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/335.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
 BY JCS ON *21 May 62*  
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JCS 1969/335

9 April 1962

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

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A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE  
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA (TS)

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## CUBA (TS)

## THE PROBLEM

1. To develop the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with reference to two questions posed by General Taylor at the meeting of the Special Group (5412), 5 April 1962, related to possible sentences for the invasion prisoners as follows:

- a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should intervene?
- b. Does the United States have the capability to intervene?

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Past considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been reviewed for opinions or decisions related to General Taylor's first question. Two studies are appropriate; however, both studies were directly concerned with the current Cuba Project (Mongoose).

- a. The first study,\* dated 8 February 1962:

A significant conclusion of this study states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime can be accomplished without precipitating general war and without serious effect on world public opinion if, among other things, the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba.

- b. The second study,\*\* dated 16 March 1962:

This study repeated the above decision, but further,

\* JCS 1969/303  
\*\* JCS 1969/313

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appended a list of circumstances which could be considered sufficient provocation for US military intervention in Cuba. One of the situations listed, which depended upon degree of seriousness, is stated:

"Execution of prisoners taken in the abortive attempt of April 1961."

3. For additional facts bearing see Enclosure B.

#### DISCUSSION

4. For discussion see Enclosure C.

#### CONCLUSIONS

5. The Secretary of Defense should be advised during the meeting of 10 April that execution of 100 or more Cuban prisoners should be exploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda campaign if necessary) by the US as justification for intervention.

6. The Secretary of Defense should be advised that there is no question of US capability to intervene, and that the deliberate course of implementing such action within 18 days after decision is more prudent than the faster but riskier course of piecemeal force commitments.

7. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not addressed the question of US military intervention in Cuba except within the context of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable that military action be recommended to the Secretary of Defense and/or the President as the only course which provides assurance that the Communist Cuban regime can be removed in the important time frame of the near future.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Conclusions 5 and 6 above be reflected as the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the meeting with the Secretary of Defense 10 April 1962.

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b. The memorandum at Enclosure A be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to express the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning US military intervention in Cuba outside the context of Operation MongOOSE.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

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DRAFT

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external political, economic or psychological pressures. Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.
2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease

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Enclosure A

(Page revised as directed by the JCS, 10 April 1962)

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the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required.

5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty.

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## ENCLOSURE B

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. With regard to the question concerning US capability to intervene in Cuba, implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 will assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government within 10 days after forces are committed. As recently as 3 April 1962 CINCLANT (in response to a Joint Chiefs of Staff query concerning the adequacy of forces in his OPLAN) has advised that contingencies which could complicate the campaign against Cuba have been recognized and considered acceptable hazards. CINCLANT states, "... it is my judgment that the forces in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 are adequate to gain essential control of Cuba within the estimated 10 days." CINCLANT qualifies this judgment to depend on the following:

"a. Intelligence available to this command concerning the current strength, capabilities, morale, and locations of Cuban military forces is essentially correct.

"b. The amphibious assault lift now available in LANTCOM and PACOM is, as an absolute minimum, maintained at no less than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.

"c. Certain of the "on call" army forces now listed in the plan are reclassified as reserve forces and put in motion in time to arrive in the objective area on or before D plus 10."

2. While the fastest means of assuring completion of the total task in Cuba is OPLAN 314-61, the situation may require initial reaction by the US in less than 18 days. A calculated risk could be considered, providing piecemeal commitment of US forces as rapidly as they and their transportation become available. This is CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61, and although not approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was returned to CINCLANT for rewrite. Representative reaction times, proposed in OPLAN 316-61 from a condition

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Enclosure B

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of no warning were:

2 ABN Divisions	- 5 days
4 Marine BLTs	- 7-8 days
Artillery and Armor	- 10-12 days
Follow-on Forces	- 15-18 days

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## ENCLOSURE C

## DISCUSSION

1. In addition to related considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, additional factors which support US intervention in Cuba, if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:

- a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mon-goose, already approved by the Special Group, indicate that military intervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow of the Communist Cuban regime.
- b. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US.
- c. Justification for US intervention will probably be more convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise. The US could, however, bolster the justification for intervention, if required, to provide a stronger case for US military action.
- d. Execution of significant numbers of prisoners would adversely affect the faith and resolution of refugee Cubans and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the Communist regime, if they feel that the US has ignored, in apparent disinterest, the final chapter of last year's invasion attempt.

2. US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc diversionary tactics in other parts of the world (most probably in known trouble spots such as Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the Offshore Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would likely engender propaganda campaigns to include use of the UN forum for pressure against the US. However, the essential and most important element of the US plan against Cuba is speed. CINCLANT's OPLAN states, "Some 5 days subsequent to gaining control, conditions should permit withdrawal of assault forces,

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leaving small military units to conduct civil affairs and counter-guerrilla mop-up operations." Estimating from D-5 therefore, it should be expected that US forces committed to Cuba will be unavailable for other contingencies for only about 20 days, although the Marine Division Wing Team from the West Coast will be in poor position for immediate redeployment for some time longer.

3. The fastest means of applying force against Cuba would be through the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF), although this would be an interim measure until surface forces could be deployed. This capability, now being prepared by CINCLANT as a new and separate plan, could be utilized for destruction of Cuban air power, reduction of ground forces (especially armor), and disruption of Cuban communications and utility systems. This plan to be operable in 6 hours in the strength desired by CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12 Air Force Squadrons in Florida.

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9 May 1962

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A Note by the Secretaries  
on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 8 May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation set forth in paragraph 11 of the paper.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/343.

F. J. BLOUNT

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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on

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A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. ENGELING

Joint Secretariat

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE  
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to the

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on

ESTABLISHMENT OF "PATROL POSTS" (U)

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ESTABLISHMENT OF "PATROL POSTS" (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a request\* from the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, to examine the possibility of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. The term "patrol posts" is assumed to include any agency or facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and infiltration surveillance system. Such an agency could be overt or covert in nature and could be purely US, bi-national, or multi-national in nature.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. By memorandum to the DOD/JCS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962, the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested an examination of the possibility of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean. Particular attention was to be given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely US, in Haiti, so as to guard against any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba.

4. For additional Facts Bearing on the Problem, see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion, see Enclosure C.

CONCLUSIONS

6. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a meaningful military invasion against any Caribbean country with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats. Surveillance of Cuban coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability of the US Atlantic Command. Forces of this command, assisted by military forces of the country concerned, are capable of combatting successfully any invasion attempts by Cuba.

\*On file in General Craig's office



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7. From a military point of view, the primary value of air-sea "patrol posts", would be in acquiring advance information of Cuban actions and indications of intentions. Due to the nature of the likely Cuban threat, i.e., infiltration and subversion supporting an indigenous revolutionary movement, the value of surface "patrol posts" is questionable.

8. Based upon the past experience of the Department of State in exploring the possibility of arranging for bilateral agreements with Central American governments to provide assistance for defense against communist infiltration and subversion, it is not feasible for the US to sponsor at this time the establishment of arrangements necessary for the "patrol posts" through bilateral agreements.

9. At the 8th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS, member States collectively took recognition of the threat posed to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration. One of the actions taken to combat this threat was the establishment of a Special Consultative Committee on Security to study the threat and make recommendations on measures which should be taken to preserve the peace and security of the hemisphere. It is possible that this committee may develop a multi-lateral proposal for such action.

10. An early availability of an amphibious training and staging facility required in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements of the Atlantic Fleet as previously expressed\* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could assist in the performance of the functions envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in Haiti.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

11. It is recommended that:

a. The attached memorandum, Enclosure A, together with its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

\* Decision on JCS 570/547

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b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Establishment of "Patrol Posts"(U)

It is recommended that the attached memorandum, subject as above, be approved and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.

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## APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

## DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE

Subject: Establishment of "Patrol Posts" (U)

1. By memorandum to the DOD/JCS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962, the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested an examination of the possibility of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean manned by personnel from one or several countries. Particular attention was to be given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely US, in Haiti, so as to guard against any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba. For the purposes of this examination, "patrol posts" were assumed to be any agency or facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and infiltration surveillance system. Such an agency could be overt or covert in nature and could be purely US, bi-national or multi-national in nature.

2. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a meaningful military invasion against any Caribbean country, with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats. Surveillance of Cuban coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability of the US Atlantic Command. These forces, assisted by military forces of the country concerned, are capable of combatting successfully any invasion attempts by Cuba. In this respect, the US through the Ambassador in the Central American Countries, Colombia and Venezuela, has informed the Presidents of the respective countries orally that the US was prepared to establish, upon request of the local government, a system of air-sea surveillance to assist in seeking out, and interdicting within

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national jurisdiction of the requesting state, attempted landings of armed forces, agents or supplies by Castro-Communist elements and otherwise to assist local governments to identify and frustrate armed assistance to such subversive elements. This commitment was not afforded Haiti.

3. From a military point of view, the primary value of air-sea "patrol posts", would be in acquiring advance information of Cuban actions and indications of intentions. Due to the nature of the likely Cuban threat, i.e., infiltration and subversion supporting an indigenous revolutionary movement the value of surface "patrol posts" is questionable.

4. Based upon the past experience of the Department of State in exploring the possibility of arranging for bilateral agreements with Central American governments to provide assistance for defense against communist infiltration and subversion (aversion to entering into bilateral defense agreements with the US), it is not feasible for the US to sponsor at this time the establishment of "patrol posts" through bilateral agreements.

5. At the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, member States collectively took recognition of the threat posed to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration. One of the actions taken to combat this threat was the establishment of a Special Consultative Committee on Security to study the threat and make recommendations on measures which should be taken to preserve the peace and security of the hemisphere. It is possible that this committee may develop a multilateral proposal for such action.

6. By JCSM-5-62,\* dated 4 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated a requirement for an amphibious training and staging facility in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements of the Atlantic Fleet. In reply to the letter from the Deputy

\*On file in Joint Secretariat

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Appendix to  
Enclosure A



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Secretary of Defense, dated 6 March 1962, which transmitted the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Under Secretary of State stated on 20 March 1962 that:

"The establishment of military facilities in Haiti raises a number of basic questions with respect to our policy toward the present (Duvalier) regime, and requires most careful consideration."

The Department of State is currently conducting an analysis of our future policy in regard to the present government of Haiti. An early availability of a US facility in Haiti, however, could assist in the performance of the functions envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in Haiti.

7. During this critical period, maximum use will continue to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB, MAAGs, Missions, and Attaches) in cooperation, where possible, with Latin American military forces to perform the functions envisioned for the "patrol posts." For example, training operations at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol activity, and traffic between that base and US naval installations in Puerto Rico provide effective air-sea surveillance of eastern Cuba and the island of Hispaniola including Haiti.

8. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that no further action be taken in regard to the establishment of "patrol posts," *at this time.*

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## ENCLOSURE B

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the American States (OAS) at their eighth meeting\* took cognizance of the threats to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere as a result of communist infiltration. The Council of the OAS (COAS) was requested to "maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of the member states with regard thereto."

2. As directed by the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at their eighth meeting, the COAS has established a Special Consultative Committee of experts on security and has charged this committee with studying the threat to the hemisphere and recommending to the COAS measures which should be taken to maintain the peace and security. This Special Committee is to submit the initial report by 1 May 1962 and subsequent reports as available. General Thomas D. White, USAR/Retired, is a member selected from the United States.

3. On 10 May 1961, the Department of State by message\*\* to US Ambassadors of Central American countries explored the possibility of consummating bilateral and later multilateral agreements with various countries to defend against communist infiltration and subversion. Responses from addressees indicated most governments were not responsive to such arrangements and opposition could be expected. This

\* Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Doc. 68 (English) Rev., dated 21 Jan 62; on file in Joint Secretariat

\*\* Department of State message, Circular 1761, dated 10 May 61; on file in Joint Secretariat

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proposal was discarded and instead, the US Ambassadors to the Central American countries were requested by message\* on 2 November 1961, to inform the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of host countries orally that the US Government recognized the Caribbean countries as likely targets of communist subversion or attack and that it was prepared to establish, upon request of a local government, a system of air-sea surveillance to assist in seeking out, and interdicting within the national jurisdiction of the requesting state, attempted landings of armed forces, agents or supplies by Castro-Communist elements and otherwise to assist local governments to identify and frustrate armed assistance to such subversive elements. In respect to Haiti, the Department of State stated, "Serious question has been raised as to whether materiel and other kinds of assistance against indirect aggression in addition to that already being made available to the Haitian Government should be given in present circumstances, particularly because of the apparent aspiration of President Duvalier to perpetuate himself in office indefinitely."

4. On 15 May 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by memorandum\*\* to the Secretary of Defense stated, "While it is recognized that there may be overriding political considerations which dictate the negotiation of such bilateral and multilateral assistance agreements, they cannot be recommended from a military point of view."

\* Department of State message, Circular CA-388, dated 2 Nov 61; on file in Joint Secretariat  
\*\* Decision on JCS 1976/365

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ENCLOSURE C

## DISCUSSION

1. The communist threat to the Western Hemisphere through infiltration and subversion was recognized by the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at their 8th Meeting at Punta del Este and action was initiated to find means to combat it. The results of the COAS Special Committee should provide measures which could be taken on a collective basis to guard against and combat the threat.

2. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a meaningful attack against any Latin American country with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats.

3. Any invasion of a Caribbean country by Cuban forces would serve only to further unite the governments of Latin America and lead to collective OAS action under the terms of the Treaty of Non-Intervention. Further, a Cuban landing on the territory of another country could provide a valid justification for US military intervention in Cuba. Any attempt to export communism from Cuba would be most likely by infiltration and subversion and would take the form of an indigenous revolutionary movement, supported by arms from Cuba and perhaps Cuban volunteers, and would be made to appear as an uprising against the incumbent government.

4. Surveillance of Cuban coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability of US aircraft and/or ships assigned to the Atlantic Command. Also, US forces and facilities in the Caribbean are adequate to prevent any invasion of a Caribbean country by Cuban forces. From a military point of view, the primary value of "patrol posts" would be in acquiring advanced information of Cuba's actions and indications of intentions. The value of ground "patrol posts", even considering governmental agreements could be effected, is questionable in view of the nature of the threat from Cuba.

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5. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider there is little military justification for establishing multilateral forces for use in the Caribbean area, the political results of such an effort may have some value in gaining further recognition of the threat and in strengthening national ties between participating countries. Based upon the past indications from Central American governments in regard to the negotiation of bilateral assistance agreements, and the present relations between the US and Cuba, it does not appear feasible for the US to sponsor a "patrol post" concept in the Caribbean area at this time. Additionally any consideration of such a proposal must consider the possible effects on the treaty with Cuba for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base, if it is to be used as a "patrol post."

6. In specific regard to a ground "patrol post" in Haiti, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum\* to the Secretary of Defense, dated 4 January 1962, stated there was a requirement for an amphibious training and staging facility in Haiti and requested that the Department of State, subject to political assessment of the political considerations involved, make necessary governmental arrangements for the conduct of surveys and for subsequent arrangements on specific requirements that are developed. The Department of State has indicated a reluctance to negotiate with the present Government of Haiti until a thorough analysis is made with respect to US policy toward the present Duvalier regime. The early availability of this facility, however, would meet any requirement for a US "patrol post" in Haiti. In the meantime, training operations at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol activity, and traffic between that base and US naval installations in Puerto Rico provide effective air-sea surveillance of eastern Cuba and the island of Hispaniola including Haiti.

7. The most feasible course of action, likely to be acceptable to the countries concerned, to contend with Cuban infiltration and subversion of Caribbean countries lies in collective efforts of the OAS. Past indications from governments of Caribbean countries have been to the effect that collective OAS efforts and actions are defensible and rational, whereas unilateral and bilateral actions carry a connotation of imperialism or intervention. When the

\* Decision on JCS 570/547

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case, appropriate consideration of the recommendations for action, to be submitted by the Special Committee on Security of the COAS, should provide a basis to accomplish the objective.

8. During this interim period, maximum use should continue to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB, MAAG's, Missions, and Attaches) and the Latin American military forces to perform the functions envisioned for the "patrol posts."

9. Any actions to establish "patrol posts" as such in the Caribbean area would require appropriate "cover" to hide or obscure the real purpose. While several means are available, (civilian commercial interests, activities associated with the Atlantic Missile Range, etc.), the ostensible purpose would surely invoke strong reaction from the Cuban government and might jeopardize the over-all security of "Operation Mongoose."

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3 April 1962



Decision on

JCS 1969/327  
(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 27 March 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the assumptions which had been agreed to by the Special Group for Operation MONGOOSE.

*J. Blouin*  
F. J. BLOUIN  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Secretary

Copy for:  
~~General~~ General Craig

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH  
DATE 21 May 88

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UNCLASSIFIED 3 April 1962

Decision on

JCS 1969/327  
(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 27 March 1962 the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the subject paper.


*F. J. Blouin*  
F. J. BLOUIN  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Secretary

Copy for:  
General Craig

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DATE 21 May 84

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3 April 1962

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DECISION ON JCS 1969/327  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on  
NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 27 March 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted JCS 1969/327.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/327.

F. J. BLOVIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/327

29 March 1962

Page 2178

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
on  
NORTHWOODS (S)

A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

R. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/327

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GUIDELINES, OPERATION MONGOOSE

The Special Group (Augmented) agreed that planning and preparations would proceed on the basis of the following assumptions:

(extracted from Gen Lansdale's copy of the "Guidelines", dated 14 March 1962)

"a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the United States will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognize that final success will require decisive US military intervention.

"b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitate and support it".

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JCSM-272-62  
10 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external political, economic or psychological pressures. Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.
2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease

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the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required.

5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

One of the requirements which evolved from the JCS Meeting, 6 April, was to up-date JCS 2304/30. That document has been reviewed and up-dating appears infeasible for the following reasons:

a. JCS 2304/30 was written in April 1961 to expand forces involved in CINCLANT Plan 312-60, from two battle groups to a force level considered adequate to cope with the improved Cuban military capability. Force levels are increased from two battle groups to two divisions plus a third division in reserve. This plan was overtaken by CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61, which further increased the total forces required to the extent that the augmented plan 312-60 was superseded. The plan for Cuba in JCS 2304/30, therefore, is no longer valid; the plan should in fact be withdrawn.

b. Much of the related information included in JCS 2304/30 not strictly concerned with the military plan is reflected in the more current papers published in support of the Cuban Project (Operation Mongoose).



10 April 1962

1969/334

At their meeting on 10 April 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the subject papers which were tabled at the meeting. JCS 1969/334 was noted and used as a background paper by the Joint Chiefs in their discussion with the Secretary of Defense at their 1430 meeting this date.

This is an Extract from the JCS minutes of 10 April. (Original of the minutes is filed ~~in the JCS file~~  
*in Secretary JCS file.*)

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10 April 1962

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DECISION ON JCS 1969/334  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on  
NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 10 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the talking paper submitted by JCS 1969/334 and it was used by them as a background paper in the discussion at their 10 April 1962 meeting with the Secretary of Defense.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/334.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

F. J. BLOUIN  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Joint Secretariat

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9 April 1962

Page 2186

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
on  
NORTEWOODS (S)

A talking paper\* on the above subject is submitted for approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN,  
M. J. INGELIDO,  
Joint Secretariat

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9 April 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS for the SecDef Meeting,  
10 April 1962

Subject: US Intervention in Cuba

Background - At the meeting of the Special Group (augmented) on 5 Apr 62, General Taylor questioned the US course of action in the event Castro decided to execute about 100 of last April's invasion prisoners. Inconclusive discussion led General Taylor to ask, "Suppose Castro decided to shoot them all, what would we do then?" Mr. Johnson, for State, expressed the opinion that even this extreme would not provide sufficient justification for US military action. Mr. Gilpatric, for Defense, and Gen Parker for the JCS, indicated they felt both the DOD and the JCS would stand firm for military intervention.

- During the JCS meeting, 6 Apr 62, discussion of this subject developed two basic questions:

- a. Do the JCS believe the US should intervene?
- b. Does the US have the capability?

Discussion - Past considerations of the JCS have been reviewed for opinions or decisions related to General Taylor's first question. Two studies are appropriate; however, both studies were directly concerned with the current Cuba Project (Mongoose).

- a. JCS 1969/303, 8 Feb 62:

A significant conclusion of this study states that the JCS believe the overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime can be accomplished without precipitating general war and without serious effect on world public opinion, if, among other things, the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba.

- b. JCS 1969/313, 16 Mar 62:

This study repeated the above decision, but further, appended a list of circumstances which could be considered sufficient provocation for US military intervention in Cuba. One of the situations listed, which depended upon degree of seriousness, is stated:

"Execution of prisoners taken in the abortive attempt of April 1961."

- In addition to these related considerations of the JCS, additional factors which support US intervention in Cuba, if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:

- a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mongoose, already approved by the Special Group, indicate that military intervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime.
- b. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US.
- c. Justification for US intervention will probably be more convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.

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The US could, however, bolster the justification for intervention, if required to provide a stronger case for US military action.

d. Execution of significant numbers of prisoners would adversely affect the faith and resolution of refugee Cubans and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the Communist regime, if they feel that the US has ignored in apparent disinterest, the final chapter of last year's invasion attempt.

- With regard to the question concerning US capability to intervene in Cuba, implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 will assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government within 10 days after forces are committed; forces can be committed 18 days after the order is given. As recently as 3 Apr 62 CINCLANT (in response to a JCS query concerning the adequacy of forces in his OPLAN) has advised that contingencies which could complicate the campaign against Cuba have been recognized and considered acceptable hazards. CINCLANT states, "... it is my judgment that the forces in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 are adequate to gain essential control of Cuba within the estimated 10 days." CINCLANT qualifies this judgment to depend on the following:

"a. Intelligence available to this command concerning the current strength, capabilities, morale, and locations of Cuban military forces is essentially correct.

"b. The amphibious assault lift now available in LANTCOM and PACOM is, as an absolute minimum, maintained at no less than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.

"c. Certain of the 'on call' Army forces now listed in the plan are reclassified as reserve forces and put in motion in time to arrive in the objective area on or before D plus 10."

- While the fastest means of assuring completion of the total task in Cuba is OPLAN 314-61, the situation may require initial reaction by the US in less than 18 days. A calculated risk could be considered, providing ~~prearranged~~ commitment of US forces as rapidly as they and their transportation become available. This was proposed in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61, and, although not approved by the JCS, was returned to CINCLANT for rewrite. Representative reaction times, proposed in OPLAN 316-61 from a condition of no warning were:

2 ABN Divisions	- 5 days
4 Marine BLTs	- 7-8 days
Artillery and Armor	- 10-12 days
Follow-on Forces	- 15-18 days

- The fastest means of applying force against Cuba would be through the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF), although this would be an interim measure until surface forces could be deployed. This capability, now being prepared by CINCLANT as a new and separate plan, could be utilized for destruction of Cuban air power, reduction of ground forces (especially armor), and disruption of Cuban communications and utility systems. This plan to be operable in 6 hours in the strength desired by CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12 Air Force Squadrons in Florida.

- US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc diversionary tactics in other parts of the world (most probably in known trouble spots such as Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the

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Offshore Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would likely engender propaganda campaigns to include use of the UN forum for pressure against the US. However, an essential and most important element of the US plan against Cuba is speed. CINCLANT's OPLAN states, "Some 5 days subsequent to gaining control, conditions should permit withdrawal of assault forces, leaving small military units to conduct civil affairs and counter-guerrilla mop-up operations." Estimating from D-5 therefore, it should be expected that US forces committed to Cuba will be unavailable for other contingencies for only about 20 days, although the Marine Division Wing Team from the West Coast will be in poor position for immediate redeployment for some time longer.

Recommendations -

- a. SECDEF should be advised during the meeting of 10 Apr that execution of 100 or more Cuban prisoners should be exploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda campaign if necessary) by the US as justification for intervention.
- b. SECDEF should be advised that there is no question of US capability to intervene, and that the deliberate course of implementing such action within 18 days after decision is more prudent than the faster but riskier course of piecemeal force commitments.
- c. Inasmuch as the JCS have not addressed the question of US military intervention in Cuba except within the context of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable that military action be recommended to the SECDEF and/or the President as the only course which provides assurance that the Communist Cuban regime can be removed in the important time frame of the near future.

Opinion as to Recommendations:

DOD/JCS Representative \_\_\_\_\_ (Concur) (Nonconcur)  
Caribbean Survey Group \_\_\_\_\_

Director, Joint Staff \_\_\_\_\_ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Talking Paper prepared by: Colonel C. S. Seamans, USAF  
Contingency Plans Branch, J-5  
Extension 59057

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3 April 1962

Decision on

JCS 1969/328  
(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 30 March the Joint Chiefs  
of Staff approved the forwarding of a memorandum (CM-628-62)  
with attachment to the Secretary of Defense.

*F. J. Blouin*  
F. J. BLOUIN  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Secretary

Copy for:  
General Craig

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DATE *21 May 84*

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention  
in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON *21 May 64*  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

*L. L. Lemnitzer*  
L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 Enclosure

Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DECISION ON JCS 1969/321  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on  
NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 13 March 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 8 of JCS 1969/321.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/321.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. ENGELIDO


Joint Secretariat

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12 March 1962

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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9 March 1962

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE  
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT (TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested  
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
on this matter by 13 March 1962.

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JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested\* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed\*\* by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggested course of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

---

\* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

\*\* Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.



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as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months.

#### CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention  
in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request\* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

A2 { 3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen Craig's office

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DRAFT

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## MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention  
in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

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4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

- (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
- (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.
- (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
- (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).



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- (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
  - (6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
  - (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
- Some damage to installations.

- (8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
- (9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
- (10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- naphthalene.
- (11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

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The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

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stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

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ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated\* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated\*\* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

" - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

\* JCS 1969/303

\*\* JCS 1969/313



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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SH-240-62  
1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling  
Central Intelligence Agency, State  
Department and US Information Agency  
Requests for DOD Support in Connection  
with the Activities of the Caribbean  
Survey Group (CSG) (S)

The Department of Defense has been requested to be prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Services in handling such requests for support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
DATE 21 May 84  
BY [signature]  
ACTION CONTINUED

F. J. BLOVIN  
RAdm, USN  
Secretary

Enclosure:  
Subj as above

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CSGWC 0479



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SPECIAL HANDLING

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1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Procedures for DOD Support of the Operations  
of CIA, the State Department, and the USIA

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Gilpatric have  
approved the attached paper, which is forwarded for  
your information.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG  
Brig General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative  
Caribbean Survey Group

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
21 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

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EOD DIR 5800.10





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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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28 Feb 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DOD/JCS REPRESENTATIVE  
Caribbean Survey Group

Subject: Cuba Project

The attached procedures are approved for forwarding to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, as the DOD position with respect to support of the CIA, the State Department, and USIA activities connected with the Caribbean Survey Group.

*Russell G. Felt*

Enclosure:  
DOD Procedures

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON *21 May 84*  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

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ENCLOSURE

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PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE DEPARTMENT AND  
USIA REQUESTS FOR DOD SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACTIVITIES  
OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (CSG) (S)

1. When approved by the Secretary of Defense the DOD will support fully on a high priority basis requests for support received in writing from the CIA, the State Department, and the US Information Agency in connection with the activities of the CSG.

2. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency should submit requests for DOD support to the Secretary of Defense (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)). These requests should contain sufficient information of the overall plan or project to permit a determination of the equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission and should include a code word to indicate the requested assistance is in support of this project.

3. Upon receipt of such a request in writing the following procedures will apply:

a. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) will forward the request to the DOD/JCS Representative of the CSG.

b. The DOD/JCS Representative will consult with the Services and then secure the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He will then return the request with recommended action to the Secretary of Defense for decision. The Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be advised of the decision.

4. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency requests for DOD support involving significant numbers of military personnel, amounts of equipment, or equipment in short supply will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense prior to the furnishing of such assistance.

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Enclosure

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5. Military personnel and/or equipment requested by the CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency from the DOD will be retained under the control of the DOD when feasible and consistent with the accomplishment of the mission.

6. As determined by the Secretary of Defense DOD agencies will be reimbursed for support rendered CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in accordance with existing procedures. Otherwise, such support will be provided within the resources available to the DOD. Determination of reimbursement will not in any way delay the implementation of the support requested.

7. Advance security planning will be made a part of all projects that provide support to the CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency. This advance security planning will be in conformance with the provisions of DOD Directive 5200.1, dated 8 July 1957.

8. In the event the Services receive requests for support direct from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information Agency, which involve significant numbers of military personnel, amounts of military equipment, or equipment in short supply, they will inform the DOD/JCS Representative of such requests.

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7 February 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/303

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 22 May 64  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 13 of the subject paper, as amended by changing the second paragraph of Enclosure A so as to read: ,

"2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the attached proposal be adopted as the official DOD position and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project."

It was also agreed that General Craig should convey to the Deputy Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs' position that General Craig should be the JCS Representative as well as the DOD Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group. It was further agreed that, in regard to clearances for NORTHWOODS, the access list would be extended to include the four Service Intelligence Chiefs, the Deputy Commander of TAC, the Deputy Commander of CONARC, and the Commander of the 18th Airborne Corps. ADM - WELLINGS SAYS THIS WASH/ INCLUDE/

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

General Craig ✓

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of 1 pages series



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~~SECRET~~

7 February 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/303

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved BGEN Craig's recommendations as set forth in paragraph 13 of the subject paper, as amended by changes in the second paragraph of Enclosure A.

*22 May 84*

*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

General Craig

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1 March 1962

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES  
to the  
HOLDERS OF JCS 1969/311  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on  
NORTHWOODS (S)

Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised Decision On and to destroy the superseded Decision On in accordance with security regulations.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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2nd N/H of JCS 1969/311

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JCS 1969/311

20 February 1962

Page 2152

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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\* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

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DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.

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JCS 1969/311

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 1969/311

A Note by the Secretaries  
on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 22 May 64  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

1. At their meeting on 20 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 1 of JCS 1969/311 as amended by changes in paragraphs 1, 3b, 4 and 6 of Appendix 1 to Enclosure C.
2. At their meeting on 23 February 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsidered JCS 1969/311 and approved the recommendations in paragraph 1, amended as indicated above, and as further amended by changes to paragraph 2 and subparagraph 3b of Appendix 1 to Enclosure C.
3. The memorandum in Enclosure C was forwarded as JCSM-158-62, dated 28 February 1962, to the Secretary of Defense. The memorandum in Enclosure B was forwarded to: Chief of Staff, US Army by SM-240-62; Chief of Naval Operations by SM-241-62; Chief of Staff, US Air Force by SM-242-62; and Commandant of the Marine Corps by SM-243-62. All SM's were dated 1 March 1962.
4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
5. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/311.

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DATE OF REVIEW 12/8/87

NOTE: THIS PAPER IS NOT COMPLETE  
WITH MISSING CHARTS

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PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE DEPARTMENT,  
USIA REQUESTS FOR DOD SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACTIVITIES  
OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (CSG) (S)

1. When approved by the Secretary of Defense the DOD will support fully on a high priority basis requests for support received in writing from the CIA, the State Department, and the US Information Agency in connection with the activities of the CSG.
2. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency should submit requests for DOD support to the Secretary of Defense (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)). These requests should contain sufficient information of the overall plan or project to permit a determination of the equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission and should include a code word to indicate the requested assistance is in support of this project.
3. Upon receipt of such a request in writing the following procedures will apply:
  - a. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) will forward the request to the DOD/JCS Representative of the CSG.
  - b. The DOD/JCS Representative will consult with the Services and then secure the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He will then return the request with recommended action to the Secretary of Defense for decision. The Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be advised of the decision.
4. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency requests for DOD support involving significant numbers of military personnel, amounts of equipment, or equipment in short supply will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense prior to the furnishing of such assistance.

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5. Military personnel and/or equipment requested by the CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency from the DOD will be retained under the control of the DOD when feasible and consistent with the accomplishment of the mission.

6. As determined by the Secretary of Defense DOD agencies will be reimbursed for support rendered CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in accordance with existing procedures. Otherwise, such support will be provided within the resources available to the DOD. Determination of reimbursement will not in any way delay the implementation of the support requested.

7. Advance security planning will be made a part of all projects that provide support to the CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency. This advance security planning will be in conformance with the provisions of DOD Directive 5200.1, dated 8 July 1957.

8. In the event the Services receive requests for support direct from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information Agency, which involve significant numbers of military personnel, amounts of military equipment, or equipment in short supply, they will inform the DOD/JCS Representative of such requests.

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2

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 20 & 23 Feb 62)



ENCLOSURE B

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Director, United States Information Agency

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling  
Requests for DOD Support in Connection with  
the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group

1. Reference is made to the activities of the Caribbean Survey Group (CSG).

2. Requests for DOD support in connection with the activities of the CSG should be submitted in writing to the Secretary of Defense (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)). In order to facilitate and expedite the furnishing of such support, each request should contain sufficient information of the overall plan or project to permit a determination of the personnel and/or equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission and an agreed code word to indicate that the requested assistance is in support of this project.

3. In regard to the funding of the operations, it is desired that, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, DOD agencies be reimbursed for support rendered in accordance with existing procedures. Determination of reimbursement will not in any way delay the implementation of the support requested. In the event agreement cannot be reached quickly on the funding, I propose that the funding problem be resolved at a later date.

4. I trust that the above meets with your approval and that you will inform me accordingly.

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SPECIAL HANDLING

REPORT BY THE DOD/JCS REPRESENTATIVE OF  
THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

UNCLASSIFIED

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE  
DEPARTMENT AND US INFORMATION AGENCY REQUESTS FOR  
DOD SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACTIVITIES  
OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (S)

1. The DOD/JCS Representative of the Caribbean Survey Group recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- a. Note the contents of Enclosure A and Enclosure B.
- b. Approve and forward Enclosure C, with Appendices, to the Secretary of Defense.
- c. After approval of the proposed procedures (Appendix 1 to Enclosure C) by the Secretary of Defense, transmit Enclosure D to the Chief of Staff, US Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff, US Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

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Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff -  
20 February 1962

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ENCLOSURE A

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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Procedure to be Followed in Handling Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and US Information Agency Requests for DOD Support in Connection with the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group

1. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense recommends procedures to be followed for DOD support of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department and US Information Agency (USIA) in connection with the activities of the Caribbean Survey Group. Past experience indicates the need for such procedures.

2. The recommended procedures are based upon the results of a conference held with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 30 January 1962 by the DOD/JCS Representative on the CSG.

3. The procedures recommended to the Secretary of Defense will afford full DOD support to the operations of the CIA, the State Department and USIA in connection with the activities of the CSG. At the same time, from the over-all point of view of the US Government, it will protect the best interests of the DOD.

4. The procedures provide for the submission in writing of requests for DOD support by the CIA, the State Department and USIA to the Secretary of Defense, who will in turn refer the requests to the DOD/JCS Representative on the CSG for evaluation. The DOD/JCS Representative will secure the comments and recommendations of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then forward the request with recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for decision.

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WILLIAM H. CRAIG  
Brig General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative  
Caribbean Survey Group

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Enclosure A

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ENCLOSURE B

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and his Reaction to Original Proposed Policy for CIA Support by the Department of Defense of Caribbean Survey Group (30 January 1962)

Mr. Gilpatric did not like this paper at all. He indicated the paper was too negative and restricted as though a policy towards an enemy like we are dealing with the Germans or Italians, not a fellow Department of our Government. This is a red line operation with the blessing of the President and approved by him as a most important task. This is probably the most important mission we have in the government today. When a request comes in from CIA, you (Craig) will evaluate it and request the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their evaluation and recommendations. The Secretary of Defense will determine, after considering the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what the decision will be, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This decision is the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense.

We do not want to get involved in a case-by-case basis. We do not want individual actions on each case. We do not want masses of individual actions. This is a red line priority problem and must be handled with dispatch and without getting involved in minutia regarding expenses and reimbursement or other details. Department of Defense may have to do it themselves regardless who foots the bill. In some cases, CIA will be required to reimburse if so determined by the Secretary of Defense. This is a matter which must be decided by the Secretary of Defense - not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense budgets for some CIA support. We have equipment of some types lying around not being used and should not require reimbursement for this type, as a general rule. This must be decided by the Secretary of Defense after considering an evaluation by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Enclosure B

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There are some assets we can get along without and should make these types available to the CIA without necessarily being reimbursed for it. Mr. Gilpatric does not object to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending to the Secretary of Defense what equipment should be used for accomplishment of stated mission and specific projects. I explained to Mr. Gilpatric that we were not trying to obstruct the operation, that we read our message loud and clear. I showed him Mr. Bob Kennedy's instructions concerning which he stated: "I can't add anything to that."

I discussed my meeting with Mr. McNamara of last Saturday with Mr. Gilpatric. He indicated that Mr. McNamara had been preoccupied on the Hill and had not known of latest developments on this project, that he would inform him in regard to Mr. McNamara's apprehensions as expressed to me last Saturday concerning security, numbers in the Department of Defense who knew of the project, etc. Mr. Gilpatric said I could inform the people necessary regarding the project in order to get the job done. This was up to my judgment. Mr. Gilpatric made it clear that I was the DOD Representative and he wanted me to make recommendations concerning requests for CIA support.

I emphasized the urgent requirement that the Services and Chiefs should determine the proper personnel and equipment to be used for specific tasks since they were better qualified as to capability and limitation of their equipment and personnel than the CIA.

In summary, Mr. Gilpatric recognized the need for the establishment of a policy on this subject. He was most emphatic that the decision as to whether or not a request was approved was the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense NOT the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the Secretary of Defense would like to have evaluations and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of



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Staff available for consideration in making important decisions on the subject. He considered the approach used in our original recommendations much too negative and directed me to adopt a more positive approach in a new proposal.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG  
Brig. General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative,  
Caribbean Survey Group

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~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

5

Enclosure B

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TOP SECRET



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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling CIA, State Department, and USIA Requests for DOD Support in Connection with the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group.

1. Reference is made to the memorandum for Brigadier General William H. Craig, USA, from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, subject: "Special Projects", dated 17 January 1962.

2. The referenced memorandum states:

"b. Department of Defense must be prepared to assist fully Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State in \* \* \* operations as Defense commitments of men, money, and materials are required."

and invited formal recommendations concerning the Defense role and contributions.

3. Enclosure 1 recommends procedures for DOD support of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the US Information Agency in connection with the activities of the Caribbean Survey Group (CSG).

4. Enclosure 2 is a draft of a recommended memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Director, Central Intelligence, and the US Information Agency setting forth procedures governing DOD support of the operations of the CSG.

5. Issuance of the recommended memoranda should assure that the procedures governing DOD support of the operations of the CSG are followed.

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ENCLOSURE D

DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Chief of Staff, US Air Force  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and US Information Agency Requests for DOD Support in Connection with the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group (CSG)

The Department of Defense has been requested to be prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, and the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Services in handling such requests for support.

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Enclosure D.

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8 February 1962

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DECISION ON JCS 1969/303  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 13 of JCS 1969/303 as amended by changes in the second paragraph of Enclosure A.
2. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/303.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 22 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

F. J. BLOVIN  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/303

7 February 1962

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report\* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP TO THE CHAIRMAN,  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBAN PROJECT

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## POSITION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CUBA PROJECT

### THE PROBLEM

1. As requested by the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project\* to determine a firm US position regarding the stake and role of the Department of Defense in the event US assistance is requested in support of Cuban insurgent efforts to overthrow the Castro government.

### ASSUMPTIONS

2. National Security Policy concerning overthrow of the Castro regime is as agreed at the 9 May 1961 meeting of the National Security Council.\*\*

3. The situation in Cuba will be as reflected in current National Intelligence Estimates.\*\*\*

4. Operations against the Castro government will be covert in the initial stages.

5. Time favors the Castro government.

### FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

6. At the 5 May 1961 meeting\*\* of the National Security Council it was agreed that US policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro. Other significant elements of policy determined at that meeting were:

a. The United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba at that time but should do nothing to foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.

b. The United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba.

\* Memorandum from Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for Brigadier General W. H. Craig, USA, subject: "Special Project" dated 17 Jan 1962, not on file in Joint Secretariat

\*\* Enclosure to JCS 2304/36

\*\*\* SNIE 85-61, dated 28 Nov 61, also NIE 85-62 to be published 7 Feb 1962, both documents will be available through Joint Secretariat

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c. The direction of the President that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba, was noted.

7. For additional facts, see Enclosure B.

#### DISCUSSION

8. For discussion, see Enclosure C.

#### CONCLUSIONS

9. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere;

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America;

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability;

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(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

10. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

11. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than Cuba is recognized, it is believed that the project objective can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following four conditions prevail:

a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

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b. If it is announced prior to the overt military action that the United States and/or other members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Block's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US interventions. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

12. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA and State, or through these agencies, to any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

13. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum at Enclosure A hereto, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba

1. Pursuant to the objectives of the Caribbean Survey Group, the Department of Defense was requested\* to construct a firm position with respect to the Department's stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the attached proposal be adopted as the official DOD position and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

\*Memorandum from BrigGeneral E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for BrigGeneral W.H. Craig, USA, subject: "Special Project", dated 17 Jan 1962; not on file in Joint Secretariat

As amended by JCS at meeting on 7 February 1962

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APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,  
Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

Subject: Cuba Project

Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for  
BrigGen W. H. Craig, USA, subj:  
"Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62

1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors:

a. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during the meeting of 9 May 1961.

b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba.

c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert, at least initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

2. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

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Appendix 1 to  
Enclosure A

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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

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a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The over-all plan\* for the overthrow of the Castro government is responsive to the following objective:

"The US objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace."

2. It is becoming increasingly evident that the Castro regime, aided materially, morally and financially by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, has become firmly entrenched. Over the past two and one-half years, the Castro regime has gradually built up a police state on the Sino-Soviet model. The first step was the immediate replacement of the existing Cuban Army and police force by revolutionary units which had fought with Castro during the revolution in the hills and in the underground. Changes in the Navy and Air Force were accomplished through purges of top personnel. Toward the end of 1959 as disillusionment and opposition over the drift toward closer association with the Sino-Soviet Bloc began to crystalize within the regular armed forces, the regime again shifted its basis of power, this time to the newly-formed civilian worker-peasant-student militia. Dr. Castro looked upon this militia as a presumably more reliable military force. For almost a year the militia maintained its status as a para-military organization under labor union and student federation leadership. On 29 September 1960, Castro reorganized the militia along military lines and the chief of the corresponding military district took over command of the militia units. Specifically trained officers replaced the original militia commanders and military training was accelerated.

\* Program Review by Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, subject: "The Cuba Project", dated 18 Jan 1962; not on file in the Joint Secretariat.

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3. Simultaneously, the Castro regime was also building its security network\*. In June 1961, the process culminated with the establishment of a Ministry of Interior with responsibility for maintaining "public order". The decree centralizes the various police and investigation units under the new ministry. It also gave the Ministry authority to supervise the activities of "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution". These committees are responsible for informing authorities of "counter-revolutionary" activities or attitudes. A campaign is under way to establish 100,000 of such committees with 50,000 "volunteer" members in offices, factories, schools, churches, cooperatives, residential areas, etc. By centralizing the police function and combining it with a vast network of informers, the Castro regime has established a security system on the Communist Bloc model.

4. In support of this military and security build-up, Castro forces have been equipped with arms and materiel from the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, i.e., Czechoslovakia and Russia. Information indicates the Cuban force is well equipped with modern weapons and that there is in Cuba an actual surplus of military equipment for the force in being. Some accounts indicate that certain materiel is rather sophisticated, and includes EW radar, fire control systems, advanced fighters, short and possibly medium range rockets. It becomes obvious that the Castro forces are being trained and equipped for operations far beyond that required to maintain law and order and internal security. This represents a continuous threat to the Western Hemisphere, and is a Communist stronghold for the

\* Department of State White Paper, subject: "The Castro Regime in Cuba", recently published but undated; not on file in Joint Secretariat

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continued spread of Communism to other countries of the inter-American System.

5. In response to a request\* by the President in April 1961 the Defense Department has already planned for the overthrow of the Castro government by use of military force. In the event formal, overt commitment of US forces in Cuba should become necessary there are now two US military plans\*\* in being one of which could be implemented. Both plans provide for the deployment of sizeable US forces and are designed, among other things, toward the over-throw of the Castro-government as rapidly as possible.

a. CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61,\*\* approved\*\*\* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides for a simultaneous amphibious and airborne assault within 18 days after the execution order, assuming no prior alert or prepositioning of forces. After the initial assault it is estimated that overthrow of the Castro government and the gain of essential control of Cuba would be assured in 10 days.

b. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61,\*\* designed for a faster commitment of US forces, provides for an airborne assault within 5 days of the execution order. However, since this plan deploys fewer forces initially, no estimate is made concerning the length of time required for overthrow of the government or control of Cuba. This latter plan, not yet approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in process of minor revision by CINCLANT.

\* JCS 2304/29

\*\* CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan 314-61 (Cuba), and CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan 316-61 (Cuba), both plans on file in Joint Secretariat

\*\*\* JCS 2018/306

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ENCLOSURE C

DISCUSSION

1. Although it is possible that a Cuban counter-revolutionary leader could emerge with sufficient appeal to enable the anti-Castro elements to unite in an attempt to seize power, such eventuality does not seem likely unless fostered and supported by the United States. To date, exiled Cubans have failed to produce such a leader.\* Even the loss of Castro by assassination or by natural causes, while unsettling on the government, would almost certainly not prove fatal to the regime.\*\* It is therefore expected that no Cuban leader or insurgent group can independently undertake a significant subversion effort against the government with any reasonable chance of success.

2. Even a cursory look at Castro's military preparations to defend Cuba indicates that a purely overt attempt to overthrow the Castro government can only be accomplished by a well conceived military plan in significant force, requiring military intervention by the United States.

3. As long as Cuba does not become a member and an accepted military partner of the Warsaw Pact the threat of general war as a result of US military intervention in Cuba does not appear to exist.

4. It is expected that the Castro government will avoid giving the United States sufficient provocation for armed intervention. For this reason Cuban forces are not expected to be committed to an attack on the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Neither is it

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\* J-2 DM-400-61, "After the Assassination of Castro 'What?'" dated 27 October 1961; on file in J-2

\*\* SNIE 85-61, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba", dated 28 Nov 61; on file in Joint Secretariat

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expected that Castro will allow a definite relationship to become known or apparent between his government and communist attempts at infiltration and subversion of other Latin American states.

5. It is postulated therefore, that to progress in following the established national policy of aiming at the downfall of Castro, it will be necessary for the United States to support a selected Cuban insurgent attempt from the outset and to be prepared to sustain such insurgent program to a successful conclusion, including overt military intervention as the final and decisive step.

6. It is clear that the United States cannot afford repetition of the unfortunate miscalculation of the political aspirations of Fidel Castro in the desire to see an end to the Batista regime. It would appear that a significant lesson of this costly mistake is the requirement for emphasis and improvement in US intelligence efforts to evaluate the true colors of potentially capable personalities and groups which eventually may have to be recognized and supported by the United States in future counter-revolutionary undertakings.

7. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base in Cuba would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the US will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

8. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

9. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

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a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or other members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

10. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA, or through these agencies, to any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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DATE : 04/22/63  
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SUBJECTS : CUBA

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## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: JCS  
Date: 22 APR 63 (starting)  
Subject: CUBA  
Original Level of Classification: TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE  
Third Agency Equities: CIA - Army - Air - Navy  
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Pages 1082 - 1094, Incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 2304/184 - 9123/3100 (9 Jul 63)

A Report by the J-5

on

COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE I) (U)

References: a. JCS 1969/217 h. JCS 2304/158  
b. JCS 1969/382 i. JCS 2304/162  
c. JCS 2018/634 j. JCS 2304/168  
d. JCS 2031/51 k. JCS 2304/171  
e. JCS 2304/134 l. JCS 2304/176  
f. JCS 2304/150 m. JCS 2428/44  
g. JCS 2304/153 n. JCS 2428/90

1. At their meeting on 6 May 1963, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 10 of JCS 2304/184.

2. This Decision (pages 1082 and 1082a) replaces page 1082. Holders are requested to substitute the additional attached revised pages 1084 to 1088, incl., and revised pages 23, 26, 27, and 34 of Enclosure C, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

3. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with its Appendix, was forwarded as JCSM-358-63, dated 10 May 1963, to the Secretary of Defense. Copies of Enclosure C, together with its Appendices,

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were forwarded by JCSM-360-63, dated 10 May 1963, to the Secretary of Army for his use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the DOD for Policy toward Cuba. Copies of this paper are being forwarded to CINCARIB, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

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JCS 2304/184

1082a

(Page added by Decision On - 10 May 1963)

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COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE I) (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a request\* from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide comment and recommendation concerning US courses of action which might be taken in the event of a spontaneous revolt in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has requested\* that a study be made covering what the United States should do in the case of a spontaneous revolt in Cuba without US incitement beyond the present level of US effort. Also, the study should contain recommendations for actions to be conveyed to the Secretary of Defense.

3. For additional facts bearing on the problem, see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

4. For discussion, see Enclosure C.

CONCLUSIONS

5. As a matter of policy the United States should:  
a. Support, not ignore, a spontaneous revolt in Cuba.  
b. Be prepared to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum that would be caused in Cuba by the downfall of the Castro communist regime.

6. The best military response to a spontaneous revolt in Cuba would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 except that, under certain conditions, a rapid incremental introduction of US forces might be considered.

\* (1) Enclosure to JCS 2304/158  
(2) Enclosure to JCS 2304/176

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7. Present arrangements do not provide for adequate and timely CIA intelligence; or for adequate in-country assets for UW operations.

8. Under present conditions, any covert or overt attempt to sustain an uprising using Cubans alone, whether on a small or large scale, is impractical and would be unsuccessful if attempted.

9. All-Cuban military units should not be created unless their employment is planned for a specific date as part of a larger operation. The formation, and maintenance in being, of such units against the contingency of spontaneous revolt is not justified.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded on a "Special Handling Required - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis, to the Secretary of Defense.

b. Enclosure C, together with its Appendices, be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the DOD for Policy toward Cuba.

c. Copies of this paper be forwarded to CINCARIB, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer: Colonel D. C. Pollock, J-5, Western Hemisphere Branch, Ext. 77556

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ENCLOSURE A



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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JCSM-358-63  
10 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that although a widespread effective revolt in Cuba is unlikely at this time, potential sources of a spontaneous uprising do exist. They have considered the alternatives open to the United States and have examined our capabilities to provide support in such an event.
2. Assuming that such a revolt were truly spontaneous, i.e., that it occurred without a considerable degree of US incitement and collaboration, we would be hampered greatly in providing effective support to the revolt prior to open US operations. In-country assets are inadequate, either to produce reliable information as to the quality of the revolution and its leaders or to support the revolt with unconventional warfare (UW) activities. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hesitates to introduce additional assets until a decision is made as to whether - and approximately when - covert paramilitary operations are to take place, because of the difficulty of keeping such assets informed of intelligence desired and of preventing their capture.
3. Therefore, time would be required to introduce additional in-country assets in support of a spontaneous uprising. Such a delay might be unacceptable, since the spontaneous revolt probably would be short-lived, and the United States might be unable to remain ostensibly inactive. The best US military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312-316. These plans are so constructed as to permit a high degree of flexibility and selectivity in the amount of force applied. The possible effects of their implementation on the revolutionaries are recognized. It might prove desirable initially to execute portions of OPLAN 312, including its UW provisions, and then attempt to evaluate the results before further expanding operations.

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Special handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

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Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental commitment of US forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

a. The uprising gives promise of success if US aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the United States.

c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piecemeal implementation of GINGLANT OPLAN 316-63.

e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk.

4. Cuban volunteers would be used in these military operations but only as individuals in US units. There is no current program which provides for developing all-Cuban military units, nor should they be created unless their employment is planned for a specific date as part of a larger operation. The formation and maintenance in being of such units against the contingency of spontaneous revolt are not justified.

5. In addition to the problems of timing, amount of force to be applied, and the use of Cuban expatriates, we could be faced with a direct confrontation with Soviet troops. Plans for the rapid application of US military forces, therefore, must consider the neutralization or elimination of the Soviet forces in Cuba, and the attendant possibility of greatly increasing world tensions.

6. Further US planning is incomplete for post-assault operations in which we would have to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum which would be caused by the downfall of the Castro-communist regime. A concentrated effort is required to devise an acceptable successor regime.

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7. To improve the US capability to support revolt in Cuba, actions are being taken now by the US Army to improve logistic preparedness by prestocking supplies to support UW in Cuba. Additional measures have been carefully examined, but rejected as being of unjustified cost or risk. Contingency plans will be refined as intelligence and other factors permit.

8. There are also actions which require attention outside of the Department of Defense:

a. CIA in-country assets for collecting intelligence and supporting UW in Cuba should be augmented as feasible.

b. The Department of State should:

(1) Develop plans for a post-hostilities government in Cuba, in coordination with DOD. These plans should encompass operations in support of military government and the successor interim government in Cuba.

(2) Initiate action to coalesce the many Cuban factions in opposition to Castro.

(3) Devise a policy assigning to Cuban-exiled activist groups an appropriate role in both a revolt and its aftermath, within the framework of the CIA and CINCLANT plans.

(4) Initiate action now to mold public opinion concerning both the revolt and a successor government, and to provide policy guidance for the conduct of US psychological operations, to include objectives and themes.

9. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the United States should be prepared to support any spontaneous revolt in Cuba showing a reasonable promise of success. It is recommended that a memorandum, substantially the same as that in the Appendix hereto, be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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## APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: US Courses of Action in Case of a  
Spontaneous Revolt in Cuba (S)

1. The following is provided for guidance in your capacity  
as Executive Agent for the Department of Defense for Policy  
toward Cuba.
2. The Department of Defense has studied carefully the  
problem of measured US responses to various contingencies  
which could arise in Cuba which the United States could  
exploit. One contingency of some validity is a spontaneous  
revolt within Cuba.
3. The United States should improve its capability to  
support a revolution in Cuba. Assuming that a revolt occurred  
in the near future, it appears that the United States would  
lack adequate assets in Cuba either to produce the required  
intelligence, or to conduct the necessary unconventional  
warfare (UW) activities prior to any desired overt US  
operations. It also appears that plans currently are incomplete  
to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum that would  
be caused in Cuba by the downfall of the Castro regime.
4. Therefore, renewed consideration should be given the  
following:
  - a. CIA in-country assets for collecting intelligence  
and supporting UW in Cuba should be augmented as feasible.
  - b. The Department of State should:
    - (1) Develop plans for post-hostilities government  
in Cuba, in coordination with DOD. These plans should  
encompass operations in support of military government  
and the successor interim government in Cuba.

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- (2) Initiate action to coalesce the many Cuban factions in opposition to Castro. 1  
2
- (3) Devise a policy assigning to Cuban-exiled activist groups an appropriate role in both a revolt and its aftermath, within the framework of the CIA and CINGLANT plans. 3  
4  
5  
6
- (4) Initiate action now to mold public opinion concerning both the revolt and a successor government, and to provide policy guidance for the conduct of US psychological operations to include objectives and themes. 7  
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## ENCLOSURE B

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The following are excerpts from public statements by the President:

a. "If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, ... if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. ... We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere." (13 September 1962 Press Conference)

b. "I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana. ... I can assure you that it is the strongest wish of the people of this country, as well as the people of this Hemisphere, that Cuba shall one day be free again, and when it is, this Brigade will deserve to march at the head of the free column." (Remarks at presentation of the flag of the 2506th Cuban Invasion Brigade Orange Bowl, Miami, Florida, 29 December 1962.)

c. "As you know, our pledge (of no invasion) was balanced off by some assurances of Khrushchev. I think the November press conference indicates our opposition to Castro. It is the policy of the United States to work for a change in the Communist regime in Cuba. It is not our intention, under present conditions, to invade Cuba, obviously, or to begin a war against Cuba, providing Cuba lives in peace with its neighbors, or providing Cuba does not engage in aggressive acts. ... We are opposed to Communist control of Cuba, to

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the intimate association of the Soviet Union, and we hope for a change . . . So I think that all we can set down now is a general attitude of the United States towards Castro, which I think we have indicated, our opposition to Castro, and also an indication of our willingness to support any free choice that the Cuban people may make following Castro, to hold out a hope to the people in Cuba, in and out of the government, that the United States would be sympathetic to a change within Cuba. We can't, it seems to me, under present conditions, go further than that." (Press Background Briefing, Paul Home, Palm Beach, Florida, 31 December 1962.)

2. The following is an excerpt from public statement by the Secretary of Defense:

"QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what is the policy of the Administration in the event Soviet forces in Cuba should be used to put down an uprising by the Cuba people?"

"SECRETARY McNAMARA: I think that this Administration indicated before that we will not accept operations in this Hemisphere, combat operations, by Soviet military personnel." (Press conference, The Pentagon, 28 February 1963).

3. The following is an excerpt from a speech made by Mr. Khrushchev:

"Soviet armed forces would rout out the imperialists if they attacked the island. The President of the United States pledged himself not to attack Cuba and we agreed to withdraw strategic missiles and IL-28 bombers from Cuba and did withdraw them. But this does not mean that we have abandoned Cuba to the big sharks of American imperialism. We gave the Cuban people our word, the word of a brother, that the Soviet Union would come to Cuba's assistance and we

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shall not leave her in the hour of need . . . . Certain wild men in the United States are attempting to push the US Government into a Cuban invasion on the claim that the United States cannot tolerate a different minded neighbor. But what kind of logic is this? . . . . If the United States undertook aggressive actions against Cuba and the Soviet Union . . . . chaos would develop which would inevitably lead to war." However, he completely ignored the subject of Soviet troops in Cuba. (Khrushchev's Electoral Speech of 27 February 1963 in Moscow.)

4. A request\* from CINCLANT for an increase in the manning level for the conduct of unconventional warfare - counter-insurgency (UW-CI) functions is now under active consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. In a reply\*\* to a request\*\*\* from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCLANT has submitted comments on certain aspects of courses of action related to a revolt in Cuba.

6. CINCLANT has submitted\*\*\*\* an outline plan which will provide for the rapid introduction into Cuba of US forces to support an uprising.

7. NSAM 57# and NSAM 162## set forth the responsibility for paramilitary operations.

8. NSAM 213### established an interdepartmental organization for Cuban affairs. The interdepartmental coordinating committee, "The Cottrell Committee", has considered#### possible contingencies concerning Cuba and plans to meet these contingencies.

\* Attachment to JCS 2428/44  
✓ CINCLANT msg to JCS, DTG 262310Z Feb 63; on file in Joint Secretariat  
✓ JCS msg to CINCLANT, JCS 8725, DTG 210000Z Feb 63;  
\*\*\*\* Enclosure to JCS 2018/634  
# Enclosure to JCS 1969/217  
## Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 1969/382  
### Enclosure to JCS 2304/134  
#### JCS 2304/150

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9. Concerning Cuba, the USUN message\* to State, No. 1581 dated 31 October 1962, stated in part: "MCCLOY HAD ONE HOUR MTG WITH KUZNETSOV TODAY . . . KUZNETSOV OBSERVED ALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS WERE IN CUBAN HANDS. MCCLOY SAID WE HAD THOUGHT SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WERE IN SOVIET HANDS. KUZNETSOV REPEATED ALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS WERE IN CUBAN HANDS . . ."

\* USUN telegram to Secretary of State, No. 1581, 11 p.m., 31 October 1962; on file in Joint Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE C  
(39 pages)

Consisting of the Enclosure - 18 Pages  
Appendix A - 3 Pages  
Appendix B - 2 Pages  
Appendix C - 4 Pages  
Appendix D - 5 Pages  
Annex - 3 Pages  
Appendix E - 3 Pages  
Appendix F - 1 Page

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## ENCLOSURE

## DISCUSSION

1. This report is in response to a request from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make a comprehensive study of the courses of action which might be taken if a spontaneous revolt occurred in Cuba. It includes consideration of pertinent comments received from CINCLANT.

2. A summary of this study is included in paragraphs 16 to 23.

## INTRODUCTION

3. Definition of a Revolt. For the purpose of this study, a revolt is considered to be an overt uprising in Cuba characterized by open defiance and armed resistance with the objective of supplanting the Castro communist regime.

4. Basic Assumptions. Throughout the study it will be assumed that:

a. Overt military conflict between the United States and its allies with the Sino-Soviet Bloc has not yet begun.

b. Sino-Soviet support continues to strengthen the Castro communist regime through contribution of moral, political, economic, and military assistance.

c. US policy and objectives are the supplanting of the Castro communist regime and the elimination of the threat to US security posed by the Soviet military presence in Cuba and a Cuban regime hostile to the United States.

d. US incitement of anti-Castro activities remains at the present level of US effort.

5. Intelligence Appraisal. The US intelligence community indicates it is considered not likely that a spontaneous, widespread, effective revolt will occur in the near future. For an analysis of the capabilities of enemy forces and anti-Castro activities, see Appendix A (Appraisal of the Enemy) and Appendix B (Appraisal of Anti-Castro Revolutionary Activity).



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6. Possible Forms and Circumstances of a Spontaneous Revolt.

There are several situations which are potential sources of a spontaneous uprising.

a. For some time there have been shortages of consumer goods which have resulted in strict rationing. Such shortages are expected to continue. If the rationing becomes too severe, or widespread favoritism is disclosed, spontaneous but scattered uprisings might occur and spread rapidly. Considerable public support probably could be generated for such a cause. However, the revolt probably would suffer from a lack of coordinated leadership, unless the United States intervenes in a timely and adequate manner, and probably could be quelled by the internal security forces.

b. The small resistance elements presently operating in various parts of the island are potential sources of revolt.

(1) A single point insurrection could occur with anti-Castro elements seizing a town such as Cienfuegos, or a mountain redoubt. (See Appendix F.)

(2) Because of geographical configuration of the island, together with its central highway system, the most likely places in Cuba where revolutionary groups could hold out against concerted attack by forces available to Castro for at least a week are the four mountain ranges - Escambray in Las Villas Province, the Organos Range in Pinar del Rio Province, the Sierra Maestra in Oriente Province, and the mountain range stretching from Mayari Arriba in Oriente Province to the southwest along the coast and east to the coastal city of Barocoa. These mountains offer good cover and concealment. However, extensive guerrilla operations could be impeded because of Castro's new "vertical envelopment" capability using helicopters and paratroopers. If guerrilla groups limited their actions and concentrated on survival by concealing themselves until aided

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by substantial forces, they could last a longer period of time. It would be advantageous, in this case, for groups to be infiltrated clandestinely as feasible, in order to conceal the scope of their presence. However, it is emphasized that vulnerability to detection and destruction by Castro's internal security forces increases in proportion to the size of revolutionary guerrilla forces.

(3) Although Castro originally gained power from a guerrilla beginning, the present situation in Cuba is vastly different from the waning days of the Batista regime. The Cuban internal security forces are much larger, better organized, and possess considerably more mobility than in the past. Organization and supply of large resistance groups probably would be quickly detected by the regime.

c. A third potential source of revolution could be a power struggle between the "old" Communists and the "new" Communists for control of Cuba. However, at the present time, relations between these two groups do not appear to be overly strained. Moreover, US assistance to either side certainly would not be welcome, nor would US support to either side accomplish US objectives.

d. There is a slight possibility of a palace revolution by disaffected 26th of July elements against Castro elements in Havana and provincial capitals. These would be hard-to-identify antagonists fighting at close quarters. The leadership of the Cuban military establishment almost certainly remains loyal to the Castro brothers. However, except for several elite military units especially selected from the most fanatic of the Young Communist League members, significantly large numbers of military personnel might be expected to defect if it became absolutely clear to them that the United States was leading an unequivocal military operation,

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with the aim of overthrowing the Communist government. Large-scale defections would probably not take place until there was tangible evidence of a US military presence in Cuba.

e. An uprising could be sparked by an insurrectionary attack against the Soviet troops or by a move by the Soviet troops to support hard-line communists in any one of the foregoing situations.

In any spontaneous uprising in Cuba, it is almost certain that its leaders, supported by important sectors of Latin American opinion, will request US assistance. The United States, because of recent public statements by national leaders, will be subjected to political and moral pressures, both international and domestic, to intervene.

#### COURSES OF ACTION

7. Major Courses of Action. If a revolt should happen spontaneously, the United States would be faced with four major and obvious options: to ignore the revolt, to discourage it, to encourage it, or actively to support it.

#### 8. To Ignore the Revolt

a. Ignoring a genuine revolt underway in Cuba would cause great damage to the international position and prestige of the United States. It would be inconsistent with the many official US public statements. It would injure Cuban morale seriously causing them to become more resigned to their fate. It could occasion almost irreparable harm by shattering the image of the United States as a leader and champion of freedom, not only in the Western Hemisphere, but throughout the rest of the Free World as well. Possibly some anti-communist forces elsewhere would lose courage and would curtail their operations.



b. In the past, Castro's forces promptly have suppressed the slightest indications of popular unrest. In several instances, anti-regime plots have been unearthed long before they matured. It would appear that efforts to launch a revolt would have little chance of success without help or control from external sources.

c. Historically, the Russians have always exploited successes to the maximum. A lack of a firm US stand might encourage the Russians to participate directly in the suppression of an uprising, even though not needed by Castro's forces, as an object lesson to future target countries of communism in the American continents. Moreover, the image of a United States not too concerned about a revolt, and apparently co-existing with communism in Cuba, could tempt the Soviets to gamble on the undertaking of an open expansion of their subversive operations in other parts of Latin America.

d. On the other hand, non-interference in a Cuban rebellion would avoid disruption of any then current negotiations between the United States and the communists. It would preclude world criticism that the United States deliberately tried to precipitate another crisis that could lead to general war.

e. Failure to exploit any opportunity to rid the Western Hemisphere of a communist state would be contrary to the best interest of the United States.

9. To Discourage the Revolt

a. Since the alleged withdrawal of some of the Soviet troops, which began in February 1963, appears largely to have been completed, it is not considered expedient to



discourage any potential revolt because of possible interference with US-Soviet negotiations. As a matter of fact, there are sufficient Soviet troops in Cuba to cause them to be a subject of discussion for some time to come. Otherwise, however, attempting to discourage a revolt would be difficult to do and would have most of the same unfortunate effects as ignoring it. A possible benefit that the United States could obtain by discouraging a revolt openly, before or after it got started, would be that of a doubtful and transient propaganda nature in the forums of the OAS and the UN. This would disturb the current Cuban regime but little.

b. If it is to be the policy of the United States not to support any revolt, then measures should be taken now to discourage such action before it gets started. This should be done as quietly and discreetly as possible, to preclude total discouragement of Cubans, both within Cuba and in exile, who desire to liberate their country. It should be done indirectly so that the United States could maintain a flexibility for future actions as well as keep the opposition guessing as to the true US intentions. Active and passive measures of resistance should be kept in low key, to avoid increasing pressure to such an unbearable extent that Castro and the communists in Cuba would inflict severe reprisals. Such reprisals would not only destroy valuable human and material assets for future operations but might trigger off a revolt that would have disastrous consequences if the United States did not intend to intervene.



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10. To encourage but not support a non-US initiated revolt

The United States could respond by giving verbal approval and moral encouragement but not otherwise supporting the revolt.

a. To encourage the revolt without actively supporting it, the State Department could focus attention upon the situation in Cuba by stimulating various international commissions and forums to consider the violation of human rights by the Castro regime. It could instruct Country Teams in the Western Hemisphere to stimulate expressions of sympathy for the revolt from as many sectors as possible in the host country. It also could issue Departmental statements as appropriate, emphasizing the struggle of the dissidents against overwhelming odds and publicly warn the Soviets to keep out of the situation.

b. Should a widespread anti-Castro movement not materialize, the United States Government could seek to derive as much political and propaganda advantage as possible from the forcible suppression of the revolt by the Castro regime. It is considered that this course of action would have the same unfortunate results as either ignoring or discouraging the revolt.

11. To support a non-US initiated revolt

a. It is unlikely that a major uprising will occur all at once and without notice. Most likely it would evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert, and military preparations to include activating the JMWTF.

b. However, rumors or reports that anti-Castro forces within Cuba plan to launch an all-out attack against the regime could represent an attempt by Castro to trap his opponents. He has used these tactics before with considerable success. As a result, the United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a genuine rebellion is imminent before its actual outbreak.

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c. Clandestine intelligence collection in Cuba is currently extremely slow and limited. The United States Government is unlikely, therefore, to be able to arrive at an early reliable appraisal of any revolt until it already has achieved considerable success or has failed - unless there had been communications links established with the resistance forces.

d. The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt would be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations, and other actions necessary. The appearance of non-US involvement should be maintained in the event the revolt fails. As a first step, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would seek to verify the validity of the revolt by making initial contact with the dissidents. It would also begin to infiltrate its externally held assets. Selected Cuban nationals, forming teams of Cubans with specialized training, would be useful to the CIA early in their operations. See Appendix C (Training of Cuban Nationals) and Appendix D (Paramilitary Operations).

e. Ordinarily the introduction of unconventional warfare forces would follow CIA assets, contingent upon the establishment of the genuineness of the uprising. This would be the initial input of uniformed US personnel into Cuba. The consequences of their capture in the event of a military reverse could be politically embarrassing for the United States. Therefore, before the introduction is made of any such personnel, a firm political decision should be made to commit the United States to a full-scale invasion, if necessary. The paramilitary forces would bolster the revolution and conduct guerrilla warfare. They would furnish by air drops and/or submarine arms, ammunition, food, medicine, and other logistical support to Cuban rebel



groups that had been actively designated by the in-country assets. They would initiate a suitable propaganda campaign, and equip Cuban volunteers.

f. Large scale undetected (clandestine) infiltration of supplies would be extremely difficult because of Cuban/Soviet defense capabilities. Overt introduction of UW forces could be accomplished, but strong Cuban/Soviet defenses and counter-insurgency forces would have to be avoided or overcome. The movement of UW forces from a normal posture would take eight days if submarine lift were required. For a discussion of covert support of uprisings and paramilitary responses, see Appendix D (Paramilitary Operations).

g. As soon as the situation warrants after a Presidential decision to support a spontaneous revolt in Cuba, the United States Government should request a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, under Article 39 of the Organization of American States (OAS) charter, "to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States." This meeting would recommend measures commensurate with the nature of the situation, and in the event of Soviet intervention while in session, could rapidly adjourn and be reconvened as Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty.

h. Following the establishment of US military control of the island, the United States must be prepared to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum created by the downfall of the Castro communist rule of Cuba. In this regard, the development and recognition of a Cuban political organization is desirable. The United States should initiate action now, prior to any revolt, to organize and coalesce the many Cuban factions. The potential leaders most likely to gain the widest Cuban support, and best suited to US interest, should be identified and encouraged to assume active leadership roles, thus providing a nucleus for a government that can be established quickly on Cuban soil.



i. A spontaneous revolt in Cuba, properly exploited, would afford the United States, with or without OAS support, the pretext to intervene in Cuban affairs. This, in turn, could lead to supplanting the Castro communist government with one whose methods and aims are more nearly compatible with those of the United States. A successful revolt would offer the opportunity to eliminate a major political and psychological lodgment and potential military base that international communism has effected in the Western Hemisphere. It would terminate Cuba's role as a direct transit link between the Bloc and Latin America. An increasingly serious threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere would have been removed.

j. On the other hand, intervention could pose some major difficulties. It could result in a direct confrontation of US forces with Soviet forces in Cuba. (See paragraph 12.) The Soviets could respond with action elsewhere around the world if the United States supported a revolt in Cuba. It is possible that some Latin American countries might react unfavorably, at least initially, to US intervention. However, the unfortunate results of not actively supporting an uprising appear to outweigh this disadvantage. (See paragraphs 8, 9, and 10.)

k. In light of the foregoing, it is believed that, as a matter of policy, the United States should support actively a spontaneous revolt in Cuba.



## SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

12. The Soviets

a. Implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 could result in a direct confrontation of US Forces with the Soviet ground forces now present in Cuba in significant strength. These plans provide that if Sino-Soviet Bloc personnel in the course of military operations constitute a threat to the security of US Forces by aiding or abetting the enemy, the Bloc personnel may be apprehended. As in any such direct confrontation with Soviet forces, there is a risk of escalation.

b. Nevertheless, the US response, as stated above, must be a rapid application of military force. Because of the possibility of a confrontation with Soviet forces, plans being developed to implement this course of action should consider elimination or neutralization of the Soviet threat in Cuba by political action, unconventional warfare activities, or by conventional military operations.

(1) Political. A firm and continuing political pressure should be maintained to remove all Soviet troops from Cuba as soon as possible. The large numbers of skilled Soviet troops and technicians, not to mention those also present from other Bloc nations, provide a professional training base that daily continues to develop competent Castro military forces. The Soviet personnel provide a means of indoctrination of the large mass of Cuban people in communist doctrine. By their presence, the Soviets could strengthen the will and the ability of Castro's forces to resist any US military action or defeat an internal uprising.



(2) Unconventional Warfare (UW). Prior to or in conjunction with US military operations, or as a substitute for conventional attacks against them, the Soviet threat could be reduced significantly or rendered ineffective by covert and/or overt UW operations against Russian personnel and equipment in their camps or weapons systems sites. Personnel could be incapacitated for combat through the use of non-lethal CB munitions. Equipment could be rendered useless through sabotage. The foregoing would be particularly effective in a contrived revolt where time would permit more thorough planning and organization.

(3) Military. The air plan directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff could well be the difference between the success or failure of any popular uprising. In conjunction with the air strikes, the following actions could be considered:

(a) First, a reasonable time before the execution of the air plan (long enough for rapid decision by the Kremlin), it would be announced publicly that the United States intended to attack only the troops and installations of the Cuban regime, and, that according to the Soviets themselves, all Cuban anti-aircraft weapons were in Cuban hands.\* It would not attack the Soviet personnel or camps, provided they remained passive. Any hostile action would result in a US attack on that particular camp, installation, or the offending concentration of personnel. Consideration could be given to identifying the known Soviet installations that will not be fired on unless they attack US Forces. This course of action has the

\* USUN telegram to State, No. 1581, 11 P.M., 31 October 1962



major disadvantage of alerting the Castro/Soviet forces. It eliminates the possibility of a surprise attack. It would allow the enemy to prepare for the attack and the Soviets to employ political or military countermeasures.

(b) A second alternative is to conduct the planned air strikes first and then afterwards announce a "stand-fast, no fire, mark position" policy.

(c) A third alternative could be used in combination with either of the two. In conjunction with the public announcement that the US intentions were to attack only hostile Cubans, the announcement would declare Havana an open city, establishing corridors of safety by which personnel in the open, travelling by day, could move to designated safe havens without fear of US attack. The United States, in possession of air superiority, would guarantee safe conduct under the Rules of War. This would allow friendly Cubans and non-Cubans to disengage from military operations. The Soviets could move their technicians, advisors, and other personnel, without losing face. A likely major disadvantage to this third course of action would be that the safe conduct could be abused and the United States would be unable to enforce its pledge of a guaranteed safe conduct. There is some Soviet-Cuban antagonism at present and the Castro forces as well as the revolutionaries could engage the Soviets in the safe corridors. It is possible that the Castro/Soviet forces could use the safe conduct and safe haven for their own hostile operations against the United States. Another critical point of the third alternative would be the Soviet reactions to their



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casualties and damage, imagined or actually suffered, in the initial strikes, whether or not they accept the proposition of safe conduct and safe haven. In any event the United States would have grounds on which to justify its actions in the world community or international forums as the necessity arose. This is also true in declaring Havana an open city. To keep Castro communist forces busy and diverted, the Cuban population would be incited to conduct demonstrations, strikes, riot, and street fighting until after the United States has seized control of the rest of the island. Cubans in the revolutionary movement could move in and take over the control of the city at the appropriate time.

(d) A fourth alternative would be to attack the Soviet troop concentrations and installations with non-lethal CB munitions, while executing the planned air strikes against the Cubans.

(e) Surprise air strikes against Cuban targets, with prior neutralization of Soviet concentrations and installations by political or UW operations, would be the appropriate action. Following the initial air strikes, Havana could be declared an open city. Any hostile action by Soviet troops in Cuba would bring immediate implementation of prepared OPLANS.

13. Training of Selected Cuban Nationals. It is considered expedient to identify US action in Cuba as closely as possible with the aspirations of the Cuban people, and to exploit the military potential of the Cuban exiles in the United States.

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Enclosure

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The United States should use the Cuban expatriates in covert support of a Cuban revolt. It would seem particularly desirable in overt operations to employ militarily trained Cuban nationals integrated with US units. For details, see Appendix C hereto --(Training of Cuban Nationals).

14. Capabilities of US Forces. A summary of the capabilities of US Forces to support anti-Castro revolutionary activity is contained in Appendix E hereto (Capabilities of US Forces to Give Military Support to Anti-Castro Revolutionary Activities). It may well be desirable to execute selected portions of OPLAN 312 and then see what the results were before expanding other operations. In this regard, CINCLANT has submitted, at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a plan which would introduce US troops into Cuba in piecemeal fashion. In so doing, he cautioned that any planning done in this matter will be without basis for execution until the deficiencies in intelligence collection (see paragraph 15) are rectified.

15. Internal Intelligence

a. The clandestine intelligence process involving Cuba is extremely slow and limited. According to CINCLANT, accurate, detailed, and continually updated intelligence of the general attitude and morale of the Cuban military and civilian populace is lacking. Such intelligence is necessary to plan and conduct unconventional warfare. Specific information is needed concerning what individuals and groups are opposed to the regime, to what degree, for what reasons, and with what degree of effectiveness. The identity and location of individuals and groups who are



actively opposing the regime must be available. In order to make full use of present resistance groups and prevent formation of communist guerrilla movement against any US invasion, continuing and accurate intelligence of the Cuban national situation is needed. CINCLANT states that he does not have the resources to obtain and produce this intelligence and is dependent upon the national intelligence community. It is noted that at present the CIA is not working on Cuba in this respect as the Department of Defense has not given the CIA a time phase for operations. The agency does not desire to develop assets before they are needed or to keep them on a stand-by status for an indefinite period.

b. CINCLANT has stated further that since actions required to obtain current intelligence on which to base military or paramilitary operations are a function of the CIA, that agency should immediately introduce into Cuba those assets which can produce this intelligence on a country-wide basis.

#### SUMMARY

16. This study examined four alternatives open to the United States with respect to a spontaneous Cuban revolution: (1) to ignore, (2) to discourage, (3) to encourage, and (4) to actively support a spontaneous revolt. Special consideration was given to the presence of Soviet troops, the role of Cuban expatriates, US military capabilities, and internal intelligence.

17. Study of the four broad courses of US action in the event of an unexpected Cuban revolution leads to the conclusions that:

a. Widespread effective revolt is not likely at this time.



- b. Potential sources of spontaneous uprising exist.
- c. Favorably situated revolutionists could survive up to a week without external aid.

d. The US could support such revolt; its best response would be orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312-63 and 316-63, modified as required.

18. Soviet Military. The presence of Soviet ground forces in Cuba increases the pressure on the United States to intervene if Soviet personnel are used to suppress a spontaneous revolt, and could draw the United States into direct confrontation with the Soviets in the event of US intervention. Accordingly, the United States must plan their neutralization or elimination.

19. Cuban Nationals. Best use of selected Cuban nationals by the military services would be to use them as individuals to accompany US forces. Some could be used as covert agents.

20. Intelligence. The United States now lacks adequate assets in Cuba to produce intelligence or to conduct unconventional warfare. CINCLANT's UW resources are inadequate to augment or replace CIA assets.

21. US Capabilities. The precise conditions that would attend a substantial uprising against Castro cannot be foreseen. It might prove undesirable, under some circumstances, to apply the full force and power envisioned in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316. An enhanced US capability providing for the rapid incremental introduction of US forces is under study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, as CINCLANT has pointed out, any planning done in this matter will be without basis for execution, until the intelligence collection deficiency is rectified. Enhancement of logistic readiness for UW is also under study.



22. Planning. Plans should be completed prior to any revolt to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum that would be caused in Cuba by the downfall of the Castro communist regime. Action should be initiated now to organize and coalesce the many Cuban factions and to provide policy guidance for conduct of psychological operations to include objectives and themes.

23. Major Conclusions.

a. The United States Government should exploit a revolution in Cuba.

b. Assuming that such a revolt were truly spontaneous; i.e., that it occurred without a considerable degree of US incitement and collaboration, we would be hampered greatly in providing effective support of the revolt prior to open US operations, due to lack of in-country assets to produce reliable information as to the quality of the revolution and its leaders, or to support the revolt with unconventional warfare activities.



## APPENDIX A

## APPRAISAL OF THE ENEMY

1. At the time of the Bay of Pigs incident in April 1961, the island was defended by an untrained, poorly equipped Cuban Army. No significant Soviet forces were present and an integrated air defense system did not exist.

2. In contrast, today Cuba is defended by a relatively well-trained Cuban Army and by a significant Soviet force equipped with weapons with a nuclear potential and modern tanks. An integrated Soviet/Cuban-manned air defense system now exists. There is also a strong civilian control organization with a significant counterinsurgency capability.

3. The enemy forces are composed of the Cuban Ground, Navy and Air Force forces and, more than likely, the Soviet forces in Cuba.

a. The Cuban Ground Forces include a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000 and a militia of 100,000. The Cuban Navy has a strength of 4,000-5,000 personnel. The Cuban Air Force has about 3,000. The Army's ready reserves are capable of quick mobilization. The Cuban Navy and Air Force have no reserves.

b. There are sufficient arms and ammunition in Cuba to satisfy the foreseeable needs of the Cuban Armed Forces. Although Cuban supply procedures are not especially efficient, there are enough supplies on hand to cope with any internally generated resistance. Fuel supplies on hand would last about three months, if conserved by a strict rationing program. Sufficient transportation is available to move combat forces to meet most anticipated resistance threats. The some 60 HOUND helicopters in the Cuban Air Force inventory furnish a significant capability for moving troops quickly into relatively inaccessible areas; and the approximately 108 MIG aircraft have an air/ground attack capability.



4. In view of the foregoing, it is believed that the capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces are as follows. Although the home-guard militia units have no significant combat capability, the Cuban Ground Forces probably are well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. In the event of a large-scale US military invasion, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be able or likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type. The battalion combat team is the basic tactical unit. The Cuban Air Force has the capability to carry out air-to-ground strikes against guerrilla forces and also has the ability to transport troops quickly to areas of insurrection.

5. Currently it is estimated that strength of the Soviet forces in Cuba is about 17,000. There are military personnel from other Bloc countries present also, in unknown numbers. There is no information available upon which an appraisal of Soviet reactions to a Cuban revolt can be made. However, it is believed the Soviets would support to the fullest extent any movement which would preserve or improve Moscow's position in Cuba. In most situations, the Soviets probably would delay intervening in order to allow the Castro regime time to suppress the revolt with its own forces. However, if the regime appeared to be in danger of collapsing, the Soviets probably would intervene in order to preserve the communist stake in Cuba and the Western Hemisphere.

6. At present, the regime's security and military forces evidently are maintaining a high degree of vigilance, which may be attributed at least partially to the recent increase in activity by anti-Castro dissidents. It is possible that the Cuban and Soviet forces will make increased use of measures to thwart US photo reconnaissance in Cuba. About twenty percent



of the island population actively supports the Castro regime. Most of the Cuban people remain apathetic to Castro. The Cuban military establishment continues seemingly loyal to Castro and yet there are no indications of any significant disaffections. In general, Castro's internal security apparatus continues to improve. The Castro communists have leadership, military experience in guerrilla warfare, emergency mobilization and counter-insurgency operations, and an adequate supply of arms and ammunition to bring against their enemies.

#### 7. Political Prisoners

a. The political prisoners convicted of the most serious crimes against the state are mainly confined in a maximum security prison on the Isle of Pines. This installation and other political prisons are reportedly slated for demolition with prepositioned explosives, should an invasion take place. Freeing the prisoners on the Isle of Pines would not be of significant benefit, because they still would have to reach the main island to become of subversive use. In addition, these prisoners would possess little intelligence information because of their isolation from Cuban life. All Bay of Pigs prisoners were released by the Cuban Government and they now live in exile in the United States.

b. American Prisoners. Recent private negotiations were successful in obtaining the release of a group of US citizens from Cuban jails. However, others could be seized and confined in the future. If negotiations to release them were unsuccessful, US military action against Cuba could result in reprisals against these prisoners.

8. Negotiations. Concerning the release of American prisoners and withdrawal of Soviet troops, it should be borne in mind that negotiations on those matters could be prolonged over a period of time. Again, even if any Americans in prison were released, others could be seized at will and confined. Sufficient Soviet troops are present in Cuba to cause them to be a subject of discussion for some time to come.



## APPENDIX B

## APPRAISAL OF ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY

1. Among the approximately 160,000 Cuban exiles in the United States, there are seven principal anti-communist organizations, with a total of about 5,000 members, with an additional 6,000 members in Cuba.\* There are at least 50 secondary organizations and over 300 minor anti-communist groups in the United States and Cuba. Some small groups are already organized and trained in guerrilla warfare. Within Cuba, anti-communist groups are mostly inactive, due to lack of communications and lack of opportunity to rise up because of the very efficient police state supported country wide by the 300-000 Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Most of the Cuban people, although apathetic toward Castro, are also unlikely to support any resistance movement until its changes of success virtually are guaranteed.

2. There remains the possibility that increasing political and economic tensions within the island might result in an uprising among the more impatient and volatile of the Cubans. Despite the boasts of the Castro regime extolling the virtues of the revolution, the standard of living has declined. Shortages of consumer goods continue to plague the regime. A growing political disenchantment with the Castro regime has been manifested in a wide-spread incidence of worker apathy, absenteeism and lack of cooperation, and in an advent of passive resistance. Castro's most urgent problem, in the form of aggravated popular unrest, will arise if any

\* Principal organizations:

30 November Revolutionary Movement (NRTN)  
Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR)  
Revolutionary Unity (UR)  
Student's Revolutionary Directorate (DRE)  
Revolutionary Democratic Rescue (RDR)  
Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP)  
Christian Democratic Movement (MRC)

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substantial cuts are made in the volume of food-stuffs  
delivered to Cuba.

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Appendix B

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APPENDIX C

TRAINING OF CUBAN NATIONALS

1. Current Policy. The present policy of the United States is to train Cuban nationals as individuals capable of serving in an emergency as members of the armed forces of the United States. On 8 February 1963, the Secretary of Defense approved military training for the members of the 2506th Cuban Brigade on a similar basis.

2. Current Program. The military departments have been conducting a training program for Cuban expatriates for the past several months. There were in training as of February 1963, approximately 2,600 Cuban nationals, all of whom were volunteers. This program:

a. Is being conducted within current manpower and funding ceilings.

b. Will cost approximately \$8,000,000 when completed.

c. Qualifies the trainee only in basic military skills. Each Cuban in the program may volunteer for additional specialized training, such as parachute qualification, and/or elect to remain on active duty. If he chooses active duty, he will be assigned to duty with US units in accordance with his military occupational specialty. No purely Cuban units will be formed.

d. Is more likely to produce volunteers for specialized training than any other. At present, the indications are that the majority of trainees will elect to revert to the inactive reserve at the earliest possible date.

e. Has not proved to be popular among Cuban exiles in general. Relatively small numbers have shown interest in the program.

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3. Use of Cubans from Present Program. Cuban nationals trained under this program could be called to active duty in an emergency and integrated with US units. Their usefulness will be limited. Besides using their basic military skills, they could serve as interpreters, but the utility of some would be limited by their command of English. They could serve as guides, providing they were employed in a familiar area. They could be used for liaison contacts with the populace. In this liaison role, the effectiveness of some would be limited by their command of English, and their acceptability to the populace. Possessing only rudimentary military training, however, these individuals cannot be integrated satisfactorily with special units without considerable additional training. Further, each trainee constitutes a distinct security risk, which may preclude some of them from receiving classified types of additional training.

4. Organization of Cuban Conventional Units. With Cuban nationals who have satisfactorily completed basic military training in the US Armed Forces Reserve, the United States could organize a small all-Cuban conventional force, probably no larger than a brigade. Primary difficulties to be overcome would be these.

a. Security risks involved in bringing together Cubans as a group. Undoubtedly Castro's agents could penetrate the unit, or, at least, Castro agents among the exile groups will be well informed concerning the formation of the unit or its state of training.



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b. Time required to bring the unit to an acceptable level of training would be from two to five months, depending upon the individual training of the officers and men at the time the unit is formed.

5. UW Usage. There appears to be no reason why Cubans could not be selected for formation into small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be used in this role, provided approximately one year were available for their training, and careful screening is possible. The CIA could train such teams for joint use.

6. Large Scale Employment of Cuban Units. Ground forces required for the invasion of Cuba, per current US plans, approximate a five division force (250,000 men). Even if Cuban nationals were available in such numbers, the equipping and training of such forces would take at least two years, would require a major revision of US defense policy, and would entail grave political risks, not the least of which would be added incentive for increased Soviet military presence in Cuba. (See Appendix D -- (Paramilitary Operations)) Overt training of smaller forces will entail similar risks -- the larger the force, the greater the risks. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63 provides for use of a "Cuban Expeditionary Force"; but the creation of such a force in anticipation of a spontaneous revolt is a risk which cannot be justified, and should not be undertaken.

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7. DOD Use of Cubans in Support of Revolt. In a letter to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 March 1963, CINCLANT pointed out that the Cuban expatriates' "greatest potential is related to those military roles for which the Army has responsibility," and urged training them for UW. Although having Cuban nationals available for deployment in a UW role would enhance, to some degree, the capability of supporting an uprising, grave political and security risks overshadow this limited capability. Furthermore, the present requirement to include Cuban volunteers within the personnel ceiling of the US Army makes any substantial program unattractive. For the present, no US Army program is pointed toward Cuban participation in UW; Cubans will participate in military operations only as individuals in US units.

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## APPENDIX D

## PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS\*

1. General

a. Paramilitary forces\*\* are forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resemble them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. A paramilitary operation\*\* is an operation undertaken by a paramilitary force. A covert operation,\*\* in part, is one planned and executed so as to conceal the identity of the sponsor. A clandestine operation\*\* is one in which the operation itself is concealed. A CIA asset is a number of people (one or more) recruited, trained, and readied for a specific task in a potential or actual enemy area. Possible tasks include collection of intelligence (CIA intelligence asset), acting as an escape and evasion contact point or giving escape assistance (CIA E&E Asset), conduct of sabotage and subversion (CIA S and S Asset), and multipurpose assets, capable of one or more of the foregoing tasks. Army Special Forces are uniformed overt forces capable of infiltrating enemy or potential enemy territory by airdrop or by other means. Their primary function is the organization and control of indigenous guerrilla forces.

b. None of the foregoing forces is paramilitary in the strict sense. CIA assets are covert. Special Forces are overt. The combination of CIA assets and unconventional warfare forces\*\* constitutes a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force. A trained force formed of Cuban exiles would be paramilitary. If it were trained and equipped by the United States, with the identity of the United States concealed or denied, it would be a US covert force of paramilitary character. This meaning of covert paramilitary force will be used throughout the remainder of the Appendix and Annex.

\* Includes unconventional warfare operations

\*\* JCS Pub 1



2. Responsibility for Paramilitary Force Operations

a. With regard to the division of responsibilities between the Department of Defense and the CIA for covert paramilitary operations, NSAM 57 stated:

"Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned to the CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed Services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role."

b. NSAM 162 restated the above paragraph, and further directed that the Department of Defense increase its capability to fund, support, and conduct wholly or partially covert paramilitary operations under the criteria of NSAM 57.

c. Under the foregoing criteria, covert paramilitary support of certain contingency operations, as now planned for by CINCLANT, lies with CIA. The procedure followed for providing such support is for CINCLANT to prepare contingency plans. Each plan contains a list of CIA assets required by CINCLANT. These lists are forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and recommendation and are in turn forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for determination as to which requirements can be met. The DCI then informs the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCLANT which assets can be provided by CIA. During the recent Cuban crisis, CIA was prevented from infiltrating CIA assets into Cuba by a US political decision. To date, CIA assets in Cuba are meager, greatly restricted in movement and are incapable of furnishing all of the information required by CINCLANT. The DCI hesitates to attempt to



introduce additional assets until definite plans are made for covert paramilitary operations because of the difficulty of keeping such assets informed of intelligence desired and of preventing their capture. The assets now in place are capable of producing required information for use with strictly conventional operations (OPLANS 312/316), but are inadequate for support of covert military operations. CINCLANT, on the other hand, feels that he cannot make proper and complete plans for the latter operations until additional assets are in place and have produced the required intelligence. Therefore, a decision is required as to whether - and approximately when - such operations are to take place before the plans can be made for such operations.

d. It is probable that the total of CIA assets, trained covert paramilitary forces, and equipment required for covert paramilitary support of an uprising, would be beyond the capabilities of the DCI to provide. NSAM 57 would then have to be invoked, and the complete responsibility for the operation assigned to DOD. By agreement between the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, the CIA force assigned to CINCLANT for planning purposes would be activated, and would then actively support CINCLANT.

### 3. Conduct of UW Operations.

a. A paramilitary response could be made as part of UW operations, either preceding or in conjunction with conventional operations, using OPLANS 312/316 or as a separate and distinct covert paramilitary operation. With proper intelligence, the paramilitary responses which could be used in the first category are envisioned as follows:

(1) Infiltration of CIA Intelligence Assets, and Subversion and Sabotage Assets, for use with guerrillas into selected areas, followed by limited UW activities using



additional CIA assets and Army Special Forces detachments in order to bolster the revolution and conduct guerrilla warfare.

(2) Furnishing by airdrops and/or submarines arms, ammunitions, food, medicine, and other logistical support to Cuban rebel groups, accurately designated by in-country assets.

(3) Initiating a suitable propaganda campaign.

(4) Equipping Cuban refugee volunteers.

b. US military UW forces now trained and required by CINCLANT for paramilitary response consist of eight "A" and two "B" Army Special Forces detachments, one Navy SEAL Detachment, and their air or submarine transportation. These forces now require eight days for infiltration by submarine. Air infiltration could commence in 72 hours from a no alert status. These forces have the capability of controlling 1500 guerrillas per "A" Detachment. CINCLANT states he is not capable of arriving at a more accurate requirement until adequate intelligence is available.

c. The foregoing responses contain provisions for use of overt uniformed Special Forces troops. The danger of committing such troops to liability to capture would have to be considered.

d. The Cuban/Soviet defenses and counterinsurgency capability presently in Cuba are such that a successful uprising without US overt support is impractical. The numbers of Cuban exile forces required would approximate the force requirements contained in current US plans. Forces in the size of two to five divisions are not available from free Cuban sources. An operation of this magnitude, using Cuban forces alone, is too costly and unrealistic to warrant further consideration. Even if the Cuban air defense system were neutralized, the Cuban/Soviet capability would render unsuccessful any attempt to sustain an uprising by free Cuban forces alone.



4. Improvement of Unconventional Warfare capability could encompass the following actions:

a. JUWTFM could be activated with a full time commander, Wartime Headquarters allowance, and with UW forces required by CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63, Annex Y assigned.

b. CINCLANT could be directed to complete CINCLANT Outline Plan for Support of Uprising in Cuba.

c. Immediate steps could be taken by the Director of Central Intelligence to procure and maintain stocks of equipment required for UW operations. (See Annex.)

d. Director Central Intelligence could be requested to accelerate positioning of CIA assets required by CINCLANT.

e. A joint intelligence center could be activated under JUWTFM to maintain a continuing evaluation of all intelligence matters related to planned UW actions.

f. Appropriate training exercises could be conducted by CINCLANT with UW forces in order to reach and maintain capability for carrying out mission.



## ANNEX TO APPENDIX D

## STOCKS OF EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR A UW OPERATION

1. Organic equipment is now available for all Special Forces assigned to JUWTEA. Army Special Forces and their equipment are located at Fort Bragg, N.C. Navy Special Forces and their equipment are located at Norfolk, Virginia. Air Force Special Forces and their equipment are located at Eglin Field, Florida.

2. A 72 hour readiness posture would require the movement of certain Special Forces to Forward Operating Bases at Opalocka, Florida, and Key West, Florida. The exact amount of personnel and equipment to be moved and maintained cannot be determined until completion of CINCLANT Outline Plan for Support of Uprising in Cuba.

3. Stocks of arms and equipment for delivery to guerrillas are procured from CIA in 1,000 man packs. These packs provide non-attributable arms of various kinds up to and including portable mortars, communication equipment, and ammunition and food for approximately three days. Packs must be prepared specially for airdrop. Preparation requires about 24 hours. CIA has the capability to deliver to the Armed Services one 1,000 man pack immediately and an additional 1,000 man pack each 24 hours. Packs when prepared for airdrop contain mixtures of food, arms and ammunition and have a limited shelf life. They pose storage problems such as the handling of fuses, etc. CIA requires reimbursement for these packs at the time of their turnover to the armed forces. A reasonable stock of such equipment would be an initial supply of twenty-five 1,000 man packs, (cost \$126,304.69 each) with five additional 1,000 man packs available each 24 hours after first drop is made. Re-supply packs (\$61,004.52 each) containing ammunition and food for 1,000 men for 90 days should be available at the rate of ten per 24 hours commencing 24 hours after first drop is made.



4. Attributable packs of standard Army equipment could be substituted if non-attribution were not required. The experience of JMWTF during the Cuban crisis indicates that the present military supply system in the CONUS will be unable immediately to provide equipment and supplies in the required configuration for projected UW operations in Cuba. A logistical arrangement must be designed specifically to support the buildup of an indigenous force engaged in guerrilla operations. Army studies of this problem indicate that first consideration should be given immediately deployable prepacked kits, in sufficient quantities to meet CINCLANT's UW plans, and to the initial requirements for the CONUS based paramilitary logistical support system. An additional stock of equipment and supplies, in an unpacked configuration, might be required at an assembly and storage depot in the Southeastern US. Subdepots would stock reserve supplies and equipment, ready for movement to the assembly depot as required. As envisaged, this system would be separate from the normal Army supply procedures. As its prime purpose, it would provide for the rapid production at one conveniently located Army depot of standardized, airdrop rigged prepacks of equipment and supplies for 100-man guerrilla units.

a. To illustrate costs, a possible pre-stock of such equipment would be a ready-to-go stockpile for 12,000 men (cost of \$1,459,830) at this CONUS depot, and a coordinated resupply for 12,000 men for a 15-day period (cost of \$268,413.80). These amounts of initial issue and resupply could support the initial logistical requirements of CINCLANT's present UW contingency operational plans for Cuba.

b. Provisions would be made for an initial issue prepack, and a resupply prepack. The initial issue prepack unit would be a balanced selection of arms and equipment for a 100-man



## APPENDIX E

CAPABILITIES OF US FORCES TO GIVE MILITARY SUPPORT  
TO ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES (S)

1. The purpose of this annex is to summarize US capabilities to support a spontaneous uprising in Cuba in the near future, and to indicate the preliminary actions which could be taken to improve US immediate capabilities should current analysis by the intelligence community indicate that such revolutionary activity is, in fact, probable.

2. US basic capabilities for action in Cuba from normal deployment posture are as follows (times are from decision to action), the United States:

- a. Can initiate low-level reconnaissance with four aircraft on 12-hour notice and eight aircraft on 24-hour notice (including additional escort, CAP, SAR, and ELINT aircraft to support these reconnaissance missions).
- b. Can evacuate the dependents and sufficiently reinforce Guantanamo in 48 to 72 hours.
- c. Can execute air strikes against Cuba in 12 to 72 hours.
- d. Can deploy Unconventional Warfare assets to staging areas within eight days ready for infiltration into Cuba.
- e. Can reinstitute a quarantine in 72 hours.
- f. Can undertake a full-scale invasion of Cuba in 18 days.

3. It is assumed that in the early phases of an uprising in Cuba, Cuban and Soviet forces would be able to retain control over principal military installations, including air defense missile sites. This capability might hamper large-scale air-lift operations to revolutionary elements to an unacceptable degree. Therefore, an early feature of active operations against Cuba would be the initiation of air strikes to eliminate the effective capability of the air defense system.



4. At the same time, intensified aerial reconnaissance over Cuba will be required, at both high and low level, to insure the provision of accurate situational data and early detection of the movement or commitment of the Soviet units.

5. Evacuation of non-combatants from Guantanamo and reinforcement of the garrison should be accomplished prior to the initiation of air strikes against Cuba. By prior prepositioning of airlift, and by retention of shipping in the Guantanamo area, time required to complete this action, following decision, can be reduced below the 48 to 72 hours indicated earlier.

6. If the decision is made to preposition air reconnaissance and strike units, and to make ready for reinforcement of an evacuation of non-combatants from Guantanamo, concurrent action should be taken to prepare the units which would be involved in support and possible reinforcement of Cuban revolutionaries. This would require the assembly and positioning of troops, airlift and sealift, and requisitioning of shipping.

7. The US must be ready to respond to the contingency of a spontaneous uprising with the rapid incremental commitment of US forces. Such action would be justified under the following conditions:

a. The uprising gives promise of success if US aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the US.

c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify piecemeal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.



e. An assessment made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk.

8. In summary, if the intelligence community should give substance to the current speculations regarding revolutionary activity in Cuba, the following military readiness actions would be indicated:

a. Immediate intensification of both high and low level aerial reconnaissance activity.

b. Prepositioning and alerting of resources required for reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of non-combatants.

c. Alerting and preliminary readying measures for the execution of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

9. Should the decision subsequently be made to initiate military operations in support of an anti-Castro uprising, the initial action following evacuation of non-combatants from and reinforcement of the garrison at Guantanamo should be initiation of air strikes to destroy the air defenses, and the introduction of unconventional warfare assets to support the revolution. In addition, blockade operations should be instituted. Ground reinforcement of revolutionary forces on any scale less than OPLAN 316-63 should thereafter be undertaken only if there is sufficient evidence to clearly indicate the military soundness of such operations.

10. In the absence of firm intelligence to indicate the imminence of a significant anti-Castro uprising, the preparatory and prepositioning actions discussed above should not be undertaken.

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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ORIGINATOR : COLONEL J. HAWKINS, USMC  
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TITLE : TALKING PAPER FOR USE BY THE JCS  
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SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA

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## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: MULTIDate: undatedSubject: National Level Cuba Planning RelationshipsOriginal Level of Classification: TOP SECRET-SENSITIVEThird Agency Equities: OSD STAR CIA NSC CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTRemarks: X 7/22/97

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF  
DATE: JUL 31 1997DECLASSIFIED BY USIA-GC/D  
MONTH 8 DAY 6 YEAR 97  
AUTHORITY: JFK ACT  
*No objection to release*



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DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF

DATE JUL 31 1997

Talking Paper for Use by the JCS.

Subject: National Level Cuba Planning Relationships

Background - Numerous departments, agencies, groups and committees have become involved in matters related to policy and planning for Cuba, and a variety of procedures and relationships have evolved.

Discussion - Chart #1 - This chart shows the principal activities of the National Government now involved.

- The Standing Group of the National Security Council has been assigned responsibility, in regard to Cuban affairs, for the development of contingency plans and the assessment of long-range policy objectives and means for meeting them. The Standing Group has recently considered and acted upon covert policy recommendations submitted to it by the CIA.

- The Special Group (NSC 5412/2) is the normal channel, established by the National Security Council in NSC 5412/2, for giving policy approval for major covert programs initiated by the CIA, and for securing coordination of support therefor among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. National Security Council directives are the governing authority with respect to the CIA, since the National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA under the direction of the National Security Council. An overlap of functions in the covert area has apparently developed as between the Special Group and the Standing Group of the National Security Council.

- The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs is responsible for coordination of day-to-day activities in the execution of policy decisions, and for timely recommendations on new courses of action. This is a tripartite committee, with actual membership restricted to representatives of State, Defense and CIA. At present, the former Director, Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Department of State, serves as Chairman of the Committee, while the Departments of Defense and the CIA are represented respectively by the Secretary of the Army and the Deputy Director (Plans). Other Departments and Agencies are called upon to provide representatives as appropriate, but these representatives are not members.

- The Departments of State and Defense and the CIA are the principal agencies engaged in Cuba planning, although others, such as the U.S. Information Agency; Health, Education and Welfare; Labor; Justice; Treasury, and the Agency for International Development also participate in the areas under their cognizance.

- Now that the principal participants are identified, the various relationships and channels of action among them can be examined.

- Chart #2 - This chart shows one channel through which plans or policy recommendations may be submitted from the Departments or Agencies to higher authority for approval. In this case, the Department or Agency submits recommendations to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee, which considers them and transmits a coordinated recommendation to the

GROUP-1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED

BY JCS ON 17 OCT 1989

CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

By JCS/STAFF/JOINT STAFF  
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Policy on the  
Classification of  
Documents

9123/3100 (63)



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Standing Group of the National Security Council. This, however, does not represent all of the available channels upward which are available to the Committee.

- Chart #3 - This chart illustrates that the Committee may use a channel directly to the President.

- Chart #4 - For covert matters, a channel through the Special Group (5412) may be used. There are channels beyond these, however, by-passing the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee, which may be utilized by the Department of State and the CIA.

- Chart #5 - In some cases, the CIA submits plans or policy recommendations concerning covert actions directly to the Special Group (5412), or to the Standing Group of the National Security Council. On occasion, the Department of State may deal directly with the White House, or with the Standing Group of the National Security Council.

- The appearance of this chart suggests that there is a need to standardize the channels used in policy and planning matters related to Cuba.

- Chart #6 - Adoption of the arrangement shown on this chart would improve matters. It is not dissimilar to the functional arrangement previously employed in the Mongoose Program. All policy and planning recommendations by Departments and Agencies would flow through the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee, thus ensuring coordination. In the interest of security, covert matters would be limited to consideration by the actual members of the Coordinating Committee (State, Defense, CIA). All matters concerning covert activities would flow through the Special Group (5412), since this is the functional responsibility for which this small and exclusive Group was established. All other planning and policy matters, appropriate for consideration by authority higher than that of the Departments and Agencies themselves, would flow through the Standing Group of the National Security Council, which includes a broader representation of the National Government in its membership.

- If the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee is to coordinate the day-to-day activities of the Departments and Agencies as intended, and act as the clearing house for policy and planning recommendations submitted by the Departments and Agencies to higher authority, its organization should be strengthened. At present, the Committee is not chaired by an official of sufficient rank. An appropriate organization would involve chairmanship by a member of the White House Staff or by an official from a principal Department or Agency involved, of Deputy Secretary or equivalent rank.

- Chart #7 - This chart depicts the principal planning channels within the Department of Defense.

- Military contingency and other operation plans for Cuba are prepared by unified commanders concerned and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- For Cuba, CIA presents its requests for support to the Defense Representative, Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, who transmits them directly to the Services concerned. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been

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informed in every case of these requests, although steps have recently been taken to ensure that this will be done in the future, in order that there will be a single ready repository of this information.

- The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) may also participate in some planning activities regarding Cuba. Recently this office has acted jointly with the Department of State in developing a specific contingency plan, involving military action, for support of possible uprisings in Cuba. This plan has been coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- There are no evident basic defects in the intra-Defense planning arrangements.

Recommendations - It is recommended that the Secretary of Defense be requested to propose to the President that:

a. The policy and planning channels for Cuban affairs be standardized as shown on Chart #6.

b. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs be reorganized to include a Chairman from the White House Staff or from a Department or Agency, of Deputy Secretary or equivalent rank.

Approved by \_\_\_\_\_ SACSA

Opinion as to Recommendation:


Director, Joint Staff \_\_\_\_\_ (Concur)(Nonconcur)

Talking Paper prepared by: Colonel J. Hawkins, USMC  
Programs & Review II, SACSA  
Extension 56507/das

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### WHO IS INVOLVED IN CUBA PLANNING, AND HOW.




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CHART #1




# WHO IS INVOLVED IN CUBA PLANNING, AND HOW.



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# WHO IS INVOLVED IN CUBA PLANNING, AND HOW.




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CHART #3



# PROPOSED ORGANIZATION




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### CUBA PLANNING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



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CHART NO. 7



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10017  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC/DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FROM : WILLIAM H. BRUBECK  
TO : MCGEORGE BUNDY  
TITLE : CUBA- BACK UP PAPERS AND A SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF CCA  
DATE : 01/22/63  
PAGES : 37  
SUBJECTS : POLICY, CUBA

LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY

CUBAN BRIGADE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
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CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central File, Box 3. 5 U.S.-Cuba policy papers  
under 1 cover sheet.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: State/NSCDate: 22 Jan. 63Subject: CUBA - Back up papers...

Original Level of Classification: \_\_\_\_\_

Third Agency Equities: State CIARemarks: JCS - SON NSC docs (p.129/16)/LMS - no objection 7/22/97Page # of PostponementReason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK ActCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTThe Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)Reviewed on 7/23/97NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OFAS listedDATE: JUL 23 1997



(WITH REVISIONS)

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
January 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
COPIES TO : All Members of the NSC Executive Committee  
SUBJECT : CUBA - Back-up Papers and a Summary of  
Recommendations of the Coordinator  
of Cuban Affairs

The enclosed papers are submitted by the Coordinator  
of Cuban Affairs.

1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.
3. United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization  
of American States.
4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.
5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.

It is understood that the recommendations will be  
considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on  
Thursday, January 24.

  
William H. Brubeck  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1953, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

- a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
- b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
- c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
- d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;
- e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
- f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

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being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

- g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
- h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
- i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
- j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

## 2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

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action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

- a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
- b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

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The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

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Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

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7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

- A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further

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actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:
  - a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
  - b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may:
    - 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
  - c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

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2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.
3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
  - a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
  - b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
  - c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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- d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
  - a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
  - b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

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- 2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
  - 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba;
  - and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.
6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal OAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
  7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.
  8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
  9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m.)

FROM : Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of American States.

PROBLEM

To determine the future course of action which the U.S. should seek in the OAS with respect to Cuba.

Discussion

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in January 1962 put the problem of Cuba clearly in the hemispheric context. At that meeting the Foreign Ministers excluded Cuba from participation in the inter-American system, declared an arms embargo, and directed vigilance against Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

The U.S. invoked the Rio Treaty on October 22, 1962. Pursuant thereto, the Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to act provisionally as the Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (OC)

Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanimously passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such action, including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to prevent continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prevent the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere. In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. instituted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic cooperated with us in the quarantine and 9 others offered their assistance and facilities.

With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Consultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing to concern themselves with subversion and possible extension of economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken,

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COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) Continue the COAS/OC in being under the Rio Treaty but take no further action at present.

Considerations:

The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis. If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed circumstances.

- (2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities.

Considerations:

This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would represent one feasible, appropriate, immediate step following the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.

Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.

Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insurrection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.

It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemisphere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to the Soviet Union.

- (3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este. (Which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and a Special Committee to study the further suspension of trade.)

Considerations:

This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.

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Taken by itself, this course of action might raise doubts concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are continuing our surveillance.

Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would appear as though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification surrendered (on-site inspection and re-introduction of offensive weapons).

(4) Combine (2) and (3).

Considerations:

This combination of actions is feasible and is likely to obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.

The termination of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.

Termination of the COAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3). Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accompanied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic sanctions.

(5) Seek to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a resolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.

Considerations:

With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able to obtain a substantial majority.

Such action would give a better basis for urging such additional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).

It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement action.

(6) In addition to (5), seek authorization under the Rio Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force, to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Cuba if the OAS call is not heeded.

Considerations:

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Considerations:

This action should be seriously considered only if we are determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet troops.

While it should be possible with adequate consultation and preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political and economic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it would be difficult to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority for authorization of the use of armed force.

(7) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11)).

Considerations:

This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.

Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments would have some appeal.

Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained for this.

(8) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all economic and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11)).

Considerations:

The severance of all economic and commercial relations would go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the U.S. to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies. Such action would expose us to charges of inhumanity and would probably nullify our public statements that we have no quarrel with the Cuban people.

A number of telecommunications between Latin America and Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services would interrupt communications vital to many of our Latin American friends. Further, U.S. communications with Cuba should be maintained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national interest and those for humanitarian reasons.

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These considerations would make it extremely difficult to obtain a 2/3 majority in the COAS/OC.

(9) Seek resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

- (a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);
- (b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
- (c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also be added to No. (8).)

Considerations:

This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could be taken independently of other steps.

With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned is more psychological than practical because Latin American countries ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps.

It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S. unilateral steps in controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, and for urging other states to control Soviet flights to Cuba.

(10) Intensify through COAS and SCCS programs of recommended controls over subversive activities. Seek COAS resolution warning Castro that continued subversive activity may result in action under Rio Treaty.

Considerations:

The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and should be continued. However, it would be difficult to get unanimous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because of the reference to the Rio Treaty.

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(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued subversive activities.

Considerations:

If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs. the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be necessary to invoke the Rio Treaty since the present functions given the COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveillance and recommendations to governments for control measures.

The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection in Latin America.

The basis of any such action should consist of the production of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, insufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS action. (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under way.)

(12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This could be done:

- (a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to the IADB;
- (b) by the COAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or
- (c) having the OAS member governments designate their representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.

Considerations:

As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover, amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governments.

As to (b), this is a feasible course of action which the COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be difficult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the Council of the desirability of such action.

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As to (c), member governments could take this course on an individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that "exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this action under the OAS Charter.

#### COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international complications were key factors which I have carefully considered.

Courses of action (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance us toward our objective, would be politically feasible, and would involve minimum adverse international effects. We could probably obtain a near-unanimous vote in the OAS for these courses except (10) and (12).

Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) and (12) would advance us considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11) particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would involve adverse international effects, including a probable acute confrontation with the USSR.

I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best interests at this time.

I recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).

Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and (b) terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further suspension of trade.

Course (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

- (a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b)

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- (b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
- (c) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on Bloc-Cuba runs.
- (d) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar actions.

#### Rationale

The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our objective, carrying the OAS with us, without committing us to any further action.

After these initial measures are in effect, we should assess the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which may be opened to us by events.

I believe we should develop our pressures steadily and gradually, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation under constant review for the optimum opportunity to initiate additional measures.

I do not believe we should take a track now which will break hemispheric unity. We may need unity later in an emergency.

Neither do I believe we should push the OAS into probable acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.

Both of these prices the U. S. may find it necessary to pay for action at a later date but not now, in my opinion.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
SUBJECT: Cuban Brigade

PROBLEM

To determine the future of the Cuban Brigade (participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion recently released from Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who participated in or trained for the invasion. To determine the future of existing Cuban training programs.

DISCUSSION

Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over 1100 were released.

A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically proceed from whatever over all policy the U. S. adopts toward Cuba.

A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively marginal military value because of its quantitative limitations and restricted military capability, but its

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politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate for its limited military utility.

Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be weighed.

#### COURSES OF ACTION

Three courses of action appear feasible with respect to the Brigade's future.

- (1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military unit, with no further U. S. special assistance.

If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and their families would be eligible for the benefits now accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area (approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent to those received by American citizens in Dade County, Florida who are in need. The principal ones include: financial grants of up to \$100 per month for a family and up to \$60 a month for an individual; hospitalization and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities; employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied children; special English and refresher courses for doctors and lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides up to \$1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part of special language courses and vocational training; and physical examinations and inoculations at time of entry into the U. S.

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DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides 20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve status. They are not required to know English. A two week period for resettlement is also provided at the termination of the training.

Another DOD program enables former officers of the Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly selective basis for programs in the U. S. Armed Forces. Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is necessary. The officers are in civilian status. They receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer available.

Considerations:

This course of action would provide the simplest and most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent to benefits offered to American citizens.

Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill and country knowledge could be distributed through various U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.

The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade as a result of Administration statements and actions; it would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would probably engender some adverse political reaction domestically as well as from the Brigade and its sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the Free World concerning the determination of the United States

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to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence with the Castro regime.

(2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve component of the U. S. Armed Forces.

Considerations:

Under this course of action whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile community.

It would constitute an immediate political and psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the present Cuban regime.

It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with the statements and actions of the Administration in connection with the future of the Brigade.

But it would inevitably become a focal point for Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and morale, discipline and esprit would be difficult to maintain over the long term without early employment to retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups in the U. S. armed forces reserve component. There is a

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risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members, as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of serious embarrassment to the U. S .

(3) Tailor a special civilian and military program for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue as a "fraternal" unit similar to the "Flying Tigers". Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current military training program for Cubans to establish a Brigade military reserve component which other U. S. militarily-trained Cubans could join.

Under existing authority, HEW could provide the following additional benefits for Brigade members in need, over and above those now offered: special employment counseling and placement service; extended student loans to provide for all institutional costs such as tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds \$1,000 per year (living costs to be provided by another agency); expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased financial assistance to needy persons while in training; increased distribution of surplus food (with approval of the Department of Agriculture).

The following additional programs could be undertaken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such action would contribute to the defense and security of the United States or advance its foreign policy interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for vocational training anywhere in the United States; an expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure of \$2,500 per person per year would be about \$2.5 million.

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A military component of a specially tailored program would enable Brigade members to enlist in the U. S. Army in the same manner as have other Cuban refugees (about 2000 are now at Fort Jackson, South Carolina). Special arrangements could be made for professional military officers who desired officer training, similar to that now being offered Cuban exile officers in the U. S. armed forces. Individuals trained in this manner might later create or join units, and serve to perpetuate the Brigade unity and "mystique".

Considerations:

A specially tailored program would fulfill any "moral" obligations of the U. S. toward Brigade members and mitigate inevitable complaints.

It would give members their choice of selecting a useful civilian occupation or service in U. S. Armed Forces, weeding out the Brigade and allowing those who want to continue the Brigade as a military unit to pursue this desire through joining a reserve unit after training, thus preserving their core.

It would tend to disperse Brigade members geographically and in different activities, thus effectively disbanding the present entire Brigade as a unit.

Cuban refugees in general might resent special assistance given Brigade members, but probably not if this assistance included the health and educational fields.

HEW would have to set up a special benefit structure, and it should be noted that the additional cost of these programs would have to be met out of current operating funds.

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Establishment of additional programs, after a Presidential determination, would increase costs even more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary" privileges for Brigade members.

#### COORDINATORS'S RECOMMENDATION

1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored program for Brigade members.
2. I recommend against a Presidential determination providing broader privileges for Brigade members.
3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should be permitted to join.
4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange consultation with them immediately if this course of action is approved.

#### Rationale

Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the future desire the presence in the U. S. Armed Forces of militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade members to enlist in the existing military training program for Cubans and to enter a U. S. Reserve Unit thereafter.

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Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, 1963 at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba

1. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
2. Removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.
3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons plus Mr. Robert Gaddes, British subject married to a U. S. citizen. X
4. Cuban subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere.
5. Future activities of Mr. Donovan. *- Projects work*
6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a political weapon against the Castro regime.
7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba. X
9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in intensified intelligence collection; Policy on illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia flights to Cuba.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

January 29, 1963

This document consists of 2 pages -

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MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Cottrell  
Coordinator for Cuban Affairs

FROM: M - William J. Jordan

SUBJECT: Psychological Program in Support of U.S.  
Policy on Cuba

Purpose. Our basic program sets forth several objectives for our policy toward Cuba and commits us to "be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created."

The purpose of this paper is to outline a program that will meet the psychological requirements of our overall policy. Our aim is to carry out actions that will have psychological impact favorable to our purposes--in Cuba, among Cubans, in Latin America, in the Soviet Union and other Communist states, in other countries, and in the United States.

Scope. A successful psychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a propaganda exercise or an informational program. It should cover actions and statements--all that is said or done solely or primarily for psychological effect. This definition sets off psychological activities from those actions undertaken primarily for their direct value--whether in the fields of intelligence, military, political, or economic action.

It will be one of the tasks of psychological operations to exploit other activities to maximum advantage or to seek to minimize the negative impact of such activities.

In designing and carrying out all of our action programs, the totality of our interests will have to be weighed. It is one of the tasks of the Coordinator and his Group to balance possibly conflicting interests and to determine which, in any given circumstance, shall have priority.

Framework

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Framework for Psychological Operations.

We must keep in mind constantly the relationship between what happens in Cuba and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Communists. We should seek to insure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way that will:

- a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime;
- b) demonstrate to the Cuban people and to the world at large that communism is not a solution for the problems of a developing country;
- c) discredit Castro and his associates and their methods of operation throughout the Americas;
- d) insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and the satellites adds substantially to the mounting evidence that in efforts to spread communist revolutions, "the light is not worth the candle."

Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the end of the communist regime in Cuba. But we should not forget that pending achievement of this, we can move toward the other objectives. And they, after all, are of major importance to our overall strategic purposes.

We have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains Communist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the Communist cause generally. This strategic concept is essentially that which the Communists have tried to use against us.

Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept. It calls for the utilization of every available weapon in our arsenal and engagement, day-in and day-out, in a multi-faceted struggle at all levels.

Our initial aim should be to weaken steadily the capability, confidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspondingly, to strengthen our side. We need not, indeed ought not, stake everything on one great effort. Nor should we concentrate on simply building up our forces and husbanding them "until the right time comes" for a final showdown.

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Instead, our effort should be directed toward achieving an unbroken series of small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro elements and failures on the part of the regime itself. Our aim should be that the end of each day would see the position and prospects of the Castro regime a little worse than they had been at sunrise.

A factory breakdown because of a shortage of spare parts or sabotage, an increase in absenteeism, lengthened queues at the food stores, failure to get a field planted--whether because of neglect or lack of seed, a resort to terrorist methods against the populace, an assassination attempt, an unexplained fire, creation of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance of antiregime slogans on walls, a defection from the armed forces--these and similar things, whether major or minor, and over and over again on a mounting scale, will have a cumulative impact. In the long run, as Mao has said, they can be equivalent to a major victory.

The important thing is to keep the pressure on, to never give the regime a respite, to see that the series of small defeats and setbacks is unbroken and unending. Our purpose is to create a situation in which the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and heart, in which they cannot but come to accept the certainty of eventual defeat.

Meanwhile, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist world. Assistance to the regime would increasingly be regarded as a "rat hole" operation. The "example of Cuba" would become the reverse of expectations; fidelismo would become a term of opprobrium.

In short, the goal is to bring about the elimination of the Castro regime without resort to direct and massive force. We cannot rule out the possibility that some reliance on force may become necessary to insure final victory for anti-Castro forces. But the greater and more effective is the effort herein outlined, the more we are likely to insure that overt force requirements will be minimal.

Specific programs, overt and covert, to carry out this kind of approach to the Cuban problem will be submitted separately.

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Information Programs.

1. Some current requirements--

a) We need a solid and fairly extensive statement of U.S. attitudes toward Cuba. This is covered in the separate memo on public statements.

b) We need clarification of the non-invasion policy--does it exist? what are its limitations? what circumstances would justify our resort to force against Cuba? This might be covered in (a) above.

c) We need to have clearly in mind our position regarding a possible internal revolt. What we say and do should be in agreement with this attitude. We should avoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to encourage an open revolt. We should avoid for the present anything that could be read as a firm pledge to come to the aid of anyone who moves against Castro. It should be our position that the future of Cuba, and of Castro, will be determined by the Cuban people but that we will be doing what we can, within reasonable limits, to help those who support freedom for their country.

d) We need a clear policy regarding the Soviet forces now in Cuba. How do we propose to encourage their withdrawal? Do we need a statement regarding their possible use against Cubans? I would favor some clear definition of our attitude. There should be no doubt in the minds of the Soviet troops, of Castro and of the Kremlin that use of Russian force against Cubans will be regarded as justification for the introduction of U.S. and/or OAS forces in their defense.

2. Some suggested themes--

In both overt and covert propaganda and information programs, we should stress the following:

- a) Castroism is doomed, it is on the slippery slope to oblivion
- b) Cuba is a puppet of Moscow, subject to the whims and moods of a foreign power
- c) Moscow will use Cuba as it sees fit and for its own purposes, giving help and withdrawing it to suit the Kremlin's desires.

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- d) Castro has isolated his country from its traditional friends, from the hemisphere in which its roots of history, culture, religion and well-being are sunk.
- e) Communism has failed to solve the problem of Cuba-- has lowered rather than raised its standard of living.
- f) The revolution has been perverted and betrayed.
- g) Freedom and independence are the wave of the future

(for Latin American audiences)

- h) Castro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion and aggression, espionage and sabotage against neighboring states.
- i) Castroism promises bloodshed, terror and economic stagnation.

(for Soviet audiences)

- j) Cuba represents a steady drain on already limited Soviet resources; every shipment to Cuba means things do not appear on Soviet shelves.
- k) Castro really supports the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using Soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow's policy.

The above are but the beginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit in our information and propaganda programs.

### 3. Need for coordination and guidance.

It is obvious that in carrying out the kind of many-sided offensive described here it will be necessary to provide some machinery for coordinating various programs. We must be sure that what we do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere. We will also have to provide careful and regular policy guidance to those responsible for actions. This is discussed further in the next section on organization.

### 4. Need for quick reaction.

The picture we should seek to create is one of a confident and decisive United States moving forward in cooperation with its other friends, dealing with the Cuban situation but not exclusively preoccupied with Castro. We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion. We should take note of developments

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in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly. Our answer to claims, charges or attacks should be swift. Our machinery must be so geared as to permit us to answer Castro and his henchmen immediately and effectively. If he makes a speech tonight, our reply should be on the airwaves tomorrow at the latest.

Moreover, our approach should not be defensive. We should not confine ourselves to answering Castro but as much as possible force him onto the defensive. Let him do the answering, the explaining, the disagreeing as much as possible.

#### Organization.

There is need for coordination and direction of our psychological effort. This should be carried out under the overall supervision of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. He should designate an individual to head a sub-group to deal with this aspect of the total program. Each of the departments or agencies concerned should designate one officer to represent it on the sub-group.

There should be close and regular contact among representatives of the group who are most concerned with such things as public statements and press releases, radio broadcasts, and propaganda programs. These would include State, Defense, CIA and USIA. But all members of the group should be kept as fully informed as possible on decisions taken and projects launched.

The organizations that should designate representatives to participate in this program are: State (P, H, INR), Defense, CIA, Justice, N.E.W., and the White House. The Coordinator and/or his Deputy should be kept fully and regularly informed of all actions. Matters requiring policy determination should be referred immediately to the Coordinator for approval or reference to higher authority.

In addition

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In addition to handling the flow of daily business, the group should meet regularly--perhaps once a week or more--to consider and work out long-range projects, arrange for special reports, identify targets of opportunity, and the like. The group should prepare action programs--both overt and covert--for approval by the Coordinator and his Group and, as necessary, by EXCOM.

It will be necessary to develop some system for close coverage of Cuban statements and actions to which we might want to respond. We should be able to provide quick guidance to USIA, for example, on how to handle such things as a Castro speech.

This requirement for quick and thorough coverage will require utilization of all available facilities. It almost certainly will require the full-time services of at least one man and probably two or three. Coverage should be provided by several agencies but basic responsibility should be assigned to INR. Obviously those individuals assigned to this job should be thoroughly familiar with the Cuban situation. It would be their task to report significant developments promptly to the sub-group with appropriate background and analysis within 24 hours of any event, preferably sooner.

The sub-group should then come up with guidance to all concerned as to how we should deal with the matter. Propaganda and information guidance should be cleared with the sub-group and, as necessary, with the Coordinator.

The group should be alert to the necessity for and advantages of supplying factual data on Cuban developments to our posts abroad and to friendly governments. It should arrange to keep interested Congressmen as fully informed as possible on Cuban developments and our proposed actions.

#### Recommendations on Organization--

It is recommended that the Coordinator:

- (a) pick one individual to act as chairman of a sub-group on psychological programs;
- (b) ask each interested bureau, agency or department to select an individual to work on or with the sub-group
- (c) arrange with INR and CIA for regular and close coverage of Cuban developments for use by the sub-group.

Surveys

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Surveys that are needed.

The psychological group will need reports on or analyses of the following as soon as possible:

1. Programs now underway in the psychological field.
2. U.S. capabilities in the psychological field--our present radio programs, covert radio facilities, possible use of private outlets, etc. These reports should point out any obvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a significant psychological effort against Cuba.
3. Castro's propaganda machine--what does it consist of, how much effort goes into it?
4. The major lines of Castro's propaganda offensive--favorite themes, techniques, principal targets, etc.
5. Current position of Castro and his regime in Latin America--main areas of influence, by country and by groups--labor, youth, intellectuals, etc.
6. The past record on leaflet drops--how effective, advantages of plane vs. balloon drops, comparison with delivery of leaflets or other material by other means, possibilities of a balloon or other leaflet drop campaign being used against us.

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*Last page 39.*



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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TITLE : COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II)  
DATE : 05/01/63  
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SUBJECTS : POLICY, CUBA

REVOLT IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

OPLAN 312

OPLAN 316

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and Joint Staff discussing courses of action toward  
Cuba.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: JCS  
Date: Starting 1 May 93  
Subject: Courses of Action Related to Cuba  
Original Level of Classification: TS  
Third Agency Equities: CIA NSC State  
Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Page # of PostponementReason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

**NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

**CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT**

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on

7/22/97



RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that: 1
- a. The memorandum in Enclosure A, which reflects the 2  
above conclusions, be forwarded on a "Special Handling 3  
Required - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis, 4  
to the Secretary of Defense. 5
  - b. The memorandum in Enclosure B, together with its 6  
Appendix, be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for 7  
his use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Depart- 8  
ment of Defense for Policy toward Cuba. 9
  - c. Copies of this paper be forwarded to CINCARIB, 10  
CINCLANT, and CINCSRIKE. 11
  - d. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned 12  
to NATO activities. 13
  - e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US 14  
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 15

Action Officer: Colonel D. C. Pollock, J-5, Ext. 77556  
Western Hemisphere Branch

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

JCS 2304/189

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(Rev. 5/13/63)

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## ENCLOSURE A

## DRAFT

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Concept for Politico/Military Action  
in Cuba (U)

1. The objective of US policy toward Cuba is the  
elimination of the communist government and the establish-  
ment of a government acceptable to the United States. At  
present, the United States is following a program of economic  
and political isolation as the primary means to achieve our  
goals in Cuba.
2. Current intelligence does not indicate that the Castro  
communist government is weakening. To the contrary, there is  
evidence that the Castro regime is becoming more firmly  
entrenched because of the increased capabilities of the  
Cuban armed forces, the greater efficiency of the internal  
security apparatus and massive Bloc aid. Moreover, the  
regime continues its efforts to spread communism. There has  
been an increase in sabotage and other violence perpetrated by  
Castro-inspired extremists throughout Latin America.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to be concerned about  
the military implications of the continuing Communist  
domination of the Cuban government because:
  - a. It constitutes an increasingly serious threat to  
the security of the Western Hemisphere.
  - b. The continued strengthening of Cuban military  
capabilities increases the opposition which must be  
overcome in the event of US military intervention in Cuba.
  - c. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective  
base they have ever had for spreading communism throughout  
the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases

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the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under communist control. Communist control of additional countries would result in:

(1) Increased communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased communist capability for spreading communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

4. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that military intervention will be required in order to achieve our national objectives. If the proper political atmosphere were created prior to intervention, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it could be accomplished without serious risk of general war, of damage to our alliances or of military action by Soviet forces outside Cuba. However, it is unlikely that the Castro regime will provide, intentionally, sufficient provocation for US military intervention. It is equally unlikely that a spontaneous effective revolt, which might be supported by US forces, will occur in Cuba in the near future. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the possibilities of contriving a pretext for military intervention.

5. Two main alternatives have been considered as a pretext for military intervention: (a) the engineering of provocative incidents ostensibly the acts of the Castro regime, and (b) the fomenting of a revolt in Cuba.



6. The engineering of provocative incidents could progress from minor to major, increase in number, occur in different locations and pose a rising threat to the security of the United States and Latin America. This sequence would form the basis for a favorable international public image, that of a long suffering United States Government that partially mobilizes reluctantly in response to a security threat and reacts violently to a final major incident. At this time, one single incident alone would not suffice as a cause for military intervention as Castro painstakingly has avoided moves which might provoke an armed response. He has acknowledged publicly his missteps as mistakes. The United States, for its part, pointedly has displayed forbearance towards Cuba. Reversal of this attitude would appear plausible only after a series of provocations.

7. Fomenting a genuine, widespread and effective revolt in Cuba would require a difficult, long term and carefully coordinated effort. It would have to begin with intensified intelligence collection, covert introduction of intelligence and guerrilla assets, sabotage and the organization of a resistance framework capable of expansion when propitious. The initial stages of the actual revolt would be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other necessary actions until its leaders appealed for outside assistance. Any uprising without US overt support is likely to be short-lived because of current Cuban-Soviet military and internal security capabilities. Therefore, once the final stages began, overt assistance would have to be available at a preplanned time. The United States would be committed morally to support the revolt and could not withdraw without serious damage to its national reputation.

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8. Comparison of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two concepts indicates:

a. Engineered provocations would be more easily implemented militarily and involve smaller amounts of men, money and equipment. Timing and operations could be controlled better than in a revolt. Activities would be less susceptible to detection by the Castro security forces because they could be staged outside of Cuba. In fact, some incidents could be made credible even to Castro. As compared to a revolt, the incidents could impress otherwise indifferent Latin American nations with the threat to their own countries. As international tension developed and heightened, progressive and orderly marshalling of US forces could be achieved. The risk of compromise would be lower since few, if any, foreign nationals would be involved. For this same reason, the quality of the execution of plans would be higher. Conversely, it should be recognized that there are risks involved in the deliberate creation of international tension. Unforeseen reactions to a provocative incident could cause the loss of US control of events.

b. Supporting a fomented revolt would present the United States to the world as coming to the assistance of a people fighting for freedom rather than avenging a wrong or injury to its own citizens or properties. It would identify US intervention more closely with the ideals and aspirations of the freedom-seeking Cubans and thereby more readily attract their support and assistance. The covert support of Cuban resistance offers a means of subjecting Castro to internal pressure. The disclosure of US support for a resistance group would occasion less world censure than the compromise of a contrived incident. The covert process of fomenting

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a revolt would produce collateral benefits such as by  
providing better intelligence and by developing indigenous  
Cuban organizations which would be useful in an invasion  
and in the successor regime. However, in comparison with  
contriving an incident, fomenting an uprising would be a  
more complex operation requiring greater time for planning  
and preparation and more in-country assets. In view of the  
past problems in infiltrating agents into Cuba and of  
obtaining reliable information out of Cuba, it would be  
extremely difficult to foment a large scale timed uprising  
in proper relation to US preparations to exploit it. Preser-  
vation of security would be more difficult because it would  
involve at least some Cubans of untested reliability.

c. Either of these concepts could complement effectively  
the course of action recommended to you in JCSM 360-63\*.  
Therein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the United  
States should be prepared to support a spontaneous revolt  
that shows reasonable promise of success, and that intelli-  
gence and UW assets in Cuba should be augmented as feasible.  
Intelligence flowing from a resistance framework could con-  
tribute significantly to the design and timing of provocative  
incidents. Pressure on Castro from within could cause him  
to resort to actions which would lend credence to further  
contrived incidents. Conversely, incidents generated between  
Castro and other powers, if properly publicized in Cuba, could  
encourage resistance.

9. An analysis of the foregoing indicates that engineered  
incidents would provide greater advantages in control, timing,  
simplicity and security than would a fomented revolt. The  
analysis also indicates that it would be most difficult to  
generate a widespread, effective revolt. However, the staging  
of a local uprising as a contrived incident should not be  
precluded.

\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/18+

Enclosure A



10. Believing that US military intervention in Cuba is necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that:
- a. The United States should:
    - (1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for overt US military intervention in Cuba.
    - (2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, commencing with the intensification of intelligence collection and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for guerrilla activity.
    - (3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist government.
  - b. Implementation of the above would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan.
11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you forward these views to the Special Group (5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57\*.

\* Enclosure to JCS 1969/217

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ENCLOSURE B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: Courses of Action Related to Cuba (U)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the courses  
of action that might be taken by the United States to contrive  
a pretext for US military intervention in Cuba. They are of  
the opinion that the discussion in the Appendix hereto would  
be useful to you in your capacity as Executive Agent of the  
Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE B

(20 pages)

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## APPENDIX

## DISCUSSION

## INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This report is in response to a request from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider the desirability and requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. It includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series of incidents as a cause for invasion and consideration of pertinent comments received from CINCLANT.

2. Summary. Study of the desirability and the requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of engineering an incident or a series of incidents rather than trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability leads to the conclusions that:

a. It is unlikely that an effective spontaneous revolt will occur in the near future.

b. Any uprising without US overt support is likely to be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's increasingly efficient internal security operations.

c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro communist regime will risk a direct provocation that could be used as a pretext for US intervention.

d. Unless the United States intervenes militarily, the Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its efforts and ability to spread international communism will increase.

e. The United States should intervene militarily in Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly



perpetrated by the Castro regime to serve as the cause of invasion or (b) foment a revolt within Cuba which would call for US military intervention.

f. Engineered provocation would provide greater advantages in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.

g. The United States should:

(1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pre-text for US military intervention in Cuba.

(2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, commencing with the intensification of intelligence collection and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for guerrilla activity.

(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist government.

h. Implementation of the above would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization should be given the primary responsibility for developing such a national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan.

i. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57.

j. CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba while containing much merit, should be re-examined both for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity it envisages.



3. Assumptions. Throughout this study, it will be assumed that:

a. Overt military conflict between the United States and its Allies with the Sino-Soviet Bloc has not yet begun.

b. Sino-Soviet support continues to strengthen the Castro regime through contribution of moral, political, economic and military assistance.

c. US policy and objectives are the supplanting of the Castro communist regime and the elimination of the threat to US security posed by the Soviet military presence in Cuba and a Cuban regime hostile to the United States.

4. Background. For a detailed analysis of the below listed subjects requiring special consideration, see Attachment to JCSM-360-63.

a. Spontaneous Revolt in Cuba.

b. Appraisal of the Enemy.

c. Appraisal of Anti-Castro Activity.

d. Presence of Soviet Troops.

e. Political Prisoners (Current Negotiations).

f. Training of Cuban Nationals.

g. Capabilities of US Forces.

h. Internal Intelligence.

#### COURSES OF ACTION

5. In light of current intelligence, two major options face the United States in regard to the situation in Cuba. One is to restrict US action to attempts to isolate Cuba politically and economically from the rest of the American nations while awaiting the opportunity to capitalize on a spontaneous revolt or to respond to a direct provocation. The other is to take positive action to contrive a pretext for employing US military force to overthrow the Castro regime.



## TO CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT

6. The US intelligence community has indicated that it is unlikely that a spontaneous, widespread effective revolt will occur in the near future. If a revolt does not occur spontaneously, the United States is faced with the possibility of a further strengthening of Cuba as a Soviet satellite and the continuing exportation of communism to other Latin American countries. This could involve US forces in a major operation of defending Latin American countries against internal and external subversion and aggression. Continued US acceptance of a Soviet base or bases in Cuba might avoid the risk of Soviet retaliation to US military action, but such acceptance would also generate a greater eventual hazard from the improved Soviet general war posture. In continuing as at present, time would favor Castro and the Communists.

7. Circumstances under which the United States should consider invasion, other than in support of a revolt, include any one or a combination of the following provocations:

- a. Continued exportation of communism to other Latin American countries.
- b. Military or paramilitary attack against US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay.
- c. Attacks or serious threats against the United States, its territories, forces, planes, or ships by the Cuban Government or from Soviet forces in Cuba.
- d. Internal hostilities resulting in anarchy or other intolerable political, economic or social conditions.
- e. US military assistance is required in accordance with action instigated by the OAS under the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact).
- f. Discovery of offensive weapons again in Cuba.



8. It is expected that, regardless of the two recent air attacks on US shipping, the Castro government and the Soviets will avoid giving the United States sufficient provocation for armed intervention. There appears to be little likelihood that a direct provocation will occur that could be used as a pretext for US intervention in Cuba. As a result the Castro government will become more firmly entrenched than now and its efforts to spread international Communism to other American states will continue.

#### TO CONTRIVE A PRETEXT FOR INVASION

9. It is postulated, therefore, that it will be necessary for the United States to contrive a pretext for intervention in Cuba if it is desired to eliminate the communist regime on the island. The President could reach a decision that affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing US security. In turn, a national policy decision might be reached that an overt military intervention in Cuba is to be undertaken. A suitable pretext or fabricated provocation would be necessary.

#### FABRICATED PROVOCATIONS

10. a. US manufactured provocations could be evolved as the prelude to the execution of OPLANS 312 and 316. The contrived incidents should progress from minor to major, increase in number, occur at different locations and pose a rising threat to the security of the United States and Latin America. The foregoing sequence would form the basis for a favorable public relations image, that of a long suffering US Government that finally mobilizes partially in response to a security threat and reacts violently to a final major incident. Compartmentation of participants should insure that individuals in one incident would have no knowledge of the development of others.



b. Fabricated provocations could be evolved by a carefully timed combination of some of the following typical incidents:

(1) Arranging a series of well coordinated incidents to take place in and around Guantanamo to give a realistic appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces to establish a credible attack against the US Naval Base.

(2) Using MIG type aircraft flown by US pilots to harass civil air, attack surface shipping or to attack US military.

(3) Creating an incident which would demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft had attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to a selected Latin American country.

(4) Creating an incident which would make it appear that Cuban communist MIGs had destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

(5) Make it appear that Castro was lending direct support to insurgent communist elements in a Latin American country, such as Haiti or Guatemala.

c. A fabricated provocation more than likely would not evoke a violent response from the Soviet Union. The USSR could avoid making critical concessions and would not have to initiate action as their vital military interests would not be involved.

11. For the over-all operation involved in engineering an incident, it would be desirable to plan for and implement cover actions designed to mask the marshalling of US forces in forward areas of debarkation for the execution of CINCLANT's OPLANS. Prior to the build-up period, a time interval would be required to accomplish the psychological and military preparatory activities and to complete the detailed planning required. It is considered that a period of thirty days from the date of the decision to implement the plans until any actual movement of forces to the forward areas under the guise of a cover plan would be desirable. This time interval would be required to insure that movement of



US forces were meshed or superimposed in training exercises currently in planning stages or in future projected exercises. Inexplicable cancellations, advancement or retardation of exercise dates probably would cause undue curiosity and thus negate any effort to cover the movement of US forces to forward areas.

12. a. Justification for US intervention probably would be more convincing to the American public and the rest of the world if it could be related to real and valid provocations rather than based wholly on manufactured ones which entail risk of compromise.

b. To date, Castro publicly has made it painstakingly clear that he does not desire intentionally to provoke the United States into armed action. His missteps have been acknowledged publicly as mistakes. He has been careful to be conciliatory on the prisoners issue. The United States does not credit Cuba publicly with a capability for overt aggression, and has to date displayed forbearance in dealing with Cuba. To reverse this policy will seem plausible only after a series of provocations, the engineering of any of which will be associated with grave risks in the event of miscarriage or disclosure. Engineering of a single incident as a sole casus belli is not a recommended course of action at this time. Nevertheless, the engineering of a series of provocations to justify military intervention is feasible and could be accomplished with the resources available.

#### FOMENTING A REVOLT

13. As an alternative to engineering a provocation as a pretext for invasion, the United States could inspire, support and exploit an uprising. A revolt could be initiated in one of the following ways:



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a. Fomenting a revolt as a pretext for unilateral United States intervention. This would be a widespread effective revolt as a prelude to the implementation of OPLANS 312-316. It would permit careful planning and the development of a gradual and calculated preparedness in an organized manner. The United States would attempt to control the action of the revolutionaries and could make use of Cubans in exile. The plan would be flexible and not be dependent on allies, but subject to security compromise.

b. Fomenting a revolt intended to justify multilateral intervention by the United States with selected allies or an OAS reaction. Because of the time involved in lining up allies to participate actively in the operation or to achieve OAS diplomatic sanction, such a revolt would have to be large enough to be self-sustaining until help could arrive after a period of time.

c. Fomenting a revolt for third country(s), intervention, initially without overt US participation. This rebellion would have to be very large and virtually self-sustaining. Its security would be most vulnerable. Some US support, if eventually not intervention, undoubtedly would be necessary. Selection of an intervening power responsive to US interests would be difficult and the interference of the intervening power with the successor government also could be a problem. It is unlikely that any one or group of Latin American countries could provide the degree of support needed to assure the success of a purely internal Cuban revolt. It would be the most difficult of the alternatives.



d. Fomenting a revolt using Cubans alone. Plans have been developed to conduct UW operations to support uprisings with or without a planned overt follow-up of conventional US forces. However, because of the Cuban/Soviet defenses and counterinsurgency capabilities it is considered that any covert or overt attempt to sustain an uprising using Cubans alone whether on a small or large scale would be unsuccessful if attempted.

14. Unilateral military intervention by the United States would be the most successful course. While the possibility of Bloc reactions in areas other than Cuba is recognized, it is believed that the intervention could be accomplished without precipitating a general war and without serious lasting adverse effect on world opinion if the following three conditions were to prevail:

a. If the impression were created that there was an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States was responding to an appeal for assistance from a government that was representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it were announced simultaneously in conjunction with overt US unilateral military action that the United States was moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, that OAS nations were invited to participate and that the United States would withdraw immediately as soon as the new government advised that it had the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations.

c. If the military operation were conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Bloc's ability to take effective countermeasures in support of the Castro regime were reduced to the minimum.



15. The United States could undertake to foment an uprising in Cuba, at a time and place of its own choice, beginning with the covert introduction of intelligence and resistance assets into the island and culminating the effort in overt assistance. The build-up of assets could be gradual or rapid. It could be planned to generate and coordinate the action from either inside or outside of Cuba.

16. A gradual, low-level, build-up of assets in Cuba would be the least noticeable and less likely to offend the sensibilities of the other Latin American countries. On the other hand, it is more than likely that the United States would be credited, rightly or wrongly, with sponsoring any revolution that occurs, so the build-up should be accomplished to fit the timing and execution desired by the United States.

17. In view of past problems in infiltrating agents into Cuba, and of obtaining reliable information out of Cuba, it would be extremely difficult to incite a large-scale, timed uprising from within Cuba in proper relation to US preparations to exploit it. It conceivably could involve many Cubans of unknown reliability. It might involve the loss of friendly assets before or just as they were needed in Cuba. Planning must guard against decimating the ranks of Cuban nationals who would be needed as the leaders of the new government.

18. Another course of action would be to conduct short-term UW operations in a preselected area, with the purpose of staging an uprising to be followed by subsequent short notice US conventional operations. The area would be easily defensible for sustaining a small token uprising for a sufficient length of time to permit the introduction by the United States of a US selected Cuban revolutionary government.



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By pre-arrangement this government would then call upon the United States to intervene. Because of geographical configuration of the island together with its central highway system, the most likely places in Cuba where revolutionary groups could hold out for at least a week are the four mountain ranges - Escambray in Las Villas Province, the Organos Range in Pinar del Rio Province, the Sierra Maestra in Oriente Province, and the mountain range stretching from Mayari Arriba in Oriente Province to the southwest along the coast and east to the coastal city of Baracoa. These mountains offer good cover and concealment. However, extensive guerrilla operations could be impeded because of Castro's new "vertical envelopment" capability using helicopters and paratroopers. If guerrilla groups limited their actions and concentrated on survival by concealing themselves until aided by substantial forces, they could last a longer period of time. It would be advantageous in this case for groups to be infiltrated clandestinely as feasible in order to conceal the scope of their presence. However, it is emphasized that vulnerability to detection by Castro's internal security forces increases in proportion to the size of revolutionary guerrilla forces. It must also be appreciated that the mountainous areas of Cuba are well known to Castro's forces, having once served as a refuge of Castro's guerrillas, and that the smaller the UW group, and the more concentrated their operation, the easier their encirclement and elimination when discovered.

19. In execution of one of the foregoing courses of action to contrive a pretext for invasion the Armed Forces of the United States would:

- a. Support tasks of the other Departments and governmental agencies in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel, bases and cover as might be required.

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b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as directed.

c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with contingency plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and directed by the President. The primary purpose of the US military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of the Castro communist government and to assist in the establishment of a new, non-communist government acceptable to the United States.

20. The implementation of any of the suggested courses of action in this study would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that one single governmental organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan.

21. Because of the extensive military operations involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan. In addition, for a contrived revolt, they should be assigned the specific responsibility for developing the military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by the United States were an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCLANT has developed a specific concept for political and military action in Cuba.

#### CINCLANT CONCEPT

22. The CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in Cuba, followed by overt, large-scale US military operations. The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18 months. Supporting operations by CIA, State, and USIA will be required.

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23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban Government (FCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and the development of a suitable cover plan.

24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by CINCLANT of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 January 1964. This plan calls for infiltrating of UW forces into Cuba for area assessment, establishing guerrilla bases, developing military units, establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would accelerate subversive operations to create conditions favorable for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for employment of conventional forces.

25. CINCLANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by D-Day OPLAN 316, about 3 August 1964.

26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's excellent counter guerrilla ability. This time requirement appears to be excessive, but it could be shortened. The criteria for United States recognition of a new government could be met in this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:

- a. Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery.
- b. Was administering it with general acceptance by the population; and,
- c. Was prepared to honor international obligations.



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27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are approximately:

(1) Headquarters, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (JUWTF)	-	6 Off	42 EM
(2) UW Operating Base	-	36 Off	482 EM
(3) Support Units	-	15 Off	331 EM
(4) Special Forces	-	1 Group Headquarter (reinf.) 2 Companies (reinf.)	
(5) Submarines	-	2	
(6) APD	-	1	
(7) SEAL Teams	-	1	
(8) Air Commandos	-	150 Personnel 20 Aircraft 4 Air Control Teams	
(9) CIA Forces	-	Internal and External assets as required by CINCLANT.	

28. CINCLANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time, however, a nucleus JUWTF staff is included within the CINCLANT staff and has the capability for preparing UW plans for normal contingencies. Planning or conducting UW operations of the magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond current capabilities.

29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the activation of the JUWTF as a separate organization and the assignment to it of full wartime headquarters complement of 48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be required. Approval of any concept in principle or for planning purposes, however, would not necessitate the

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activation of a separate headquarters. In this case, CINCLANT would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept recommended, concerning the use of Cuban nationals in UW operations, that "As practical, the Military Services should initially form their Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units . . .". It is considered that the creation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Force" in anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316 is a risk which cannot be justified and should not be undertaken. There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be formed into small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be used in this role. It would be appropriate for the CIA in a supporting role to select and train the individuals forming them into teams of appropriate size to be made available for joint use by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary.

31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, see JCSM-350-63.

32. The force levels in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 are adequate to cope with the improved Cuban military capability and the presence of Soviet troops on the island.

33. The experience of the JMWTF during the Cuban crisis in October 1962, indicates that the present military supply system in the CONUS will be unable immediately to provide equipment and supplies in the required configuration for projected UW operations in Cuba. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equipment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.

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34. The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT does not provide an exact plan in detail for contriving a revolt in Cuba. However, his general concept would provide for:

"a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion, unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and finally full-scale invasion in that order, if necessary.

b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point in the process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government favorable to US interests.

c. An ambiguous atmosphere during the critical phases in its development which would not present the Soviets with a direct confrontation of power until events would preclude timely action on their part to prevent our intended result in Cuba.

d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban Government in exile and the final, decisive military action.

e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements in the US for political and military support without depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success of the plan.

f. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all US military posture, until the final decisive stages of the plan are ready for execution, thus reducing maldeployment time.

g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish the defeat of Castro communism.

h. A definite time scale of events culminating in the defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing the groundwork for the installation of a government compatible with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October 1964."

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35. CINCLANT, in sum, proposes that the United States should provide the necessary support to establish a Free Cuban Government (FCG) on Cuban soil about 15 July 1964. Once established, no matter how precariously, the FCG would request and would receive US assistance. Control of the steps in fomenting the revolt would be from outside of Cuba, thus obtaining maximum flexibility. Operations could be terminated quickly if so desired. Exact timing of the emplacement of the US chosen revolutionary government could be achieved as desired. A feasible cover plan to mask the marshalling of the forces in the Southeastern part of the United States could be generated by a plausible adjustment of the FY 1965 Exercise Schedule plus other actions as appropriate.

36. The CINCLANT concept would require the positioning of augmented CIA assets on the island for at least six months or more and great care would have to be exercised to avoid taking unacceptable security risks or creating easy intelligence targets for the communists. The over-all time required for the execution of UW and the scale of guerrilla activities in the concept is apparently based on transportation and infiltration methods used by the CIA in past operations. In addition, political considerations in the past have restricted the fullest exploitation of the introduction and use of friendly agents in Cuba. Lifting of political limitations and the use of modern equipment and techniques and the full use of all Service capabilities in this field might reduce the time period required.

37. Comparison of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two major options indicates:

a. Engineered provocations would be more easily implemented militarily and involve smaller amounts of men, money, and equipment. Timing and operations could be controlled better than in a revolt. Activities would be less susceptible to detection by the Castro security forces because they



could be staged outside of Cuba. In fact, some incidents could be made credible even to Castro. As compared to a revolt, the incidents could impress otherwise indifferent Latin American nations with the threat to their own countries. As international tension developed and heightened, progressive and orderly marshalling of US forces could be achieved. The risk of compromise would be lower since few, if any, foreign nationals would be involved. For this same reason, the quality of the execution of plans would be higher. Conversely, it should be recognized that there are risks involved in the deliberate creation of international tension. Unforeseen reactions to a provocative incident could cause the loss of US control of events.

b. Supporting a fomented revolt would present the United States to the world as coming to the assistance of a people fighting for freedom rather than avenging a wrong or injury to its own citizens or properties. It would identify US intervention more closely with the ideals and aspirations of the freedom-seeking Cubans and thereby more readily attract their support and assistance. The covert support of Cuban resistance offers a means of subjecting Castro to internal pressure. The disclosure of US support for a resistance group would occasion less world censure than the compromise of a contrived incident. The covert process of fomenting a revolt would produce collateral benefits such as by providing better intelligence and by developing indigenous Cuban organizations which would be useful in an invasion and in the successor regime. However, in comparison with contriving an incident, fomenting an uprising would be a more complex operation requiring greater time for planning and preparation and more in-country assets. In view of the past problems in infiltrating agents into Cuba and of obtaining reliable information out of Cuba, it would be



extremely difficult to foment a large scale timed uprising in proper relation of US preparations to exploit it. Preservation of security would be more difficult because it would involve at least some Cubans of untested reliability.

c. Either of these concepts would complement effectively the course of action recommended to you in JCSM-360-63. Therein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the United States should be prepared to support a spontaneous revolt that shows reasonable promise of success, and that intelligence and UW assets in Cuba should be augmented as feasible. Intelligence flowing from a resistance framework could contribute significantly to the design and timing of provocative incidents. Pressure on Castro from within could cause him to resort to actions which would lend credence to further contrived incidents. Conversely, incidents generated between Castro and other powers, if properly publicized in Cuba, could encourage resistance.

38. An analysis of the foregoing indicates that engineered incidents would provide greater advantages in control, timing, simplicity and security than would a fomented revolt. The analysis also indicates that it would be most difficult to generate a widespread, effective revolt. However, the staging of a local uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.

40. Review of the foregoing leads to the conclusions that:

a. The United States should:

(1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for overt US military intervention in Cuba.

(2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, commencing with the intensification of intelligence collection and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for guerrilla activity.



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~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist government.

b. Implementation of the above would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan.

41. See summary, paragraph 2.

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(Rev. 5/13/63)

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Appendix

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13 May 1963

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to the

HOLDERS OF JCS 2304/189 - 9123/3100

A Report by the J-5

on

COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE 11) (U)

THIRD CORRIGENDUM

Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised paper and to destroy the superseded paper in accordance with security regulations.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II) (U)

## SECOND CORRIGENDUM

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COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE III) (U)

JCS 2304/189 is withdrawn from consideration by the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in light of JCS 2304/194-1. - 9/23/3100 (30 May 63)

M. J. INGELTOD

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

1st N/H of JCS 2304/189

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10019  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/149  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JOINT SECRETARIAT  
FROM : M. J. INGELIDO / R. C. FORBES  
TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
TITLE : UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE REQUIREMENTS FOR CUBA  
DATE : 02/04/63  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, CUBA  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
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CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 5. Memo from Joint  
Secretariat to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with attached  
CIA memo and appendix.



202-10002-10019

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: CIA / ~~Sec~~

Date: 30 Jan 03

Subject: TOP SECRET

Original Level of Classification: TS

Third Agency Equities: CIA

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

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Pages 897 - 899, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE REQUIREMENTS FOR CUBA (TS)

The enclosed memorandum by the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence, dated 30 January 1963, subject as above, with its Appendix, is referred to SACSA for appropriate action.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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APPENDIX

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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30 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, CINCLANT  
SUBJECT: Unconventional Warfare Requirements for Cuba (TS)  
REFERENCE: Memorandum from ACOS Plans, CINCLANT  
Same subject dated 10 October 1961\*

1. This Agency has previously committed itself to hold in readiness for an indefinite period at Midwest Depot a 5000-man pack of U.S. weapons for CINCLANT UW use against Cuba.

2. As discussed with Col. J.A. Cook, USA, J58, during a recent visit by Mr. Edward H. Hinkle of this Agency, urgent requirements on us in other parts of the world make it very difficult to maintain such a pack in an indefinite hold status.

3. You are accordingly advised that we are unable to continue our commitment for a 5000-man pack on call. However, in any future contingency, we would be pleased to consider assistance to CINCLANT in this matter, based on our capabilities at the time.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

/s/ F. H. CHANDLER

\* Not on file in Joint Secretariat

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Appendix

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ENCLOSURE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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30 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
SUBJECT: Unconventional Warfare Requirements for Cuba

Attached for your information is a copy of a memorandum being sent to Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, CINCLANT, through the CIA Representative.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

/s/ F. H. CHANDLER

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JCS 2304/149

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Enclosure

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10020  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/168  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JOINT SECRETARIAT  
FROM : M. J. INGELIDO / R. C. FORBES  
TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
TITLE : USE OF CUBAN NATIONALS  
DATE : 03/13/63  
PAGES : 5  
SUBJECTS : UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Memo from Joint  
Secretariat to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with attached  
letter from CINCLANT and enclosure.



202-10002-10020

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: CINCLANT

Date: 13 MAR 63

Subject: Use of Cuban Nationals

Original Level of Classification: \_\_\_\_\_

Third Agency Equities: CIA SUR 050

Remarks: Disputed

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

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13 March 1963

Page 986

DATE: JUL 23 1997

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

USE OF CUBAN NATIONALS (U) \*

Reference: JCS 2304/167

The attached letter from CINCLANT, dated 11 March 1963, on the above subject, together with its enclosure, is referred to the J-5 for consideration in connection with the action directed by JCS 2304/167.\*

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

2304/167 w/enclosure &  
\* reviewed as 2304/171

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THE ATLANTIC COMMAND  
AND  
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET

11 MAR 1963

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Dear Max:

As you requested during Rear Admiral Leverton's briefing on the 316 OPLAN, my views on the training and use of Cuban nationals are presented for your consideration. Essentially, they represent an expansion of the ideas contained in my letter\* to you of 7 March 1963 in which I proposed a schedule of activities to include the use of Cuban nationals.

In general, I feel that we can make good use of all Cubans that are made available to us. Besides any actual military value, they are bound to be a definite psychological asset. In an unconventional warfare role their ability to blend into the country, in comparison with US nationals, is obvious.

I recognize that in utilizing these people there are certain difficulties. Obviously we will have to utilize them in such a manner as to avoid taking unacceptable security risks or creating easy intelligence targets for the communists.

In summary, my convictions are that we should adopt a plan of action that makes maximum use of all available Cuban

\* Attachment to JCS 2304/167  
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED Page 1 of 2 Pages

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nationals and get it started right away. With these thoughts in mind, the attached outline concept for their utilization is forwarded for such use as you and the Joint Staff desire.

With kindest personal regards,

*Denny*  
ROBERT L. DENNISON  
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Encl:

(1) Outline Concept

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Department of Defense  
Washington 25, D. C.

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Outline Concept

1. General. The use of Cuban nationals for operations in Cuba is both desirable and plausible. The utilization of the maximum number of Cubans in a practical plan, that is commensurate with their abilities and the requirements of the situation, should prove to be a significant contribution in achieving US/OAS goals in Cuba.

2. Unconventional Warfare (UW) Operations.

a. The numbers of personnel who may be used in a covert role is limited due to the security risks involved. Cuban refugees who are true patriots and possess the characteristics needed for unconventional warfare operations may have relatives in Cuba that would be the basis for subjecting them to undue pressures from the communist regime and thereby invalidate their utility for this purpose. Above and beyond this consideration is the largely unsolvable problem of being able to check individuals sufficiently for sensitive tasks to be absolutely sure they are not communist agents. Expedited action to determine the security status of all Cuban nationals in the military service would be most helpful in establishing the number available for sensitive missions.

b. Training for covert operations can not be closely held for long periods of time. These activities are vulnerable to communist efforts of observation and infiltration as any significant group of Cubans will become an inviting communist intelligence target. Any course of action adopted must provide reasonable safeguards against these dangers. However, we believe these problems can be resolved and at the appropriate time Cuban nationals may be utilized for covert UW operations, for raids or integrated into existing US Special Forces detachments, Seal Teams and Air Commando detachments that have been tabbed for operations in Cuba. Since any US sponsored forces conducting UW operations would be involved not only in sabotage but in seeking opportunities to generate or support revolts, uprisings and guerrilla activity, these Cuban nationals should be very advantageous to us in carrying out these missions. However, to use them piecemeal outside the framework of an over-all plan would represent inefficient utilization of limited resources.

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Enclosure (1)



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c. As practical, the Military Services should initially form their Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units in order to maximize security, facilitate training, develop esprit de corps, and facilitate scrutiny by US counter-intelligence agencies. They should be given UW type training less those subjects which are obviously unnecessary, such as language and area orientation.

3. Conventional Force Operations.

a. There are a number of possible uses for Cuban nationals; however, their greatest potential is related to those military roles for which the Army has responsibility, as follows:

(1) Initial consideration should be given to the development of ranger type companies for use as externally trained guerrillas. Their successful infiltration, under US UW control could prove to be the basis for instigating a revolt or uprising which would pave the way for ultimately applying conventional US/OAS forces to the overthrow of the Castro Communist Government. The use of US UW forces is considered essential as all intelligence data indicates that the Cuban people will require tangible evidence of US support before any significant uprising can be generated. Disclosure of their ultimate use need not be made to the Cubans significantly in advance of their employment.

(2) Other uses for Cuban nationals are in psychological warfare units, as guides and interpreters in assault units and in support of Civil Affairs operations. After these requirements have been satisfied the remaining Cubans should be trained and, at the proper time, organized into a force suitably identified to prove to the world that Cubans are fighting shoulder to shoulder with US/OAS forces to establish a "Free Cuba" that can once again take an honorable place among the American States.

b. The principal requirement for Cuban nationals within the Navy and Air Force in conventional operations is for use as guides, interpreters and liaison personnel. The early integration of these nationals into fighting elements of the Navy and Air Force is limited due to long lead times in training. However, within the naval forces, consideration should be given to the development of an all Cuban raider/commando unit for harassment operations. Such a force could be employed in conjunction with underwater demolition operations, utilizing personnel familiar with the beaches and surrounding terrain.

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RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/138  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : JOINT SECRETARIAT  
TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
TITLE : FUTURE POLICY TOWARD CUBA  
DATE : 01/19/63  
PAGES : 8  
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
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COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1963, Box 3. Memoranda regarding  
possible alternative courses of action toward Cuba.



202-10002-10028

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Cuba

Original Level of Classification: \_\_\_\_\_

Third Agency Equities: \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: JCS 900

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 2304/138-912 3/3100 (2 Jan 63)

A Note by the Secretaries

on

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD CUBA (U)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 18 January 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to forward the memorandum in the Enclosure hereto (pages ii and iii) to the Secretary of the Army in response to his memorandum in the Enclosure to JCS 2304/138.

2. The memorandum was forwarded as JCSM-67-63, dated 19 January 1963.

3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 2304/138.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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Gen. Wheeler (CSA)  
Adm. Anderson (CNO)  
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)  
Gen. Shoup (CMC)

Gen. Hayes (DC/S-P, MO)  
Adm. Riley (D/JS)  
Gen. Reynolds (VD/JS)  
Gen. Unger (J-3)  
Gen. Enrick (J-5)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
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ENCLOSURE



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-67-63  
19 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: Future Policy Toward Cuba (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army, dated 17 January 1963, subject as above, which forwards a memorandum for the President you propose to table at the next meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your proposed draft memorandum for the President and, with the one change indicated below, recommend that it be forwarded to the President for his consideration. Of the two courses of action considered, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the adoption of the first alternative subject to subsequent consideration of timing and content of the program.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it would be desirable to add low-level aircraft flights over Cuba to the type of actions that might be included under the first course of action. It is therefore recommended that the first paragraph of Discussion of Alternative One be rewritten as follows:

"The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the US and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; aggressive air activity to include major deception operations and repeated low-level aircraft flights over Cuba

\* Enclosure to JCS 2304/138

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INTERVALS. NOT AUTOMATICALLY  
DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.10

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Dec On JCS 2304/138

11

Enclosure



~~SECRET~~

designed to embarrass the Castro government and to keep the Castro forces on continual alert; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; aggressive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of US military forces."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Dec On JCS 2304/138

~~SECRET~~

111

Enclosure



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JCS 2304/138

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17 January 1963

Pages 846 - 850, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD CUBA (U)

Reference: JCS 2304/136

The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army, CSAM-19-63, dated 17 January 1963, is referred to the J-5 as a matter of urgency.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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Gen. Reynolds (VD/JS)  
Gen. Unger (J-3)  
Gen. Enrick (J-5)  
Gen. Ingelido (S/JCS)  
Col. Forbes (DS/JCS)

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JCS 2304/138

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ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY  
for the  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
on

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD CUBA (U)

Reference: NSAM No. 213

Memorandum from Deputy Secretary  
of Defense to Mr. Bundy, Special  
Assistant to the President,  
dated 10 January 1963

Memorandum from Secretary of Army  
to Mr. Cottrell, Chairman,  
Interdepartmental Committee on  
Cuba, dated 11 January 1963

CSAM-19-63

17 January 1963

1. (S) The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs considered the future policy toward Cuba this afternoon on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views on 16 January\*.

2. (TS) The results of the meeting today were inconclusive. The committee will be required to reconsider the proposed policy.

3. (TS) As the DOD executive agent, the Secretary of the Army proposes to table the attached memorandum at the next meeting. He had asked for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether or not the first paragraph in quotation marks on page 848 of the attached memorandum or the following alternative paragraph in quotation marks be included in the policy.

4. (U) The Secretary of the Army has requested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be provided by 1600 hours, Saturday, 19 January 1963.

1 Incl

Proposed Memorandum for  
the President

\* JCSM-54-63; JCS 2304/136

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JCS 2304/138

847

GROUP-1

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Enclosure

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~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Future Policy Toward Cuba (U)

We have attached a basic paper concerning our future policy toward Cuba for your consideration. The attached paper does not deal with a fundamental issue on which we need your guidance. The attached paper does not make it clear to the members of this Committee, the departments which they represent and other Government departments and agencies, whether the US Government will actively and boldly pursue its ultimate objective, the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime, or whether the US Government will adopt a substantially less active policy.

If the first course of action is desired, then the following should be inserted in the paper after the first sentence:

"To achieve this objective, the US Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown."

If the second course of action is desired, then the following should be inserted in the paper after the first sentence:

"To achieve this objective, the US Government will be prepared, as appropriate opportunities present themselves, to apply political, economic, psychological and military pressures on the Castro/Communist regime."

Discussion of Alternative One - Active Pursuit of Our Objective

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition

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JCS 2304/138

848

Appendix

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to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the US and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; aggressive air activity to include major deception operations designed to keep the Castro forces on continual alert; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; aggressive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of US military forces.

This alternative has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and materiel and far greater numbers of personnel. This course of action will eventually be almost impossible to conceal. From the standpoint of international politics, the US will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the US for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). The active pursuit of the objective will make it clear that the US will not permit the introduction of a communist base in this hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions by the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere and, once undertaken, it would be difficult to alter this course of action without significant loss of US prestige.

At crucial points along the way it would be necessary at the highest levels to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers.

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JCS 2304/138

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Appendix

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Commitment to this alternative does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

Discussion of Alternative Two - Less Active Pursuit of Our Objective

Adoption of this alternative would, for the most part, preclude actions such as those listed above. Under this alternative, we would exert economic, diplomatic and psychological pressures at a significantly lower level. The types of action sanctioned under this alternative would include intelligence gathering, OAS resolutions and covert activities which could not be attributed to the US Government.

This course of action is not likely to accomplish the objective in the foreseeable future. A far lesser degree of risk for the US is entailed and the expenditures of men, money and materiel in the near future is much smaller. Such a policy would enable the Castro/Communist regime to further consolidate its position, by tightening internal security, strengthening its military posture and further increasing the apathy of the Cuban people. This course of action may aggravate present problems with respect to Cubans in the US and could subject the US to criticism from other hemispheric countries.

On the one hand, this alternative offers a degree of flexibility to move to a more active or less active course of action in the future. On the other hand, however, this alternative gives the US less control over its ability to react in a timely manner to some of the opportunities it may create. If this course is misunderstood as a softening of our position toward Castro/Communism, it may again encourage the Soviets to probe our intentions in a dramatic way.

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JCS 2304/138

850

Appendix

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10029  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : DOD  
FROM : EDWARD G. LANSDALE  
TO : ARMED SERVICE SECRETARIES  
TITLE : COVERT PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS  
DATE : 07/31/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1962, Box 30. Memorandum to Sec. of  
the Army, Sec. of the Navy, Sec. of the Air Force, and  
CJCS from MG Edward G. Lansdale.



202-10002-10029

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: 050

Date: 31 JUL 63

Subject: \_\_\_\_\_

Original Level of Classification: \_\_\_\_\_

Third Agency Equities: \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: JCS 500

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act



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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF  
DATE 1111 22 1997

31 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Covert Paramilitary Operations

Paragraph 2d, Secretary of Defense memorandum to you, subject: "Development of U.S. and Indigenous Police, Paramilitary, and Military Resources," 10 July 1962, assigns me the responsibility of monitoring the development of covert paramilitary operations by the JCS and the Military Departments as required by paragraph 5, NSAM 162. \*

Due to change of personnel on my staff, I am designating Colonel K. M. Lemley (3D-928, extensions 59100/59102) as my action officer for this monitoring.

As indicated earlier, my responsibility for monitoring on behalf of the Secretary of Defense requires that you keep my designated staff officer fully apprised of any planning or pertinent developments by you in this area of activity. This also permits me to represent better your alertness and constructive activities in this field, as I report to the Secretary from time to time.

For your information, Colonel Lemley also will be my staffing point for the coordinating responsibilities assigned me in paragraphs 2c and 2f of the memorandum referenced above.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 24 May 84  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

E. G. Lansdale  
EDWARD G. LANSDALE  
Major General, USAF  
Assistant to the Secretary of  
Defense (Special Operations)

cc: Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

FACE



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10035  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/199

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : JOINT SECRETARIAT  
TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
TITLE : ATTITUDES OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL REGARDING  
SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES  
DATE : 06/21/63  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1963, Box 5. Memorandum from CIA  
routed through the Joint Secretariat to the Joint  
Chiefs of Staff dealing with attitudes of personnel  
within the Cuban government toward the U.S..



202-10002-10035

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator:

JCS/CIA

Date:

17 June 63

Subject:

Attitudes...

Original Level of Classification:

secret

Third Agency Equities:

CIA

Remarks:

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

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JCS 2304/199

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21 June 1963

Pages 1 - 3, incl.

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DATE 3 JUL 22 1997

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

ATTITUDES OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL REGARDING  
THE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES (U)

The enclosed memorandum by the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence for the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 17 June 1963, subject as above, is circulated for information.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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Adm. Riley (D/JS)  
Gen. Reynolds (VD/JS)  
Gen. Unger (J-3)  
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JCS 2304/199

1

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JCS 2304/199 23 230

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it in order to maintain its  
confidentiality.



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ENCLOSURE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
Subject: Attitudes of Cuban Government Personnel  
Regarding the Situation in the United States

1. The following discussion of the attitudes of Cuban Government personnel regarding the current situation in the United States was provided on 13 June 1963 by a resident of Habana who is a usually reliable source and whose employment entails considerable travel in Habana Province and brings him into contact with government officials. Source's comments are derived from his personal conversations with government and Foreign Ministry personnel, with whom he has met frequently during the past few weeks.

2. The second echelon supervision in the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, i.e., the departmental-head level, is of the opinion that Cuba has nothing to fear from the United States until after the 1964 elections. They believe that both the Republican and Democratic Parties consider the Cuban issue in the United States too sensitive and do not, therefore, wish to divert the focus from domestic issues.

3. Cuban Government and Foreign Ministry personnel believe that the Kennedy administration will become further embroiled in racial problems. As a result, the administration will lose more white votes in the forthcoming election than it will gain from the combined Negro vote in the north and south. This

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JCS 2304/199

2

Enclosure



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situation will force the administration to concentrate its efforts on domestic programs designed to improve the lot of the white population. Further, Cuban Government personnel feel that the administration will desist from any dramatic adventure, since such action might prove to be unpopular at the polls. They have, in addition, noted that the administration's attitude toward the Cuban exiles has become hostile, and that the greater the influx of exiles into the United States, the greater the friction between them and the Kennedy administration.

4. These officials have observed that the Soviet propaganda theme to the effect that US intervention in Cuba would mean the beginning of World War III is now echoed through the US press and has made its impact on US public opinion.

5. There is a more subtle feeling detectable in official echelon thinking. These people feel more secure because they believe the White House is taking its advice from the Pentagon and no longer from the Central Intelligence Agency. The official view expressed is that the Soviet military have always claimed that a base in Cuba is not a decisive factor against the United States in any war; likewise, the Pentagon does not believe that a Soviet base in Cuba is decisive in an overall confrontation with the Soviets. In conclusion, it is the Cuban view that the rising US military influence on the White House has obscured much of the political overtones and considerations from the administration's thinking and this, in turn, is leading to a mellowed attitude toward Castro.

6. There are also rumors in official circles in Habana regarding future visits by James B. Donovan. In early June, Bosko Vidakovic, Yugoslav Ambassador to Cuba, said that Donovan was to visit Habana within a few days to negotiate some financial settlement for expropriated US properties and that this might lead to the reopening of consulates. Donovan was also to negotiate for the release of Cuban prisoners on the Isle of Pines.

/s/ RICHARD HELMS  
Deputy Director (Plans)

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JCS 2304, 199

3

Enclosure



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10036  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM : ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC  
TO : SECRETARY OF STATE  
TITLE :  
DATE : 03/21/62  
PAGES : 12  
SUBJECTS : CUBA

LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1963, Box 122. Memoranda related to  
delivery of patrol boats to the Cuban government and  
U.S. opportunity to embarrass Castro.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: OSDDate: 21 MAR 62Subject: Delivery to CUBA of 5 PANOL CRKOriginal Level of Classification: SECRETThird Agency Equities: SECRET

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Page # of PostponementReason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on: 7/21/97



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DATE: JUL 22 1997

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DATE: JUL 10 1997

21 MAR 1962

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF  
DATE: JUL 10 1997

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Recently the Soviets completed the delivery to Cuba of five patrol craft (PC) and eight motor torpedo boats (MTB).

Their characteristics, listed in the inclosure, show that these small vessels are most suitable for transporting personnel and material for subversive purposes to any coast in the Caribbean Basin. It seems likely that the Cuban Government will use these newly acquired PCs and MTBs for transporting arms and men to other Latin American countries in operations similar to those previously attempted in Panama and Hispaniola.

We believe that an opportunity exists for the United States to draw unwelcome attention to these possibilities by publicizing, in our information programs and in international forums, a theme to the effect that: "Since these craft can hardly pose a serious threat to the United States, it is more likely that they are intended for use for subversive purposes directed toward the Caribbean members of the OAS".

By prosecuting this theme we might well reduce the probability that Castro will employ these craft for clandestine operations against other Latin American nations. At the same time we would highlight the threat posed by Cuba to the security of the hemisphere.

The Department of Defense would be prepared to cooperate in any program which the Department of State may consider on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

3ccs-JCS (D-26561)

Inclosure \*

1. Characteristics of Cuban PC/MTB

(Annex to  
JCSM-100-62)

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Signed  
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCSM-100-62  
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13 Aug 86

\* Annex to JCS 2304/48

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SecDef Control No. 1602



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

8 March 1962

TO GENERAL LEMNITZER:

The attached JCSM-180-62 is submitted for signature.

Derived from JCS 2304/48, subject: Cold War Opportunity to Harass the Castro Government (C)

Approved by telephone on 8 March 1962 without change.

Degree of Precedence:

PRIORITY - nature of the proposal

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF

DATE: JUL 1 1997

*J. G. Blouin*  
J. G. BLOUIN  
RADM, USN  
Secretary

Via Director

9/3/62

Recommended Sig.

*John A. Skintz*

10 March 62

Signed *L* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

T



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DATE: JUL 10 1997

JCSM-180-62

10 MAR 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**Subject: Cold War Opportunity to Harass the Castro Government (C)**

1. The expected receipt by the Cuban Government of five (5) patrol craft (PC) and eight (8) motor torpedo boats (MTB) from the Soviets will give Castro a capability to transport men and material for subversive purposes to any coast of the Caribbean littoral.
2. An opportunity exists for the United States to embarrass the Castro Government by publicizing through the Organization of American States, the United Nations and the US Information Service, a theme that these PC/MTB are most likely intended to be used for subversive purposes.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you forward to the Secretary of State a memorandum, similar in substance to the one in the Appendix, which would request his implementation of the suggested theme.

**Distr:**

Chairman, JCS (2)  
CMC (2)                      DIR/PLANS, AF  
DCSOPS                      MarCorps L/O  
Secy to GNO (JCS)       Dir J/S (3)

**For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

**SIGNED**

**L. L. LEMNITZER**  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Attachment**

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 13 Aug 86  
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2-346



5 March 1962

Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a report to be considered at the JCS Meeting, Friday, 9 March 1962.

Subject: J.C.S. 2304/48  
Cold War Opportunity to Harass the  
Castro Government (C)

Background - The CNO has submitted a memorandum to the JCS forwarding a proposal designed to harass the Castro Government.

- The Soviets are expected to deliver five patrol craft and eight motor torpedo boats to the Castro Government.

- It is probable that Castro will use these in future subversive operations in Latin America.

- The CNO believes that the US can embarrass the Castro Government by publicizing that:

a. These craft cannot pose a serious threat to the US.

b. They are, therefore, probably intended for subversive activities against other Caribbean countries.

- The CNO further believes that if effectively prosecuted such a US campaign should reduce the probability that Castro will employ these craft subversively.

Current Report - Contains a memo for SECDEF with the objective of requesting State to exploit this situation in the OAS and over the Voice of America.

Service Comments - The Army, Air Force and Marine Corps are expected to concur with the report as written.

Comments and Recommendation - SACSA recommends that the Chairman, JCS, support the report as written and that CINCLANT and CINCARIB be informed of any action taken by SECDEF.

Approved by *W. H. ...* SACSA

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Director, Joint Staff \_\_\_\_\_ (Concur)(Nonconcur)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Captain G.M. Cunha, USN  
Programs II, SACSA  
Extension 70529

*13 Aug 86*



APPENDIX

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Cold War Opportunity to Harass the Castro Government (C)

1. The expected delivery by the Soviets of five patrol craft (PC) and eight motor torpedo boats (MTB) will provide the Castro Government with a capability to transport personnel and material for subversive purposes to any coast in the Caribbean Basin. A high probability exists that Castro will attempt to utilize these newly acquired PC/MTB's for subversive operations similar to those previously attempted in Panama and Hispaniola. The Annex lists the characteristics and capabilities of these craft.

2. An opportunity exists for the United States to embarrass the Castro Government by publicizing in the Council of the Organization of American States, the United Nations and otherwise, a theme to the effect that:

"Since these craft can hardly pose a serious threat to the United States, it is more likely that they are intended to be used for subversive activities directed towards the Caribbean members of the OAS."

Effective prosecution of this theme could prove beneficial to the United States by reducing the probability that Castro will employ these craft for subversive purposes and, at the same time, will alert the hemispheric nations to the threat.

3. It is recommended that the Department of State exploit the above theme in the Council of the Organization of American and in the United Nations. In cooperation with the US Information Agency, this theme could be propagated over the Voice of American and further disseminated through the facilities of the US Information Service.



# ANNEX

## CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES OF CUBAN PC/MTB

	<u>PC</u>	<u>MTB</u>
Length	170 Ft.	83 Ft.
Draft (max)	6½ Ft.	5½ Ft.
Displacement	380 Ton	60 Ton
Spd Max.	24 Kt.	45 Kt.
Endurance	2300 MI @ 19 Kt. 4200 MI @ 12 Kt.	545 MI @ 45 Kt. 1400 MI @ 22 Kt.
Armament	1 - 3.35", 2-37 mm,  6 Machine-gun, mine racks	2-21" Torpedo Tubes  4-25 mm AA guns Mine laying capability using depth charge racks.
Personnel capacity	Up to 100 men with light equipment or equivalent cargo capacity.	Up to 25 men with light equip- ment or equiv- alent cargo capacity.



JCS 2304/48

10 March 1962

COPY NO. 48

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DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF  
DATE 10/1/97

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 2304/48

A Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations  
on

COLD WAR OPPORTUNITY TO HARASS THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT (C)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 8 March 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 4 of JCS 2304/48.
2. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendix and Annex, was forwarded as JCSM-180-62, dated 10 March 1962, to the Secretary of Defense.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 2304/48.

R. J. BLOVIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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JCS 2304/48

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1 March 1962

Page 364 - 368, incl.

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

COLD WAR OPPORTUNITY TO HARASS THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT (C)

Serial 00179P60

27 February 1962

1. The expected delivery by the Soviets of five patrol craft (PC) and eight motor torpedo boats (MTB) will provide the Castro government with a capability to transport personnel and material for subversive purposes to any coast in the Caribbean Basin. A high probability exists that Castro will employ these newly acquired PC/MTB in future subversive operations similar to those previously conducted against Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

2. This new Cuban subversive capability presents the United States with an opportunity to embarrass the Castro government by publicizing this suggested theme:

"Since these craft can hardly pose a serious threat to the United States, it is more likely that they are intended to be used for subversive activities directed toward the Caribbean members of the OAS."

3. The United States should emphasize this theme in the Council of the OAS, in the United Nations and through US Information Agency media. If effectively prosecuted, it should prove beneficial to the United States by reducing the probability that Castro will employ these PC/MTB for subversive purposes and, at the same time, will alert the hemispheric nations to the threat.

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DOD DIR 5280.10

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364

(Page revised by 1st Corrigendum - 2 March 1962)

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4. It is recommended that:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forward the memorandum in the Enclosure, together with Appendix and Annex, to the Secretary of Defense, with the objective of requesting the Department of State to:

(1) exploit this theme within the Organization of American States and the United Nations and

(2) propagate this theme over the Voice of America and make other dissemination through facilities of the US Information Service.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cold War Opportunity to Harass the Castro Government (O)

1. The expected receipt by the Cuban Government of five (5) 1  
patrol craft (PC) and eight (8) motor torpedo boats (MTB) 2  
from the Soviets will give Castro a capability to transport 3  
men and material for subversive purposes to any coast of the 4  
Caribbean littoral. 5
2. An opportunity exists for the United States to embarrass 6  
the Castro Government by publicizing through the Organi- 7  
zation of American States, the United Nations and the US 8  
Information Service, a theme that these PC/MTB are most 9  
likely intended to be used for subversive purposes. 10
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you forward 11  
to the Secretary of State a memorandum, similar in substance 12  
to the one in the Appendix, which would request his 13  
implementation of the suggested theme. 14

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APPENDIX

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Cold War Opportunity to Harass the Castro Government (C)

1. The expected delivery by the Soviets of five patrol craft (PC) and eight motor torpedo boats (MTB) will provide the Castro Government with a capability to transport personnel and material for subversive purposes to any coast in the Caribbean Basin. A high probability exists that Castro will attempt to utilize these newly acquired PC/MTB's for subversive operations similar to those previously attempted in Panama and Hispaniola. The Annex lists the characteristics and capabilities of these craft.
2. An opportunity exists for the United States to embarrass the Castro Government by publicizing in the Council of the Organization of American States, the United Nations and otherwise, a theme to the effect that:  
"Since these craft can hardly pose a serious threat to the United States, it is more likely that they are intended to be used for subversive activities directed towards the Caribbean members of the OAS."  
Effective prosecution of this theme could prove beneficial to the United States by reducing the probability that Castro will employ these craft for subversive purposes and, at the same time, will alert the hemispheric nations to the threat.
3. It is recommended that the Department of State exploit the above theme in the Council of the Organization of American and in the United Nations. In cooperation with the US Information Agency, this theme could be propagated over the Voice of American and further disseminated through the facilities of the US Information Service.

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ANNEX

CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES OF CUBAN PC/MTB

	<u>PC</u>	<u>MTB</u>
Length	170 Ft.	83 Ft.
Draft (max)	6½ Ft.	5½ Ft.
Displacement	380 Ton	60 Ton
Spd Max.	24 Kt.	45 Kt.
Endurance	2300 MI @ 19 Kt.	545 mi @ 45 Kt.
	4200 MI @ 12 Kt.	1400 MI @ 22 Kt.
Armament	1 - 3.35", 2-37 mm,  6 Machine-gun, mine racks	2-21" Torpedo Tubes  4-25 mm AA guns Mine laying capability using depth charge racks.
Personnel capacity	Up to 100 men with light equipment or equivalent cargo capacity.	Up to 25 men with light equip- ment or equiv- alent cargo capacity.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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TO : DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

23 MAY 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Joints Chiefs of Staff  
Department of Defense

Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security  
Department of State

Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

Director of Special Investigations  
Inspector General, USAF

Assistant Chief of Staff  
Intelligence, USAF

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy

The Commandant  
United States Coast Guard

Director  
National Security Agency

Director, Office of Security  
United States Information Agency

NO JCS OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION: DATE 28 AUG 1989  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE  
CIA

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


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CSCI-3/774, 345

## CUBAN CONTROL AND ACTION CAPABILITIES

This is a working paper, 16 pages, with two attachments: Training of Subversive, Sabotage, and Espionage Agents in Cuba, six pages, and Communism in Cuba, three pages. It describes the types and extent of Cuban government controls of the population in Cuba and summarizes the means by which the Cuban government can place its personnel and use those of other countries for pro-Cuban espionage, subversion, propaganda, and sabotage in other areas, especially Latin America. The paper is based on information available up to the end of December 1962. It is intended solely as a survey and is for BACKGROUND USE ONLY.



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## CUBAN CONTROL AND ACTION CAPABILITIES

Before the events of late October 1962, the Cuban government had been engaged for a little over two years on measures to insure a complete control over the Cuban population under a centralized authority resting largely in the hands of the prime minister, Fidel Castro, and his immediate coterie: his brother Raul Castro, his principal close friend and advisor Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and at a slightly more distant situation INRA chief Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes, Minister of Foreign Relations Raul Roa, and Minister of Education Armando Hart. The centralized control was achieved by a number of means: intelligence and security organization, military reorganization and new organization, economic measures such as rationing and nationalization, and the initiation of a civilian surveillance extending through government, industry, agriculture, and private residences.

At the same time, Cuba directed much attention to a series of projects known as export of the revolution, in other words, the promotion or provocation of revolts similar to the Cuban in any country of Latin America where dissident groups or parties could be found or provided to attack the local government. Cuban efforts took the form of first mounting small expeditions against nearby countries with their own citizens, then of providing dissidents with arms, funds, and instruction. The last part of the program was rapidly expanded into a large-scale training of citizens of other countries in the techniques of revolution: espionage, subversion, sabotage, and all types of unconventional warfare, including propaganda. Cuban leaders were exported along with the techniques and the training.

Combined with both the internal and the external program was a Cuban counterintelligence effort, directed primarily at "counterrevolutionary" groups and organizations in all the countries where exiles from Cuba had gathered. Activities embraced all categories from terrorism and assassination to intensive propaganda and sabotage of installations in the host countries. Cuban government agents for such work included intelligence and security personnel of all levels, legal travelers, government officials, and government facilities such as Cubana Airlines.

In both internal and external activities, the guiding hand of the Soviet Bloc, particularly the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China, was evident to varying degrees. Many aspects of the Cuban programs could not have been carried out without external support in terms of funds, experience, and expert training. Such aid the Cuban government obviously received. In return, it furnished a base for Bloc activities and operations in the Western Hemisphere, a cheaper and more adaptable location for training, and a convenient way-station for travel and shipment.



When the missile situation developed, Cuban controls were tightened in every possible way. On the island itself, a military alert called out both regular and reserve forces of all categories and gave greater latitude to the imposition of security measures, including arrests of suspected dissidents. Nationalization and rationing were extended and intensified, residential and industrial controls were strengthened, and the usual military precautions of a threatening international situation, such as censorship and travel restrictions, were strictly enforced. Abroad, sabotage was increased, agents were examined, official personnel were removed or transferred if their loyalty was in doubt, and propaganda was exploited to the full. Efforts to penetrate exile groups and interfere with or expose exile plans were expanded, and more varied means were used. Access to Cuba was denied to all except carefully authorized visitors, and travel from Cuba was curtailed for anything but official purposes.

The result of the general approach and the emergency enforcement of controls has been to deny information to the outside world except as the Cuban government wished to give it and greatly to restrict the possibilities of anti-government action in Cuba. Only a few carefully controlled overt channels were left functioning, and clandestine methods became far more difficult and their exposure more likely. In spite of that, some solid information can still be obtained by analysis of overt material and through clandestine channels and associations, or through liaison in countries which still maintain relations with Cuba. The total possibilities are limited, however, and access to upper echelons of the Cuban government concerned with planning must necessarily be sporadic and accidental.

A knowledge of Cuban official intentions, therefore, is available principally through such means as examination of Cuban official statements, access where possible to responsible members of the government, widespread but localized observation of military movements and civilian controls, observations of foreigners in Cuba and the area they occupy, correspondence between Cuban residents and persons abroad, scrutiny of subversive activities in countries in which Cuba has shown an interest, and recruitment or defection of accessible Cubans abroad who can continue to supply information on official moves. All such means are being pursued, but the Cuban security controls are severe enough to make them less hopeful than in a period of open travel and communication.

#### Civilian Controls.

The Cuban resident and the Cuban economy generally are controlled under the centralized authority to such an extent that individual privacy is difficult and organized opposition to the government hazardous and greatly restricted. The means by which civilian controls are achieved include the following:



a. Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). A national organization of CDR, under a national directorate, has, in descending order, provincial headquarters, municipal offices, suburban offices, and industrial and block committees. The higher echelons supervise the lower, and the lowest, the industrial and block committees, supervise individuals. The committees are generally responsible for observing and reporting, at all levels, expressions of political opinions, especially those unfavorable to the regime; anti-regime sympathies or activities; and any suspicious conduct. They are also charged with insuring maximum support and attendance for government-sponsored rallies and demonstrations. Members of the CDR were chosen from among loyal Communists and supporters of the regime, but anyone considered qualified might be required to join. An ordinary citizen was forced to join a local CDR block committee in summer 1961 under pressure from a security service (he escaped in fall 1962), and such cases were not uncommon. The local committee members often used their positions to work off old scores and to make life difficult for persons they considered suspect. Since most were untrained, however, the system has some weakness, and informants have lost some of their effectiveness because they have been identified. The ordinary citizen can to some extent protect himself by avoidance of controversial statements except among his most trusted friends and by careful concealment of any illegal or suspicious act.

(1) Block committees are the most penetrating level of the organization. The reluctant block committee member cited above was assigned to constant strict surveillance of every move of every person living in the block, stressing particularly activities, visitors, and private ownership of cars. Each person, thus, is subject to constant investigation and surveillance by his neighbors, his friends, and sometimes even his own family.

(2) CDR committees in industrial establishments have a similar surveillance function, extending to all employees and the management. In addition, they are responsible for reporting unjustified absences or intentional damage to equipment, for recommending employees for promotion, and for recruiting likely persons into the militia or reporting those avoiding or refusing recruitment.

(3) CDR committees also exist in government offices, where they have the same function of surveillance, reporting on performance, and observation and reporting of any move contrary to regulations or undermining to the government.

b. Rationing. The poor economic and agricultural situation in Cuba, stemming from the shortage of adequate supervision of agri-



culture, the failure to convert to diversified production, and the lack of coordination (admitted by Guevara in a publicly broadcast speech in early December 1962), has been aggravated by the lack of food supplies caused by the cutting off of imports from Western countries and the inadequate provision made by the Soviet Bloc to cover the deficiency. As a result, rationing of major foods had to be instituted. The CDR was assigned to issue ration books and to control the distribution and sale of all rationed articles, principally food and clothing. That control gave the committees enormous power, both against enemies and for friends. In December 1962, for example, when shoes were very difficult to find, a Habana resident complained that, when a sale of rationed shoes was announced, he promptly went to buy some, only to find that the few pairs released for sale had already been purchased, evidently by persons who has received early notification through some connection.

c. Nationalization. In conformance with the "Socialist" pattern, the Cuban government has taken over most of the industry, commerce, and agriculture of the country. The movement began in 1959 with "intervention" in foreign-owned companies, but was soon extended to the major elements of the economy. Many of the owners of larger holdings fled the country; some who stayed were reimbursed to a minor extent; and many were simply ousted from their property without compensation. The nationalization program has continued steadily; further expropriations were put into effect in fall 1962, and in December 1962 small businesses and such concerns as restaurants and taverns, which had previously been unmolested, were nationalized. The result was consternation among the owners and employees.

d. Price controls. The government has also instituted control of the prices of many products, partly in connection with rationing. An effort is made to keep down black marketing, but even the vigilance of the CDR has not completely succeeded.

e. Restriction of movement. Among the functions of the block committees of the CDR is to report on attempts to remove property from houses whose inhabitants are leaving the country. In addition, as noted above, visitors are reported. Persons staying in hotels, according to a political prisoner who was released in August 1962 and left the country, were subject to arrest if they could not show proper identification. The Ministry of Interior on 4 December 1962 issued an official announcement by government radio that foreign residents or transients entering any public lodging must present documents showing their legality in the country, and owners or managers of such establishments were obligated to report arrivals and departures daily.

f. Restrictions on communications. The Cuban government almost since its establishment has maintained censorship of mail, telephone, and telegraph communications. Employees of the post office, the telephone



company, and the cable companies who escaped from Cuba in 1961 and 1962 agree in confirming the existence of censorship of various kinds. All mail from abroad, for example, passes through the central post office in Habana, where it is examined, sometimes opened, and sometimes---certain publications regarded as anti-regime propaganda, for example---thrown away. Mail censorship is directed mostly against a watch list of correspondents known to oppose the regime, but it extends also to foreigners, to letters without return addresses, to any piece of mail that appears suspicious, and to any suspect person. Money and small objects placed in letters are often removed. Outgoing international mail is subject to the same scrutiny. All long-distance telephone calls, both within Cuba and between it and other countries, are monitored, and those that appear to warrant it are tape-recorded for further study. Telephone monitoring of local calls is concentrated on suspected or known anti-regime persons. Particular attention is given to the telephones of diplomatic establishments, even those of countries friendly to Cuba. Even diplomatic mail is also censored to some extent. Until December 1962, the Soviet embassy alone was privileged to bring in articles duty free under diplomatic privilege, and its immunity was canceled on 4 December, after which it was required to inform the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations about all articles imported, as all other diplomatic missions had been previously required to do. Telegraph messages, including diplomatic communications, have to be approved by a special office before dispatch abroad or delivery to addressees in Cuba, and coded messages are copied for study. The main communications censorship is concentrated in Habana, but monitoring and censoring units exist in all major and many minor towns and communications centers. All censorship is under the control of the security services.

g. Restrictions on travel. During the suspension of regular air travel after 24 October 1962, no Cuban citizen could leave the country except with the authorization of the government---and the tacit acknowledgement that the mission was official. Ordinary citizens desiring to leave Cuba were subjected before that date to a series of controls, and presumably will be equally subject when travel is again possible. In October 1962, delegates of the Ministry of Education and the CDR were taking a census of children aged five to twenty-one for purposes of a compulsory education study; with it a requirement was made that anyone wishing to leave the country must have a power of attorney from a responsible person authorizing the departure. Both parents had to authorize a child's departure, and, if one or both was already abroad, the power of attorney had to be submitted through the Czechoslovak embassy in Washington, D. C. A visa waiver had to be obtained for departure, a process normally requiring about three months. Such visas are a different color from ordinary travel permits.

The reaction to the known civilian controls is an attitude of caution among all levels of the population. Telephone conversations with relatives



abroad are guarded, and, as noted above, true opinions are not expressed except among trusted friends. A retired officer who left Cuba in late November 1962 said censorship was so strict that no one knew what was happening outside his own home town, and no one dared to repeat news of sabotage, uprisings, or firing squad executions for fear of security service reprisals. A former official who had been imprisoned in La Cabana and left Cuba in summer 1962 said that in his opinion many employees of the government were opposed to the regime and that a citizen needing help against regulations was often referred to a sympathetic person in some ministry who assisted him. Against such opinions, however, stand the CDR activities and, equally repressive, the activities of the military and security services throughout Cuba.

In consequence of the international tension in October and November 1962, all civilian controls, from government regulation to informing, were greatly tightened and more severely enforced. In many areas informants were reported as being much more active, many suspects and innocent persons were arrested by civil or military authorities as threats to the regime, and economic controls became stricter. The citizens who remained at home were often forced to contribute part of their rations to support the military forces manned for the defense of the island. After the promise of outside interference was dispelled, greater caution in expressions of sentiments appeared; Cubans talking to relatives or friends in the United States, for example, became much more cryptic in their discussions of local situations and conditions and careful about their comments on the government. The disappointment in cancellation of action also caused the withdrawal of many persons from any show of support for anti-government ideas or actions and produced an attitude of reserve and distrust.

#### Military and Security Controls.

The military and security forces of the Cuban government are as closely integrated into the centralized structure as the civilian agencies. Military forces come under the overall command of Raul Castro, as Minister of Armed Forces, and security forces, except for some police elements and limited military intelligence units, are subordinate to the Castros' close friend Ramiro Valdes. The two groups in combination exercise an even stricter control over the Cuban population than that of the Batista regime, particularly through the addition of a militia which requires participation by all parts of the people. Although strongly centralized in Habana, moreover, the military forces have been organized to permit a more comprehensive direction of the provinces.

A former resident of Cuba estimated that in August 1962 there were 350,000 to 400,000 men in the army and air force, besides the reserves such as the militia units in work centers and the large inactive militia. In addition,



In December 1962 a former government official estimated the strength of the navy at 5000 to 6000 regulars, plus a large number of members of the Union of Young Communists attached to naval vessels. Organizations and reorganizations of the armed forces since 1959 have brought an increasingly centralized control. Under that, the army and the navy is each divided into three operational groups, covering the eastern, central, and western sections of the island, respectively. The army maintains a garrison arrangement throughout each area; the navy maintains command of the seas in each of its divisions but shares command of the shore posts with the militia. The function of the military services is largely protection against foreign invasion, but military officers and units also participate in general police functions, supervise prisons, and act as part of the civilian security forces, many of whose officers are still military personnel with military titles, often in uniform.

The formation of the militia under the Castro regime introduced a new element into the Cuban military picture. Its character is apparently that of a home guard, combined with that of the fighting groups known in Communist countries like East Germany. Membership in it is virtually compulsory. Each business and industrial establishment, agricultural enterprise or collective, and government office is required to have its militia organization, formed from employees and local residents, and each municipality likewise has its militia contingents. All the local groups come under a national headquarters in Habana. Until early fall 1962, the militia appeared to be replacing the revolutionary army, and its reserve units were considered a formidable military force. Militia were reported guarding military and government installations, policing villages and the countryside, handling guard and checking duties in government, commercial, and industrial establishments, and generally appearing as a specialized ubiquitous military police force. Whether in uniform or civilian clothes, the members were as well armed as the army and apparently as well supplied.

About September 1962, a change in the militia status appeared, with reports from many refugees that the militia were having to turn in their arms and that they were being investigated for subversive tendencies. A former militia member reported that he was recruited by the security service to provide information about the activities and political opinions of his unit, and there were other evidences of distrust of the militia by higher authorities.

When the international situation became tense in late October 1962, the militia was called out, along with other forces, to protect Cuba. Militiamen were assigned to additional patrols throughout the island and were used to prepare and defend trenches and obstacles on all the coasts. Active and reserve units were virtually absorbed into the army. The men in the trenches, however, were not well supplied; many had to obtain rations from home after a short period during which they were supplied officially. As the season advanced, many complained about the lack of clothing, particularly shoes, and their exposure to rain and discomfort.



The military reaction to the threat of an invasion, however, indicated that the Cuban government had learned a lesson from the abortive invasion of April 1961. The defensive positions around the island were better prepared and provisioned, and the prompt mobilization was relatively well organized. Military and civilian measures were imposed which made any advance, even after a successful landing, very difficult for any but a large invading force. Along with the purely military preparations, there was a considerable increase in military and civilian arrests and imprisonment of suspected persons, and a general tightening of prison discipline. A military and security threat amounting to implied and sometimes actual terrorism was quite effective.

Even before the period of tenseness, military establishments and many civilian industrial and commercial sites were provided with defense in the form of weapons placed on roofs and caches of arms and ammunition within easy reach. Plans were in force for the establishment of control points and arms and ammunition supplies in the main cities, especially Habana, and at useful points in the country. Beginning in October 1962, plans and arrangements for military defense have continued, with the provision of emergency stores, communication points, and unit locations.

The function of the Cuban Navy in the general defense picture was the safeguarding of the coasts. Watchers were posted at all likely points, and during the night small naval craft patrolled exposed parts of the coast. No sound detectors or anti-submarine nets were put out in any ports, but the Bay of Santiago de Cuba was closed at El Morro at night by a chain of tanks, and the major harbors were guarded. During the period of invasion threat, patrols were increased close to the shore, and additional guards were placed on naval installations.

Although the main security mission of the government was transferred from the military to the civilian sector in 1961, the military forces each retained an intelligence function, principally for the security of forces and installations. The G-2 of the army, the navy, and the air force is each responsible for personnel and protection of its own resources, with the Army G-2 (G-2 ER) exercising a supervision of those of the other two groups. The principal interest of the G-2 units appears to be subversion in the armed forces. Subversion apparently is understood to mean opposition to Castro as much as to the government, and personnel suspected of such disloyalty are disciplined, transferred, demoted, and otherwise rendered harmless to the ruling clique. In the period after the main excitement, the army was reported to be better in morale and discipline, as well as better armed and equipped, than the militia or any other forces.

The formation of the Ministry of Interior in 1961 and the transfer to it of all the major security services, which had previously been under military



control and were generally referred to as G-2, brought together the former police office, the Department of Public Order (Departamento del Orden Publico) (DOP); the National Office of Identification (Gabineto Nacional de Identificacion) (GNI); the CDR; the Department of Immigration; and a new Department of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del Estado) (DSE). The latter absorbed most of the former G-2 functions along with its personnel. Like the militia, the Ministry of Interior spread its units into all parts of the country and into all organizations, using the police units to enforce law and order, the Immigration Department to enforce travel and residence controls, the Censorship Department to control communications, and the CDR and DSE units (still often referred to as G-2) to maintain control of anti-government activities. In December 1962, a well-informed source indicated that the CDR local units were being actually used in surveillance of specified "counterrevolutionary" persons, an indication that the DSE was increasing its capability for a closer hold on the population. The DSE has been generally reported possessing armed positions throughout the country, occupying various well-defended points in Habana, maintaining a country-wide communications network with both cable and radio connections, and being equipped with emergency gear for any circumstance. Like the military forces, it intensified its arrest and imprisonment activities in fall 1962, added guards at ports and airports, and attempted deeper penetrations into possible trouble areas. The close relationship between Ramiro Valdes, Minister of Interior, and the Castros apparently gives the ministry and its subordinate organizations almost unlimited power. The size of its budget indicates that it receives unusual favor in the government hierarchy.

The military and security forces occupy certain areas---military installations, training schools, sensitive areas, and ports---which are denied to the public, usually under armed guard. In addition, areas have been reported throughout Cuba which are denied to almost all Cubans, even military officers in command positions and militia leaders. Such areas are generally believed to be occupied by foreign personnel, military and civilian, principally Soviet but in some cases Czechoslovak or Chinese. The commander of the Central Cuba Military District was reported in October 1962 to have been denied admittance to such an area and to have obtained access only on orders from Habana. The restricted areas, including known and suspected missile sites, are so carefully controlled that materials and equipment for use in them are deposited at the entrance and taken on from there by the foreign personnel inside, using their own trucks and other equipment.

Within Cuba, the Cuban Communist Party provides the government with an extra means of disciplining and controlling the population. Following the model of the classic Communist states, Cuba has reorganized its Party into an effective control mechanism. Beginning in mid-1961 with the acknowledgement that the regime was Communist, the Party has been brought closely into the central government structure, and the Party power has been consolidated in the hands of the two Castros and their coterie. Part of the reorganization was the struggle for power between the "old" Communists and the "Fidelistas" who came



into prominence through the revolutionary campaign. The shift to persons loyal to Castro was typified by the removal of Rebel Army men from many command positions, the transfer of intelligence functions from the military to the civilian side, and the pulling together of a taut Party organization whose members were required to show loyalty to the regime. The operation was scheduled to be completed by January 1963, and announcement of the formal installation of the new United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) was to follow.

The strengthening of the Communist structure contributes to control of the people in several ways. A demand for loyalty to Castro insures that each Party cell will provide a watchdog organ at all levels of government, industry, and private life, paralleling the CDR but stricter in attention to anti-regime sentiment. Centralized control of a loyal Party also permits increased use of Party and front organizations to propel the populace toward the official line. Attendance at some schools was always contingent on proper indoctrination, and other privileges are becoming increasingly influenced by Party support. The front organizations, for culture, instruction, industry, etc., are expanding to draw in persons not qualified or not desirable for regular Party membership. Thus larger segments of the population are subjected to Communist indoctrination and control, with the concomitant of increased supervision of their leisure as well as regular activities.

The controls exercised in Cuba by foreigners are not so obvious as the Communist, but some are known to exist. Mention has been made of the areas restricted to Cubans because of Soviet or other foreign occupancy. In many of the major government ministries, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Communications, rooms or even whole floors of buildings have been set aside, with strict security precautions, for the use of Soviets. In both the ministries named above, special equipment, including microwave, cable, and apparently direction-finding facilities, has been installed. Soviet advisors have been seen, although they try to be unobtrusive, in many higher-level government offices, and even when they are not seen their presence is indicated by the necessity to consult some separate office when a policy decision is to be made. In the intelligence field, two independent sources have reported that the Cuban security services have been greatly improved since they were taken in hand by the Czechoslovaks. The instruction given to some Cubans in military techniques may also be duplicated in police and intelligence work, as appears from the reported presence of Soviet or Czechoslovak instructors at training sites.

An extension of foreign interest abroad is indicated by the numerous known cases of Cubans going to the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and other Bloc countries for specialized training. Cuban students have included airplane pilots and technicians, technicians of various other kinds, university students, cultural groups, and persons sent for varying periods of political indoctrination; some of the government officials whose attitude was considered incorrect were sent to the USSR or on travels in the Soviet Bloc for both formal training and persuasion through discussion. Some at least returned with a more severely Communist attitude and renewed devotion to the principles of the Cuban revolution.



As is pointed out below, Cuba also acts as a staging area for the travel of Communists and front personnel from other countries to the Soviet Bloc for indoctrination and training.

#### Cuban Capabilities Abroad.

The Cuban government, making use of its military, security, diplomatic, and other services, began in 1959 shortly after its inauguration to pursue a threefold objective: achievement of recognition and status for the Castro regime, protection of the regime from opposing elements, and "export of the revolution" to the Latin-American countries. In accordance with its aims, it has continued since 1959 to export propaganda favorable to Cuba through all possible media, to send out emissaries to penetrate and frustrate the activities of anti-Castro groups and to collect information on countries opposing Castro, and to offer assistance, funds, training, and leadership to any group or organization interested in harassing or overthrowing the established governments of Western Hemisphere countries.

In the promotion of its foreign aims, the Cuban government employs all the resources available to a totalitarian state. It is capable of placing agents for propaganda, subversion, sabotage, and espionage through official means in any country with which Cuba maintains diplomatic relations or where official international bodies are in session, and through unofficial means in almost any country. Some of the methods by which it can accomplish such placements are the following:

a. Legal travel permits. Anyone wishing to leave Cuba must have government permission. Persons the government wishes to send out, whether on an official mission or ostensibly as private citizens, are issued a squarish white exit permit, containing only essential biographic data and a photograph, and distinguished from the normal refugee exit visa by color and the absence of perforations for machine processing. Such permits are obtainable within two to three days. Of course, if the government wishes to conceal its interest in a traveler, it can issue the normal visa and date it for the usual three-month delay. It has been noted by several refugees that some travelers who are seen off at the airport in Habana by government officials later appear as refugees or defectors; their status as genuine refugees is thus suspect.

b. Suppression of travel information. Numerous instances have been reported of travelers who wish to conceal the fact that they have visited Cuba. For such persons the Cuban government issues visas to Cuba on separate paper, so that no mark of entry to Cuba appears in the regular passport. An American citizen, for example, can enter Mexico with a tourist card, not even a passport, and obtain a separate visa to Cuba from the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. He can go to Cuba and return, supplied with a new tourist card obtained in Cuba, without any indication that he has ever been there. Separate visas can be issued



to any citizen of any country for entry to Cuba. Moreover, if the person wishes to travel in Soviet Bloc countries without revealing it, he can obtain visas for his objectives in Cuba and can travel thence either with his own passport or with a Cuban passport issued in Habana and show no evidence of his travel in his own documents. It has also been reported that the Cuban government has agents traveling in Latin-American countries on passports issued by the Brazilian government and others, which conceal their Cuban nationality.

c. Carriers. All normal airline traffic to Cuba was cut off in late October 1962 in the emergency. As of late December 1962, no Western air traffic had entered Habana since the blockade, but the Czechoslovak airline, CSA, continued regular flights from Prague during the emergency, under established air agreements. The USSR, which announced a regular service between Moscow and Habana in summer 1962, has also made several flights into Cuba, although by no means maintaining a regular schedule. In addition, the official Cuban airline, Cubana, after a brief interruption, has made fairly regular flights to Mexico, carrying mail and cargo as well as passengers. The Czechoslovak, Soviet, and Cuban flights are available to the Cuban government for the dispatch of persons from Cuba to European points and the Western Hemisphere. Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomats, for example, have made extensive use of the service to Mexico, and there has been considerable travel on the European flights. In addition, Iberia Airlines has made a very small number of flights from Madrid, patronized primarily by Cubans.

It is well established that the Cuban government makes use of the Cubana flights for espionage purposes. An experienced Cubana flight employee reported that he often saw Cuban agents aboard making air photographs. Cargo delivered by Cubana has been found to contain propaganda materials and even sabotage materials. It has, moreover, been a common practice to assign intelligence agents to Cubana as crew members, ground crew members, technicians, or airport personnel, as well as business representatives. One such suspect intelligence agent is the Cubana office manager in a Latin-American country. Both permanent and transient personnel are handled by such means.

During the air travel embargo, the Soviet Bloc air services and Cubana have been the principal means of moving airmail and air cargo from Cuba to other points. Cuban mail for the United States, for example, has traveled by Cubana to Mexico and thence to U. S. addresses. Cuban mail for Europe can be assumed to travel by one of the Bloc carriers.

d. Illegal travel. The Cuban government controls illegal travel for two purposes: to prevent the movement of unauthorized persons and to promote the movement of authorized ones. Refugees who have escaped from Cuba by boat, for example, have reported on the difficulties of evading coast watchers and patrols. Those who succeeded usually pretended to be fishing, in company with a known fisherman or using his boat, and tried to get far enough out so that they could evade the coastal patrol craft under cover of darkness. In several



instances, members of such escape parties have appeared to use the method as a means of establishing themselves as genuine refugees, arriving at a haven in company with other true refugees. Identification by other Cubans, discrepancies in stories, or unusual documents or equipment have often led to their interception and removal from the refugee stream, but many have undoubtedly succeeded.

Another facet of the escape method is its use by intelligence and security services in Cuba as a provocation. Many instances have been recorded of persons offering to assist those wishing to escape, either by procuring boats or by introducing the prospect to someone who can help, and then betraying the escapee. Sometimes the escapees have been caught when already embarked and under way; at other times they have been arrested on land at some point in their departure preparations.

e. Placement of personnel in official positions. The Cuban government is known to have made extensive use of its official representatives abroad for the placement of intelligence agents, propaganda disseminators, and training or guidance officers for foreign subversive groups. In the six Western-Hemisphere countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations, Cuba has intelligence representatives in all but one, Canada, where the absence of intelligence operations by diplomats was firmly stated by a late 1962 defector. Members of embassies and consulates in the other five countries have been positively identified as security service personnel, and in some cases have been expelled for unauthorized activities. Security and intelligence personnel are also known to be stationed in Cuban diplomatic establishments in Europe and Africa. Delegations to international organizations such as the United Nations also include intelligence personnel; two or three members of the Cuban delegation in New York have been positively identified as DSE members. The instigator of the sabotage preparations for which several persons were declared persona non grata and several others were arrested in New York in late November 1962 was a known DSE man. Intelligence personnel have been recognized in other UN organizations. In many instances, intelligence agents have been known to wield much greater power in official missions than their ostensible positions warranted.

f. Placement of personnel in unofficial positions. In addition to Cubana Airlines, the Cuban government commands other resources for placement of security personnel abroad under nonofficial cover. Since all foreign trade is controlled by the government, members of the Ministry of Foreign Trade traveling abroad or stationed abroad, and employees of companies under the ministry can be used for espionage, subversion, and similar purposes. In several Latin-American countries, the presence of such persons has become evident from their intervention in special shipments, or from their contacts with local subversive groups.

The missions assigned to security personnel abroad cover a wide field. One of the main objectives of the security services, both inside and outside Cuba, has from the beginning been the penetration and frustration of anti-government groups. The refugee centers at various points in the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, have always been a busy operating ground for security personnel. Agents are of two types: Cubans permanently resident in the area who appear to



be opposed to the Castro regime, and refugees arriving in the area ostensibly escaping from persecution in Cuba. Both types try to join refugee groups and rise to positions in which they can obtain information about the group plans and intentions and as far as possible either frustrate them or cause such dissension that the group is made ineffectual. Penetration agents have been apprehended in the United States and in other areas, sometimes after a considerable period of concealment as genuine sympathizers with the group, and many undiscovered undoubtedly continue to operate. Cubans already established in an area may serve the Castro regime by penetration of a group, by winning the confidence of individual refugees and discouraging or misleading them, and by supplying contact points, support, equipment, and facilities for other agents. A case in point is that of Jose Garcia Orellano in New York, one of the persons arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in late November 1962, who had been in New York as a resident for a considerable period and permitted the use of his business establishment for caching sabotage materials and for meetings.

In that context, another mission of security agents abroad, pursued with some success, is the sabotaging of industrial and other installations in the host country. The sabotage plot frustrated in New York was directed against large commercial establishments. An abortive plot in Miami was directed against a well-known anti-Castro leader. The sabotage of oilfield installations in Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, in late October 1962 was apparently ordered, if not performed, under Cuban direction. Other sabotage missions are known to be in preparation for other areas, and extensive training and guidance are being provided by the Cubans for such purposes.

A very important part of the Cuban security activities abroad is the promotion of pro-Cuban sentiments. In all countries where Cuba has official representation, and in others to which it has unofficial access, friendship societies for Cuba have been formed under the direction of Cuban agents. The local members are usually leftists, Communists, or other anti-government elements. The greatest potential of such groups is publicity for Cuba, through demonstrations, publications, use of information media, and word-of-mouth propaganda, but their potential for subversion and sabotage is also a by no means negligible feature. In addition, the Cuban government uses its intelligence as well as its official personnel for the distribution of pro-Cuban propaganda wherever possible. The Cuban news agency Prensa Latina, with offices in many Latin-American countries, is one of the agencies in which intelligence personnel are known to operate. The Cuban Foreign Minister, Armando Hart, was also the bearer of a large shipment of propaganda materials on an official visit to a Latin-American country and was much upset when the shipment was confiscated by the local government.

For propaganda, subversion, and sabotage purposes, the Cuban government through Cubans stationed or traveling abroad makes use of dissidents and



Communist groups in many countries. In all the Latin-American countries, there are known Cuban links with such groups, sometimes the official Communist Party of the country but more often radical groups associated with the Party but operating as separate entities, such as the Action Vanguard (VAN) in Panama. Cuban agents pay frequent visits to group leaders, supply them with funds and propaganda and sabotage materials, and bring their personnel to Cuba for training in subversion, sabotage, and espionage techniques. On 27 December 1962, for example, a group of Guatemalan Communists set off for Cuba, some to remain there, others to continue to the Soviet Bloc for training and liaison. Cuban officials were involved in the illegal departure from France of a group of Dominican Communists in late December 1962. From August to November 1962, Cuban sympathizers traveling in Panama were investigating the potential of VAN and were said to have promised to finance a VAN rebellion. About September 1962, a delegation from Nicaragua or Honduras was promised free arms and ammunition for a revolt. Members of a leftist organization in Peru were receiving propaganda and support secretly from Cuban agents visiting Peru, and some agents remained with the group for some time for training purposes. Many such examples can be cited.

Cuban intelligence and security activities abroad are also directed at Cubans themselves. The DSE is known to station men on Cuban ships to act as watchdogs and informants on crew members and their activities. Even security personnel are not exempt: in December 1962 when two DSE men were recalled from a Latin-American country, they were seen off at the airport in such an entourage that no one could get near them, and arrangements were made with other Cuban embassies at points where the plane touched to meet and chaperone the men, who were thus under constant surveillance until they reached Cuba. Reports from official establishments in various places indicate that Cuban personnel are carefully policed by their own security officers and that full reports on individual activities are required by the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Cuban refugees have always been a primary intelligence target for the Cuban services. The principal objective of all foreign intelligence under the Castro regime in 1959 was the nullification of exile groups and activities, and the first security agents sent abroad were dispatched to areas where such groups congregated. The penetration of refugee organs has been mentioned above. Disruption of refugee activities by all possible means remains a major preoccupation of intelligence services, which strive to eliminate "counter-revolutionary" activity by undermining, frustrating groups, and sometimes even assassinating individuals. Cuban intelligence agents are most frequently found in communities of exiles, such as the areas of Miami and New York in the United States.



## TRAINING OF SUBVERSIVE, SABOTAGE, AND ESPIONAGE AGENTS IN CUBA

From the beginning of the Castro regime in Cuba, even in 1959 at a time when the new government was still consolidating its position and setting up its organization, attention has been given to the training of sabotage, subversive propaganda, and espionage agents in Cuba. Students, particularly from Latin-American countries, were brought in early in 1959 and were given instruction running from political indoctrination to sabotage in hastily-organized schools at various points, mostly in the Habana area. The work of indoctrination and training has continued, with increasingly better organization and equipment, since that time. Students have been brought in from many Latin-American countries and also from other areas and have been trained for various types of activities against the governments in their own countries and, specifically, against U. S. interests both at home and abroad. Many were returned to their own areas equipped with funds, propaganda materials, arms and destruction means, and continuing supplies of such items have reached them periodically since.

Agent training has been reported in the following instances:

a. In September 1961, the Cuban Military Intelligence Service (G-2) was reportedly operating three schools for instruction in terrorist activities and sabotage. In late July 1961, a General Serov, presumably General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, chief of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (GRU), visited Habana in connection with the program (discussed below under individual countries).

b. As of July 1961, a training center was reported operating in Habana under the auspices of the Soviet State Security Service (KGB) to train women espionage agents from the USSR and other Soviet-Bloc countries for activities in Western countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. One of the principal training staff members was allegedly an unidentified Soviet woman. Upon completion of their courses, the girls were documented with Cuban passports issued by Cuban consulates in Rome and Milan and sent to their target areas as Cuban citizens. A large number of young Italian women, fully trained as KGB agents, were allegedly infiltrated thus from Habana into Argentina.

c. In early 1962, the Casa de las Americas in Habana was reported as a contact and recruiting center for Communist agents. Connected with the center was a group called International Labor Brigades (Brigadas Internacionales de Trabajo), composed of volunteers from Central and South American countries and a large number from the United States, receiving training in their leisure time in all phases of revolutionary warfare.

d. In early 1962, a special indoctrination center, occupying the former Institucion del Padre Testion in Bejucal, Habana, Province, was reported training agents, primarily from Latin-American countries, in subversive propaganda activity. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, chief of INRA, was one of the advisors of the center.



Schools for training Latin-American students from all countries included the following:

a. As of April 1962, the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples (Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos) (ICAP), according to one of its Communist employees, was bringing in Latin-American Communist Party leaders for instruction in guerrilla warfare and related subjects. A training course lasting five or six months was given at a guerrilla school in Pinar del Rio Province. Upon completion of the course, the students returned to their own countries to serve as Communist agents, maintaining communication with Cuba through the local Cuban embassies. Before the Castro regime came to power in January 1959, Latin-American Communist leaders were taken to the USSR for instruction. The transfer of the facility to Cuba, with the lower costs of transportation and maintenance there, permitted an increase in the number of trainees. Some selected persons continued to be sent to the USSR for training, however.

b. As of August 1962, ICAP was acting as a cover organization for both training and other activities, for all sorts of Latin-American citizens. Cubans were sent to Latin-American countries to organize subversive activities and recruit local citizens to come to Cuba as guests of the Cuban government for training in Marxism and qualification as secret agents or provocateurs in urban areas or as agitators and guerrillas in rural areas. The headquarters for such schooling was reportedly the Hilton Hotel in Habana. Students brought to Cuba for such training were issued Cuban visas on separate papers so that their passports would not show their entry into Cuba. ICAP handled all customs and controls for the students while they were in Cuba. Some of the students completing the course were chosen for advanced indoctrination and training in Communist China and other Soviet-Bloc countries. They traveled from Cuba either on Cuban passports or with visas on separate paper, so that their visits to Communist countries would not be recorded in their passports.

c. In September 1962 it was reported that on numerous occasions groups of young South Americans were escorted through Cuba as guests of the government and allegedly received sabotage instruction during their visits.

d. On 6 October 1962, the second anniversary of ICAP was publicized in an official television program on Habana CMQ. Among its accomplishments was cited the successful inducement on 10,000 persons to travel to Cuba as guests of the government; ICAP was also said to have arranged the repatriation to Cuba of some 8300 emigres from other countries and to be operating an international sailors' club for the purpose of Communist indoctrination of merchant marine and naval personnel from other countries temporarily visiting or transiting Cuba.

e. As of early October 1962, a special intelligence school in Minas del Frio, Oriente Province (frequently reported earlier), was reported offering a one-month course of instruction to Latin-American students in espionage, subversion,



### The Emergence of PURS.

On 29 September 1962, Castro announced: "By 1 January 1963 we will have a strong and well-organized party." On 20 November, Guevara revealed that by the beginning of 1963 the new Party would be completed with a nucleus of 50,000 to 60,000 members and that a Party congress would then be held. It might be delayed, he said, because of the "mobilization measures necessitated by the crisis of the past month." In late 1962, ORI-PURS units were being formed in the six provinces and 126 municipalities of Cuba, and the following structure was being set up: six provincial directorates (one in each province); regional committees, grouping several municipalities; sectional committees, one for each municipality; and active revolutionary nuclei (Nuclei Revolucionarios Activos)(NRA), basic Party units or cells, in factories, schools, and government components.

In building the new Cuban Communist Party, the ORI adopted procedures characteristic of Soviet Bloc parties. In late 1962, meetings were held at labor centers throughout Cuba to choose the most exemplary workers as "member-candidates" for NRA's. The ORI National Directorate began issuing new Party cards on 2 October 1962. The selection and approval of members of Party cells was controlled by commissions, one for each province, appointed by Castro. The commissions were charged with insuring the proper Marxist-Leninist indoctrination of the member-candidates and their loyalty to the revolution and to Fidel Castro. The political indoctrination of prospective Party members was assigned to a network of Basic Schools of Revolutionary Instruction, operating at municipal level throughout the country. More advanced Schools of Revolutionary Instruction were formed at the provincial level. The national director of the schools is Lionel Soto.

When the organization of the new Party is completed, the ORI is scheduled to assume the new name, PURS, presumably at the ORI congress announced for early 1963. Even in late 1962, occasional references were being made by ORI leaders to the ORI as the United Party of the Socialist Revolution. By the time the congress convenes, Castro should be in firm control of the rank-and-file members and cadre of the new Cuban Communist Party. It is expected that he will be named first secretary and that the leading organs of the Party will be headed by Fidelistas, so that he will have top-to-bottom control of the new Party.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCSM-67-63

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
TO : SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
TITLE : FUTURE POLICY TOWARD CUBA  
DATE : 01/19/63  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
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COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1963, Box 3. A memorandum from CJCS to Secretary of the Army on policy toward Cuba.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: JCS  
Date: 19 Jan 63  
Subject: Future Policy Toward Cuba  
Original Level of Classification: \_\_\_\_\_  
Third Agency Equities: \_\_\_\_\_  
Remarks: JCS 0500

Page # of PostponementReason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on

7/21/97



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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]  
DATE: JUL 22 1997

JCSM-67-63

JAN 19 1963

23 JAN ENT

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

**Subject: Future Policy Toward Cuba (U)**

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army, dated 17 January 1963, subject as above, which forwards a memorandum for the President you propose to table at the next meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your proposed draft memorandum for the President and, with the one change indicated below, recommend that it be forwarded to the President for his consideration. Of the two courses of action considered, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the adoption of the first alternative subject to subsequent consideration of timing and content of the program.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it would be desirable to add low-level aircraft flights over Cuba to the type of actions that might be included under the first course of action. It is therefore recommended that the first paragraph of Discussion of Alternative One be rewritten as follows:

"The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping, propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the US and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; aggressive air activity to include major deception operations and repeated low level aircraft flights over Cuba

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of 2 pages series "A"

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designed to embarrass the Castro government and to keep the Castro forces on continual alert; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; aggressive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of US military forces."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

10

18 January 1963

\*Decision On:

DF-11-63

(Future Policy Toward Cuba) (U)

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF  
DATE: JUL 22 1997

At their meeting on Friday, 18 January 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the subject paper together with an unnumbered, undated flimsy tabled by the Director, Joint Staff, containing a draft Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject: "Future Policy Toward Cuba (U)." After discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved DF 11-63, as amended, by substituting the Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army contained in the flimsy tabled by the Director for the memorandum contained in DF-11-63. The memorandum tabled by the Director in the cited flimsy was itself amended as follows:

a. In paragraph 2, delete all after the word "President" and substitute "and, with the one change indicated below, recommend that it be forwarded to the President for his consideration. Of the two courses of action considered, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the adoption of the first alternative subject to subsequent consideration of timing and content of the program."

~~SECRET~~

Re 2304/138

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY J. 17 OCT 1989  
CLASSIFIED




~~SECRET~~

b. Paragraph 3:

(1) Delete all which precedes the text recommended for the first paragraph of Discussion of Alternative One and substitute the following:

"3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it would be desirable to add low-level aircraft flights over Cuba to the type of actions that might be included under the first course of action. It is therefore recommended that the first paragraph of Discussion of Alternative One be rewritten as follows:"

(2) In the recommended text for the Discussion of Alternative One, change "; aggressive air activity to include major deception operations and low level aircraft flights over Cuba designed to keep the Castro forces on continual alert;" to read "; aggressive air activity to include major deception operations and repeated low level aircraft flights over Cuba designed to embarrass the Castro government and to keep the Castro forces on continual alert;"

  
R. B. SPILMAN  
Lt Colonel, USA  
Assistant Secretary

~~SECRET~~



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM : M. J. INGELIDO  
TO : GENERAL BROWN  
TITLE : JCS-SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEETING - AGENDA 11 FEBRUARY  
1963  
DATE : 02/07/63  
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for JCS-Sec. of Defense Meeting.





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

7 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN

Subject: JCS - Secretary of Defense  
Meeting - Agenda 11 February 1963

Attached is a tentative agenda for the subject meeting.

SIGNED

DECLASSIFIED BY JCS  
DATE 9 May 79

M. J. INGELIDO  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Secretary

Attachment

Copy for:

- ✓ Chairman, JCS
- ✓ CSA
- ✓ CNO
- ✓ CSAF
- ✓ CMC
- ✓ Director, J/S

✓ JRC

Col. Berry 050, notified  
Gen. Ingelido that Mr.  
Anderson will not be  
able to meet with  
Chief of Staff.

Fill

~~SECRET~~



**TENTATIVE AGENDA**

**JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**1430, MONDAY, 11 FEBRUARY 1963**

**1. Low Level Photo Reconnaissance - Cuba**





~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

7 February 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN**

**Subject: JCS - Secretary of Defense  
Meeting - Agenda 11 February 1963**

Attached is a tentative agenda for the subject meeting.

SIGNED

DECLASSIFIED BY JCS

DATE 8 May 89

**M. J. INGELIDO  
Brig Gen. USAF  
Secretary**

**Attachment**

Copy for:  
Chairman, JCS  
CSA  
CNO  
CSAF  
CMC  
Director, J/S

*Completed*

12/1  
2710 2000 per 2000



1430

1

6 February 1963

**\*NOTE TO CONTROL DIVISION:**

**Subject:** Items to be Discussed with the Secretary of Defense at their Meeting on 11 February 1963.

At their meeting on 6 February 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered possible items for discussion with the Secretary of Defense and agreed that the following item should be discussed at the Monday, 11 February meeting:

Low Level Photography (Cuba)

DECLASSIFIED BY JCS

DATE 1 May 89

*File*

*Walter M. Turner*

WALTER M. TURNER  
Lt Colonel, USA  
Assistant Secretary

Copy to:

J-3 (JRG)

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DATE 8 May 89

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/97  
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COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 5. Tentative Agenda for JCS  
Staff Meeting with the Secretary of Defense, scheduled  
for 15 April 1963.



**TENTATIVE AGENDA**

**JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**1430, MONDAY, 22 APRIL 1963**

1. Commanders of Unified Combatant Commands
2. Support of the Military Budget
3. U-2 Flights - Cuba Contingency Plans

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DATE: 11/11/21/1997



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10065  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :  
FROM : R. C. FORBES  
TO : CONTROL DIVISION  
TITLE : MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DATE : 02/18/63  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : MEETING AGENDA

POLICY PLANNING, U.S. MILITARY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/11/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1963, Box 5. Notes regarding items for  
discussion at meeting between JCS and Sec of Defense.



~~TOP SECRET~~

18 February 1963

\*NOTE TO CONTROL DIVISION:

Subject: Meeting with the Secretary of Defense

At their meeting on 18 February 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the Secretary of Defense and discussed problems of mutual concern. As a result of these discussions, the Secretary of Defense desires that the following actions be accomplished:

a. Preparation of a JCS study of possible changes in current or planned overseas deployments of Air Force and Army units which could be accomplished as a result of (1) increased ferrying range of tactical fighter aircraft, (2) increased availability and capability of airlift, and (3) prepositioning of heavy equipment. Recommendations as to feasible redeployments are desired. In undertaking this study, possible redeployments of Air Force units abroad should be considered first and thereafter, Army redeployments. In both cases, combat readiness should be maintained to the maximum extent possible.

b. Preparation of a JCS evaluation of the MIRAGE IV weapon system as a credible deterrent. This evaluation should especially address the capability of this weapon to penetrate Soviet defenses.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 8 May 69  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

CLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF  
DATE JUL 11 1997

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*File*

*54101001 400-44*



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(NOTE TO CONTROL - Subj: Meeting with the Secretary of Defense)

c. Formulation by the Navy (in coordination with CINCLANT) of an SOP to insure that, in the event a ship of a friendly Latin American nation is taken over by other than a duly constituted authority of that nation, the United States Navy initiate immediate action to institute a search for the concerned vessel. The Secretary indicated that, upon receipt of notification of such an unlawful seizure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should issue necessary instructions without awaiting discussion of the matter within the US Government.

d. Initiation by the Navy of a study addressing the desirability and feasibility of an all-nuclear versus a "non-nuclear" (i.e. partially nuclear powered) Navy. The Secretary further indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider this matter (leaving decision as to whether such consideration should be concurrent or upon completion of the Navy study up to the JCS).

e. Consideration by the Navy of the possibility of basing submarine tenders in Italian waters in connection with the POLARIS submarines to be stationed in the Mediterranean.

f. Preparation of a plan by the Air Force setting forth a time-phased training program for pilots of the Vietnamese Air Force which would include the numbers of

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- 2 -



~~TOP SECRET~~

(NOTE TO CONTROL - Subj: Meeting with the Secretary of Defense)

pilots to be trained, both jet and non-jet, together with the type of aircraft to be flown. The long range objective of such a program is to permit the withdrawal of USAF pilots flying air missions in South Vietnam other than airlift assignments.



R. C. FORBES  
Colonel, USA  
Deputy Secretary

Copy for:

J-3

J-5

CSAF

CM

~~TOP SECRET~~



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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10066  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING  
AT 1430 MONDAY, 15 APRIL 1963  
DATE : 04/15/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : MEETING AGENDA

POLICY PLANNING, U.S. MILITARY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/11/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1963, Box 5. Agenda for meeting  
between JCS and Sec of Defense.



COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

15 April 1963 - 0800

AGENDA

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING AT  
1430 MONDAY, 15 APRIL 1963

1. Commanders of Unified Combatant Commands
2. Support of the Military Budget
3. U-2 Flights - Cuba Contingency Plans

GROUP -4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
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JCS AGRA BR RM 23 940



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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10078  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : TENTATIVE AGENDA  
DATE : 07/29/63  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
  
CUBA PLANNING  
  
COMPARATIVE STUDY, WEST GERMAN ARMY  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/24/89  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1963, Box 5. Meeting agenda for JCS  
and Sec. of Defense, 29 July 1963.



**TENTATIVE AGENDA**

**JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**1430, MONDAY, 29 JULY 1963**

1. Cuba Planning Relationships (Briefing by Major General Krulak, SACSA) (10 minutes)
2. Movement of Nuclear Weapons Overseas (Briefing by Colonel Andrus, J-3) (10 minutes)
3. US-FRG Comparative Army Study (Briefing by Brig General Stromberg, USA) (45 minutes)

*Tactics Paper ~  
Workbooks for allies?   
R for work & each to be ref.*

*Will*  
DECLASSIFIED BY JPS  
DATE *24 April 79*

**SECRET**

*5410 (103) 905-000*





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

25 July 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HARDIN**

**Subject: JCS - Secretary of Defense Meeting - Agenda  
29 July 1963**

**Attached is a tentative agenda for the subject meeting.**

**SIGNED**

**M. J. INGELIDO  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Secretary**

**Attachment**

**Copy for:  
Chairman, JCS  
CSA  
CNO  
CSAF  
CMC  
Director, J/S**




24 July 1963


\*NOTE TO CONTROL DIVISION


Subject: Items to be discussed with the Secretary of Defense at their meeting on 29 July 1963

At their meeting on 24 July 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to propose the following items for discussion with the Secretary of Defense at their meeting on 29 July 1963:

- (a) Cuba Planning Relationships (SACSA Briefing).
- (b) Movement of nuclear weapons overseas (J-3 briefing).
- (c) Briefing by Brigadier General W. W. Stromberg, U.S.A., "USFRQ, Comparative Army Study".

  
R. R. LAW  
Captain, USN  
Executive Secretary



DECLASSIFIED BY JCS  
DATE 





~~SECRET~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

18 July 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN**

**Subject: JCS - Secretary of Defense Meeting - Agenda  
22 July 1963**

**Attached is a tentative agenda for the subject meeting.**

SIGNED

**M. J. INGELIDO**  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Secretary

**Attachment**

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DATE 24 April 89

**Copy for:**  
Chairman, JCS  
CSA  
CNO  
CSAF  
CMC  
Director, J/S

*Fill*



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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10079  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : COL. D.C. POLLOCK  
TO :  
TITLE : JCS 2304/189 - COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA  
DATE : 00/00/63  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : REVOLT IN CUBA

## CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/11/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central File 1963, Box 4. Briefing sheet for CJCS,  
6 May 1963.



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~~TOP SECRET~~

Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a report to be considered at the JCS Meeting on 6 May 1963.

Subject: JCS 2304/189 - Courses of Action Related to Cuba (Case II) (U) <sup>9/23/3/00(197663)</sup>

Background - On 25 Mar 63, TAB B, the Chairman, JCS, requested, inter alia, that a separate study be undertaken of the requirements for and desirability of fomenting a revolt in Cuba, giving consideration to the advantage of engineering an incident as an alternate cause for invasion. It was indicated that CINCLANT's letter of 7 Mar 63 (containing a concept for politico-military action in Cuba) and his letter of 11 Mar 63 (concerning the use of Cuban nationals) offer a useful point of departure.

Current Report - TAB A -

a. Contains a study examining (1) contrived provocations (other than a revolt) and (2) a contrived revolt in Cuba. Conclusions of the study are summarized as follows:

(1) An effective spontaneous revolt in Cuba is not considered likely at this time.

(2) Any uprising without US overt support is likely to be short-lived because of current Cuban/Soviet military capabilities in Cuba and Castro's increasingly efficient internal security operations.

(3) There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro communist regime will risk a direct provocation that could be used as a pretext for US intervention.

(4) If the United States restricts its actions to attempts to isolate Cuba politically and economically the Castro regime will become more firmly entrenched and the communists' subversive efforts in the Western Hemisphere using Cuba as a base will continue.

(5) The engineering of a major incident or series of incidents (other than a revolt) as a sole cause for invasion is not advisable at this time. However, plans for fabricated provocations, either alone or in conjunction with a contrived revolt, should be developed by appropriate governmental agencies, and periodically reappraised in the light of developing events.

(6) The United States in the interest of national security should undertake a carefully coordinated effort to foment a revolution in Cuba beginning with intensified intelligence collection, covert introduction of intelligence and guerrilla assets, sabotage, and the organization of a guerrilla and resistance framework capable of expansion and culminating in overt assistance of the revolt at a pre-planned time.

(7) A small and well managed revolt would be the best course of action to adopt if the United States should decide to contrive a pretext for US military actions in Cuba.

(8) CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba, while containing much of merit, should be re-examined both for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity it envisages.

b. Contains a memo for SECDEF informing him of the above conclusions and recommending that he:

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DATE: JUL 11 1997

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DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.

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SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED  
BY JCS ON 18 OCT 1980  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

~~TOP SECRET~~

5/20/63



~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(1) Seek a national policy decision to undertake a carefully coordinated, flexibly phased effort to contrive a revolution in Cuba in order to supplant the Castro communist regime.

(2) Forward these views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Special Group.

(3) Arrange for the Department of Defense (Joint Chiefs of Staff) to participate in all planning for this effort, and, at an appropriate time in the execution thereof, to assume responsibility for the operations.

Service Comments - All Services are expected to support the report as written.

Comments and Recommendations - The current report is considered to be an adequate assessment.

- The Director, J-5, recommends that the Chairman, JCS support the report as written.

Approved by Meldons, Deputy Director, J-5.

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Director, Joint Staff \_\_\_\_\_ (Concur)(Nonconcur)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Colonel D. C. Pollock, USMC  
Western Hemisphere Branch, J-5  
Extension 77556

TAB A - JCS 2304/189  
TAB B - JCS 2304/176

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10094  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : M.J. INGELIDO  
TO : GENERAL TAYLOR  
TITLE :  
DATE : 10/27/62  
PAGES : 20  
SUBJECTS : PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, CUBA  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/10/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files, Box 102. Memo from Gen. Ingelido to  
Gen. Taylor with attachments on leaflet campaign.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

27 October 1962

~~TO GENERAL SECRETARY~~

The attached JCSM-833-62 is submitted for signature.

Derived from SACSA M 610-62,  
subject: Psychological Leaflet  
Campaign to Accompany Cuban  
Surveillance Program (C).

Item 4, JCS Agenda, 27 Oct 62.

Approved on 27 Oct 62 without change

Degree of Precedence:  
PRIORITY

*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Secretary

Via Director *Re*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCSM-833-62

27 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Psychological Leaflet Campaign to Accompany  
Cuban Surveillance Program (C)

1. On 26 October 1962, the President approved the text of a psychological leaflet to be dropped over Cuba in quantity, as White House decision, for the purpose of presenting the truth to the Cuban people.
2. A program for introduction of the above leaflets is presented in the Appendix hereto.
3. It is recommended that the program as outlined be executed.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

HERBERT D. RILEY  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director, Joint Staff

Attachment

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DATE 101 10 1997

Distr:

Chairman, JCS (2)  
GMC (2)  
DCSOPS USA  
Secy to CNO (JCS)  
Dir/Plang, AF  
MarCorps L/O  
Dir d/S (1)  
SACSA

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
27 October 1962

Decision on:

Subject: Leaflet Campaign to Accompany Surveillance Program

At their meeting at 0900 hours on 26 October 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered a SACSA paper, subject, "Leaflet Campaign to Accompany Surveillance Program", dated 26 October 1962. After discussion the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that SACSA be provided the following guidance:

- a. SACSA is authorized to coordinate with other governmental agencies concerned in subject area.
- b. No leaflets will be stockpiled or printed until a specific mission for dropping leaflets is directed.

  
R. B. SPILMAN  
Lt. Colonel, USA  
Chief, Control Division

Copy for:  
SACSA

13 Aug 66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR  
2-17-64

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DATE JUL 1 0 1997

1470



27 October 1962

Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a report to be considered at JCS meeting, Saturday, 27 October 1962.

Subject: SACSA-M 610-62 - Psychological Leaflet Campaign to Accompany Cuban Surveillance Program (C)

Background - On 22 October 1962, a program for surveillance of Cuba was announced by the President, and has since been initiated.

- On 26 October 1962, the President approved the text of a leaflet, drafted at the White House, to be used in a leaflet campaign to accompany the surveillance program.

- On 26 October 1962, the text was delivered to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and reproduction in quantity was directed, pending a decision to execute the leaflet mission.

- On 26 October 1962, JCS directed CINCLANT to be prepared to execute the leaflet mission on order.

Current Paper - Contains a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending that the program outlined in the enclosure thereto be executed. The program presents the basic decisions, subsequent actions, facts related to the mission, benefits and hazards, and additional general facts concerning leaflet operations. A copy of the approved text of the leaflet is also attached.

Service Comments - Military Services are expected to support the paper as written.

Recommendations - SACSA recommends that the Chairman, JCS, support the paper as written.

Approved by M. M. H. SACSA

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Director, Joint Staff \_\_\_\_\_ (Concurs) (Nonconcurs)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr.  
PD&R Division, SACSA  
Extension 78878

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DATE JUL 10 1997

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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MAE  
8-17-64



JCS 2304/78

27 October 1962

Pages 565 - 571, incl.

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DATE JUL 10 1997

## NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

PSYCHOLOGICAL LEAFLET CAMPAIGN TO ACCOMPANY  
CUBAN SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (C)

1. At their meeting on 27 October 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 6 of the attached report by SACSA.

2. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendix and Annexes A and B, was forwarded as JCSM-833-62, dated 27 October 1962, to the Secretary of Defense.

3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Taylor (C/JCS)  
Gen. Wheeler (CSA)  
Adm. Anderson (CNO)  
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)  
Gen. Shoup (CMC)  
Gen. Parker (EC-OPS)

Gen. Hayes (DC/S-P, MC44 RM 23 946)  
Adm. Riley (D/JS)  
Gen. Reynolds (VD/JS)  
Gen. Unger (J-3)  
Gen. Emrick (J-5)  
Gen. Krulak (SACSA)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
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JCS M44 RM 23 946



**PSYCHOLOGICAL LEAFLET CAMPAIGN TO ACCOMPANY CUBAN SURVEILLANCE  
PROGRAM (C)**

**THE PROBLEM**

1. To develop a psychological leaflet campaign to accompany the Cuban Surveillance Program.

**FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM**

2. A program for surveillance of Cuba was announced by the President on 22 October, and has since been initiated.
3. On 26 October the President approved the text of a leaflet, drafted at the White House, to be used in a leaflet campaign to accompany the surveillance program.

**DISCUSSION**

4. The capability to conduct a psychological leaflet campaign in Cuba is being developed by CINCLANT. The details of the program are presented as an Appendix to the Enclosure.

**CONCLUSIONS**

5. The CINCLANT psychological leaflet program responds adequately to the President's instructions. Its execution is feasible.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

6. It is recommended that:
  - a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendix which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
  - b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.
  - c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.
  - d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject Psychological Leaflet Campaign to accompany  
Cuban Surveillance Program (C)

1. On 26 October 1962, the President approved the text of a psychological leaflet to be dropped over Cuba in quantity, on White House decision, for the purpose of presenting the truth to the Cuban people.
2. A program for introduction of the above leaflets is presented in the Appendix hereto.
3. It is recommended that the program as outlined be executed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosure

JCS 2304/78

567



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX

CINCLANT PSYCHOLOGICAL LEAFLET PROGRAM (U)

1. Basic Decisions

a. On 26 October 1962, Annex A hereto was approved by the President as a psychological leaflet to be dropped over Cuba, on order.

b. At the same time, reproduction of Annex A in quantity was directed, pending a decision to execute the leaflet mission.

2. Subsequent Actions

a. Annex was delivered to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and reproduction begun at 1500 hours, 26 October 1962.

b. After being printed, the leaflets will be loaded into air delivery containers, moved to Pope Air Force Base, thence by air to McCoy Air Force Base, Florida, for final launch.

3. Facts Related to the Mission

a. Code word for operation - "Eagle Call."

b. Aircraft to be employed - F-105 (2 containers/aircraft)

c. Nature of approach - medium level (2,500 - 5,000 feet).

d. Altitude of container release - 2,000 feet.

e. Time - daylight.

f. Leaflet capability as of 1500 hours, 27 October 1962 - 8 containers (400,000 leaflets).

g. Leaflet capability as of 1500 hours, 28 October 1962 - 32 containers (1,600,000 leaflets) per strike; second mission in same amount can be launched if required.

4. Benefits and Hazards

a. This operation provides a rapid and supplementary method of expanding the President's pronouncement to the Cuban people.

b. Losses of aircraft and pilots assigned to this mission can be expected in the same magnitude as those assigned to the surveillance mission.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. Additional general facts concerning leaflet operations are contained in Annex B.



ANNEX A

(Leaflet drop approved by the President, 26 October 1962)

THE TRUTH

The Russians have secretly built offensive nuclear missile bases in Cuba. These bases endanger Cuban lives and world peace, because Cuba is now a forward base for Russian aggression.

The Russians, with the consent of Castro, did their work in secret. Cubans are not allowed on these bases. But the bases are there.

To protect the Cuban people -- and all the people of the Western Hemisphere -- President Kennedy, with the unanimous approval of all the Latin American nations, has imposed a quarantine on offensive war equipment being shipped into Cuba. Food is not being stopped; medicine is not being stopped -- only aggressive Russian war materials.

When the war weapons are removed from Cuba, the quarantine will end.

---

MAP

CAPTION UNDER MAP:

Eight or ten Russian offensive nuclear missile bases are located near Guanajay, Remedios, San Cristobal, and Sagua La Grande.

---

PHOTO

CAPTION UNDER PHOTO:

This photo was taken within the past week from an airplane flying over Cuba. It shows a Russian offensive nuclear missile base near San Cristobal. This is one of several bases hastily and secretly built by and for the Russians.

Annex A



## ANNEX B

### GENERAL FACTS CONCERNING LEAFLET OPERATIONS

1. Facts related to a leaflet campaign are presented in the following paragraphs.

#### 2. Leaflet Container and Leaflet Packaging

a. Standard leaflet container M129E1 is constructed of fiberglass, measures 21 x 35 inches, and has an empty weight of 92 pounds. The casing is fragmented by primacord. Although never employed in military operations, the container has a high degree of technical reliability.

b. Each container has a capacity of 50,000 5 x 7 inch leaflets.

c. Fifty leaflet containers (2,500,000 leaflets) have been prepositioned at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. Additional containers from a stockpile of 1,350 are available at Bluegrass Ordnance Depot, Kentucky.

d. Personnel at the US Special Army Warfare Center have been trained in leaflet packaging.

#### 3. Leaflet Production

At the US Army Special Warfare Center, maximum rate of production is 200,000 leaflets per hour, or approximately 5,000,000 per 24 hour period.

#### 4. Leaflet Aircraft

a. F-100 and F-105 aircraft are readily adaptable to the leaflet task. Each will carry two leaflet containers (100,000 leaflets).

b. These aircraft are now available.



SACSA  
leaflets

Talked C 900 Mtg 26 Oct  
1) No printer auth.  
until ordered drops leaflets  
2) SACSA Can Coord

SACSA  
26 October 1962

LEAFLET CAMPAIGN TO ACCOMPANY SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

1. Facts related to a leaflet campaign are presented in the following paragraphs.
2. Leaflet Bombs
  - a. Each bomb has a capacity of 50,000 5x7 inch leaflets.
  - b. Fifty leaflet bombs have been prepositioned at Pope AFB, N. C.
  - c. Resupply procedures are in effect to sustain a drop rate of 24 bombs daily.
3. Leaflet Aircraft
  - a. The P-100 and F-105 are readily adaptable to the leaflet task.
  - b. They are available at Homestead AFB or at Key West.
4. Leaflet Production
  - a. Leaflets will be printed at USA Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N. C.
  - b. Maximum rate of production is 200,000 leaflets per hour, or approximately 5,000,000 per 24 hour period.
5. Current Readiness
  - a. Steps in the leaflet process - print at Fort Bragg, N. C.; load bombs at Pope AFB, N. C.; airlift loaded bombs to Florida operational bases; arm accompanying aircraft with bombs.
  - b. First drop can be made in 24 hours, or less, after approval of text.
  - c. Subsequent drops can be made within 2 hours of order to execute.
  - d. CINCLANT was alerted at 1930 hours, 25 October 1962.
6. Attached are a family of leaflets which are recommended for immediate reproduction, to be ready for execution on order.

2304/78

~~SECRET~~

13 Aug 66



SACSA  
26 October 1962

TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE

- The United States aircraft you see intend no harm. They are over Cuba on a peaceful mission.
  - The Castro-Communists and the Soviet Union have installed offensive nuclear missiles on your land to threaten all of the Americas. In doing this they have endangered the lives of every Cuban.
  - The United States aircraft are taking photographs of these missiles to show the world how the Communist aggressors have threatened the peaceful people of the Western hemisphere.
- 

TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE

- The Castro-Communists and the Soviet Union have endangered the lives of the innocent people of Cuba.
- They have installed long range nuclear missiles on your soil to threaten all of the American republics.
- Cuba does not need nuclear missiles for her defense. None of the American republics mean your country any harm, but as long as the Russian missiles are in your land there is great danger to all Cubans.
- The United States aircraft are flying over Cuba only to take pictures of these dangerous missiles, to show the world what the Castro-Communists and the Russians have done to innocent Cuban people.



SACSA  
26 October 1962

TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE

- The Castro Communists and the Russians have installed dangerous long range nuclear missiles in your country.
- The American republics all have sympathy for their brothers in Cuba who are suffering under Communist oppression, and who are now endangered by these offensive weapons which the Communists have built on your soil.
- Until the missiles are removed, the people of Cuba must live under the terrible fear of nuclear war.
- The aircraft you see are taking photographs to tell the story of the Cuban people to the world.



SACSA  
26 October 1962

TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE

Sketch of rocket,  
with hammer and  
sickle behind it

DANGER !

- The Russians and the Castro Communists have stolen your beautiful island.
- They are using it as a base for nuclear missiles to threaten the whole Western hemisphere.
- They have no interest in your welfare, and have now brought great danger to your land.
- The innocent people of Cuba have the good will and respect of all of their American neighbors. They do not need Russian nuclear weapons for their defense.
- The Russians must take their missiles out of Cuba.



CUBANS IN CHAINS

Sketch of the island,  
encircled by a chain of  
rockets; hammer and sickle  
in the background

- The Russians and Castro-Communists are using Cuba as a base to threaten the entire Western hemisphere. They have installed many long range nuclear rockets on your island.
- As long as those rockets remain on your soil they hold innocent Cubans in chains - chains of fear of a terrible nuclear war.
- The United States aircraft you see are your friends. They are taking photographs to prove to the world what has happened in Cuba, in the hope that the Russians can be persuaded to take their weapons out of your country.



## ANNEX B

## GENERAL FACTS CONCERNING LEAFLET OPERATIONS

1. Facts related to a leaflet campaign are presented in the following paragraphs.

2. Leaflet Container and Leaflet Packaging

a. Standard leaflet container M12931 is constructed of fiberglass, measures 21 x 35 inches, and has an empty weight of 92 pounds. The casing is fragmented by primacord. Although never employed in military operations, the container has a high degree of technical reliability.

b. Each container has a capacity of 50,000 5 x 7 inch leaflets.

c. Fifty leaflet containers (2,500,000 leaflets) have been prepositioned at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. Additional containers from a stockpile of 1,350 are available at Bluegrass Ordnance Depot, Kentucky.

d. Personnel at the US Special Army Warfare Center have been trained in leaflet packaging.

3. Leaflet Production

At the US Army Special Warfare Center, maximum rate of production is 200,000 leaflets per hour, or approximately 5,000,000 per 24 hour period.

4. Leaflet Aircraft

a. F-100 and F-105 aircraft are readily adaptable to the leaflet task. Each will carry two leaflet containers (100,000 leaflets).

b. These aircraft are now available.



ANNEX A

(Leaflet drop approved by the President, 26 October 1962)

THE TRUTH

The Russians have secretly built offensive nuclear missile bases in Cuba. These bases endanger Cuban lives and world peace, because Cuba is now a forward base for Russian aggression.

The Russians, with the consent of Castro, did their work in secret. Cubans are not allowed on these bases. But the bases are there.

To protect the Cuban people -- and all the people of the Western Hemisphere -- President Kennedy, with the unanimous approval of all the Latin American nations, has imposed a quarantine on offensive war equipment being shipped into Cuba. Food is not being stopped; medicine is not being stopped -- only aggressive Russian war materials.

When the war weapons are removed from Cuba, the quarantine will end.

---

MAP

CAPTION UNDER MAP:

Eight or ten Russian offensive nuclear missile bases are located near Guana Jay, Remedios, San Cristobal, and Sagua La Grande.

---

PHOTO

CAPTION UNDER PHOTO:

This photo was taken within the past week from an airplane flying over Cuba. It shows a Russian offensive nuclear missile base near San Cristobal. This is one of several bases hastily and secretly built by and for the Russians.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. Additional general facts concerning leaflet operations are contained in Annex B.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## APPENDIX

### CINCLANT PSYCHOLOGICAL LEAFLET PROGRAM (U)

#### 1. Basic Decisions

a. On 26 October 1962, Annex A hereto was approved by the President as a psychological leaflet to be dropped over Cuba, on order.

b. At the same time, reproduction of Annex A in quantity was directed, pending a decision to execute the leaflet mission.

#### 2. Subsequent Actions

a. Annex was delivered to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and reproduction begun at 1500 hours, 26 October 1962.

b. After being printed, the leaflets will be loaded into air delivery containers, moved to Pope Air Force Base, thence by air to McCoy Air Force Base, Florida, for final launch.

#### 3. Facts Related to the Mission

a. Code word for operation - "Bugle Call."

b. Aircraft to be employed - F-105 (2 containers/aircraft)

c. Nature of approach - medium level (2,500 - 5,000 feet).

d. Altitude of container release - 2,000 feet.

e. Time - daylight.

f. Leaflet capability as of 1500 hours, 27 October 1962 - 8 containers (400,000 leaflets).

g. Leaflet capability as of 1500 hours, 28 October 1962 - 32 containers (1,600,000 leaflets) per strike; second mission in same amount can be launched if required.

#### 4. Benefits and Hazards

a. This operation provides a rapid and supplementary method of expanding the President's pronouncement to the Cuban people.

b. Losses of aircraft and pilots assigned to this mission can be expected in the same magnitude as those assigned to the surveillance mission.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10103  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : J. D. ALGER  
TO : DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
TITLE : INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN  
AFFAIRS: REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS  
DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION  
DATE : 11/26/63  
PAGES : 19  
SUBJECTS : LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY  
  
CUBAN SUBVERSION  
  
COUNTERINSURGENCY  
  
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COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 3. Report to the President  
on efforts to curtail Cuban subversion in Latin  
America with cover memorandum to Director, Joint  
Staff.



202-10002-10/03

# Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: MULTI (Army)

Date: 20 NOV 03

Subject: Interdepartmental Coordinating...

Original Level of Classification: TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

Third Agency Equities: CIA State NSC

Remarks: JCS SON

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

NSC has no  
objection to  
declassification  
& release 10/7/93

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7/23/97, JCS

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF  
As Listed

DATE: JUL 23 1997

JCS CENTRA FILES  
Box 3  
12 of 15

NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY  
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF  
DATE: 7 Oct 97





~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:  
Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to  
Counter Subversion (U)

References: NSAM No. 213

Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense to  
Mr. Bundy, Special Assistant to the President,  
dated 10 Jan 63

Memorandum from Secretary of Army to Mr. Cottrell,  
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba,  
dated 11 Jan 63.

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President  
of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During Sep-  
tember 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America. The Department  
of Defense portion of subject report is based on submission provided in  
response to referenced memorandum.

Should you desire to comment, it would be appreciated if your  
comments could be provided this office by 1200 hours, 2 December 1963.

Attachment  
as

*[Signature]*  
J. D. SINGER  
Major General, GS  
Special Assistant for  
Special Warfare Activities

NO JCS OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION: DATE 28 AUG 1989  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE  
OF DoS/CIA

DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

DATE: 7 Oct 97

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING  
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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9123/1170 (26 Nov 63) ST



DRAFT  
11/13/63

~~SECRET~~

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE  
on CUBAN SUBVERSION  
ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURBING  
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY  
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE: 7 Oct 97

~~SECRET~~

7416

ASG Control No. 8707

9123/1170 (26 Nov 63) WJ



~~SECRET~~

DRAFT  
11/13/63

I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

- a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air penetration of Africa.
  - b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Government officials, reminding them of their past assurances that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish service to Cuba via Conakry.
  - c. Instructed Consulate Port au France to investigate and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel.
- Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and

From

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian Government began tightening controls against Cubana flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office, with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities.

e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and that H.M.C. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued inter-Departmental efforts to prevent resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S. which a British citizen, Harold Derber, has been attempting to establish during the past several months.

g.

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- 3 -

g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and report on evidence the Department received which indicates that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of regular service for passengers and cargo.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 - October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:

(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39 practicing architects who had planned to attend cancelled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an international architects meeting to be held in Mexico in October;

(3)

~~SECRET~~



(3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine government express concern over such flights.

b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office. Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September 21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison agreement for similar harassment in the event of future Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior to the Architects Congress to discourage participation in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and inoculations



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- 5 -

innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the 60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda

*Measures to counteract*



III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and arms

Department of State

Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

Department of Defense

Three OH-13 helicopters from USSOUTHCOM supported Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies, evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19 passengers to points in the operational area, and recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational area.

IV.

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IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency, and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction. Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase, it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, of the activities of Semondelp Enterprises, a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he is prohibited from engaging in such trade.

V.



V. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S. Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school.

b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile training teams were providing training to the Armed Forces of five Latin American countries during the period. U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were in two countries.

c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries were under instruction in the operation of coast guard utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance. Six students from two countries were undergoing similar training in the United States.

d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo.

e.



e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and internal security purposes.

f. On May 25, 1963, three M-43B KAMAN helicopters were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. <sup>Guatemala</sup>Guatemala City Station has recruited, on a trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations continue with the Government of Guatemala for the formation of a new internal security service.

b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry of personnel and weapons into Peru.

VI.



VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Department of Defense

Engineering installation work continued on radio stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to establish radio stations in those countries. Installation of the new trans-isthmian commercial cable in Panama is nearing completion.

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence information with local intelligence Agencies. The following actions are of special significance:

- a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and requested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings. The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy this omission in view of the personnel changes expected within SIDE after the new government is installed on 12 October.



b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota Station to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number of passport violations have been discovered in which travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type of violation.

c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trip to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training. This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MLR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be done by the SIN.

The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (PNIS) has, in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill.

The



The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and Police has requested from the CIA representative in Lima any information that he might supply on subversive elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru. This request has opened an additional channel to the highest level of the Government with a concomitant prospect for effective action when needed.

d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) has been provided by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963. This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis; the names are now being integrated into the regular watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela. Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested on the basis of the information supplied to DIGEPOL. DIGEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data being supplied and desires that the arrangement be continued.

VII. Attendance of Cuban Diplomats, Commercial and Cultural

No special actions to report.

VII.



VIII. Other Special Actions

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers. Developments reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela, the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the International Union of Architects Congress in Habana (emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted 27 articles and commentaries during September on the subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most part with economic and political conditions inside the country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and the reports of refugees.



B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America during September carried a total of 20 news analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of the developments treated included the following:

A commentary on communist embassies as channels for subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech; a news analysis on Cuban subversion as an obstacle in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-part series on university autonomy in Latin America; a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries that gave and interviewed lightly on economic and political developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban media and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to commentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in



the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to industrialize.

c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular instruction to all its Latin American posts urging greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of information activities to support this effort, and requesting monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3, 1963.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. CIA in Brazil assisted in the defection and exploitation of a Cuban athlete Roberto Perez Ondarso in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member of the Cuban basket-ball team which participated in the World University Games (FISU) held in Porto Alegre Brazil in early September 1963.

b. Assistance was given to the Government of Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who were arrested in connection with the Communist Party documents that were confiscated in late May 1963.



Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement with the captured documents, the Communist Party, guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge denied that he was involved in any way. The Government of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at a later date.

c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan officer prepared a report summarizing this data and presented it to the National Council of Government which has been asked to indicate or turn over communist subversive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report, the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint a special commission to study the problem of Communist subversion and to make recommendations as to what course of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government. Should the Government wish to . . . for passage of

stronger

~~SECRET~~



stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken steps to prepare Uruguayan public opinion by planning simultaneous local press releases of the salient features of the defector report with similar press reporting in the United States where the defector will be brought to light.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
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FROM : H. K. JOHNSON, W. B. ROSSON  
TO : DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
TITLE : INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN  
AFFAIRS; UNITED STATES POSITION ON EFFORTS BY CUBAN  
EXILES TO ACHIEVE UNITY  
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COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 5. Draft policy paper on US  
policy on efforts by Cuban exiles to achieve unity,  
with attached cover memorandum.



202-10002-10105

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: MULTI  
Date: 29 May 93  
Subject: Inter departmental Coordinating  
Original Level of Classification: C  
Third Agency Equities: CIA State NSC  
Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

**NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7/20/97

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT**

**NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY  
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF**  
DATE: 7 Oct 97





**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

29 May 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF**

**SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs;  
United States Position on Efforts by Cuban Exiles to Achieve  
Unity**

**References: NSAM No. 213**

Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense  
to Mr. Bundy, Special Assistant to the  
President, dated 10 Jan 63

Memorandum from Secretary of Army to Mr.  
Cottrell, Chairman, Interdepartmental  
Committee on Cuba, dated 11 Jan 63

Attached is a draft policy paper on the US position with respect  
to efforts by Cuban exiles to achieve unity. This paper was prepared  
by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

Should you desire to comment, it would be appreciated if your  
comments could be forwarded by 1200 hours, Saturday, 1 June.

1 Incl  
as

*for*  
*W B Rosson*  
H. K. JOHNSON  
Major General, GS  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Military Operations

W. E. ROSSON  
Major General, GS  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Military Operations

DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

DATE: 7 Oct 97

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
JCS EARL BRANCH 20030

9123/9101 (29 May 63) ST



29 MAY 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : All Members, Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs  
FROM : The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
SUBJECT: United States Position on Efforts by Cuban Exiles  
to Achieve Unity.

Attached is a revised draft of the paper, subject as above, which was discussed at the May 24 meeting of the Committee. The revision incorporates the changes recommended at that meeting.

Please telephone concurrences or comments to Mr. Follestad, Code 182, extension 2535, by close of business, Wednesday, May 29.

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from attachments.

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9120/9100 (29MAY63) 1/2



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DRAFT MEMORANDUM

29 MAY 1963

Subject: United States Position on Efforts by Cuban Exiles  
to Achieve Unity.

PROBLEM

To determine the position of the  
Government with respect to efforts  
by Cuban exiles in the United States  
to achieve unity.

BACKGROUND

A. As a result of developments in the past two months especially the U. S. measures against hit-and-run raids, Miró Cardona's resignation as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the withdrawal of U.S. support for the Council, and its consequent decline -- a vague, confused and still embryonic movement toward "unity" (usually conceived of as a single body or organization speaking or acting for all exiles) has taken place in the Cuban exile community. The search for a unifying formula arises from a variety of motives: a psychological need on the part of the exiles for a single organization which they can consider as their representative; an instructive belief that unity in itself will advance the cause of liberation; the desire for an organization which can address governments, international bodies, and public opinion;

the

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DATE: 1 Oct 97

1016/5216  
(294462)W



the belief that to work toward unity is to conform to the wishes of the U.S. Government, which is the only potential source of major material support; and the hope on the part of the ambitious that participation in unity will lead to political preference in post-Castro Cuba.

B. So far the developments in the effort for unity have resulted in the following line-up:

Left. The Second National Front of Escambray, Alpha-66, the Anti-Communist Liberation Front, and elements of the Peoples's Revolutionary Movement and the 30th of November Movement have reached a working agreement. Although the working agreement is essentially action-oriented, the member organizations tend to the view that the original revolution promised by Castro should be reclaimed and redirected. The adherence of Manuel Ray's Revolutionary Junta (JURE) would increase the influence of this grouping, which probably has the most potential appeal to Castro's opponents within Cuba, but which is an object of concern to more conservative exiles.

Center. Revolutionary Unity (UR), Revolutionary Recuperation Movement (MRR), Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), Revolutionary Student Directorate (DRE), and other less well-organized center groups, have held aloof from attempts at unity.

Right. The Alliance for Cuban Liberty (ALC), and the Association for Economic Recovery of Cuba (AREC) have had difficulty attracting adherents. They principally look to the return of  
their



their lost property, rather than action and politics. Recent discussions by these groups with U.S. nationals promising large-scale financial support appear to have had no results.

"Letter of Integration." Stimulated by old-line politicians, Alonso Fajal and Carlos Prio, this grouping has secured a number of signatures of prominent exiles on a document which calls for the liberation of Cuba, the extirpation of Communism, and the return to the 1940 Constitution. Rightist in makeup, heavily weighted on the side of discredited politicians, it is unlikely to have much support within Cuba.

Plebiscite. Jose (Pepin) Bosch (Bacardi Rum) is forming a committee to organize a plebiscite to elect a single leader. There has been little forward movement to date.

Enrique Ruiz Williams. He has formed a unity committee and claims the personal support of Attorney General Kennedy. His efforts have shown only limited results thus far.

Students. Student sectors of eleven organizations are reported to have reached a working agreement. The extent and significance of this attempt is unknown. Significantly, the DRE is not included in this bloc.

Brigade. An association of Brigade veterans, formed in April and claiming a membership of 900, is primarily -- at least at present -- a fraternal organization, but some of its leaders appear to have hopes that the group might form a nucleus for unity of all exiles.



C. The public attitude of the Government toward unity efforts was expressed by Assistant Secretary Martin last week as follows:

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community if it is to have vitality.

It is desirable that a point implicit in the foregoing statement be made explicit, that is, the requirement that unity reflect the basic desires of the people within Cuba.

D. It is unlikely that the exiles will be able to achieve a unity which meets the criteria set out in the Martin statement. So far the efforts toward unity have been tentative and competitive. Political divisions, both ideological and personal, are deep and there appears to be little disposition or ability to effect a real accommodation of views. The groups on the left distrust those on the right and vice versa; the center groups are wary of both. Any formula for unity would have to be so diluted as to be almost meaningless. Moreover, the ability of a united exile organization



organization to reflect, to any meaningful degree, the attitudes and aspirations of those within Cuba would be minimal.

1. Support of Unity Efforts

Considerations: Through judicious use of our resources, we might be able to force or induce unity among all or the principal democratic groups from right to left. Such a movement or organization would have to be of the least-common-denominator type. It would generally be recognized as an artificial creation of ours, although it might have some favorable effect on domestic public opinion. Our interference would probably be resented by many of the best exile elements (as in the case of the CRC), would deprive any unity movement of spontaneity (one of the sole virtues of a Cuban-originated and directed effort), would commit us to continuing support of the movement or organization, and would probably be suspect within Cuba. Even beyond these considerations, unity in itself does not significantly contribute to the achievement of our present objectives in Cuba. In fact, it is quite possible that a continuation of the present situation in which there is no pre-eminent central organization would be easier and more effective from an operational standpoint.

2. Opposition to Unity Efforts

Considerations: By judicious use of our resources, we probably could thwart movements toward unity. Our interference in this sense would be strongly resented and would be widely interpreted



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 6 -

as a demonstration that we are "giving up" on the Cuban question. It would be very difficult to explain, particularly to domestic public opinion, since "unity" on its face is attractive. In any case, the prospects for a spontaneous, effective, and meaningful unity are hardly good.

### 3. Hands-Off

Considerations: If we were to remain as aloof as a decent public posture allows, the chances are considerably better than even that unity efforts would fail. There is an outside possibility, however, that a unified organization or movement meeting our standards would emerge. If it did, it would have the strength endowed by the free, undistorted (by U.S. interference), competitive play of political currents, and it would not carry the taint of U.S. sponsorship.

A "hands-off" policy incurs the risks of permitting the possibly embarrassing intensification of division among the exiles, of sacrificing some sound but poorly financed groups to the necessities of exile politics in which less sound but better-financed elements might become dominant, and of being faced, should a unity movement or organization be formed, with demands for U.S. support. In the last case, the fact that we had not participated in the formation of the movement would give us maximum flexibility.

### Conclusions

1. The U.S. Government should follow a "hands-off" policy toward exile efforts to achieve unity.

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2.



2. The statement of position made by Assistant Secretary Martin is a good expression of this policy, provided it is expanded by a reference to the requirement that unity reflect the basic desires of the people within Cuba.

Recommendations

1. That the U.S. Government follow a "hands-off" policy toward exile efforts to achieve unity.
2. That public statements by all officers of the U.S. Government on the subject of exile unity be consistent with the following:

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community and be consistent with the desires of the people within Cuba if it is to have vitality.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10106  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.  
TO : DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
TITLE : REPORT OF CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA ON OCTOBER 21,  
1963 AND RELATED INCIDENT OF A CUBAN ATTACK ON A  
LIBERIAN TANKER  
DATE : 10/22/63  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : CIA OPERATIONS, CUBA  
SS JOSEPH LOUIS, ATTACK BY CUBANS  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 3. Memo on CIA operations  
against Cuba and possibly related Cuban attack on  
Liberian tanker.



202-10002-10106

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: MULTI/Army

Date: 22 OCT 03

Subject: TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Original Level of Classification: \_\_\_\_\_

Third Agency Equities: CIA, STATE, OSD

Remarks: JCS, SOD

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF  
As listed  
DATE: JUL 23 1997

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7/23/97





~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

October 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF <sup>R</sup>  
THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Report of CIA Operations Against Cuba on October 21, 1963 and Related Incident of a Cuban Attack on a Liberian Tanker

There were two scheduled CIA operations against Cuba on the night of October 21-22, 1963. The first was an externally mounted UDT attack on the harbor of La Isabela on the northern coast of Las Villas. This operation, which had been postponed from the night of October 18, 1963 due to weather, was executed on the night of October 21, 1963 and initial reports indicate that the attack went according to plan. The second CIA operation was an infiltration into southwest Pinar del Rio of a six-man team for the purpose of establishing an internal resistance net. A mother ship and two small craft were utilized for this operation.

CIA states that it appears that the Cubans had been forewarned of the infiltration operation since after the mother vessel had dispatched its two small boats with the landing parties, it came under hot pursuit by unidentified surface craft. The mother vessel avoided contact and departed the area. Nothing is known of the fate of the small craft and the landing parties. Concurrently, it appears that Cuban forces in the area mistook a 13,000 ton tanker of Liberian registry, which is owned by the US Reynolds Metals Company and which was enroute from Jamaica to Corpus Christi, for the mother ship. At 0440Z to 0541Z the ship was taken under heavy air attack. A total of 16 firing passes were counted by the crew of the SS JOSEPH LOUIS. There was damage to the super structure above the waterline and fires under the forecastle. After two hours, the fires were brought under control. There were no casualties.

Copy No. 1 of 5 Copies

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

DATE: 7 Oct 97



Defense Department actions pertaining to the above attack are outlined below:

0552Z: First radio report apparently transmitted by ship and received by US Coast Guard.

0601Z: Commander Eastern Area, US Coast Guard (COMEASTAREA) notified Commander-in-Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT)

0606Z: CINCLANT commenced a telephone conference call with National Military Command Center (NMCC) and Commander Key West Force (COMKEYWESTFOR).

0615Z: COMKEYWESTFOR (and NMCC) furnished with all necessary information.

0629Z: Two F4B's from Key West directed to launch.

0635Z: Aircraft airborne with directions to proceed to area, observe and report.

0711Z: Aircraft rounded western tip of Cuba at 30 miles range offshore. Nothing sighted in area except two flares; no surface vessels or aircraft sighted in the specified area.

0735Z: Aircraft recalled due to fuel limitation.

0813Z: Aircraft landed at Key West.

Two other two-plane fighter sections were launched and patrolled to the northward of Cuba. One section was airborne from 0830Z to 0945Z and the other section from 0728Z to 1000Z. No Cuban air activity was noted by Key West radar. US fighters were never closer than 15 nautical miles from the Cuban coast. (The authority to overfly Cuban territory was not exercised since the vessel was known to be of non-US registry at time of scramble. Additionally, only five minutes flight time would have been gained by an overflight.)



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In view of the probability of numerous press inquiries on this incident, the following procedures have been established with the Department of State. General inquiries on the Cuban attack will be handled by the Department of State; specific queries pertaining to the reaction of US military forces will be handled by the Department of Defense. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs has been advised and an appropriate release has been furnished that office.

  
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
General Counsel

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10107  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DJSM-146-63  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : JOHN M. REYNOLDS  
TO : MAJOR GENERAL ABRAMS  
TITLE : INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CUBA;  
GUIDANCE FOR USIA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS POLICY  
AND PLANS WITH RESPECT TO CUBA  
DATE : 01/28/63  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, CUBA  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
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RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 3. Memo for Gen. Abrahms  
regarding policy on psychological operations directed  
against Cuba. Memo from Gen. Abrams to director, Joint  
Staff on ICCO meeting on psy-ops policy.



202-10002-10107

## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

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 Date: 28 Jan 63  
 Subject: Intergovernmental Coordinating...  
 Original Level of Classification: TS  
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Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

ENTIRE FILE DECLASSIFIED  
 BY JOINT STAFF  
 DATE: OCT 7 1997

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
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USIA ✓DATE: JUL 22 1997

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The Department of State has no objection to the  
 release or declassification of this document in full  
 under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
 Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on

7-22-97

DECLASSIFIED BY USIA-GC/D  
 MONTH 8 DAY 6 YEAR 97  
 AUTHORITY: JFK Act

No objection to release





THE JOINT STAFF

TO: [REDACTED]  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF  
DATE: OCT 07 1997

DJEM-146-63  
28 January 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL ABRAMS**

**Subject:** Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba; Guidance for USIA and Psychological Operations Policy and Plans with Respect to Cuba (U)

**References:** a. USIA Infoguide 63-6, Post-Missile Cuba, dated 14 January 1963  
b. CSUSA Memorandum, subject as above, dated 28 January 1963

1. For your information, the latest USIA guidance (ref a) transmitted to the field is attached. This guidance reflects current policy concerning psychological operations measures with regard to Cuba as now understood by this office.

2. However, at a conference which was attended by a Joint Staff representative at Panama last week, Mr. Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, informally announced the following general guidelines, inter alia, with respect to Cuba:

a. Isolate Cuba from the remainder of the Western Hemisphere in terms of people, goods, and propaganda.

b. Encourage Cuban people to continue to resist, even to expel the Castro regime.

These guidelines appear to be in consonance with the overall USIA general guidance.

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[REDACTED]

3. In conjunction with the current USIA guidance as enhanced with Mr. Martin's statement, the following suggestions are made concerning psychological operations measures that can be taken to achieve the ultimate objective of overthrowing the Castro regime.

a. The tone of the Voice of America Broadcasts, both to Cuba and to the remainder of the Western Hemisphere, should guardedly but subtly enhance the isolation process outlined in 2a above.

b. Consideration should be given to strengthening Voice of America broadcasts to Cuba by additional transmitters. The new transmitter complex scheduled to become operational at Greenville, North Carolina, early in February may provide support, but military mobile transmitters, such as those soon to enter the Army inventory, could be located in the Cuban fringe area to provide additional Voice of America broadcast support. At the present time, the Navy has a mobile 50-KW transmitter operating in the Florida Keys under USIA programming control.

c. Clandestine publications and other visual media, prepared externally and infiltrated into Cuba, could be used to support both overt and covert broadcasts. The basic objective should be to convince the Cuban people that, in the long run, the destruction of the Castro regime is in the hands of the people themselves who are in Cuba.

d. Clandestine publications, ostensibly of Cuban origin and in poor taste, could be introduced into the remainder of the Western Hemisphere to alienate middle-road Cuban sympathizers as a part of the psychological isolation process.

e. Additional anti-Castro orientation materials should be prepared for release through appropriate outlets in the Latin American countries. These materials, aimed at the civilian and military opinion leaders of each country, should include TV program materials, motion picture films, cartoon books, pamphlets, books, postal cards, book covers, match covers, calendars, flags, editorials, feature columns, book reviews, etc.



**f. The facilities and talents of the United States Army Special Warfare Center should be considered for the development and preparation of suitable materials for both Cuban and Western Hemisphere use.**

cc: File  
SACSA  
OCJCS  
R&RA  
SJCS  
Staff

**JOHN M. REYNOLDS**  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director



*Disse  
Form 002911  
COB  
28 Jan*

JAN 28 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF**

**SUBJECT: Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba; Guidance for  
USIA and Psychological Operations Policy and Plans with Respect  
to Cuba**

**References: NSAM No 213**

Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense  
to Mr Bundy, Special Assistant to the  
President, dated 10 Jan 63

Memorandum from Secretary of Army to Mr  
Cottrell, Chairman, Interdepartmental  
Committee on Cuba, dated 11 Jan 63

The Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba will meet on Tuesday, 29 January 1963, to discuss guidance which should be given to USIA and a psychological operations policy with respect to Cuba. It would be appreciated if the Joint Staff would provide by 0800 hours on Tuesday, 29 January 1963, information on any matters which you believe should be considered at this meeting and any comments or suggestions on these subjects you desire to make.

**CREIGHTON W. ARBANS**  
Major General, GS  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Military Operations

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JAN 30 15 30.23

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10108  
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS  
TO : DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
TITLE : INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CUBA;  
MOVEMENT OF FUNDS TO AND WITHIN LATIN AMERICA  
DATE : 03/27/63  
PAGES : 13  
SUBJECTS : CUBAN SPONSORSHIP OF SUBVERSION

LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY

TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Memo for Director, Joint Staff concerning the movement of Cuban funds to and within Latin America.



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## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: Multi ArmyDate: 27 Mar 93Subject: Interdepartmental CoordinatingOriginal Level of Classification: SECRETCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTThird Agency Equities: State CIARemarks: JCS 500 K7/20/97Page # of PostponementReason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK ActENTIRE FILE DECLASSIFIED  
BY JOINT STAFF  
DATE: 001071997The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Record  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)Reviewed on 7/23/97, 023NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF  
AS Listed  
DATE: JUL 23 1997NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY  
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF  
JCS  
DATE: 76777 158





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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

27 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:  
Movement of Funds To and Within Latin America


Attached is the second working draft prepared by the Subcommittee on Subversion of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs concerning "Direct Controls on the Movement of Funds To and Within Latin America".

The Secretary of the Army, in his capacity as Department of Defense executive agent for all matters concerning Cuba, has asked for comments on this paper. This will be the last opportunity to address the paper before it is considered by the committee. Should you desire to comment on this draft before it is presented to the committee, it would be appreciated if your comments could reach this office by 1700 hours, 28 March 1963.

1 Incl  
as

*for [Signature]*  
BREIGHTON W. ABRAMS  
Major General, GS  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Military Operations

NO JCS OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION DATE 19 OCT 1989  
REVIEWED CONCURRENCE  
OF OSD



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9123/3100 (27 MAR 63) 57



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DATE: OCT 07 1997

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

27 March 1963

TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS

1. Here is the second working draft on actions to impede the transfer of funds from Cuba to and within Latin America.

2. Please make your marginal notes and get the paper back to me by 1000, 28 March. We will discuss it, finally, at a meeting at 1300, 28 March.

K  
V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC  
Chairman

NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY  
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF  
JCS  
DATE: 10/7/97

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USM, HQ, USMID, Vol. 777A

GROUP-1  
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GRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

74-2/3100 (27 MAR 63) WJ



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SECOND WORKING DRAFT

CUBA

DIRECT CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS TO AND  
WITHIN LATIN AMERICA

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to recommend measures which will impose direct controls upon the flow of funds from Cuba to and within other Latin American countries.

We possess evidence that Cuba is providing financial support to subversive campaigns in other Latin American countries, but the full dimensions of the problem, in terms of amounts involved and methods used, are not known. We need more information. The difficulty with which this information is procured underscores the problems of countermeasures, since funds can be transferred in many ways, all difficult to detect and harder to prevent. While we may be able to diminish the flow through some channels and increase the difficulty of Castro's subversive financial operations in others, we cannot hope to succeed in stopping them altogether.

In examining this problem, it quickly became evident that the most effective countermeasures are to be found in the area of reducing the capability of Cuba to acquire reserves of free world convertible currencies, such as U.S. dollars, Canadian dollars, Pounds Sterling,

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Swiss francs, etc. Cuban pesos are usable only in Cuba. They are not convertible to any other currency and are therefore of no value elsewhere in the world. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange, moreover, have been steadily diminishing, and are now estimated to stand at not more than \$25 million to \$50 million. If we are willing to intensify our efforts to weaken the Cuban economy, these foreign exchange reserves can be reduced further, to a point where the Castro regime will be unable to provide large-scale financial support to subversive activities elsewhere in the hemisphere.

While of transcendent importance, this question of diminishing Cuba's foreign exchange through economic measures is properly related to the larger objective of weakening the economic position of Castro-Communist Cuba, and thus advancing further toward the goal of causing the downfall of the Communist government. Clearly, as progress is realized in this broad endeavor, there will be a concomitant reduction in Castro's subversive financial operations in the Hemisphere.

The matter of intensifying our economic warfare against Cuba is regarded, however, as beyond the purview of this committee. Therefore, the program of actions recommended in this paper has been limited to meeting the specific problem of impeding directly the flow of Cuban funds to and within other Latin American countries. The

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problem of reducing Cuba's ability to acquire foreign exchange is a matter which should be examined separately, in the overall context of our basic objectives regarding Cuba.

2. Nature and Scope of the Problem

a. The Castro regime may transfer convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries by four general methods:

- (1) Introduction by hand, by legal or illegal travellers
- (2) Transfers through international banking institutions
- (3) Introduction by Cuban or Bloc diplomatic personnel, including couriers
- (4) The practice of subterfuge in connection with international business transactions.

These methods are discussed in following paragraphs, along with steps which might be undertaken to diminish the effectiveness of each.

b. Introduction of Funds by Hand, by Individual Travellers

This is the least convenient and least dependable method in terms of the hazard of theft, loss, misappropriation, confiscation or extortion. Nevertheless, we have evidence that this technique is employed. Funds can be introduced by legal travellers, where there are no preventive regulations, or they can be introduced by smuggling. With respect to smuggled funds, it is noted that the measures previously approved for control of illegal travel will likewise be effective in impeding the illegal movement

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of funds by such persons. In like manner, the measures previously approved for control of legal travel will affect the movement of funds by persons in that category.

Additional restrictions on the introduction of funds by legal travellers might be adopted by Latin American countries, in the form of limitations on amounts or administrative requirements for declaration of sums in hand. However, recommendation on our part to institute such controls would be contrary to our established policy of encouraging the Latin American nations to maintain free exchange systems. These countries need foreign exchange, and would consequently be hesitant to adopt any actions which would limit their means of acquiring it. Additionally, the adoption of controls on the importation of foreign exchange by Latin American nations would impose an undesirable burden on legitimate business travel from the United States, as well as from other friendly nations.

Thus, in the category of movement of funds by travellers, it is concluded that little more can be done than is now in motion.

c. Transfers through Banking Institutions.

In addition to physical transfers of currency, Cuba can transfer funds to subversives in Latin America through banking institutions, either by cable or by mail.

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Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange are held principally in the State Bank of Russia, the Moscow Narodny Bank in London, the Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord (a Communist-owned institution) in Paris, the Bank Intra of Switzerland, the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Bank of Canada. Funds from these deposits are transmitted on order of the National Bank of Cuba, which controls all of the accounts.

U.S. dollars are the principal currency used in Latin America. The transfer of dollars from these overseas accounts to subversives in Latin American countries can be impeded, in a significant degree, through the institution by the United States of blocking controls against Cuba, under paragraph 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This blocking action would prohibit all transactions with Cuba by persons or institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and would effectively interrupt Cuban movement of U.S. dollars to Latin America through any U.S. bank.

Movement by Cuba of dollars through banks of third countries would also be greatly diminished by this action. It is known and generally accepted in international banking circles, that it is standing U.S. policy that any foreign bank which transfers dollars through U.S. banks in behalf of a blocked country is subject to having its

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own U.S. accounts blocked. Because of the importance of U.S. banks in international trade, foreign banks cannot afford such a restriction. This policy has been effective in the past, having deterred foreign banks, even those of Communist countries, from engaging in dollar transactions on behalf of Communist China, which has been blocked by the U.S. for over twelve years.

With U.S. dollar channels blocked, other, less desirable, avenues would remain open to Cuba for bank transfer of convertible currencies such as Sterling, Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, etc. If the British and Canadians could be persuaded to prohibit remittances in their currencies in behalf of Cuba, the latter's capability to move funds through banking channels would be further curtailed, and transfers in minor currencies, such as Swiss francs, would be relatively easy to detect and monitor. While it is unlikely that British and Canadian cooperation would be forthcoming in this degree, these countries could still make a valuable contribution to the campaign against Castro-Communist subversion by providing intelligence concerning major transactions in their currencies by Cuba.

d. Transfers by Diplomatic Personnel

We know that convertible currencies have been carried to Latin American countries illegally by diplomatic representatives and couriers of both Cuba

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and the 'Bloc' countries, under the protection of their diplomatic immunity. This form of transfer can be diminished through the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba by those countries in Latin America which have not already taken such action. Although the diplomatic facilities of other Bloc countries would probably remain available to Cuba in some Latin American nations, the fact that Russia and Cuba are competing for influence in the area might cause the Bloc to be reluctant to cooperate with Castro by the transfer of currency in their diplomatic borders.

e. Transfers Through Trade Subterfuge.

An effective method of disguising transfers of funds for subversive purposes is to give such transfers the appearance of legitimate payments for items received in trade. In one technique, goods may be sent to a Cuban addressee by a subversive in the export-import business in a Latin American country bearing an erroneous invoice. A shipment having an actual value of \$10,000 can be invoiced and paid for at \$12,000, thus achieving a direct transfer of \$2,000 from Cuba to the Latin American country whence the shipment originated. Such transfers of funds could be eliminated only by the interruption of all trade between Cuba and other Latin American countries. And even if this were achieved, the same technique could be used, although at greater cost



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and much more difficulty, to transfer Cuban funds to Latin America via France, for example, through a third party French Communist import-export firm.

Another commercial technique for transferring funds from Cuba directly to Latin America, through trade, is by means of uncompensated exports. As an example, a Cuban source might send \$5,000 worth of Cuban publications to a leftist bookstore in Chile. The bookstore would not pay Cuba for the publication, but instead would use the proceeds of the sale for subversive purposes. This method also could be fully controlled only by an interruption of trade with Cuba.

f. Relative Importance of Transfer Methods.

All of the above mechanisms are usable, and probably all are employed now. However, since large sums can now be transferred readily through banking institutions, with small risk of loss or exposure, this method is considered to be the most significant and is deserving of the greatest attention in an action program. Next in importance probably is the transfer of currencies by diplomatic personnel - a procedure involving small risk of loss or exposure. Transfers by legal or illegal travellers are considered to be less important in view of the risks involved, the physical limitation on amounts which can be carried by individuals and the availability of other means.

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Trade subterfuge would presently appear to be of least significance, since such arrangements involve more difficulties than any of the other available methods.

### 3. Actions Recommended

a. The actions proposed herein, when added to those already proposed for controlling the movement of subversive persons, propaganda and arms, will serve to inhibit directly Cuba's effectiveness in financing subversion in Latin America. It must be acknowledged however, that Cuba's efforts to provide convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries cannot be rendered wholly ineffective by these measures alone. Complementary steps designed to reduce the ability of Cuba to acquire foreign exchange will also be required before a full and adequate solution to the problem is achieved.

b. The following direct actions are recommended as promising the most significant effect:

(1) Establish regulations blocking (a) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars to Cuba; (b) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars directly or indirectly from Cuban accounts to free world countries; and (c) all other unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuban nations, or transactions involving property in which there is a Cuban interest.

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(2) Renew efforts to persuade Latin American nations which have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

c. The following complementary actions are also recommended:

(1) Increase intelligence efforts to obtain information concerning the extent of Cuban transfers of funds to Latin American countries by legal and illegal travellers, as well as information on the techniques employed.

(2) Where locally feasible, encourage Latin American nations to impound funds of known Castro-Communist organizations.

(3) Encourage Latin American countries to enlist the cooperation of their financial institutions in detecting suspicious accounts and in exposing transfers of funds for subversive purposes.

(4) Seek to induce Canada, Great Britain, and other NATO countries as appropriate, to provide information on the direct or indirect transfer of significant amounts of their currencies by Cuba or Cuban nationals to other Latin American countries.

(5) Utilize intelligence and diplomatic resources to determine size and location of Cuban accounts in free world banking institutions.

(6) As applicable, persuade Latin American countries

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to sever all direct or indirect trade relations with Cuba, except those involving sale to Cuba of foodstuffs and medicines.

(7) Encourage Latin American countries to establish surveillance of known or suspected Communist controlled businesses to inhibit transfers of funds to subversives through such establishments.

(8) Discourage trade by Latin American countries with the Soviet Bloc.

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to the

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on

DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

9123/3100 (10 Oct 63)

Enclosures A and B, memoranda by the Secretary of the Army for the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, respectively, dated 30 November 1963, subject: "A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)", together with their Appendices, are circulated for information.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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the information herein in order  
to carry out their official duties

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ENCLOSURE A

30 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

Over the past several months interagency staff effort has been directed toward contingency planning for a revolt in Cuba. At enclosure 1 is a proposed plan\* which has been prepared jointly by the Departments of State and Defense in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency and which provides a conceptual basis for US response to a Cuban military coup. At enclosure 2\* is a summary of the plan together with a schematic layout of its provisions.

The plan has been formally reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who consider it to be militarily feasible and who also concur in the recommendation of the paper that it be used as the basis for detailed planning. The plan has been revised in the light of specific comments provided by the Joint Chiefs (enclosure 3\*\*), with which I was in general agreement and final informal interdepartmental coordination has been completed. Therefore, I have initiated action with Alexis Johnson in order to obtain the formal approval of the Secretary of State and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is recommended that you provide equivalent approval for the Department of Defense so that necessary detailed planning by appropriate governmental departments and agencies can be developed at an early date.

/s/ CYRUS R. VANCE  
Secretary of the Army

\* Appendix to Enclosure B, hereto

\*\* Attachment to JCS 2304/196

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Enclosure A

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## APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

SUMMARY OF A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR  
A COUP IN CUBA

As a result of a comprehensive review of US contingency planning for Cuba, the need was identified for the development of plans for several kinds of coups which might be initiated by Cuban dissidents. The first of these plans, representing working-level consensus in State, CIA, and Defense, provides planning guidance for a US response to a palace coup in Cuba to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, would result in the replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States. The JCS have stated that the plan is militarily feasible.

The plan is based on the following major assumptions:

1. A coup could be triggered in two ways: the leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence, in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring an immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

2. In the event of a coup, whether or not initiated with US knowledge and concurrence, the US, before a decision to intervene is made, would send a "special team" to Cuba to obtain information to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. The team could be introduced into Cuba within twenty-four hours after a coup had started if the US had prior knowledge of the revolt. It is expected that this team could determine and report within twenty-four hours after arrival whether the insurgents generally met the criteria for US support.



This information would be helpful to the President in making his decision and would reduce the chances of commitment of US force to the support of an uprising which might collapse before US help had become effective enough to sustain and expand it.

3. US intervention would be based on a pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government after it had been determined that the uprising met the general criteria for support. The plan also assumes that in the event of intervention by local Soviet forces, the US would immediately and overtly render necessary support to assure the success of the uprising, whether or not the insurgents met the criteria.

4. A coup, to be supportable, should generally meet the following criteria:

- a. Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia.
- b. Be prepared to establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for US intervention.
- c. Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.
- d. Seize and hold a significant piece of territory long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

The concept of operations set forth in this plan is based on the following general sequence of events: (a schematic outline of the plan is attached hereto)

Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated in Cuba, the US would introduce a special team, composed of representatives of CIA, Defense and State, to obtain information essential to making a decision to support the insurgents. (CIA has stated there can be no assurance that trained American observers will be in Cuba, hence the need for this team.) At



the same time, US forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba would be ordered to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing a blockade, if ordered. Similarly, the US would quietly commence generating and positioning the forces required to implement CINCLANT contingency plans. These preliminary moves, accomplished with a minimum of public knowledge, would, if the decision were made to intervene, enable early overt military action by US forces soon after the decision.

The plan provides two options for US action after the decision is made to intervene: (1) immediate and overt military support for the insurgents; or (2) a preliminary stage during which the US would not publicly acknowledge its support (while providing small groups of personnel for the purposes of reconnaissance, communications, and liaison with the coup leaders and establishing a full air and sea blockade of Cuba ostensibly to prevent external support being rendered to either side), followed by an overt military phase which would consist of implementing part or all of CINCLANT contingency plans, as necessary. The second option would provide time, while completing the positioning of military forces, to consult with and obtain the support of our allies, including the OAS.

The concept of political operations calls for consultation with our NATO allies (to alert them to possible Soviet action in Berlin or elsewhere) and a private Presidential message to Khrushchev informing him of the US decision to support the revolt and requesting that the Soviet Union not intervene in the affair.

The plan envisions OAS rather than unilateral US intervention in the uprising. It calls for OAS sanction for the blockade and an "OAS Assistance Command" under which military support would be provided the insurgents. An "OAS Technical Assistance Mission,"



would be formed to render assistance to the Cuban Provisional Government after termination of major hostilities. This mission, under an OAS Special Representative who would be a Latin American of considerable stature, competence and known cooperativeness with the US, would render assistance in maintaining law and order, provide administrative and technical support, assist in the organization of national elections, and help develop and execute an economic development plan.

The plan summarized above was developed by, and has the concurrence at the planners level in Defense, State, and CIA. While it has not yet been formally commented upon by the principals of those departments, it has been reviewed by the JCS. The following points in the plan have been singled out for criticism or question during interdepartmental coordination:

a. The Concept of the Special Team. (p.1, para 2b; p. 3, paras 3b and c) The JCS expressed "serious reservations with regard to the probable effectiveness" of the team in light of "the short time frame contemplated." They consider it "doubtful whether such a team will be able to add significantly to the broad, multiple-source intelligence assessment necessary for the critical decision" to be made. CIA and State favor the special team concept and agree with OASD/ISA that some kind of assurance is necessary in order to prevent commitment of US prestige to an uprising which would fail before our help could become effective. The plan has been revised to lessen the role of the special team in the scenario and its present role is to assist in developing the multiple-source intelligence estimate necessary for the decision.

b. Criteria for US Support. (p. 1, para 2c; p. 7, para 5a) State considers the criteria to be too rigid. The plan has been reworded to indicate that the criteria should



"generally" be met. This is not considered a vital point because the President and his advisers will evaluate the existing situation in light of many factors, rather than adopt a "check-off list" approach to making a decision.

c. Incremental Introduction of Forces. (p. 11, para 5b (3))

In commenting on an earlier provision of the plan which states "Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, the first incremental introduction of balanced forces (airborne divisions) could be effected if considered militarily desirable under the circumstances," the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented, "It should be emphasized that decision as to size and type of forces to be committed, as well as the advisability of incremental commitment, cannot be prejudged, but will be dependent upon the situation at the time." The language of the plan has been revised to emphasize the reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the incremental commitment of forces.

d. Miscellaneous. Other less significant reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Departments and the Agency at planners level have been resolved by agreed revisions.



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ENCLOSURE B

30 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ALEXIS JOHNSON  
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Department of State

SUBJECT: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

As you know, over the last several months interagency staff effort has been directed toward contingency planning for a revolt in Cuba. Enclosed herewith is the plan\* developed by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency which provides a conceptual basis for US response to a Cuban military coup.

The enclosed plan has been formally reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who consider\*\* it to be militarily feasible and who also concur in the recommendation of the paper that it be used as the basis for detailed planning. I am in full agreement with the views of the JCS in this regard and have requested approval for such action from the Secretary of Defense.

I understand that you will obtain equivalent approval or comment from Secretary Rusk and Mr. McCone and advise me accordingly so that further revisions can be made in the plan, if required. In the event that the Departments and the Agency are in accord, I propose the prompt initiation of the detailed planning contemplated in the plan.

/s/ CYRUS R. VANCE  
Secretary of the Army

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\* Appendix hereto  
\*\* See JCS 2304/205-1

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Enclosure B



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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE B

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Appendix to  
Enclosure B



APPENDIX

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A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA

1. Problem. To provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain information to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.

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c. US intervention would be based on:

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS approval), or

(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or

(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable, recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the situation existent at the time:

(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.

(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation

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which could be used as a pretext for such action.

(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage unorganized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANES 312 and 316.

3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time. (In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering information made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a pre-arranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:

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(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty-four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained American observers in Cuba would be of great value to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT, would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Government if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervene.)

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source intelligence assessment including the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision because, once-made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth,

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(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316.

d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and reconnaissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support. At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces required for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, as required.

4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea

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approaches to the island. The security and military forces are sizeable, well-ordered, and effective. The number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba is apparently being reduced. At present, about 5,000 to 7,000 of these personnel of all kinds remain on the island. Castro remains the dominant figure in Cuba. The regime is organizing a State party which may ultimately have a base of 50,000 members. A militant minority of the Cuban people supports Castro; the majority submits passively to the regime. Internal active resistance is limited, uncoordinated, and badly equipped.

Even though a coup in this environment seems unlikely at this time, it appears to be one of the most probable variants of insurgent action as well as the type most likely to succeed without US intervention. However, depending upon the nature of the coup and the amount of indigenous military support it would attract, very substantial US support, possibly as much as all the forces required by CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, may be required, the provisions of other US support notwithstanding.

5. Basic Considerations. There are a number of problems which confront the United States in considering its response to the contingency of an uprising.

a. Criteria Affecting US Response. For purposes of military and political contingency planning, the situation in Cuba at the time of US intervention should be generally as follows:

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(1) Fidel Castro (and possibly Raul Castro, President Dorticos, and Che Guevara) has been neutralized by the insurgents.

(2) The insurgents have seized and are in control of a significant area of Cuba, preferably including Havana with a number of key government buildings and a major radio station.

(3) The action should have triggered revolts in several additional strategic locations throughout Cuba. (Neither the Air Force nor the Navy may yet have joined in the fighting but probably the former tends to side with the regime while the latter might be predominantly sympathetic to the insurgents. Many military commanders in all services will probably be dragging their heels in order not to get caught on the wrong bandwagon. Most of the population will probably remain passive but generally in sympathy with the insurgents. A few civilian groups may have risen in resistance although such resistance must be deemed of minor significance in the present context.)

(4) The Soviets, having been warned repeatedly by the US of the consequences of their intervention in an internal Cuban conflict, would have either withdrawn to their own compounds and not be participating actively in the fighting except to provide advice and encouragement to the Castro/Communist supporters or intervened, in which case OPLANs 312 and 316 would have been implemented.

(5) While fighting was going on, the insurgents would have announced via radio and other means the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and the establishment of a Provisional Government. They would

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have appealed to the US and/or OAS for recognition and support. The insurgents simultaneously would have declared that Soviet nationals will not be harmed if they remain in their compounds while awaiting repatriation to the Soviet Union.

b. Military Criteria Affecting US Response.

(1) The JCS have examined criteria affecting US support to a spontaneous uprising. Their views, paraphrased in part, are of value in judging the circumstances in which US support of a coup should be risked:

"Optimally, support to resistance elements prior to invasion would be confined to logistic, UW, and fire support which would detract from the combat power of the invasion forces to the smallest extent possible and not alter materially the location or timing of operations planned in OPLANS 312 and 316.

"Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental commitment of US forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

"a. The uprising gives promise of success if U.S. aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

"b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the U.S.

"c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

"d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piecemeal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

"e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk."

(2) The JCS also have pointed out that the "best military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT

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OPLAN 312-316." It should be noted, however, that in the absence of a request for help following Soviet intervention, a full-scale US invasion would be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view. Such an invasion would raise the spectre of US interventionism in Latin America, could poison our future relations with Cuba and Latin America and would be difficult to justify in light of previous Presidential pronouncements. However, a well-planned and successful "rescue" of a revolt could be made politically acceptable. Further, a measured execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 (air strikes) could make the difference of life or death to a revolt under some conditions.

(3) A coup is likely swiftly to encounter serious difficulties, require prompt US help, and lack any clear outline as to the extent of forces involved and their location, especially if it were triggered without US knowledge. JCS study has been given to results which might be anticipated from execution of "portions of OPLAN 312 (air) including its UW (unconventional warfare) provision." Concomitant with the provision of such support, the US (CINCLANT) could, during the period, hereinafter called the first phase, between the time the decision to intervene is made (when establishment of the blockade would be announced) and public announcement of the US intent to commit other military forces in support of the insurgents, introduce small groups for the purposes of reconnaissance, communications, and liaison with the revolutionary forces, and could provide unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine.

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Provision of this assistance would be in such manner as to minimize public knowledge of US involvement in the coup. These first phase actions would have the purpose of assuring the insurgents of forthcoming military assistance as well as providing information as to the military desirability of the incremental introduction of balanced forces. Commencing seventy-two hours after the alerting of these groups (at the time the special team is introduced into Cuba), an initial increment would be ready for introduction into Cuba. Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, introduction of balanced forces could be effected on an incremental basis if considered militarily advisable and desirable under the circumstances. Once the US was openly committed to support the Provisional Government, it is estimated that air support, both tactical and logistical, is the type of overt help which a group of insurgents would most likely need and which, at the same time, would bear the least political onus. The actual amount of help would be dependent upon the extent of participation by indigenous armed forces in the insurgency and their degree of success.

c. Implications of Soviet Military Action.

(1) Action by Soviet troops to suppress a revolt would, more than any other single development, call for US intervention. A military response by the US under such circumstances, however, could immediately bring about a direct, local US-Soviet confrontation, either because we

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already had moved to support the uprising or because the Soviet intervention in itself would have created a requirement for US intervention. Therefore, an especially important objective would be to deter the Soviets from acting. The chances of Soviet intervention might be reduced by (1) a private warning to them not to intervene, (2) the speed and obvious determination with which the US was acting, and (3) the avoidance of attacks on Soviet personnel and installations in Cuba, unless there is an indication of a clear Soviet intention to intervene.

(2) Any US action would also have to be considered in light of the desirability of avoiding, if possible, a direct challenge to the USSR. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any US action in support of opponents of the Castro regime is bound to impinge on Soviet interests and thus raise in a rather direct fashion the problem of a US-USSR confrontation. In addition, military action such as a full blockade, or an attack on the SAM defenses and Soviet combat formations on the island, would immediately and directly challenge the USSR. The questions thus become: are we prepared to accept this risk, what do we estimate to be its probable consequences, and how would we propose to contain and minimize the degree of Soviet involvement?

(3) In connection with the military risk, the military inferiority of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean area remains; the relative overall military balance between the US and USSR likewise remains unchanged and in US favor. If the sympathy of the Cuban people was demonstrably on the side of the insurgents, the United States would have a solid moral

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basis for action. The greatest potential danger lies in those regions where the USSR may consider itself to possess a local advantage, e.g., Berlin. The Soviets might hope to make gains there while our attention was focused on Cuba. Carried to the extreme, concern over Soviet harassment or threats to the safety of Berlin could paralyze any resort to arms elsewhere by the West to preserve its vital interests. Therefore, if it were to intervene in Cuba, the US would have to recognize the possibility of Soviet exploitation of their position in such peripheral areas and to be prepared to counter Soviet action in those areas. The support of our European allies for forceful US action in Cuba is highly desirable and would assist in deterring any untoward Soviet action in Europe. Because of the nature of our proposed actions, the US should make every effort to seek allied support for a decision to assist overtly the insurgents with military means.

(4) On the level of military action, to the extent that circumstances permit, the US should conduct operations so as to leave to the Soviet Union the choice of whether to become directly involved with our armed forces. The blockade is inherently such an action, but our air and ground forces would have to be given explicit instructions at the time on the conditions under which they would engage Soviet forces in Cuba. This point should be made quite clear to the Kremlin. US planning provides, for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time, for the possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba.

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d. The Decision. The considerations discussed above point up the number of complex, inter-acting factors which would be brought to bear on the US during the decision-making period. It is very likely that the Government would lack essential, evaluated information, regardless of the manner by which a coup were initiated, but would, at the same time, be under heavy pressure to respond quickly. In the case of a pre-arranged CIA-insurgent plan, the President may not have enough information without the special team's report to determine whether the coup was successful enough to merit US support and, then, to decide what degree of support should be rendered and at what point in time to announce overt support for the dissidents. In the event of a coup which came as a surprise to the US, the dilemma which would confront the Government would be of even greater proportions. In the midst of rapidly changing developments, more time would probably be required for the US to determine whether the revolt should be supported and, if so, in what manner.

6. Concept of Military Operations.

a. The foregoing considerations point toward a concept of US military operations, after the decision to intervene is made, in one or two phases: a first phase, if necessitated by political considerations, oriented primarily toward intelligence and reconnaissance operations, followed, as required, by a second (overt) phase. It cannot be determined now whether, in the event of a coup, time and other considerations would permit or require implementation of the first phase operations prior to rendering overt support or vice versa. In the application of military

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force, the basic political principle to be followed is that of support to the insurgents and of helping them to liberate Cuba themselves. However, the US Government must be clear that, once our criteria were adequately met and our support initiated, we would commit sufficient force to insure success, including execution of parts or all of OPLANs 312 and 316. It should be made equally clear to potential insurgents, on the other hand, that US support for a revolt initiated without our prior knowledge or concurrence would be contingent upon the circumstances existent at that time. From a political viewpoint, it is important, in either case, that the revolt appear genuine and not open to the charge of being a facade for a forcible US overthrow of Castro.

b. If the Soviets should intervene against the insurgents, with whatever ground capability remained at that time, the first phase might turn out to be extremely short or non-existent. At the point of Soviet intervention, the US would side openly with the insurgents. However, the more rapidly the US can move to incisive overt intervention under any circumstance, while avoiding actions that risk the more direct and immediate stimulation of Soviet response, the less danger of Soviet armed involvement in Cuba or of Soviet response elsewhere.

c. During the first phase, if there should be one, the US would announce immediately the establishment of an air and sea blockade and would establish further contact with the revolt by deploying small groups while positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316. Although the US could implement the first phase promptly

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after a Presidential decision to intervene, either intervention by the Soviets or an appeal for help from the Provisional Government would establish the necessary political basis for announcing a US decision overtly to intervene.

d. In the event of a coup initiated with US approval, the first phase would probably be of short duration, if it occurred at all. If a US aircraft were shot down during this phase, the US should then either (1) declare openly for the insurgents with the opening measure of its overt support being against selected or all air defense targets or (2) retaliate overtly against the offending element of the air defense without admitting assistance to the insurgents. From a political point of view, the latter choice could be justified only with difficulty, although we might seek to justify our actions on the basis that the aircraft shot down was on a reconnaissance flight. In the event of a coup initiated without US knowledge, the provision of any support would be delayed because more time would be required for special team operations, thus increasing the danger of later losing an aircraft to an alerted air defense, if those forces did not join the insurgents.

e. After the United States had decided that overt armed assistance constituted the appropriate response or the Soviets had taken forcible action against either our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would render sufficient direct assistance to the insurgents to permit them to continue to operate and to extend their span of control, and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as necessary to insure

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success of the operation. The US Government would initially place main reliance on the psychological impact of the blockade, on the abandonment of the Castro regime by the Cuban people in the face of the clear evidence of decisive US actions to bring down the regime, and on logistical and air support of the revolt in the hope that these factors would be sufficient to bring down the Communist regime.

f. During the second (overt) phase of operations, the US would suppress or eliminate those air defenses which might endanger the air movement of US troops into the area and be prepared to conduct other air operations as required. Following the elimination of hostile Cuban fighter aircraft and SAM defenses, US forces would have the capability to isolate most areas of Cuban territory during daylight by interdiction of military vehicles and troop concentrations, and to make such movement difficult at night.

g. It is important that we have an estimate of the overt support which would be required and which could be introduced in a time-phased manner to sustain the revolt. This estimate of overt support, and time-phasing of its application into Cuba, will be predicated upon a commitment to utilize whatever force is necessary to sustain and exploit the uprising. Following completion of such initial air attacks as may be necessary, provision will be made for the rapid, incremental introduction of balanced forces, to include full-scale invasion if such becomes necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed CINCLANT to look into these matters.

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7. Concept of Political Operations.

a. When the decision is made to support the Provisional Government, the President would send a message to Khrushchev informing him of the decision to insure the success of the coup, expressing the expectation that he will not intervene in this Cuban affair and specifically requesting the Chairman to comply with the sea and air blockade to be effected at (time) and to order Soviet troops to specified concentration points to minimize Soviet loss of life. (The latter not to be included in Soviet forces already are actively committed in support of the Castro regime.)

b. After the Provisional Government had issued a public call for help, and the United States had decided that armed assistance constituted the appropriate response, or the Soviets had taken forcible action against our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would consider the following actions:

(1) Cease to recognize the Castro Government and recognize the insurgents as the Provisional Government.

(2) Request the convocation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics under Article 39 of the OAS Charter or, particularly if the Soviets intervene, of the Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty (it would be preferable to have this request preceded by an appeal from the Provisional Government to the OAS) and recommend (i) OAS sanction for and joint participation in the blockade, (ii) the furnishing of all necessary military help to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Assistance Command," even though the US might be the only supplier of forces (in any case, the Command would

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be pro-forma and would actually be controlled by the US), and (iii) that the OAS Secretary General and the governments provide all necessary technical assistance to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission."

(3) Dispatch Presidential emissaries to Ottawa, London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome to consult with heads of government and the NAC.

(4) Insure that the OAS informs the United Nations Security Council under Article 54 of the UN Charter of the action taken in the OAS. Forestall Soviet moves in the UN.

(5) Seek the cooperation of selected Cuban exile leaders whose aims are compatible with those of the insurgent group within Cuba.

(6) Convoke a joint session of Congress which would be asked to announce, presumably in the form of a Joint Resolution, US determination to commit all necessary resources in support of the new government.

c. Should the time arrive when, as a result of US air attacks, blockades, etc., it might have become apparent from the standpoint of military power that Castro was finished, the Provisional Government, preferably with the OAS Assistance Command, or, less acceptably, the US, acting as Executive Agent for the OAS, should jointly issue a political ultimatum. This action should be taken while awaiting the earliest point in time at which CINCLANT OPLAN 316 could be implemented, and after the Cuban insurgent chief of the armed forces had been requested to declare martial law. The ultimatum should include the following elements:

(1) A demand that key Castro/Communist personalities, to be

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named, be turned over to the custody of the Provisional Government.

(2) An announcement that the OAS will send representatives to the island to assist the Provisional Government in preparing for and conducting free elections.

(3) An appeal to all Cubans to avoid the inevitable bloodshed of invasion by cooperating with the Provisional Government in effecting the removal of the remnants of the Castro Dictatorship and the Soviet presence.

d. Working closely with the OAS-SYG the US should help him select and send civilian personnel, comprising an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," to Cuban territory as soon as major military operations had ceased. (US Government personnel should be made available for this purpose in order to have an interdepartmental staff in Cuba.) The OAS should be strongly encouraged to designate an OAS Special Representative to head this Mission who would be a Latin American of considerable stature, demonstrated competence and known cooperativeness with the US. His Deputy should be an American and the actual operating head of the OAS Mission. Once ashore, the Deputy would be recognized by US agencies and officials as the senior US civilian officer in Cuba until such time as a US Ambassador is designated; he would be the link between the OAS Special Representative and the US military commander heading the "OAS Assistance Command," if one had been established, while the commander exercised military responsibilities prior to turning over his functions to Cuban officials. If the revolt gained rapid success prior to the overt introduction of US military

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forces on the ground in Cuba, the US should accredit an Ambassador to the Provisional Government who, when so directed by the President, would become the senior US Representative in Cuba. If the revolt grew beyond its original limits only slowly and if relatively large numbers of overt military forces were committed, the arrival of the "Technical Assistance Mission" and diplomatic representatives should be deferred until such time as their activities would be effective after major military operations had been completed.

c. The immediate objectives which the Senior US civilian Representative in Cuba (whether the deputy head of the OAS Mission or the Ambassador) would seek, with the assistance of the "OAS Assistance Command" and the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," are:

- (1) To assist the Provisional Government in maintaining law and order and train and equip Cuban military and police forces as rapidly as possible.
- (2) To provide necessary administrative and technical support to ensure an orderly and efficient maintenance of governmental operations at the national, provincial and municipal levels.
- (3) To assist in the organization of national elections at the earliest suitable date and in the supervision of those elections.
- (4) To lend assistance in the reconstruction of Cuba and in the development and execution of economic development plans.
- (5) To facilitate the speedy departure of any remaining Soviet forces from the island, including protection and assistance in evacuation.

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f. The US military commander, under the full operational command of CINCLANT, would continue to be responsible for any residual combat operations. He would also continue to render such civil affairs type assistance to the Provisional Government and/or the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission" as the situation might require.

8. Recommendation. Approve this plan as a basis for development of detailed planning by governmental departments and agencies concerned which would include the following implementing actions:

a. CIA would, as appropriate and with Presidential approval, deal with the potential leaders of a coup in Cuba.

b. CIA, State, and DoD jointly would organize and make ready a special team and establish procedures for its rapid introduction into Cuba when required.

c. Pertinent CINCLANT plans would be revised to reflect the concept of military operations described herein.

d. The Department of State would develop detailed plans to implement the concept of political operations.

e. The Department of State would review and revise, as necessary, the series of papers developing policy recommendations on the host of problems connected with a post-Castro regime.

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Appendix



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16 January 1964

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

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HOLDERS OF JCS 2304/205-2  
A Note by the Secretaries  
on

9123/3100  
(1 0063)

DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

Holders are requested to insert the attached white page  
11 in the Appendix to Enclosure B.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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8



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

18 October 1963

TO GENERAL TAYLOR:

The attached JCSM-809-63 is submitted for signature.

Derived from JCS 2304/205-1, subj: Draft State-Defense Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S).

Item 4, 18 October 1963 Agenda.

Approved by the JCS in meeting on 18 October 1963 as amended at the Op Deps Meeting by DF-204-63, CSAF Flimsy, in meeting, and CSAM-571, itself amended (changes reflected on pages 5 and 6-7).

Degree of Precedence:

PRIORITY - 21 October deadline;  
request of Sec Army

*MJ Angelido*  
M. J. ANGELIDO  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Secretary

Via Director

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JCSM-809-63

21 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup  
in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Secretary of the Army, dated 1 October 1963, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view, previously stated in JCSM-458-63, dated 15 June 1963, subject: "US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C)," that, although a coup may be one of the most promising types of revolt in Cuba, it is unlikely to occur at this time. They also have serious reservations with regard to the probable effectiveness of the "special team" which is to be introduced into Cuba after the coup takes place. Within the short time frame contemplated, it is doubtful whether such a team will be able to add significantly to the broad, multiple-source intelligence assessment necessary for the critical decision which would commit the United States to the employment of portions or all of the military forces required by CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 316. Further, in the case of a coup initiated by dissident leaders who had agreed to meet the criteria for US support and to whom prior approval had been given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time, the United States would have some obligation to intervene, irrespective of the report of the "special team." The introduction of small groups for intelligence, liaison, and communication purposes after the decision to intervene had been made, however, should prove very useful in providing information on which a subsequent military recommendation might be based for the incremental introduction of forces.

3. Since the subject addressed in the draft State-Defense paper relates primarily to US actions following a coup, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made no comment on the statements of broad policy considerations

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cited therein as affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba. These statements have been considered as assumptions for the purpose of the paper, rather than as approved national policy. Further, the draft has been interpreted as presenting a broad concept and, consequently, detailed suggestions for changes in wording have not been made. Appropriate comments can be made on detailed plans to be developed in accordance with the recommendations of the paper.

4. It is noted that the draft paper states, "Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, the first incremental introduction of balanced forces (airborne divisions) could be effected if considered militarily desirable under the circumstances." It should be emphasized that decision as to size and type of forces to be committed, as well as the advisability of incremental commitment, cannot be prejudged, but will be dependent upon the situation at the time.

5. It is also noted that the draft paper provides that the United States will commence to position forces to implement CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 316 as soon as the decision to introduce a "special team" into Cuba has been made. This provision is important in that it will reduce the reaction time required for overt military support after a Presidential decision to intervene and will provide forces for the suppression of Cuban air defenses as required in order to "initiate overt logistical and air support to insurgents." It might also reduce the risk of incremental introduction of forces into Cuba if such were considered. For example, the early commitment of airborne or air-landed forces might entail less risk if the US Naval Base, Guantanamo, had been reinforced and a combat-loaded amphibious force were at sea.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while holding reservations as expressed in the comments above, have concluded that the plan envisaged in the State-Defense paper is militarily feasible.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Signed

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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4

18 October 1963

Decision On:

JCS 2304/205-1

(Cuba Planning) (U)

On 18 October 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the subject paper together with DF-204-63, CSAM 571-63, and an unnumbered, undated Air Force Flimsy, the latter two tabled at the meeting. After some discussion, the recommendations of the J-5, as set forth in paragraph 10 of the subject paper, were approved as amended by:

- a. Deleting on line 11, page 5, Enclosure A, the word "problematical", substituting therefor the word "doubtful" and the words "a very small", substituting therefor the words "such a".
- b. Changing the end of the last sentence in paragraph 2, page 5, Enclosure A, to read "... information on which a subsequent military recommendation might be based for the incremental introduction of forces."
- c. DF-204-63.
- d. CSAM 571-63, with the exception of paragraphs 2 and 5.
- e. The Air Force Flimsy.

*E. A. Davidson*  
E. A. DAVIDSON  
Commander, USN  
Assistant Secretary

DECLASSIFIED BY JCS  
DATE 18 OCT 1989

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69-11-26-63  
IMPLEMENTED  
Jan 8-9-63



8 Oct 67

AIR FORCE FLIMSY

on

JCS 2304/205-1

DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

1. I have reviewed JCS 2304/205-1 and recommend the following change:

Page 6, para 5, line 23. Add phrase to sentence as follows:

... decision to intervene and will provide forces for the suppression of Cuban air defenses as required in order to "initiate overt logistical and air support to insurgents." It might ...

REASON: To impress upon the political planners that overt logistic and air support of insurgents cannot be insured unless it is recognized that appropriate suppression of the Cuban defensive environment is required. This thought was agreed to in JCS 2304/201 (US courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba (C)) and should be restated for emphasis. XY

OK, as in

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Johnston to meet  
1000 hrs  
Fri 18 Oct 63

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CSAM 571 -63  
18 October 1963

DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army

I have reviewed JCS 2304/205-1 with 2d Corrigendum and am generally in agreement. However, in view of the tenuous arrangements in the draft plan for verifying the existence of a coup preliminary to a Presidential decision to intervene, I feel that the JCS should emphasize their reservations concerning the "Special Team." Accordingly, I recommend the attached change. With their inclusion I can concur in JCS 2304/205-1.

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The following changes are recommended in the Memorandum  
for the Secretary of Defense, Enclosure A, JCS 2304/205-1, Corrigendum 2:

1. Line 8, page 5.

"...have some serious reservations..."

2. Line 11, page 5:

NO | "...it is problematical doubtful whether a one very..."

3. Line 12, page 5:

"...information broad, multiple-sources intelligence assessment  
necessary..."

4. Line 18, page 5:

sec  
3P "..." however, might should prove...."

5. Line 19, page 5:

NO | "...on which a subsequent military decision ...."

6. Line 30, page 6-7: Delete the word "some"

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17 October 1963

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DF 204 63

JCS Meeting 18 Oct 1963  
Agenda Item 4

DIRECTOR'S PLIMSY

on

JCS 2304/205-1 - Draft State-Defense  
Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

It is recommended that JCS 2304/205-1 be changed as follows:

Page 5, line 16, insert a sentence as follows:

"316. Further, in the case of a coup initiated by  
dissident leaders who had agreed to meet the criteria for  
US support and to whom prior approval had been given to  
commence the coup at the earliest practicable time, it  
would appear that the United States <sup>would have some</sup> would be committed  
obligation to intervene  
from the outset, at least morally, irrespective of the  
report of the 'special team'. The introduction of . . . "

OK

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Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a report to be considered at the JCS meeting, 18 October 1963.

Subject: JCS 2304/205-1 Draft State-Defense Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

Background - On 10 May 63, TAB B, the JCS forwarded to SECDEF their comments concerning US courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba.

- On 15 June 63, TAB C, the JCS forwarded to SECDEF their comments on a draft State-Defense Plan to provide assistance to a revolt in Cuba,

- On 22 July 63, TAB D, the JCS forwarded to SECDEF their comments on a revised draft State-Defense Plan.

- On 1 Oct 63, TAB E, the SEC ARMY requested the views of the JCS on a Draft State-Defense Plan for a Coup in Cuba which provides:

a. Upon initiation of a coup which appears to meet criteria for US support, a "special team" would make contact with the coup leaders and the US would simultaneously commence to position forces required for CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

b. Upon the President's decision to intervene after receipt of the report of the "special team," the US would be fully committed to assure success of the revolt and the following actions would take place.

(1) CINCLANT would assume command of military operations.

(2) Small groups of personnel would be introduced into Cuba for intelligence and liaison purposes.

(3) The President would announce a blockade effective within 48 hours.

(4) Appropriate portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 would be implemented.

Current Report - TAB A - contains a memorandum for SECDEF informing him the JCS, while holding some reservations, consider the concept militarily feasible. These reservations are that:

a. Such a coup is not likely.

b. The effectiveness of the "special team" is questionable.

c. The paper is considered as a broad concept rather than a detailed plan.

d. The size, type and timing of the forces to be committed cannot be pre-judged but must depend on the situation at the time.

Special handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information to make decisions.

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Service Comments - The Services are expected to support the report as written.

Comment and Recommendations - The Director, J-5, recommends the Chairman, JCS, support the report as written.

Approved by *Concur* Director, J-5.

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Director, Joint Staff \_\_\_\_\_ (Concur) (Noncur)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Colonel W. C. Chamberlin, USMC  
Latin America Branch, J-5  
Extension 77556

TAB A, JCS 2304/205-1 ✓  
TAB B, JCS 2304/184 ✓  
TAB C, JCS 2304/197 ✓  
TAB D, JCS 230/201 ✓  
TAB E, JCS 2304/205 ✓

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JCS 2304/205-1

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REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

Reference: JCS 2304/205

DECISION

9123/3100 (10 Oct 63)

1. Special handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

2. At their meeting on 18 October 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after making amendments, approved the recommendations in paragraph 10 of this report.

3. This Decision replaces page 2. Holders are requested to substitute the additional attached revised pages 5 and 6-7, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

4. The memorandum in Enclosure A was forwarded as JCSM-809-63, dated 21 October 1963, to the Secretary of Defense. Copies of this paper are being forwarded to CINCLANT, USCINCSO, and CINCSTRIKE.

5. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

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JCS 2304/205-1



## DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

## THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a memorandum\* by the Secretary of the 1  
Army, to provide the comments on a draft State-Defense paper 2  
entitled, "A State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba." 3

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 10 May 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded\*\* to 4  
the Secretary of Defense their comments concerning US courses 5  
of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. 6

3. On 15 June 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded\*\*\* 7  
to the Secretary of Defense their comments on a draft State- 8  
Defense Plan\*\*\*\* for providing sufficient assistance to an 9  
anticommunist revolt in Cuba to assure its success. 10

4. On 22 July 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded# 11  
to the Secretary of Defense their comments on a revised draft 12  
State-Defense Plan## for providing sufficient assistance to an 13  
anticommunist revolt in Cuba to assure its success. 14

5. On 1 October 1963, a draft State-Defense contingency 15  
plan### for a coup in Cuba was forwarded by the Secretary 16  
of the Army for comment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A 17  
summary of the plan is in the Appendix to Enclosure B. 18

6. For additional facts, see Enclosure B. 19

- \* Attachment to JCS 2304/205  
\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/184  
\*\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/197  
\*\*\*\* Attachment to JCS 2304/196  
# Enclosure A to JCS 2304/201  
## Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 2304/200  
### Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 2304/205



## DISCUSSION

7. For discussion, see Enclosure G.

## CONCLUSIONS

8. The concept outlined in the draft State-Defense paper is militarily feasible.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should express reservations on the following aspects:

a. There is no information available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that indicates such a coup is likely.

b. It is problematical whether the "Special Team" would be able to add significantly to the information necessary for a decision to commit US forces.

c. The size and type of forces to be committed should not be prejudged but depend on the situation existing at the time.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in Enclosure A, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded on a "Special Handling Required - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis to the Secretary of Defense.

b. Copies of this paper be forwarded to CINCLANT, USCINCSO, and CINCSTRIKE.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officers: Colonel W. C. Chamberlin, USMC  
Colonel R. H. Dettre, USAF  
Latin America Branch, J-5  
Extensions 77556/78926





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ENCLOSURE A  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-809-63  
21 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup  
in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Secretary of the Army, dated 1 October 1963, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view, previously stated in JCSM-458-63, dated 15 June 1963, subject: "US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C)," that, although a coup may be one of the most promising types of revolt in Cuba, it is unlikely to occur at this time. They also have serious reservations with regard to the probable effectiveness of the "special team" which is to be introduced into Cuba after the coup takes place. Within the short time frame contemplated, it is doubtful whether such a team will be able to add significantly to the broad, multiple-source intelligence assessment necessary for the critical decision which would commit the United States to the employment of portions or all of the military forces required by CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 316. Further, in the case of a coup initiated by dissident leaders who had agreed to meet the criteria for US support and to whom prior approval had been given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time, the United States would have some obligation to intervene, irrespective of the report of the "special team." The introduction of small groups for intelligence, liaison, and communication purposes after the decision to intervene had been made, however, should prove very useful in providing information on which a subsequent military recommendation might be based for the incremental introduction of forces.

3. Since the subject addressed in the draft State-Defense paper relates primarily to US actions following a coup, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made no comment on the statements of broad policy considerations

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REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10  
DOES NOT APPLY

\* Attachment to JCS 2304/205  
\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/197

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JCS 2304/205-1

5

Enclosure A

(Revised by Decision - 21 October 1963)



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cited therein as affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba. These statements have been considered as assumptions for the purpose of the paper, rather than as approved national policy. Further, the draft has been interpreted as presenting a broad concept and, consequently, detailed suggestions for changes in wording have not been made. Appropriate comments can be made on detailed plans to be developed in accordance with the recommendations of the paper.

4. It is noted that the draft paper states, "Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, the first incremental introduction of balanced forces (airborne divisions) could be effected if considered militarily desirable under the circumstances." It should be emphasized that decision as to size and type of forces to be committed, as well as the advisability of incremental commitment, cannot be prejudged, but will be dependent upon the situation at the time.

5. It is also noted that the draft paper provides that the United States will commence to position forces to implement CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 316 as soon as the decision to introduce a "special team" into Cuba has been made. This provision is important in that it will reduce the reaction time required for overt military support after a Presidential decision to intervene and will provide forces for the suppression of Cuban air defenses as required in order to "initiate overt logistical and air support to insurgents." It might also reduce the risk of incremental introduction of forces into Cuba if such were considered. For example, the early commitment of airborne or air-landed forces might entail less risk if the US Naval Base, Guantanamo, had been reinforced and a combat-loaded amphibious force were at sea.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while holding reservations as expressed in the comments above, have concluded that the plan envisaged in the State-Defense paper is militarily feasible.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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JCS 2304/205-1

6-7

Enclosure A

(Revised by Decision - 21 October 1963)



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ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. On 10 May 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded\* to the Secretary of Defense their comments concerning US courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, in summary:

a. The United States should be prepared to support any spontaneous revolt in Cuba showing a reasonable promise of success.

b. The best military response to a spontaneous revolt in Cuba would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 except that, under certain conditions, a rapid incremental introduction of US forces might be considered.

c. There are actions which require attention outside the Department of Defense. A number of such actions requiring CIA and Department of State attention were listed.

2. On 15 June 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded\*\* to the Secretary of Defense their comments on a draft State-Defense Plan\*\*\* for providing sufficient assistance to an anticommunist revolt in Cuba to assure its success. These comments were, in summary, that:

a. The draft plan was not militarily feasible or desirable and, if implemented, would entail excessive risks.

\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/184  
\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/197  
\*\*\* Attachment to JCS 2304/196

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JCS 2304/205-1

Enclosure B

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b. Revision of the draft plan was recommended.

3. On 22 July 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded\* to the Secretary of Defense their comments on a revised draft State-Defense Plan\*\* for providing sufficient assistance to an anti-communist revolt in Cuba to assure its success. Their comments were, in summary that:

a. The draft plan was generally compatible with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Specific changes were necessary to make clear that:

(1) Once the United States is committed to overt support of a revolt in Cuba, the principal course of action should be the prompt and orderly execution of preplanned operations in areas of our own choosing and with appropriate forces.

(2) Interim operations should be ancillary to and not a substitute for the principal course of action.

(3) The objective of all US operations should be the establishment of a government in Cuba acceptable to the United States.

\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/201

\*\* Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 2304/200

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JCS 2304/205-1

9

~~Enclosure B~~

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE B

SUMMARY OF PLAN

1. Upon the initiation of a coup in Cuba (either with or without prior knowledge of the United States) which appears to meet the criteria required for US support, the United States would:

a. Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to make contact with the coup leaders and recommend to the President whether the United States should intervene in support of the uprising.

b. Simultaneously commence positioning forces required to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba and to implement CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

2. Upon receipt of the report of the "special team", and if the President's decision were to intervene, the United States would be fully committed to assure success of the revolt and the following action would take place.

a. CINCLANT would assume command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba, including operational control of the "special team" previously introduced.

b. Small groups of personnel would be introduced into Cuba promptly for intelligence, reconnaissance, communication and liaison purposes. A decision as to the military desirability of the incremental introduction into Cuba of balanced forces would be made as a result of an evaluation of their reports. These groups would serve also as assurance to the insurgents of forthcoming US military support.

c. The President, in answer to a request for help from the insurgents, would announce an air and sea blockade effective within forty-eight hours.

d. All, or appropriate portions of, CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 would be implemented at appropriate times.



## ENCLOSURE C

## DISCUSSION

1. On 10 May 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded\* their comments concerning US courses of action related to a revolt in Cuba. ~~Briefly,~~ <sup>T</sup>hese comments and recommendations are summarized as follows:

a. CIA assets in Cuba are inadequate for effective support of a spontaneous revolt, and time would be required to introduce additional assets. Such delay might be unacceptable.

b. The best military response to the revolt would be orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312-316.

c. Incremental commitment of US forces would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

(1) The uprising gives promise of success if US aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

(2) Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the United States.

(3) This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

(4) Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piecemeal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

(5) An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk.

d. Plans for rapid application of US forces must consider the neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba.

e. Planning is incomplete for post-assault operations in which we would have to fill the political, economic and military vacuum which would be caused by the downfall of the Castro-communist regime.

\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/184



f. There are actions which require attention outside the Department of Defense:

- (1) CIA assets in Cuba should be augmented as feasible.
- (2) The Department of State should:
  - (a) Develop plans for a post-hostilities government in Cuba.
  - (b) Initiate actions to coalesce Cuban factions in opposition to Castro.
  - (c) Devise a policy assigning Cuban exiles an appropriate role both in a revolt and its aftermath within the framework of CIA and CINCLANT plans.
  - (d) Initiate action now to mold public opinion and to provide policy guidance for the conduct of psychological operations.

2. On 5 June 1963, the Director for Arms Control, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded\* for comment or concurrence by the Joint Chiefs of Staff a draft State-Defense plan for providing sufficient assistance to an anti-communist revolt in Cuba to assure its success. The draft plan was at variance with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 1 above, in several important respects.

3. On 15 June 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented\*\* on the draft State-Defense plan to the Secretary of Defense as follows:

a. Commitment of US forces incrementally in a "structured 'rescue'" as proposed in the draft plan could invite defeat in detail, heighten the risk of a major US-USSR confrontation, and require US forces to fight on terms of maximum advantage to the enemy.

b. The draft State-Defense plan is unduly restrictive concerning use of airpower. It fails to include, during the overt phase of operations the possible suppression and/or elimination of those air defenses which might endanger air movement of US troops into the area.

\* Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 2304/196

\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/197



c. The draft State-Defense Plan is at variance with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which are:

(1) Although a palace revolt may be the most likely type of revolt, it is unlikely to occur at this time.

(2) Portions, or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312-316, as necessary, should be implemented to support any revolt the United States chooses to exploit.

(3) The possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba, with either lethal or nonlethal munitions, should be included explicitly in US plans for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time.

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree that the USSR should be advised of the US decision to initiate covert operations in Cuba because to do so would prematurely reveal US intentions.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that a Special Representative of the President should move immediately into Cuba to establish direct liaison with the provisional government. CINCLANT should be the US representative during combat operations and their immediate aftermath.

f. In summary, the draft State-Defense plan in its present form is not militarily feasible or desirable and would entail excessive risks. It is recommended that the plan be revised to reflect the foregoing comments, those forwarded in JCSM 358-63,\* and the data forwarded by JCSM 360-63\*\* to the Secretary of the Army for use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for policy toward Cuba.

4. On 24 June 1963, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded for comment a revised draft State-Defense Plan\*\*\* for providing sufficient assistance to an anti-communist revolt in Cuba to assure its success.

\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/197

\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/184

\*\*\* Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 2304/200



5. On 22 July 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented\* on the revised draft State-Defense plan to the Secretary of Defense as follows:

a. The revised draft State-Defense plan is generally compatible with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Specific changes were necessary among which were:

(1) Recognition that a US invasion would not invariably be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view.

(2) Clarification of the concept that once the United States is committed to overt support of a revolt in Cuba, the estimate of overt support for sustaining the uprising, and the time phasing of its application to or into Cuba, will be predicated upon commitment to utilize whatever force is necessary to sustain and exploit the uprising.

(3) Clarification of the concept that the principal course of action should be the prompt and orderly execution of preplanned operations in areas of our own choosing and with appropriate forces; interim operations to sustain the revolt being considered as ancillary to, and not a substitute for, the principal course of action.

(4) Emphasize that the objective of all US operations should be the establishment of a government in Cuba acceptable to the United States.

6. The draft State-Defense Plan\*\* currently being considered is a revised draft prepared pursuant to the recommendations set forth above, but addressing solely the problem of a "palace revolt" or "coup". Other types of revolt are to be addressed in subsequent State-Defense plans upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be requested to comment. The plan\*\* is generally in consonance with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A summary is in the appendix to Enclosure B.

\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/201

\*\* Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 2304/205



7. The draft State-Defense plan\* contemplates the prompt introduction into Cuba of small groups for intelligence, reconnaissance, communication and liaison purposes after the President's decision to intervene. It also contemplates that there may be a delay in the public announcement of the decision to intervene (other than the announcement of the intent to establish an air and sea blockade). Nevertheless, the prompt introduction of these small groups would take place during the period of delay prior to public announcement (which period the plan defines as the first phase) and unattributable logistic support by air drop or submarine could also be provided.

8. The draft State-Defense plan,\* the thirteenth in the particular series, appears accommodated to the previously expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff insofar as they pertain to a coup. The draft is essentially a new paper rather than a revision of its predecessors and as such might be improved substantially by extensive modification to its language. It presents, however, a broad concept to be developed further by detailed plans. The concept is sufficiently clear and suggestions for the paper's improvement by reorganization and extensive detailed word changes would appear neither productive nor desirable. To avoid future erroneous inferences, however, it is desirable to state that the draft has been considered as a broad concept and further to comment on certain of its aspects which are worthy of especial note. These are:

a. The Likelihood of a Coup. While a coup may be one of the most promising variants of a revolt in Cuba, there is no available information which indicates it is likely at the present time.

\* Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 2304/205



b. The Introduction of a "Special Team" After the Occurrence of a Coup to Obtain Information Essential to Making a Decision to Support the Insurgents. This team is to consist of three persons to be introduced into Cuba within 24 hours and to report within 48 hours in the event the United States has prior knowledge of an intended coup. In the event of no prior knowledge, a longer period might be required, but in either case the time contemplated is relatively short. It is questionable whether additional information of great significance could be obtained by this small number of persons on this short length of time. It is to be noted, however, that the team's introduction does not delay preparation for military action.

c. The Statement of US Policy Considerations Set Forth under "Facts Bearing on the Problem" on Paragraph 4 b of the Draft Plan. These considerations may have served as useful background assumptions for the purposes of the development of the plan, but the approval of the plan should not be construed later to be specific approval of these statements as definitive of national policy.

d. The Incremental Introduction of Forces into Cuba

While the draft plan is accurate in stating that airborne divisions could be introduced within approximately five days after the introduction of the "special team," if considered desirable under the circumstances, it is important to emphasize that no prejudgment as to incremental introduction can be made; that this decision can only be made at the time by the responsible military commander



when the situation is known; and that he will determine the size, type and composition of the forces as well as the timing of their introduction. The early introduction of small groups of personnel for intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison purposes may assist the commander in arriving at this decision.

e. The Time at Which the "Generating and Positioning Forces Required for the Implementation of CINCLANT OPLANES 312 and 316" is to Commence. The draft plan provides that such action will commence concurrently with the decision to introduce the "special team" into Cuba. This time is of significance and should be emphasized since it will reduce the reaction time required for military operations after the Presidential decision to intervene has been made. It is also considered important to emphasize that the "generating and positioning of the forces required" applies to all of the forces and to all necessary action with regard to their positioning.



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17 October 1963

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A Report by the J-5

on

DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

SECOND CORRIGENDUM

1. At the request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised pages 5 and 6-7, and destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

2. Holders are also requested to delete the word "Briefly," and change "these" to "These" on page 11, line 3.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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A Report by the J-5

on

DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

At the request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised pages 5, 6, and 7 of Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205-1, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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1 October 1963

Page 1

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE

CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

1. The attached memorandum by the Secretary of the Army, dated 1 October 1963, subject as above, together with its attachment, is referred to the J-5 for comment and recommendation.
2. A report is required by 14 October 1963; the Secretary of the Army requests a reply by 21 October 1963.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



ON REPLY REFER TO:

1 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup  
in Cuba (S)

As part of the development of a series of State-Defense contingency plans for Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided comments (JCSM-358-63\*, JCSM-458-63\*\* and JCSM-548-63\*\*\*) on drafts of a State-Defense paper on "US Course of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba."

Review of JCS comments and of comments by other agencies has led to the conclusion that there should be separate contingency plans for each of the possible variants of revolt -- e.g., a military coup, a military revolt which does not neutralize the top leadership, an insurgency movement, and a mass uprising.

Analysis of the situation in Cuba and of current US plans and programs indicates that the military coup is one of the most promising variants of revolt in Cuba for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, there has been developed first, the attached draft plan for that contingency. Draft plans for other types of revolt will follow.

This paper has endeavored to bridge complex problems. There is a need to make quite clear the military requirement that once a US decision has been made to support a coup in Cuba, all action required, including implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, if necessary, is to be authorized. On the other hand, there is a political requirement that US intervention on behalf of the coup be made as palatable to the world as is consistent with the military requirement. A coup must meet certain criteria in order to satisfy these conflicting military and political requirements. The interdepartmental group which prepared the attached draft

\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/184 }  
\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/197 } 9122/5100 (19 Feb 63)  
\*\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/201 }

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contingency plan has concluded that the only way to be certain that these criteria have been met without undue loss of time is to have CINCLANT introduce a special CIA/DOD/State team within twenty-four hours of the first report of the coup. It is proposed that this special team would operate as indicated in the attached plan.

JCS comments are requested by October 21, 1963.

*Cyrus Vance*

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

Attachment  
As Stated

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30 September 1963

A STATE - DEFENSE CONTINGENCY  
PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA

1. Problem. To determine whether a coup in Cuba meets the criteria for U. S. support and to provide for sufficient US assistance to an anti-communist coup in Cuba to assure the replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: the leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain the information on which to base a decision to support the insurgents; if the US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.

c. US intervention would be based on:

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS approval), or

(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or

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(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

d. A coup must meet the following criteria to be supportable:

(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.

(2) Establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time. (In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering information made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a prearranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:

(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information essential to making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, under the direction of CIA and composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by

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CIA within twenty-four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained American observers in Cuba are essential to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the success of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT, would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Government if the US intervened, and would report to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervene.)

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision because, once made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth, the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These actions would include:

(1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba.

(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the US delayed public announcement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active US involvement in Cuba.

(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government and request

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US and OAS assistance in order to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade to become effective in forty-eight hours. The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta del Este meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the OAS/OC established a collective basis for the blockade as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See paragraph 7.a. below)

(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of portions or all of GEMANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and reconnaissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support while generating and positioning forces required for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of

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the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as required.

4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the island. The security and military forces are sizeable, well-ordered, and effective. The number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba is apparently being reduced. At present, about 5,000 to 9,000 of these personnel of all kinds remain on the island. Castro remains the dominant figure in Cuba. The regime is organizing a State party which will ultimately have a base of 60,000 members. A militant minority of the Cuban people supports Castro; the majority submits passively to the regime. Internal active resistance is limited, uncoordinated, and badly equipped.

Even though a coup in this environment seems unlikely at this time, it appears to be the most probable variant of insurgent action as well as the type most likely to succeed without US intervention. However, depending upon the nature of the coup and the amount of indigenous military support it would attract, very substantial US support, possibly as much as all the forces required by CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, may be required, the provision of other US support notwithstanding.

b. Policy Considerations. US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation which could be used as a pretext for such action.

(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage unorganized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too

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easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANs 312 and 316.

5. Basic Considerations. There are a number of problems which confront the United States in considering its response to the contingency of an uprising.

a. Criteria Affecting US Response. For purposes of military and political contingency planning, the situation in Cuba at the time of US intervention would be generally as follows:

(1) Fidel Castro (and possibly Raul Castro, President Dorticos, and Che Guevara) has been neutralized by the insurgents.

(2) The insurgents have seized and are in control of a significant area of Cuba, preferably including Havana with a number of key government buildings and a major radio station.

(3) The action should have triggered revolts in several additional strategic locations throughout Cuba. (Neither the Air Force nor the Navy may yet have joined in the fighting but probably the former tends to side with the regime while the latter might be predominantly sympathetic to the insurgents. Many military commanders in all services will probably be dragging their heels in order not to get caught on the wrong bandwagon. Most of the population will probably remain passive but generally in sympathy with the insurgents. A few civilian groups may have risen in resistance although such resistance must be deemed of minor significance in the present context.)

(4) The Soviets, having been warned repeatedly by the US of the consequences of their intervention in an internal Cuban conflict, would

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have either withdrawn to their own compounds and not be participating actively in the fighting except to provide advice and encouragement to the Castro/Communist supporters or intervened, in which case OPLANs 312 and 316 would have been implemented.

(e) While fighting was going on, the insurgents would have announced via radio and other means the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and the establishment of a Provisional Government. They would have appealed to the US and/or OAS for recognition and support. The insurgents simultaneously would have declared that Soviet nationals will not be harmed if they remain in their compounds while awaiting repatriation to the Soviet Union.

b. Military Criteria Affecting US Response.

(1) The JCS have examined criteria affecting US support to a spontaneous uprising. Their views, paraphrased in part, are of value in judging the circumstances in which US support of a coup should be risked:

"Optimally, support to resistance elements prior to invasion would be confined to logistic, UW, and fire support which would detract from the combat power of the invasion forces to the smallest extent possible and not alter materially the location or timing of operations planned in OPLANs 312 and 316.

"Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental commitment of US forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

"a. The uprising gives promise of success if U.S. aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

"b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the US.

"c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

"d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piece-meal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

"e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk."

(2) The JCS also have pointed out that the "best military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT

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OPLAN 312-316." It should be noted, however, that in the absence of a request for help following Soviet intervention, a full-scale US invasion would be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view. Such an invasion would raise the spectre of US interventionism in Latin America, could poison our future relations with Cuba and Latin America and would be difficult to justify in light of previous Presidential pronouncements. However, a well-planned and successful "rescue" of a revolt could be made politically acceptable. Further, a measured execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 (air strikes) could make the difference of life or death to a revolt under some conditions.

(3) A coup is likely swiftly to encounter serious difficulties, require prompt US help, and lack any clear outline as to the extent of forces involved and their location, especially if it were triggered without US knowledge. JCS study has been given to results which might be anticipated from execution of "portions of OPLAN 312 (air) including its UW (unconventional warfare) provision." Concurrent with the provision of such support, the US (CINCLANT) could, during the period, hereinafter called the first phase, between the time the decision to intervene is made (when establishment of the blockade would be announced) and public announcement of the US intent to commit other military forces in support of the insurgents, introduce small groups for the purposes of reconnaissance, communications, and liaison with the revolutionary forces, and could provide unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. Provision of this assistance would be in such manner as to minimize public knowledge of US involvement in the coup. These first phase actions would have the purpose of assuring the insurgents of forthcoming military assistance as well as providing information as to the military desirability of the incremental introduction of balanced forces. Commencing seventy-two hours after the alerting of these groups (at the time the special team is introduced into Cuba), an initial increment would be ready for introduction into Cuba. Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, the first incremental introduction of balanced forces (airborne

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divisions) could be effected if considered militarily desirable under the circumstances. Once the US was openly committed to support the Provisional Government, it is estimated that air support, both tactical and logistical, is the type of overt help which a group of insurgents would most likely need and which, at the same time, would bear the least political onus. The actual amount of help would be dependent upon the extent of participation by indigenous armed forces in the insurgency and their degree of success.

### c. Implications of Soviet Military Action.

(1) Action by Soviet troops to suppress a revolt would, more than any other single development, call for US intervention. A military response by the US under such circumstances, however, could immediately bring about a direct, local US-Soviet confrontation, either because we already had moved to support the uprising or because the Soviet intervention in itself would have created a requirement for US intervention. Therefore, an especially important objective would be to deter the Soviets from acting. The chances of Soviet intervention might be reduced by (1) a private warning to them not to intervene, (2) the speed and obvious determination with which the US was acting, and (3) the avoidance of attacks on Soviet personnel and installations in Cuba, unless there is an indication of a clear Soviet intention to intervene.

(2) Any US action would also have to be considered in light of the desirability of avoiding, if possible, a direct challenge to the USSR. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any US action in support of opponents of the Castro regime is bound to impinge on Soviet interests and thus raise in a rather direct fashion the problem of a US-USSR confrontation. In addition, military action such as a full blockade, or an attack on the SAM defenses and Soviet combat formations on the island, would immediately and directly challenge the USSR. The questions thus become: are we prepared to accept this risk, what do we estimate to be its probable consequences, and how would we propose to contain and

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minimize the degree of Soviet involvement?

(3) In connection with the military risk, the military inferiority of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean area remains; the relative overall military balance between the US and USSR likewise remains unchanged and in US favor. If the sympathy of the Cuban people was demonstrably on the side of the insurgents, the United States would have a solid moral basis for action. The greatest potential danger lies in those regions where the USSR may consider itself to possess a local advantage, e.g., Berlin. The Soviets might hope to make gains there while our attention was focused on Cuba. Carried to the extreme, concern over Soviet harassment or threats to the safety of Berlin could paralyze any resort to arms elsewhere by the West to preserve its vital interests. Therefore, if it were to intervene in Cuba, the US would have to recognize the possibility of Soviet exploitation of their position in such peripheral areas and to be prepared to counter Soviet action in those areas. The support of our European allies for forceful US action in Cuba is highly desirable and would assist in deterring any untoward Soviet action in Europe. Because of the nature of our proposed actions, the US should make every effort to seek allied support for a decision to assist overtly the insurgents with military means.

(4) On the level of military action, to the extent that circumstances permit, the US should conduct operations so as to leave to the Soviet Union the choice of whether to become directly involved with our armed forces. The blockade is inherently such an action, but our air and ground forces would have to be given explicit instructions at the time on the conditions under which they would engage Soviet forces in Cuba. This point should be made quite clear to the Kremlin. US planning provides, for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time, for the possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba.

d. The Decision. The considerations discussed above point up the number of complex, inter-acting factors which would be brought to

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bear on the US during the decision-making period. It is very likely that the Government would lack essential, evaluated information, regardless of the manner by which a coup were initiated, but would, at the same time, be under heavy pressure to respond quickly. In the case of a pre-arranged CIA-insurgent plan, the President would have to await the special team's report to determine whether the coup was successful enough to merit US support and, then, to decide what degree of support should be rendered and at what point in time to announce overt support for the dissidents. In the event of a coup which came as a surprise to the US, the dilemma which would confront the Government would be of even greater proportions. In the midst of rapidly changing developments, more time would probably be required for the US to determine whether the revolt should be supported and, if so, in what manner.

### 6. Concept of Military Operations.

a. The foregoing considerations point toward a concept of US military operations in one or two phases: an initial phase, if necessitated by political considerations, oriented primarily toward intelligence and reconnaissance operations, followed, as required, by an overt phase. It cannot be determined now whether, in the event of a coup, time and other considerations would permit or require implementation of the first phase operations prior to rendering overt support or vice versa. In the application of military force, the basic political principle to be followed is that of support to the insurgents and of helping them to liberate Cuba themselves. However, the US Government must be clear that, once our criteria were met and our support initiated, we would commit sufficient force to insure success, including execution of parts or all of OPLANS 312 and 316. It should be made equally clear to the potential insurgents, on the other hand, that US support for a revolt initiated without our prior knowledge or concurrence would be contingent upon the circumstances existent at that time. From a political viewpoint, it is important, in either case, that the revolt appear genuine and not open to the charge of

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being a facade for a forcible US overthrow of Castro.

b. If the Soviets should intervene against the insurgents, with whatever ground capability remained at that time, the first phase might turn out to be extremely short or non-existent. At the point of Soviet intervention, the US would side openly with the insurgents. However, the more rapidly the US can move to incisive overt intervention under any circumstance, while avoiding actions that risk the more direct and immediate stimulation of Soviet response, the less danger of Soviet armed involvement in Cuba or of Soviet response elsewhere.

c. During the first phase, if there should be one, the US would announce immediately the establishment of an air and sea blockade and would establish further contact with the revolt by deploying small groups while positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316. Although the US could implement the first phase promptly after a Presidential decision to intervene, either intervention by the Soviets or an appeal for help from the Provisional Government would establish the necessary political basis for announcing a US decision overtly to intervene.

d. In the event of a coup initiated with US approval, the first phase would probably be of short duration, if it occurred at all. If a US aircraft were shot down during this phase, the US should then either (1) declare openly for the insurgents with the opening measure of its overt support being against selected or all air defense targets or (2) retaliate overtly against the offending element of the air defense without admitting assistance to the insurgents. From a political point of view, the latter choice could be justified only with difficulty, although we might seek to justify our actions on the basis that the aircraft shot down was on a reconnaissance flight. In the event of a coup initiated without US knowledge, the provision of any support would be delayed because more time would be required for special team operations, thus increasing the danger of later losing an aircraft to an alerted air defense, if those forces did not join the insurgents.

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e. After the United States had decided that overt armed assistance constituted the appropriate response or the Soviets had taken forcible action against either our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would render sufficient direct assistance to the insurgents to permit them to continue to operate and to extend their span of control, and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as necessary to insure success of the operation. The US Government would initially place main reliance on the psychological impact of the blockade, on the abandonment of the Castro regime by the Cuban people in the face of the clear evidence of decisive US actions to bring down the regime, and on logistical and air support of the revolt in the hope that these factors would be sufficient to bring down the Communist regime.

f. During the overt phase of operations, the US would suppress or eliminate those air defenses which might endanger the air movement of US troops into the area and be prepared to conduct other air operations as required. Following the elimination of hostile Cuban fighter aircraft and SAM defenses, US forces would have the capability to isolate most areas of Cuban territory during daylight by interdiction of military vehicles and troop concentrations, and to make such movement difficult at night.

g. It is important that we have an estimate of the overt support which would be required and which could be introduced in a time-phased manner to sustain the revolt. This estimate of overt support, and time-phasing of its application into Cuba, will be predicated upon a commitment to utilize whatever force is necessary to sustain and exploit the uprising. Following completion of such initial air attacks as may be necessary, provision will be made for the rapid, incremental introduction of balanced forces, to include full-scale invasion if such becomes necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed CINCLANT to look into these matters.

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7. Concept of Political Operations

a. When the decision is made to support the Provisional Government, the President would send a message to Khrushchev informing him of the decision to insure the success of the coup, expressing the expectation that he will not intervene in this Cuban affair and specifically requesting the Chairman to comply with the sea and air blockade to be effected at (time) and to order Soviet troops to specified concentration points to minimize Soviet loss of life. (The latter not to be included if Soviet forces already are actively committed in support of the Castro regime.)

b. After the Provisional Government had issued a public call for help, and the United States had decided that armed assistance constituted the appropriate response, or the Soviets had taken forcible action against our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would consider the following actions:

(1) Cease to recognize the Castro Government and recognize the insurgents as the Provisional Government.

(2) Request the convocation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics under Article 39 of the OAS Charter or, particularly if the Soviets intervene, of the Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty (it would be preferable to have this request preceded by an appeal from the Provisional Government to the OAS) and recommend (i) OAS sanction for and joint participation in the blockade, (ii) the furnishing of all necessary military help to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Assistance Command," even though the US might be the only supplier of forces (in any case, the Command would be pro-forma and would actually be controlled by the US), and (iii) that the OAS Secretary General and the governments provide all necessary technical assistance to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission."

(3) Dispatch Presidential emissaries to Ottawa, London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome to consult with heads of government and the NAC.

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(4) Insure that the OAS informs the United Nations Security Council under Article 51 of the UN Charter of the action taken in the OAS. Forestall Soviet moves in the UN.

(5) Seek the cooperation of selected Cuban exile leaders whose aims are compatible with those of the insurgent group within Cuba.

(6) Convoke a joint session of Congress which would be asked to announce, presumably in the form of a Joint Resolution, US determination to commit all necessary resources in support of the new government.

c. Should the time arrive when, as a result of US air attacks, blockade, etc., it might have become apparent from the standpoint of military power that Castro was finished, the Provisional Government, preferably with the OAS Assistance Command, or, less acceptably, the US, acting as Executive Agent for the OAS, should jointly issue a political ultimatum. This action should be taken while awaiting the earliest point in time at which CINCLANT OPLAN 316 could be implemented, and after the Cuban insurgent chief of the armed forces had been requested to declare martial law. The ultimatum should include the following elements:

(1) Key Castro/Communist personalities to be named would be turned over to the custody of the Provisional Government.

(2) Announcement that the OAS will send representatives to the island to assist the Provisional Government in preparing for and conduct of free elections.

(3) An appeal to all Cubans to avoid the inevitable bloodshed of invasion by cooperating with the Provisional Government in effecting the removal of the remnants of the Castro dictatorship and the Soviet presence.

d. Working closely with the OAS-SYG the US should help him select and send civilian personnel, comprising an "OAS Technical Assistance

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Mission," to Cuban territory as soon as major military operations had ceased. (US Government personnel should be made available for this purpose in order to have an interdepartmental staff in Cuba.) The OAS should be strongly encouraged to designate an OAS Special Representative to head this Mission who would be a Latin American of considerable stature, demonstrated competence and known cooperativeness with the US. His Deputy should be an American and the actual operating head of the OAS Mission. Once ashore, the Deputy would be recognized by US agencies and officials as the senior US civilian officer in Cuba until such time as a US Ambassador is designated; he would be the link between the OAS Special Representative and the US military commander heading the "OAS Assistance Command," if one had been established, while the commander exercised military responsibilities prior to turning over his functions to Cuban officials. If the revolt gained rapid success prior to the overt introduction of US military forces on the ground in Cuba, the US should accredit an Ambassador to the Provisional Government who, when so directed by the President, would become the senior US Representative in Cuba. If the revolt grew beyond its original limits only slowly and if relatively large numbers of overt military forces were committed, the arrival of the "Technical Assistance Mission" and diplomatic representatives should be deferred until such time as their activities would be effective after major military operations had been completed.

c. The immediate objectives which the Senior US civilian Representative in Cuba (whether the deputy head of the OAS Mission or the Ambassador) would seek, with the assistance of the "OAS Assistance Command" and the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," are:

(1) To assist the Provisional Government in maintaining law and order and train and equip Cuban military and police forces as rapidly as possible.

(2) To provide necessary administrative and technical support to ensure an orderly and efficient maintenance of governmental operations at the national, provincial and municipal levels.

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(3) To assist in the organization of national elections at the earliest suitable date and in the supervision of those elections.

(4) To lend assistance in the reconstruction of Cuba and in the development and execution of economic development plans.

(5) To facilitate the speedy departure of any remaining Soviet forces from the island, including protection and assistance in evacuation.

f. The US military commander, under the full operational command of CINCLANT, would continue to be responsible for any residual combat operations. He would also continue to render such civil affairs type assistance to the Provisional Government and/or the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission" as the situation might require.

8. Recommendation. Approve this plan as a basis for development of detailed planning by governmental departments and agencies concerned which would include the following implementing actions:

a. CIA would, as appropriate and with Presidential approval, deal with the potential leaders of a coup in Cuba.

b. CIA, State, and DOD jointly would organize and make ready a special team and establish procedures for its rapid introduction into Cuba when required.

c. Pertinent CINCLANT plans would be revised to reflect the concept of military operations described herein.

d. The Department of State would develop detailed plans to implement the concept of political operations.

e. The Department of State would review and revise, as necessary, the series of papers developing policy recommendations on the host of problems connected with a post-Castro regime.

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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JCSM-77-64

81 JAN 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of the Army, dated 10 December 1963, subject as above.

2. CINCLANT has been instructed to prepare a contingency plan to support a coup in Cuba within the context of conditions described in the attachment to the reference.

3. When these plans have been developed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a subsequent report will be rendered.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

JAY DAVIS  
Major General, USA  
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

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BY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989  
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SM-161-64  
31 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC

Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

1. Transmitted herewith is a conceptual proposal, subject as above, which has been developed jointly by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may, if supported by the United States, achieve US national objectives by the elimination of the communist regime and establishment of a Cuban government acceptable to the United States.
3. The proposal provides for US military intervention in a flexible manner covering a spectrum ranging from provision of logistic support to full execution of OPLANS 312, and 316. Conditions under which military intervention at a level LESS than that of OPLAN 316 might be undertaken are generally in consonance with those described in JCS Message 8970, DTG 070155Z March 1963.
4. It is desired that CINCLANT prepare a separate contingency plan to support a coup in Cuba within the context of conditions described in the attachment hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*M. J. Ingelido*  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Secretary

Attachment

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APPENDIX

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A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA

1. Problem. To provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain information to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.

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c. US intervention would be based on:

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS approval), or

(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or

(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable, recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the situation existent at the time:

(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.

(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation.

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which could be used as a pretext for such action.

(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage unorganized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANs 312 and 316.

3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time. (In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering information made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a pre-arranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:

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(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty-four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained American observers in Cuba would be of great value to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT, would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Government if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervene.)

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source intelligence assessment including the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision because, once-made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth,

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the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These actions would include:

(1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba.

(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the US delayed public announcement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active US involvement in Cuba.

(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta del Este meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC established a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph 7.a. below).

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(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANES 312 and 316.

d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and reconnaissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support. At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces required for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANES 312 and 316, as required.

4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea

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approaches to the island. The security and military forces are sizeable, well-ordered, and effective. The number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba is apparently being reduced. At present, about 5,000 to 7,000 of these personnel of all kinds remain on the island. Castro remains the dominant figure in Cuba. The regime is organizing a State party which may ultimately have a base of 60,000 members. A militant minority of the Cuban people supports Castro; the majority submits passively to the regime. Internal active resistance is limited, uncoordinated, and badly equipped.

Even though a coup in this environment seems unlikely at this time, it appears to be one of the most probable variants of insurgent action as well as the type most likely to succeed without US intervention. However, depending upon the nature of the coup and the amount of indigenous military support it would attract, very substantial US support, possibly as much as all the forces required by CINCLANT OPLANES 312 and 316, may be required, the provisions of other US support notwithstanding.

5. Basic Considerations. There are a number of problems which confront the United States in considering its response to the contingency of an uprising.

a. Criteria Affecting US Response. For purposes of military and political contingency planning, the situation in Cuba at the time of US intervention should be generally as follows:

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(1) Fidel Castro (and possibly Raul Castro, President Dorticos, and Che Guevara) has been neutralized by the insurgents.

(2) The insurgents have seized and are in control of a significant area of Cuba, preferably including Havana with a number of key government buildings and a major radio station.

(3) The action should have triggered revolts in several additional strategic locations throughout Cuba. (Neither the Air Force nor the Navy may yet have joined in the fighting but probably the former tends to side with the regime while the latter might be predominantly sympathetic to the insurgents. Many military commanders in all services will probably be dragging their heels in order not to get caught on the wrong bandwagon. Most of the population will probably remain passive but generally in sympathy with the insurgents. A few civilian groups may have risen in resistance although such resistance must be deemed of minor significance in the present context.)

(4) The Soviets, having been warned repeatedly by the US of the consequences of their intervention in an internal Cuban conflict, would have either withdrawn to their own compounds and not be participating actively in the fighting except to provide advice and encouragement to the Castro/Communist supporters or intervened, in which case OPLANs 312 and 316 would have been implemented.

(5) While fighting was going on, the insurgents would have announced via radio and other means the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and the establishment of a Provisional Government. They would

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have appealed to the US and/or OAS for recognition and support. The insurgents simultaneously would have declared that Soviet nationals will not be harmed if they remain in their compounds while awaiting repatriation to the Soviet Union.

b. Military Criteria Affecting US Response.

(1) The JCS have examined criteria affecting US support to a spontaneous uprising. Their views, paraphrased in part, are of value in judging the circumstances in which US support of a coup should be risked:

"Optimally, support to resistance elements prior to invasion would be confined to logistic, UW, and fire support which would detract from the combat power of the invasion forces to the smallest extent possible and not alter materially the location or timing of operations planned in OPLANs 312 and 316.

"Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental commitment of US forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

"a. The uprising gives promise of success if U.S. aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

"b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the U.S.

"c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

"d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piece-meal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

"e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk."

(2) The JCS also have pointed out that the "best military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT

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OPLAN 312-316." It should be noted, however, that in the absence of a request for help following Soviet intervention, a full-scale US invasion would be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view. Such an invasion would raise the spectre of US interventionism in Latin America, could poison our future relations with Cuba and Latin America and would be difficult to justify in light of previous Presidential pronouncements. However, a well-planned and successful "rescue" of a revolt could be made politically acceptable. Further, a measured execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 (air strikes) could make the difference of life or death to a revolt under some conditions.

(3) A coup is likely swiftly to encounter serious difficulties, require prompt US help, and lack any clear outline as to the extent of forces involved and their location, especially if it were triggered without US knowledge. JCS study has been given to results which might be anticipated from execution of "portions of OPLAN 312 (air) including its UW (unconventional warfare) provision." Concomitant with the provision of such support, the US (CINCLANT) could, during the period, hereinafter called the first phase, between the time the decision to intervene is made (when establishment of the blockade would be announced) and public announcement of the US intent to commit other military forces in support of the insurgents, introduce small groups for the purposes of reconnaissance, communications, and liaison with the revolutionary forces, and could provide unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine.

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Provision of this assistance would be in such manner as to minimize public knowledge of US involvement in the coup. These first phase actions would have the purpose of assuring the insurgents of forthcoming military assistance as well as providing information as to the military desirability of the incremental introduction of balanced forces. Commencing seventy-two hours after the alerting of these groups (at the time the special team is introduced into Cuba), an initial increment would be ready for introduction into Cuba. Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, introduction of balanced forces could be effected on an incremental basis if considered militarily advisable and desirable under the circumstances. Once the US was openly committed to support the Provisional Government, it is estimated that air support, both tactical and logistical, is the type of overt help which a group of insurgents would most likely need and which, at the same time, would bear the least political onus. The actual amount of help would be dependent upon the extent of participation by indigenous armed forces in the insurgency and their degree of success.

c. Implications of Soviet Military Action.

(1) Action by Soviet troops to suppress a revolt would, more than any other single development, call for US intervention. A military response by the US under such circumstances, however, could immediately bring about a direct, local US-Soviet confrontation, either because we

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already had moved to support the uprising or because the Soviet intervention in itself would have created a requirement for US intervention. Therefore, an especially important objective would be to deter the Soviets from acting. The chances of Soviet intervention might be reduced by (1) a private warning to them not to intervene, (2) the speed and obvious determination with which the US was acting, and (3) the avoidance of attacks on Soviet personnel and installations in Cuba, unless there is an indication of a clear Soviet intention to intervene.

(2) Any US action would also have to be considered in light of the desirability of avoiding, if possible, a direct challenge to the USSR. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any US action in support of opponents of the Castro regime is bound to impinge on Soviet interests and thus raise in a rather direct fashion the problem of a US-USSR confrontation. In addition, military action such as a full blockade, or an attack on the SAM defenses and Soviet combat formations on the island, would immediately and directly challenge the USSR. The questions thus become: are we prepared to accept this risk, what do we estimate to be its probable consequences, and how would we propose to contain and minimize the degree of Soviet involvement?

(3) In connection with the military risk, the military inferiority of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean area remains; the relative overall military balance between the US and USSR likewise remains unchanged and in US favor. If the sympathy of the Cuban people was demonstrably on the side of the insurgents, the United States would have a solid moral

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basis for action. The greatest potential danger lies in those regions where the USSR may consider itself to possess a local advantage, e.g., Berlin. The Soviets might hope to make gains there while our attention was focused on Cuba. Carried to the extreme, concern over Soviet harassment or threats to the safety of Berlin could paralyze any resort to action elsewhere by the West to preserve its vital interests. Therefore, if it were to intervene in Cuba, the US would have to recognize the possibility of Soviet exploitation of their position in such peripheral areas and to be prepared to counter Soviet action in those areas. The support of our European allies for forceful US action in Cuba is highly desirable and would assist in deterring any untoward Soviet action in Europe. Because of the nature of our proposed actions, the US should make every effort to seek allied support for a decision to assist overtly the insurgents with military means.

(4) On the level of military action, to the extent that circumstances permit, the US should conduct operations so as to leave to the Soviet Union the choice of whether to become directly involved with our armed forces. The blockade is inherently such an action, but our air and ground forces would have to be given explicit instructions at the time on the conditions under which they would engage Soviet forces in Cuba. This point should be made quite clear to the Kremlin. US planning provides, for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time, for the possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba.

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d. The Decision. The considerations discussed above point up the number of complex, inter-acting factors which would be brought to bear on the US during the decision-making period. It is very likely that the Government would lack essential, evaluated information, regardless of the manner by which a coup were initiated, but would, at the same time, be under heavy pressure to respond quickly. In the case of a pre-arranged CIA-insurgent plan, the President may not have enough information without the special team's report to determine whether the coup was successful enough to merit US support and, then, to decide what degree of support should be rendered and at what point in time to announce overt support for the dissidents. In the event of a coup which came as a surprise to the US, the dilemma which would confront the Government would be of even greater proportions. In the midst of rapidly changing developments, more time would probably be required for the US to determine whether the revolt should be supported and, if so, in what manner.

6. Concept of Military Operations.

a. The foregoing considerations point toward a concept of US military operations, after the decision to intervene is made, in one or two phases: a first phase, if necessitated by political considerations, oriented primarily toward intelligence and reconnaissance operations, followed, as required, by a second (overt) phase. It cannot be determined now whether, in the event of a coup, time and other considerations would permit or require implementation of the first phase operations prior to rendering overt support or vice versa. In the application of military

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after a Presidential decision to intervene, either intervention by the Soviets or an appeal for help from the Provisional Government would establish the necessary political basis for announcing a US decision overtly to intervene.

d. In the event of a coup initiated with US approval, the first phase would probably be of short duration, if it occurred at all. If a US aircraft were shot down during this phase, the US should then either (1) declare openly for the insurgents with the opening measure of its overt support being against selected or all air defense targets or (2) retaliate overtly against the offending element of the air defense without admitting assistance to the insurgents. From a political point of view, the latter choice could be justified only with difficulty, although we might seek to justify our actions on the basis that the aircraft shot down was on a reconnaissance flight. In the event of a coup initiated without US knowledge, the provision of any support would be delayed because more time would be required for special team operations, thus increasing the danger of later losing an aircraft to an alerted air defense, if those forces did not join the insurgents.

e. After the United States had decided that overt armed assistance constituted the appropriate response or the Soviets had taken forcible action against either our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would render sufficient direct assistance to the insurgents to permit them to continue to operate and to extend their span of control, and would implement portions or all of CINOLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, as necessary to insure

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success of the operation. The US Government would initially place main reliance on the psychological impact of the blockade, on the abandonment of the Castro regime by the Cuban people in the face of the clear evidence of decisive US actions to bring down the regime, and on logistical and air support of the revolt in the hope that these factors would be sufficient to bring down the Communist regime.

f. During the second (overt) phase of operations, the US would suppress or eliminate those air defenses which might endanger the air movement of US troops into the area and be prepared to conduct other air operations as required. Following the elimination of hostile Cuban fighter aircraft and SAM defenses, US forces would have the capability to isolate most areas of Cuban territory during daylight by interdiction of military vehicles and troop concentrations, and to make such movement difficult at night.

g. It is important that we have an estimate of the overt support which would be required and which could be introduced in a time-phased manner to sustain the revolt. This estimate of overt support, and time-phasing of its application into Cuba, will be predicated upon a commitment to utilize whatever force is necessary to sustain and exploit the uprising. Following completion of such initial air attacks as may be necessary, provision will be made for the rapid, incremental introduction of balanced forces, to include full-scale invasion if such becomes necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed CINCLANT to look into these matters.

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7. Concept of Political Operations.

a. When the decision is made to support the Provisional Government, the President would send a message to Khrushchev informing him of the decision to insure the success of the coup, expressing the expectation that he will not intervene in this Cuban affair and specifically requesting the Chairman to comply with the sea and air blockade to be effected at (time) and to order Soviet troops to specified concentration points to minimize Soviet loss of life. (The latter not to be included in Soviet forces already are actively committed in support of the Castro regime.)

b. After the Provisional Government had issued a public call for help, and the United States had decided that armed assistance constituted the appropriate response, or the Soviets had taken forcible action against our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would consider the following actions:

(1) Cease to recognize the Castro Government and recognize the insurgents as the Provisional Government.

(2) Request the convocation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics under Article 39 of the OAS Charter or, particularly if the Soviets intervene, of the Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty (it would be preferable to have this request preceded by an appeal from the Provisional Government to the OAS) and recommend (i) OAS sanction for and joint participation in the blockade, (ii) the furnishing of all necessary military help to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Assistance Command," even though the US might be the only supplier of forces (in any case, the Command would

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be pro-forma and would actually be controlled by the US), and (iii) that the OAS Secretary General and the governments provide all necessary technical assistance to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission."

(3) Dispatch Presidential emissaries to Ottawa, London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome to consult with heads of government and the NAC.

(4) Insure that the OAS informs the United Nations Security Council under Article 54 of the UN Charter of the action taken in the OAS. Forestall Soviet moves in the UN.

(5) Seek the cooperation of selected Cuban exile leaders whose aims are compatible with those of the insurgent group within Cuba.

(6) Convoke a joint session of Congress which would be asked to announce, presumably in the form of a Joint Resolution, US determination to commit all necessary resources in support of the new government.

c. Should the time arrive when, as a result of US air attacks, blockade, etc., it might have become apparent from the standpoint of military power that Castro was finished, the Provisional Government, preferably with the OAS Assistance Command, or, less acceptably, the US, acting as Executive Agent for the OAS, should jointly issue a political ultimatum. This action should be taken while awaiting the earliest point in time at which CINCLANT OPLAN 316 could be implemented, and after the Cuban insurgent chief of the armed forces had been requested to declare martial law. The ultimatum should include the following elements:

(1) A demand that key Castro/Communist personalities, to be

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named, be turned over to the custody of the Provisional Government.

(2) An announcement that the OAS will send representatives to the island to assist the Provisional Government in preparing for and conducting free elections.

(3) An appeal to all Cubans to avoid the inevitable bloodshed of invasion by cooperating with the Provisional Government in effecting the removal of the remnants of the Castro dictatorship and the Soviet presence.

d. Working closely with the OAS-SYG the US should help him select and send civilian personnel, comprising an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," to Cuban territory as soon as major military operations had ceased. (US Government personnel should be made available for this purpose in order to have an interdepartmental staff in Cuba.) The OAS should be strongly encouraged to designate an OAS Special Representative to head this Mission who would be a Latin American of considerable stature, demonstrated competence and known cooperativeness with the US. His Deputy should be an American and the actual operating head of the OAS Mission. Once ashore, the Deputy would be recognized by US agencies and officials as the senior US civilian officer in Cuba until such time as a US Ambassador is designated; he would be the link between the OAS Special Representative and the US military commander heading the "OAS Assistance Command," if one had been established, while the commander exercised military responsibilities prior to turning over his functions to Cuban officials. If the revolt gained rapid success prior to the overt introduction of US military

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forces on the ground in Cuba, the US should accredit an Ambassador to the Provisional Government who, when so directed by the President, would become the senior US Representative in Cuba. If the revolt grew beyond its original limits only slowly and if relatively large numbers of overt military forces were committed, the arrival of the "Technical Assistance Mission" and diplomatic representatives should be deferred until such time as their activities would be effective after major military operations had been completed.

e. The immediate objectives which the Senior US civilian Representative in Cuba (whether the deputy head of the OAS Mission or the Ambassador) would seek, with the assistance of the "OAS Assistance Command" and the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," are:

- (1) To assist the Provisional Government in maintaining law and order and train and equip Cuban military and police forces as rapidly as possible.
- (2) To provide necessary administrative and technical support to ensure an orderly and efficient maintenance of governmental operations at the national, provincial and municipal levels.
- (3) To assist in the organization of national elections at the earliest suitable date and in the supervision of these elections.
- (4) To lend assistance in the reconstruction of Cuba and in the development and execution of economic development plans.
- (5) To facilitate the speedy departure of any remaining Soviet forces from the island, including protection and assistance in evacuation.

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f. The US military commander, under the full operational command of CINCLANT, would continue to be responsible for any residual combat operations. He would also continue to render such civil affairs type assistance to the Provisional Government and/or the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission" as the situation might require.

8. Recommendation. Approve this plan as a basis for development of detailed planning by governmental departments and agencies concerned which would include the following implementing actions:

a. CIA would, as appropriate and with Presidential approval, deal with the potential leaders of a coup in Cuba.

b. CIA, State, and DoD jointly would organize and make ready a special team and establish procedures for its rapid introduction into Cuba when required.

c. Pertinent CINCLANT plans would be revised to reflect the concept of military operations described herein.

d. The Department of State would develop detailed plans to implement the concept of political operations.

e. The Department of State would review and revise, as necessary, the series of papers developing policy recommendations on the host of problems connected with a post-Castro regime.

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JCS 2304/205-4

25 January 1964

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A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

References: a. JCS 2304/205-2  
b. JCS 2304/205-3

DECISION

1. On 30 January 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 8 of this report.
2. This Decision replaces page 28. Holders are requested to substitute the additional attached revised page 33, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.
3. The memorandum in Enclosure A was forwarded as JCSM-77-64, dated 31 January 1964, to the Secretary of Defense. The memorandum in Enclosure B, together with its attachment, was forwarded as SM-161-64, dated 31 January 1964, to CINCLANT.
4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

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CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

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A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a memorandum\* from the Secretary of the Army (in his capacity as the Department of Defense representative on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee, Cuba) requesting that CINCLANT contingency plans for Cuba be revised as necessary to incorporate provisions for reacting to a coup in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. CINCLANT has developed plans to meet a wide spectrum of possible contingencies related to Cuba, ranging from the imposition of a quarantine to full-scale invasion. None of these plans provides specifically for the conditions and circumstances as described in the State-DOD-CIA plan.\*\*

DISCUSSION

3. CINCLANT has developed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved, contingency plans for Cuba. In addition, CINCLANT is developing plans that will:

a. Provide for an alternate concept to OPLAN 316\*\*\*, to provide for combat operations launched from the Guantanamo-Santiago area.

b. Provide for the support of uprisings under clearly defined conditions.

c. Provide added flexibility within the framework of the basic concept and force tabs of OPLAN 316 to accommodate a phased, incremental commitment of major units, but with a shortened reaction time (12 days versus 18 days).

4. None of these plans is specifically designed to provide a military response to a coup, such as is described in the joint

\* Attachment to JCS 2304/205-3

\*\* Appendix to Enclosure B to JCS 2304/205-2

\*\*\* On file in Joint Secretariat; see JCS 2018/580



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State-DOD-CIA plan. From an operational point of view, currently 1  
approved contingency plans for Cuba provide for a militarily 2  
sound and feasible reaction that give a high degree of assurance 3  
of success against the current Cuban military capability. So 4  
long as the military threat is undiminished from its present 5  
proportions, and presently assigned missions are unchanged, the 6  
political ramifications of a coup will not alter substantially 7  
the plans of the military commander. The commander's force 8  
requirements and concept of operations must provide for the 9  
worst possible military situation. If, as operations progress 10  
this situation is NOT encountered, lesser force can be applied 11  
as may be appropriate. In essence, what is required is a timely 12  
political decision, couched in language sufficiently definitive 13  
to provide the responsible military commander with timely infor- 14  
mation upon which he may adjust his forces to accomplish his 15  
mission. 16

5. Thus, presently approved plans already encompass a broad 17  
range of possible military responses. However, extension of 18  
extant plans is desirable to insure complete accord with special 19  
circumstances specified in the State-DOD-CIA plan. 20

#### CONCLUSIONS

6. CINCLANT should be instructed to prepare a plan to support 21  
a coup in Cuba within the context of the conditions described 22  
in the State-DOD-CIA plan. 23

7. An interim report should be forwarded to the Secretary of 24  
Defense informing him of the instructions that have been 25  
dispatched to CINCLANT. 26

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that: 27

a. The memorandum in Enclosure A, which reflects the above 28  
conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. 29

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JCS 2304/205-4

30

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- b. The memorandum in Enclosure B, together with its attachment, be forwarded to CINCLANT. 1
- c. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands. 2
- d. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. 3
- e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 4

Action Officer: Col Walter Greenwood, Jr, USA  
Atlantic/South Division, J-3  
Extension 53517



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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum\* for the Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of the Army, subject  
as above, dated 30 December 1963, with enclosure.\*\*

2. In consonance with your request, CINCLANT has been  
instructed to prepare a contingency plan to support a coup  
in Cuba within the context of conditions described in the  
attachment to the reference.

3. When these plans have been developed and approved by  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a subsequent report will be rendered.

\* Attachment to JCS 2304/205-3  
\*\* Appendix to Enclosure B to JCS 2304/205-2

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JCS 2304/205-4

32

Enclosure A

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ENCLOSURE B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC

Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

1. Transmitted herewith\* is a conceptual proposal, subject 1  
as above, which has been developed jointly by the Department 2  
of State, Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence 3  
Agency. 4
2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may, 5  
if supported by the United States, achieve US national 6  
objectives by the elimination of the communist regime and 7  
establishment of a Cuban government acceptable to the United 8  
States. 9
3. The proposal provides for US military intervention in a 10  
flexible manner covering a spectrum ranging from provision of 11  
logistic support to full execution of OPLANs 312,\*\* and 316.\*\*\* 12  
Conditions under which military intervention at a level LESS 13  
than that of OPLAN 316 might be undertaken are generally in 14  
consonance with those described in JCS message 8970, DTG 070155Z 15  
March 1963. 16
4. It is desired that CINCLANT prepare a separate contingency 17  
plan to support a coup in Cuba within the context of conditions 18  
described in the attachment hereto. 19

\* Appendix to Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205-2

\*\* On file in Joint Secretariat; see JCS 2018/611

\*\*\* On file in Joint Secretariat; see JCS 2018/580

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## NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

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A Report by the J-3

on

A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

## FIRST CORRIGENDUM

At the request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 33 of Enclosure B, and to destroy the superseded page in accordance with security regulations.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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1st Corrig to JCS 2304/205-4

Special handling of this paper  
is requested. Access should be  
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the information herein in order  
to carry out their official duties.

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9123/3100 (1 Oct 63)



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JCS 2304/205-3

31 December 1963

Page 27

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

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on

A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA (S)

*9123/3100 (1 Dec 63)*

The attached memorandum by the Secretary of the Army, dated 30 December 1963, subject as above, is referred to the J-3 for the action required by the second paragraph.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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DEC 30 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**SUBJECT:** A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

**Reference:** JCSM 809-63, Subject as above, dated October 21, 1963

Enclosed<sup>††</sup> herewith are three copies of the plan on the above subject which has been prepared jointly on a restricted basis by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan, which has been revised to reflect generally the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference, provides a conceptual basis for US response to a Cuban military coup and has been approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency as a basis for appropriate detailed planning. Mr. McGeorge Bundy has been advised of the foregoing and requested to inform the President of the existence of the plan on a suitable occasion. It is anticipated that the Secretaries of State and Defense may subsequently be requested to brief the President on its outline.

In accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph 8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans be revised as necessary to reflect the concept of military operations described in the plan and that you advise me when this has been accomplished.

In accordance with paragraph 8b, page 22 of the plan, representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordination with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense will develop a plan for the introduction of the "Special Team" into Cuba which will subsequently be circulated for appropriate action and further detailed planning by agencies concerned.

\* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205-1

\*\* Appendix to Enclosure B to  
JCS 2304/205-2

*Cyrus Vance*  
Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

Enclosure (3 cys)  
As Stated

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CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA"  
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Draft Plan Entitled... Cuba

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Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

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Navy

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## SUMMARY

### **Draft Plan Entitled "A State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup In Cuba"**

#### BACKGROUND:

Subject plan is the thirteenth draft version of a contingency plan originally developed by ISA in coordination with State. JCS views were received on an earlier version of the plan which were also furnished to CIA. This version represents an attempt by ISA to encompass the views of State, CIA, and the JCS in an interdepartmentally agreed version. Both State and CIA concur in the draft.

#### GENERAL:

This draft plan in contrast to earlier drafts focuses on the narrow contingency of a military coup in Cuba which meets certain fixed criteria. The verification of this criteria would be the task of a special team under CIA direction but of DOD, State and CIA membership which would be introduced into Cuba to verify that the criteria are met. The coup might be known by the US a priori or post facto.

#### CRITERIA FOR US INTERVENTION

The criteria outlined in the draft plan as the basis for a Presidential decision to intervene would require a request from the Provisional Government (through OAS or directly) prearranged or post facto or intervention by local Soviet forces. (This aspect of the plan assumes that present US policy, as stated by Sec Def, is to intervene in the event of the commitment of Soviet forces against Cuban insurgents; thus, approval of the plan would formalize this policy.)

The coup must also:

- 1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia.



- 2) Establish a provisional government.
- 3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.
- 4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory long enough for US to extend support.

SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS:

1. On receiving word of coup introduce a "special team" to assess situation (CINCLANT assumes OPCON after a US decision to intervene).
2. Order operational forces into position to initiate blockade and CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.
3. If US decides to intervene, CINCLANT assumes command of all military and paramilitary operations and introduces small military groups and initiates non-attributable logistic support.
4. At prompting of special team, provisional government requests US and OAS assistance and President initiates blockade.
5. Position US forces for intervention.
6. At this point US may hold off on overt support pending allied coordination or overtly support to include incremental introduction of conventional forces. Once overt support is announced however, air support could be initiated.

CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS:

1. Phase I -- announce air and sea blockade, introduce small groups, position forces (may be before or after US announcement of overt support) could include air support.
2. Overt Phase - (based on US decision or Soviet intervention) all or portions of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 as required to insure success.



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CONCEPT OF POLITICAL ACTIONS:

After decision to intervene to inter alia:

- 1) Warn Soviets not to intervene
- 2) Recognize Provisional Government
- 3) Proceed through OAS machinery (Establish "OAS Assistance Command")
- 4) Initiate consultation with Allies
- 5) Initiate UN action
- 6) Establish appropriate US civilian and OAS control when military operations are completed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Approval of the plan would provide for necessary interdepartmental implementing planning. In the case of DOD, CINCLANT would be required to develop the required incremental plans under Phase I and the Overt Phase.

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military intervention in Cuba in the event of a coup.



198-10004-10001

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Subject:

State-Def Contingency Plan

Date:

26 Sep 63 (copy memo undated)

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

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Navy

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USAF

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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**SUBJECT: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)**

As part of the development of a series of State-Defense contingency plans for Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided comments (JCSM-358-63, JCSM-458-63 and JCSM-548-63) on drafts of a State-Defense paper on "US Course of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba."

Review of JCS comments and of comments by other agencies has led to the conclusion that there should be separate contingency plans for each of the possible variants of revolt -- e.g., a military coup, a military revolt which does not neutralize the top leadership, an insurgency movement, and a mass uprising.

Analysis of the situation in Cuba and of current US plans and programs indicates that the military coup is one of the most promising variants of revolt in Cuba for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, there has been developed first, the attached draft plan for that contingency. Draft plans for other types of revolt will follow.

This paper has had to bridge complex problems. There is a need to make quite clear the military requirement that once a US decision has been made to support a coup in Cuba, all action required, including implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, if necessary, is to be authorized. On the other hand, there is a political requirement that US intervention on behalf of the coup be made as palatable to the world as is consistent with the military requirement. A coup must meet certain criteria in order to satisfy these conflicting military and political requirements. It has been concluded that the only way to be certain that these criteria have been met without undue loss of time is to have CINCLANT introduce a special CIA/DCI/State team within twenty-four hours of the first report of the coup. This special team would operate as indicated in the attached plan.

In evaluating the attached plan, the JCS are requested to bear in mind the essentiality of the information which the special team is to provide in order to enable the President to make a decision whether to intervene in support of a coup and of the operational requirement to provide early US military support of a coup once the decision is made to provide such support.

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JCS comments are requested by 21 October 1963.

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

Attachment  
As Stated

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STATE - DEFENSE PAPER

26 September 1963

DRAFT 13A

1. Problem. To provide for sufficient US assistance to an anti-communist coup in Cuba to assure the replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see Paragraph 5.a. below), their revolt (see Paragraph 3.b.(1) below) will be supported by the US if a US "special team" confirms that the criteria for support have been met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: the leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without CIA consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. Whether or not the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain the information on which to base a decision to support the insurgents.

This document contains 21 pages.  
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c. US intervention would be based on:

- a Provisional Government set up by
- (1) A pre-arranged call for help from the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS approval), or
  - (2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or
  - (3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

d. A coup would:

- (1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.
- (2) Establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis (unless Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots) for overt US action.
- (3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.
- (4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana.

3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time. (In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering information made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision



to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a prearranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:

(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information essential to making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty-four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained American observers in Cuba are essential to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the success of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Government if the US intervened.)

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generation of other forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANES 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision



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because, once made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth, the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup.

These actions are:

(1) Prompt introduction of unconventional warfare forces, if it were decided to delay public announcement of the decision. These forces would obtain information needed to facilitate the possible incremental commitment of overt US forces and, as necessary, render assistance to the insurgents.

(2) When authorized by the President, direct the special team to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government and request US and OAS assistance in order to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade to become effective in forty-eight hours. The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta del Este meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC established a collective basis for the blockade as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph 7.a. below)

(3) Position forces for implementation of portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316.

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d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government, thereby eliminating an unconventional warfare phase (the time between the Presidential decision to intervene and public announcement of the decision), or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would employ unconventional warfare forces until such time as necessary forces were in position for overt military operations and the US decision were made public. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCANT OPLANES 312 and 316, as required.

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4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the island. The security and military forces are sizeable, well-ordered and effective. At least twelve to thirteen thousand Soviet military personnel of all kinds remain on the island. Castro is the unchallenged leader of Cuba. The regime is organizing a State party with a base of 60,000 members. An important minority of the Cuban people now apparently gives positive support to Castro, and the majority passively accepts his regime. Internal resistance is limited, uncoordinated, and badly equipped.

Even though a coup in this environment seems unlikely at this time, it appears to be the most probable variant of insurgent action as well as the type most likely to succeed without US intervention. However, depending upon the nature of the coup and the amount of indigenous military support it would attract, very substantial US support, possibly as much as all the forces required by CINCUSANT OPLANs 312 and 316, may be required, the provision of other US support notwithstanding.

b. Policy Considerations. US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation which could be used as a pretext for such action.

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(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage unorganized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANs 312 and 316.

5. Basic Considerations. There are a number of problems which confront the United States in considering its response to the contingency of an uprising.

A. Criteria Affecting US Response. For purposes of military and political contingency planning, the following criteria should obtain if the US is to render support for a coup:

(1) The leaders of the revolt must be aware from previous contact that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting specified conditions, CIA will, upon Presidential authorization, relay the message that their revolt will be supported by the US if it is confirmed by US observers that the criteria have been met. These specified conditions will include the ability of the insurgents to neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership and to seize and hold, with indigenous

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military forces and arms, a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of de facto recognition to the Provisional Government. (See Para. 3.a. for US actions in event of a surprise coup.)

(2) The situation in Cuba at the time of the US intervention would be roughly as follows:

(a) Fidel Castro (and possibly Raul Castro, President Dorticos, and Che Guevara) has been neutralized by the insurgents.

(b) The insurgents have seized and are in control of a significant area of Cuba, preferably including Havana with a number of key government buildings and a major radio station.

(c) The action should have triggered revolts in several additional strategic locations throughout Cuba. (Neither the Air Force nor the Navy may yet have joined in the fighting but probably the former tends to side with the regime while the latter might be predominantly sympathetic to the insurgents. Many military commanders in all services will probably be dragging their heels in order not to get caught on the wrong bandwagon. Most of the population will probably remain passive but generally in sympathy with the insurgents. A few civilian groups may have risen in resistance although such resistance must be deemed of minor significance in the present context.)

(d) The Soviets, having been warned repeatedly by the US of the consequences of their intervention in an internal Cuban conflict, would have either withdrawn to their own compounds and not be participating actively in the fighting except to provide advice and

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encouragement to the Castro/Communist supporters or intervened, in which case OPLANs 312 and 316 would have been implemented.

(e) While fighting was going on, the insurgents would have announced via radio and other means the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and the establishment of a Provisional Government. They would have appealed to the US for recognition and support, particularly for air cover and a naval blockade, ostensibly to make certain that the Soviets do not intervene but actually, by pre-arrangement, to immobilize the Cuban Air Force and Navy. The insurgents simultaneously would have declared that Soviet nationals will not be harmed if they remain in their compounds while awaiting repatriation to the Soviet Union.

b. Military Criteria Affecting US Response.

(1) The JCS have examined criteria affecting US support to a spontaneous uprising. Their views, paraphrased in part, are of value in judging the circumstances in which US support of a coup should be risked:

"Optimally, support to resistance elements prior to invasion would be confined to logistic, UW, and fire support which would detract from the combat power of the invasion forces to the smallest extent possible and not alter materially the location or timing of operations planned in OPLANs 312 and 316.

"Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental commitment of US forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

"a. The uprising gives promise of success if U.S. aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

"b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the US.

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"c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

"d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piece-meal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

"e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk."

(2) The JCS also have pointed out that the "best military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312-316." It should be noted, however, that in the absence of a request for help following Soviet intervention,

a full-scale US invasion would be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view. Such an invasion would raise the spectre of US interventionism in Latin America, could poison our future relations with Cuba and Latin America and would be difficult to justify in light of previous Presidential pronouncements. However, a well-planned and successful "rescue" of a revolt could be made politically acceptable. Further, a measured execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 (air strikes) could make the difference of life or death to a revolt under some conditions.

(3) A coup is likely swiftly to encounter serious difficulties, require prompt US help, and lack any clear outline as to the extent of forces involved and their location, especially if it were triggered without US knowledge. JCS study has been given to results which might be anticipated from execution of "portions of OPLAN 312 (air) including its UW (unconventional warfare) provision." Concomitant

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with the provision of such support, the US could, primarily during the UW phase, increase its subversion and sabotage assets as necessary for use in areas selected for guerrilla operations, increase UW forces as required to bolster the revolutionary forces, and provide unattributable logistic support to the rebels by airdrop or submarine. Commencing within seventy-two hours, or sooner if previously alerted, the United States could provide an initial increment of unconventional warfare forces to establish contact with the insurgents. The entire complement of UW forces would be available for commitment in eight days. Once the US was openly committed to support the Provisional Government, it is estimated that air support, both tactical and logistical, is the type of overt help which a group of insurgents would most likely need and which, at the same time, would bear the least political onus. The actual amount of help would be dependent upon the extent of participation by indigenous armed forces in the insurgency and their degree of success.

c. Implications of Soviet Military Action.

(1) Action by Soviet troops to suppress a revolt would, more than any other single development, call for US intervention. A military response by the US under such circumstances, however, could immediately bring about a direct, local US-Soviet confrontation, either because we already had moved to support the uprising or because the Soviet intervention in itself would have created a requirement for US intervention. Therefore, an especially important objective would be to deter the Soviets from acting. The chances of Soviet intervention might be reduced by (1) a private warning to them not to intervene, (2) the speed

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and obvious determination with which the US was intervening, and (3) the avoidance of attacks on Soviet personnel and installations in Cuba, unless there is an indication of a clear Soviet intention to intervene.

(2) Any US action would also have to be considered in light of the desirability of avoiding, if possible, a direct challenge to the USSR. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any US action in support of opponents of the Castro regime is bound to impinge on Soviet interests and thus raise in a rather direct fashion the problem of a US-USSR confrontation. In addition, military action such as a full blockade, or an attack on the SAM defenses and Soviet combat formations on the island, would immediately and directly challenge the USSR. The questions thus become: are we prepared to accept this risk, what do we estimate to be its probable consequences, and how would we propose to contain and minimize the degree of Soviet involvement?

(3) In connection with the military risk, the military inferiority of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean area remains; the relative overall military balance between the US and USSR likewise remains unchanged and in US favor. If the sympathy of the Cuban people was demonstrably on the side of the insurgents, the United States would have a solid moral basis for action. The greatest potential danger lies in those regions where the USSR may consider itself to possess a local advantage, e.g., Berlin. The Soviets might hope to make gains there while our attention was focused on Cuba. Carried to the extreme, concern over Soviet harassment or threats to the safety of Berlin could

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paralyze any resort to arms elsewhere by the West to preserve its vital interests. Therefore, if it were to intervene in Cuba, the US would have to recognize the possibility of Soviet exploitation of their position in such peripheral areas and to be prepared to counter Soviet action in those areas. The support of our European allies for forceful US action in Cuba is highly desirable and would assist in deterring any untoward Soviet action in Europe. Because of the nature of our proposed actions, the US should make every effort to seek allied support for a decision to assist overtly the insurgents with military means.

(4) On the level of military action, to the extent that circumstances permit, the US should conduct operations so as to leave to the Soviet Union the choice of whether to become directly involved with our armed forces. The blockade is inherently such an action, but our air and ground forces would have to be given explicit instructions at the time on the conditions under which they would engage Soviet forces in Cuba. This point should be made quite clear to the Kremlin. However, US planning should include plans, for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time, for the possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba.

d. The Decision. The considerations discussed above point up the number of complex, inter-acting factors which would be brought to bear on the US during the decision-making period. It is very likely that the Government would lack essential, evaluated information, regardless of the manner by which a coup were initiated, but would, at the

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same time, be under heavy pressure to respond quickly. In the case of a pre-arranged CIA-insurgent plan, the President would have to await the special team's report in order to determine whether the coup was successful enough to merit US support and, then, to decide what degree of support should be rendered and at what point in time to announce overt support for the dissidents. In the event of a coup which came as a surprise to the US, the dilemma which would confront the Government would be of even greater proportions. In the midst of rapidly changing developments, more time would probably be required for the US to determine whether the revolt should be supported and, if so, in what manner.

6. Concept of Military Operations.

a. The foregoing considerations point toward a concept of US military operations in one or two phases: an initial unconventional warfare phase, if necessary, followed, as required, by an overt phase. It cannot be determined now whether, in the event of a coup, time and other considerations would permit or require implementation of unconventional warfare operations prior to rendering overt support or vice versa. In the application of military force, the basic political principle to be followed is that of support to the insurgents and of helping them to liberate Cuba themselves. However, the US Government must be clear, including UW forces, that, once our criteria were met and our support initiated, we would commit sufficient force to insure success, including execution of the potential insurgents, parts or all of OPLANs 312 and 316. It should be made equally clear to /

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on the other hand, that US support for a revolt initiated without our prior knowledge or concurrence would be contingent upon the circumstances existent at that time. From a political viewpoint, it is important, in either case, that the revolt appear genuine and not open to the charge of being a facade for a forcible US overthrow of Castro.

b. If the Soviets should intervene against the insurgents, with whatever ground capability remained at that time, the UW phase might turn out to be extremely short or non-existent. At the point of Soviet intervention, the US would side openly with the insurgents. However, the more rapidly the US can move to incisive overt intervention under any circumstance, while avoiding actions that risk the more direct and immediate stimulation of Soviet response, the less danger of Soviet armed involvement in Cuba or of Soviet response elsewhere.

c. During the UW phase, if there should be one, the US would announce immediately the establishment of an air and sea blockade and would establish further contact with the revolt by deploying unconventional warfare forces while positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316. Although the US would implement the UW phase immediately after a Presidential decision to intervene, either intervention by the Soviets or an appeal for help from the Provisional Government would establish the necessary political basis for announcing a US decision overtly to intervene.

d. In the event of a coup initiated with US approval, the UW phase would probably be of short duration, if it occurred at all. If

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a US aircraft were shot down during the UW phase, the US should then either (1) declare openly for the insurgents with the opening measure of its overt support being against selected or all air defense targets or (2) retaliate overtly against the offending element of the air defense without admitting UW assistance to the insurgents. From a political point of view, the latter choice could be justified only with difficulty, although we might seek to justify our actions on the basis that the aircraft shot down was on a reconnaissance flight. In the event of a coup initiated without US knowledge, the provision of any support would be delayed because more time would be required for special team operations, thus increasing the danger of later losing an aircraft to an alerted air defense, if those forces did not join the insurgents.

e. After the United States had decided that overt armed assistance constituted the appropriate response or the Soviets had taken forcible action against either our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would render sufficient direct assistance to the insurgents to permit them to continue to operate and to extend their span of control, and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, as necessary to insure success of the operation. The US Government would initially place main reliance on the psychological impact of the blockade, on the abandonment of the Castro regime by the Cuban people in the face of the clear evidence of decisive US actions to bring down the regime,

and on logistical and air support of the revolt in the hope that these factors would be sufficient to bring down the Communist regime.

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to minimize Soviet loss of life. (The latter not to be included if Soviet forces already are actively committed in support of the Castro regime.)

Provisional Government

b. After the ~~^~~ had issued a public call for help, and the United States had decided that armed assistance constituted the appropriate response, or the Soviets had taken forcible action against our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would consider the following actions:

(1) Cease to recognize the Castro Government and recognize the insurgents as the Provisional Government.

(2) Request the convocation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics under Article 39 of the OAS Charter, or particularly if the Soviets intervene, of the Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty (it would be preferable to have this request preceded by an appeal from the Provisional Government to the OAS) and recommend (i) OAS sanction for and joint participation in the blockade, (ii) the furnishing of all necessary military help to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Assistance Command," even though the US might be the only supplier of forces (in any case, the Command would be pro-forma and would actually be controlled by the US), and (iii) that the OAS Secretary General and the governments provide all necessary technical assistance to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission."

(3) Dispatch Presidential emissaries to Ottawa, London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome to consult with heads of government and the RAC.

(4) Insure that the OAS informs  
/ the United Nations Security Council under Article

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54 of the UN Charter of the action taken in the OAS. Forestall Soviet moves in the UN.

(5) Seek the cooperation of selected Cuban exile leaders whose aims are compatible with those of the insurgent group within Cuba.

(6) Convoke a joint session of Congress which would be asked to announce, presumably in the form of a Joint Resolution, US determination to commit all necessary resources in support of the new government.

c. Should the time arrive when, as a result of US air attacks, blockade, etc., it might have become apparent from the standpoint of military power that Castro was finished, the Provisional Government, preferably with the OAS Assistance Command, or, less acceptably, the US, acting as Executive Agent for the OAS, should jointly issue a political ultimatum. This action should be taken while awaiting the earliest point in time at which CIRCULANT OPLAN 316 could be implemented, and after the Cuban insurgent chief of the armed forces had been requested to declare martial law. The ultimatum should include the following elements:

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- (1) Key Castro/Communist <sup>personalities to be named</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ would be turned over to the custody of the Provisional Government.
  - (2) Announcement that the OAS will send representatives to the island to assist the Provisional <sup>Government in preparing</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ for and conduct of free elections.
  - (3) An appeal to all Cubans to avoid the inevitable bloodshed of invasion by cooperating with the Provisional Government in <sup>remnants of the</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ effecting the removal of the Castro dictatorship and the Soviet presence.
- d. Working closely with the OAS-SYG the US should help him select and send civilian personnel, comprising an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," to Cuban territory as soon as major military operations had ceased. (US Government personnel should be made available for this purpose in order to have an interdepartmental staff in Cuba.) The OAS should be strongly encouraged to designate an OAS Special Representative to head this Mission who would be a Latin American of considerable stature, demonstrated competence and known cooperativeness with the US. His Deputy should be an American and the actual operating head of the OAS Mission. Once ashore, the Deputy would be recognized by US agencies and officials as the senior US civilian officer in Cuba until such time as a US Ambassador is designated; he would be the link between the OAS Special Representative and the US military commander heading the "OAS Assistance Command," if one had been established, while the commander exercised military responsibilities prior to turning over his functions to Cuban officials. If the revolt gained rapid success with only

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unconventional US military forces on the ground in Cuba, the US should accredit an Ambassador to the Provisional Government who, when so directed by the President, would become the senior US Representative in Cuba. If the revolt grew beyond its original limits only slowly and if relatively large numbers of overt military forces were committed, the arrival of the "Technical Assistance Mission" and diplomatic representatives should be deferred until the latter stage of combat so that the US military commander's authority would not pass to civilian control until major military operations had been completed.

e. The immediate objectives which the Senior US Representative in Cuba (whether the deputy head of the OAS Mission or the Ambassador) would pursue, using the "OAS Assistance Command" and the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," are:

- (1) To assist the Provisional Government in maintaining law and order and train and equip Cuban military and police forces as rapidly as possible.
- (2) To provide necessary administrative and technical support to ensure an orderly and efficient maintenance of governmental operations at the national, provincial and municipal levels.
- (3) To assist in the organization of national elections at the earliest suitable date and in the supervision of those elections.
- (4) To lend assistance in the reconstruction of Cuba and in the development and execution of economic development plans.
- (5) To facilitate the speedy departure of any remaining Soviet

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forces from the island, including protection and assistance in evacuation.

f. The US military commander would retain control of his forces and responsibility for any residual combat operations. He would also continue to render such civil affairs type assistance to the Provisional Government and/or the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission" as the situation might require.

8. Recommendation. Approve this plan as a basis for development of detailed planning by governmental departments and agencies concerned which would include the following implementing actions:

a. CIA would, as appropriate and with Presidential approval, deal with the potential leaders of a coup in Cuba.

b. CIA, State, and DOD jointly would organize and make ready a special team and establish procedures for its rapid introduction into Cuba when required.

c. Pertinent CINCLANT plans would be revised to reflect the concept of military operations described herein, including, budgetary considerations permitting, measures to reduce drastically the response time for both incremental introduction of forces and for full-scale invasion.

d. The Department of State would develop detailed plans to implement the concept of political operations.

e. The series of papers developing policy recommendations on the host of problems connected with a post-Castro regime would be revised, in light of this plan, and subjected to continuing review.

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10002  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OASD  
FROM : PAUL H. NITZE  
TO : SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
TITLE : DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA  
DATE : 09/30/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA  
COUP IN CUBA  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 5. Memo regarding draft plan for U.S. military intervention in Cuba in the event of a coup.



198-10004-10002

CALIFANO, BOX 6  
FOLDER #5

Originating Agency:

D-1

Subject:

Draft State-Def Contingency Plan

Date:

30/Sep/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA

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USAF

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Navy

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NSC

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ONI

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State Dept.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to  
I-3640/63

SEP 10 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

**SUBJECT: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)**

As you know, one aspect of my review of Cuban policy, carried out at your request, has been to provide for important contingencies relating to Cuba.

The attached memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, enclosing a plan for one of these contingencies, a draft "State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba", is forwarded with the recommendation that you sign the memorandum.

In the event that the JCS find important difficulties in the plan, additional work among representatives of State, CIA, and DOD will be required in order to provide a final plan. Other contingency plans are in preparation.

My staff and I are available to you to carry on this work if you desire.

/s/

Paul H. Nitze

Enclosure

Memorandum for the Chairman, JCS  
(TOP SECRET SENSITIVE)



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10003  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OASD  
FROM : A.M. HAIG  
TO : COL LINDJORD  
TITLE : NOTE FOR COLONEL LINDJORD  
DATE : 11/29/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 5. Note regarding  
contingency plan for U.S. military intervention in  
Cuba.



198-10004-10003

Originating Agency:

Army (Hq) Unclass

Subject:

Note for Col. Lindjord

Date:

11/10/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA

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USAF

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CALIFANO, BOX 6  
FOLDER #5



November 29, 1963

*File Plans  
Cont Plans*

**NOTE FOR COLONEL LINDJORD**

Attached are two copies of the contingency plan which you requested. Circumstances have prevented our getting the memorandum to Mr. Vance so far today; however, I hope that it will be signed off this evening prior to the close of business. In the interim, attached you will find two copies of the plan.

A. M. Haig  
Lt Col, GS

Attachments (2)  
As Stated



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10004  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA  
DATE : 10/21/63  
PAGES : 11  
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CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA  
COUP IN CUBA  
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 5. Draft State-Defense contingency plan for U.S. military intervention in Cuba with attached routing slips.



198-10004-10004

Originating Agency:

JCS

Subject:

Cuba Contingency Plan (draft)

Date:

10/21/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA

USAF

Navy

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10/9/97 223

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**SENSITIVE**

DATE **OCT 21 1963**

TO:

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| <input type="checkbox"/> UNDER SECRETARY OF ARMY    | <input type="checkbox"/> CHIEF OF STAFF         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ASST. SEC. OF ARMY (AS)    | <input type="checkbox"/> COMPT. OF THE ARMY     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ASST. SEC. OF ARMY (FM)    | <input type="checkbox"/> ADJUTANT GENERAL       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ASST. SEC. OF ARMY (PSD)   | <input type="checkbox"/> ENGINEERS, CHIEF OF    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CHIEF OF PUBLIC INFO.      | <input type="checkbox"/> FINANCE, CHIEF OF      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CHIEF OF LEG. LIAISON      | <input type="checkbox"/> JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GENERAL COUNSEL |   |

FOR:

- ☒ APPROPRIATE ACTION
- ☐ DIRECT REPLY
- ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF SECRETARY OF ARMY
- ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR SIG. OF ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
- ☐ INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE REPLY
- ☐ FOR COMMENT, RECOMMENDATION OR INITIAL
- ☐ INFORMATION
- ☐ NOTE AND RETURN
- ☐ FILE
- ☐ HAVE "PERSONAL ATTENTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT"
- ☐ FURNISH COPY OF REPLY TO ASD, OSA FOR US005.
- ☐ REMARKS:

(THIS IS AN ADVANCE ACTION COPY).

**SENSITIVE**

BY DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

OSA FORM 29 (REVISED)  
8 JULY 1963

*J. C. Cook*  
James C. Cook  
Administrative Assistant  
C 2186



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## ACTION

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REMARKS

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ENCLOSURE A  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF

DATE: 11/21/1997

JCSM-809-63  
21 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup  
in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum\* by the Secretary of the Army, dated 1 October 1963, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view, previously stated in JCSM-458-63,\* dated 15 June 1963, subject: "US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C)," that, although a coup may be one of the most promising types of revolt in Cuba, it is unlikely to occur at this time. They also have serious reservations with regard to the probable effectiveness of the "special team" which is to be introduced into Cuba after the coup takes place. Within the short time frame contemplated, it is doubtful whether such a team will be able to add significantly to the broad, multiple-source intelligence assessment necessary for the critical decision which would commit the United States to the employment of portions or all of the military forces required by CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 316. Further, in the case of a coup initiated by dissident leaders who had agreed to meet the criteria for US support and to whom prior approval had been given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time, the United States would have some obligation to intervene, irrespective of the report of the "special team." The introduction of small groups for intelligence, liaison, and communication purposes after the decision to intervene had been made, however, should prove very useful in providing information on which a subsequent military recommendation might be based for the incremental introduction of forces.

3. Since the subject addressed in the draft State-Defense paper relates primarily to US actions following a coup, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made no comment on the statements of broad policy considerations

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cited therein as affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba. These statements have been considered as assumptions for the purpose of the paper, rather than as approved national policy. Further, the draft has been interpreted as presenting a broad concept and, consequently, detailed suggestions for changes in wording have not been made. Appropriate comments can be made on detailed plans to be developed in accordance with the recommendations of the paper.

4. It is noted that the draft paper states, "Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, the first incremental introduction of balanced forces (airborne divisions) could be effected if considered militarily desirable under the circumstances." It should be emphasized that decision as to size and type of forces to be committed, as well as the advisability of incremental commitment, cannot be prejudged, but will be dependent upon the situation at the time.

5. It is also noted that the draft paper provides that the United States will commence to position forces to implement CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 316 as soon as the decision to introduce a "special team" into Cuba has been made. This provision is important in that it will reduce the reaction time required for overt military support after a Presidential decision to intervene and will provide forces for the suppression of Cuban air defenses as required in order to "initiate overt logistical and air support to insurgents." It might also reduce the risk of incremental introduction of forces into Cuba if such were considered. For example, the early commitment of airborne or air-landed forces might entail less risk if the US Naval Base, Guantanamo, had been reinforced and a combat-loaded amphibious force were at sea.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while holding reservations as expressed in the comments above, have concluded that the plan envisaged in the State-Defense paper is militarily feasible.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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FROM : A. M. HAIG  
TO : CAPTAIN ZUMWALT, ASD/ISA  
TITLE :  
DATE : 07/19/63  
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Memo for Capt. Zumwalt

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State Dept. ☒

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OBJECTION

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Joint Staff

Other

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
July 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN ZUMWALT, ASD/ISA  
Attention: Colonel Wolfe

The second draft summary and conclusions of the policy study include all of the recommended modifications furnished by Lieutenant Colonel Patchell with the exception of his minor recommended change on page two of the first draft. I believe Colonel Patchell's change was one of subjective preference and do not personally derive the connotation that serious damage to the Cuban economy would result from the removal of constraints. In my view the summary and conclusions adequately and logically synthesize the supporting material in the policy study.

A. M. Haig  
Lt Colonel, USA

Mr. Califano  
Lt Col Haig  
ASG



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Mr. Calhoun -  
Lt Col. Flary -  
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DRAFT # 2  
Col. Wolfe/Capt. Zumwalt  
16 July 1963

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. A recent study conducted within DOD at the request of the Secretary of the Army has examined the adequacy of present US policy toward Cuba, and also appraised a broad range of alternative policies. In so doing, it assessed opportunities and risks flowing from choices of one or another policy track, or combination of policies, as the basis for recommending a preferred policy choice.

2. With regard to present US policy toward Cuba, the study has yielded the following findings:

a. Some aspects of present policy can clearly be considered successful to date. It would seem, for example, that necessary measures are in readiness and will be taken under present policy guidelines to prevent a direct military threat to the US or to the Western Hemisphere from arising in Cuba, whether from Soviet or Cuban forces, or from the two in combination.

Toward this end, the US has successfully conducted and maintained the right to conduct regular aerial surveillance of Cuba. Other forms of intelligence surveillance are also continuing. These measures, together with announced US determination not to tolerate any significant "offensive" military build-up that might be undertaken, appear to have had the effect of inhibiting such a build-up.

b. Some aspects of present US policy have had partial success, without being decisive, however, in their contribution toward US objectives for Cuba. We have achieved some degree of isolation of

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Cuba from the Free World. At the same time it seems clear that the extent of the isolation we have created is not sufficient to control Cuba's economic prospects; it merely increases the cost of Cuba to the Soviet Bloc and provides some psychological pressure on elements of the Cuban regime and populace.

We are proceeding with the development of an extensive program of cooperation with Latin American governments to provide counter-action against Cuban/Communist subversion. These actions are serving to alert other Latin American governments to the potential dangers of Communist subversion and seem to have added certain constraints on Castro's more aggressive operations to subvert Latin America. But they have not stopped subversion and do not provide the answers to the major problems which have made Latin America vulnerable to communist penetration.

c. Still other aspects of present US policy have been notably unsuccessful. The Soviet military presence has not been eliminated from Cuba under the stimulus of quiet diplomatic pressure and careful public statement. There is no reasonable basis for assuming that the USSR will be brought to suspend her military support of Cuba or to fully remove her military presence under the present trend of affairs.

With regard to covert action directed against the Cuban economy, until recently we appear to have placed such constraints on "unattributable" actions as to make our objective of fostering economic difficulties through covert action unlikely to be realized. Some progress should be possible under a recently approved policy.



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With respect to creating a political base, either covertly among opposition elements within Cuba or among Cuban exiles, upon which a possible future alternative to the Castro regime might be built, present US policy does not appear to be making much progress.

d. The prospect for the next year or year and a half, in the absence of a more active US policy, is for rational and reasonably restrained behavior by Castro under the general policy constraints necessary to assure Soviet support and to avoid provoking US military action. Castro will remain the dominant figure in Cuba, bolstered by competent security forces and militia and important elements of the Cuban youth and others who have benefited under him. The domestic economy will probably have begun to improve, although it may still remain somewhat below today's levels and appreciably below pre-Castro standards. The relationship between Cuba and the USSR will continue to be fine, based on their present mutually advantageous association, despite the probable rise in the cost to the USSR of supporting Castro which they seem willing to bear, and despite continuing policy differences which the Chinese Communists may seek to exploit in their feud with Moscow. /

e. The longer-term prospect under continuation of present US policy is laden with uncertainties, but any frank appraisal can scarcely offer much comfort. Barring unforeseen breaks which the US has no good reason to expect (the natural or accidental demise of



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Castro himself might be one such break), there seems to be little assurance of either the elimination of Soviet presence and influence in Cuba, or of the re-establishment of a non-Communist regime on the island.

The implications of the above prognosis for US domestic politics and foreign policy are far-reaching and complex, and only a partial exploration of them was possible in the DOD study. Some of these implications are touched upon below in the paragraphs dealing with a preferred US policy.

3. The range of alternative US policies surveyed in the present study covers four broad approaches or policy tracks. These are:

Track One. This represents essentially an extension of present policy on a somewhat expanded scale, involving selective application of appropriate measures from a menu of "More Active OAS Policies" and "Intensified Economic Measures Against Cuba."

In general, the measures contemplated under Track One would not be expected to bring about a major change in the situation. They would tend to increase Cuba's isolation, lay the groundwork for further collective action, and have a constricting effect on Cuba's economy. At the same time, they would not topple the Castro regime, force a Soviet withdrawal or bring about a collapse of the Cuban economy. Some of the measures would produce friction with US allies and certain of them, particularly those involving non-military harassment of shipping, might make more difficult other aspects of our relations with the

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Soviet Union.

Track Two. This approach would represent a re-focusing of present policy in a new direction aimed at taking advantage of unfolding events to bring about a major change in the situation.

Emphasis under Track Two would be placed upon contingency planning to enable the US to respond effectively to a variety of critical developments in a way calculated to enlarge the opportunity to attain a major political result without undue sacrifice of military efficiency. Circumstances toward which contingency planning would be directed might include: interference with US surveillance; a spontaneous internal uprising in Cuba; a major new Soviet military intrusion in the Hemisphere; a military move from Cuba against the Hemisphere; action against Cuba in the context of a Soviet-initiated international crisis elsewhere in the world. Since April 1963, the White House, State, and DOD staffs have made important progress in filling the void in contingency planning.

Whether US action on this policy track would stop at restoring the situation existing before a critical development, or go on to seek positive changes of major significance such as Soviet withdrawal from Cuba and overthrow of the Castro regime, would necessarily depend on judgments made at the time. A central factor would certainly be the US estimate of Soviet willingness to risk war over Cuba. At the time of writing, the conclusion drawn in the present study (and as given in national intelligence estimates) is that the Soviet Union is not likely, if given constructive option, to risk nuclear war for the defense of Cuba.

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Track Three. This track also would re-focus present policy in a new direction, aimed at bringing about major changes in the situation. It would be distinguished from Track Two primarily by the fact that instead of waiting upon events to turn up an opportunity for US action, decision would be made to initiate actions calculated to produce major changes in the situation or to exploit disproportionately such minute opportunities as occur.

Under Track Three, the contemplated scope of action might range from a decision to use all necessary means, including the use of military force at a time of our choosing to bring about a non-Communist solution in Cuba, to a decision to seek major but limited ends. These ends might include total Soviet troop withdrawal, verified cessation of subversive training in Cuba, and periodic on-site inspection, but not displacement of the Castro regime.

Scenarios developed in the present study for possible US action under this track cover a progressive range of actions, including effective international embargo, PGL or total blockade, covertly-assisted rebellion, disarming air strikes and invasion. As in the case of Track Two, US action taken under this approach would necessarily rest on judgments made at the time. At the present writing, Soviet willingness to risk war over Cuba is considered to be as unlikely in this case as in the preceding one. In both cases, however, it must be recognized that a crisis fully as acute as that in October 1962 might ensue at some stage of developments, with no positive assurance against a Soviet retaliatory move involving the danger of war.



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Track Four. This approach also contemplates a new direction for US policy, aimed at a major change in the situation, but in notable contrast to Tracks Two and Three, it involves moving toward gradual accommodation with the Castro regime.

Under this track, US policy might seek to persuade Castro that he would stand to gain economically and in terms of national autonomy by shifting from his present close dependence upon Moscow, in return for adherence to some agreed code of good behavior in the Western Hemisphere. The possibility of working toward this end by combining an accommodation approach with gradual pressure would be contemplated under Track Four. The process of disengaging Soviet interest from Cuba while pursuing this policy track would be a delicate and uncertain operation, and might require the US to proffer the Soviet Union, a substantial quid pro quo elsewhere in the world. (The serious import of Track Four for the future power relationships of the US and USSR is discussed on page 8.)

4. Many considerations in the area of both domestic and foreign policy bear on a preferred US policy choice toward Cuba. These considerations may be viewed differently at various times and in the context of particular situations. So far as this study is able to narrow the area of choice from our present vantage point, a preferred US policy today would appear to be a continuation of present pragmatically-evolved policy, combined with some elements of alternative Policy Tracks One and Two with selected disproportionate counteractions from Track Three.

More specifically, this would be a policy which contemplates:

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a. Bringing Cuba under gradually increasing pressure through selective US/OAS policies and economic measures.

b. Progressively tightening the isolation of Cuba through similar selection of collective US/OAS actions and economic measures;

c. Putting continued pressure on the Soviet Union, plus inducements which may appear appropriate from time to time, to carry out a military withdrawal from Cuba;

d. Not letting the Cuban people believe we have given up hope and reconciled ourselves to a Communist Cuba;

e. Playing for the breaks and being prepared through a wide range of contingency planning to take advantage of opportunities that may arise for bringing about major changes, up to and including replacement of the Castro regime with a more acceptable Cuban government.

A policy along the above lines recognizes present "realities" and appears to be the minimum necessary to satisfy the demands of domestic US politics on the one hand and the maintenance of a reasonably vigorous US posture in the international arena on the other.

It still must be recognized, however, that such a policy as envisaged here is vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that it does not offer high or even moderate assurance of success -- if the criteria of success are a non-Communist solution for Cuba and the exclusion of a permanent Soviet political-military forward base from this hemisphere.

Over the course of time, if the outlined policy were to be pursued without an appreciable measure of "success", the alternatives

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toward which policy might turn under the pressure of time and events deserve more thought and consideration than they have actually been given in the body of the present study.

Accommodation of some kind would appear to be one alternative, which would mean essentially that the United States had come to reconcile itself to a new pattern of world power configuration -- a "checkerboard" pattern in which bases of Communist political-military power would dot our side of the board, possibly in additional places in Latin America and elsewhere as time went on. This is an alternative considered in the DOD study but not recommended. The domestic consequences of this alternative are difficult to anticipate, but it seems likely that in the international sphere US stature and influence would suffer.

Another alternative might be a concerted effort to create circumstances leading to US or US/OAS action to reestablish a non-Communist Cuba and expel the Soviet presence, including military action and invasion if necessary -- a course also examined but not supported in the DOD study. Factors of prime importance that bear on this alternative are: First, with the passage of time the Communist regime in Cuba is likely to become more strongly entrenched and more difficult to root out. Second, the relative military progress of the US and the USSR in the upcoming years may result in elimination of the margin of strategic superiority hitherto enjoyed by the United States, or arms



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control arrangements may lead to the same result. In this situation, the Soviet Union would not necessarily be any more prone to start a nuclear war over Cuba than in the past, but the chances of Soviet retaliation against US or Allied interests elsewhere in the world would probably go up. These developments, in short, would increase the difficulties of adopting a US or a US/OAS action policy against Cuba, and would raise the cost of such a policy if it were in the end adopted.

This is to suggest, therefore, that US policy toward Cuba is time-sensitive, with the likelihood being that the prospects for a satisfactory outcome diminish as time goes on.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

As part of the development of a series of State-Defense contingency plans for Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided comments (JCSM-358-63, JCSM-458-63 and JCSM-548-63) on drafts of a State-Defense paper on "US Course of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba."

Review of JCS comments and of comments by other agencies has led to the conclusion that there should be separate contingency plans for each of the possible variants of revolt -- e.g., a military coup, a military revolt which does not neutralize the top leadership, an insurgency movement, and a mass uprising.

Analysis of the situation in Cuba and of current US plans and programs indicates that the military coup is one of the most promising variants of revolt in Cuba for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, there has been developed first, the attached draft plan for that contingency. Draft plans for other types of revolt will follow.

This paper has had to bridge complex problems. There is a need to make quite clear the military requirement that once a US decision has been made to support a coup in Cuba, all action required, including implementation of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, if necessary, is to be authorized. On the other hand, there is a political requirement that US intervention on behalf of the coup be made as palatable to the world as is consistent with the military requirement. A coup must meet certain criteria in order to satisfy these conflicting military and political requirements. It has been concluded that the only way to be certain that these criteria have been met without undue loss of time is to have CINCLANT introduce a special CIA/DOD/State team within twenty-four hours of the first report of the coup. This special team would operate as indicated in the attached plan.

In evaluating the attached plan, the JCS are requested to bear in mind the essentiality of the information which the special team is to provide in order to enable the President to make a decision whether to intervene in support of a coup and of the operational requirement to provide early US military support of a coup once the decision is made to provide such support.

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JCS comments are requested by 21 October 1963.

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

Attachment  
As Stated

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TO : MR. CALIFANO  
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ASSISTANCE TO REVOLT IN CUBA  
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CALIFAWO, BOX 6  
FOLDER 5

Originating Agency:

Army

Subject:

Draft of State <sup>Defense</sup> Paper ... Carter

Date:

6/16/63

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BOX 6 Folder 5



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June 8, 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CALIFANO**

**SUBJECT: Comments on Fourth Draft of State-Defense Paper on  
U. S. Assistance to Revolt in Cuba**

**General**

- a. Paper is not a contingency plan -- it is a "sexy scenario" written in a discussional vein.
- b. Paper contains some very controversial judgments and some inaccuracies (I have been informed that some of these statements are in the paper by design, in order to require the JCS to unearth or develop further certain subjects).
- c. To the casual reader, the paper appears to be a scenario for the overthrow of the Cuban Government. In fact it is a discussion of U. S. response to an initiative which may never mature.

**Recommendations**

- a. That Mr. Vance not comment unless asked to do so by Mr. Nitze. I would not want them (State-ISA) to be able to indicate full coordination etc. with this office, when in fact ISA has carefully circumvented this office until 5 June, (five days after the fourth draft had been produced). Also from my discussion with Capt Zumwalt, it is obvious that this paper is going to end up as an outright confrontation between JCS and State (with ISA siding with State) -- I would not want to give it the blessing of Mr. Vance's nod of approval. However the decision goes someone will feel hurt and the paper isn't worth our getting in the position of hurting people -- when in fact both sides are

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guilty parties to a degree and both sides have some points of real and vital merit. The way the paper is going -- it may end up in a stalemate or a useless operation -- another good reason for our not getting involved.

b. That we asked to be kept informed of the progress to include our being provided with copies of the papers produced and copies of the studies referenced in this paper (Bonsal papers). Bonsal's Secretary informed me that while the work of the Bonsal Group is highly torted -- actually all they were able to accomplish was a detailed listing of the areas which should be studied or investigated in order to determine U. S. policies for a post-Castro Cuba. (This was confirmed by Seymour Bolton and Bob Mandelstam.)

c. That you note the attached specific comments on the paper.

James K. Patchell  
Lt Colonel USA

Attachment  
As Stated



P1, par 2a

Soviet Advisors and Bloc technicians scattered throughout Cuba should also be considered.

P2, par 3a

Rapidity of movement and preponderance of force used against resistance because of Castro's sensitivities against guerilla operations and his optimism of guerilla success. This paragraph should also point up the inability to get word out in time and the unlikelihood of resistance to obtain an organ or voice.

P2, par 3a, 2d par, 1st sentence

This point is highly controversial on success without outside intervention. (Support in such magnitude that it appears to be military intervention.)

P5, par c

If such exist as stated, then these should be farmed out to the people who would have to implement. To the best of my knowledge, they do not reflect formulated policy to the extent that they would be useful.

P5, par 4a, 2d sentence

That is only a part of it. If we are willing to pay we can do it in less time. If we are willing to have forces held in a high state of readiness we can do in less time. Also, the 18 refers to 316, not to 312.

P6, top par

There are advantages to a "blunt" invasion which are not stated. This paragraph is over stated and loaded. We can do many things under the "adroitly structured" clause. OP PLAN 312 as modified could be helpful, but not spell life or death, etc.

P6, par b, 1st sentence

A judgment with which I do not agree

<p>-- many others don't either.</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY</p> <p>DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY</p> <p>DATE: 7 Oct 97</p>
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P6, last sentence

Not true. This is a statement which ISA indicates was designed to pull out further facts from JCS.

P8, par c, 2nd sentence

Strongly disagree with wording. The U. S. cannot afford to commit itself again in Cuba in anything but a successful undertaking.

P11, 1st sentence

Undesirable restriction, or limitation. So far as possible, etc. we should do it, but to redesign our Op Plans, No.

P11, last sentence of 1st par

I do not understand this. This "most dangerous period" could be made less dangerous.

P11, par, 1st two sentences

In other words there would be no commitment of U. S. Forces connected with covert support?

P11, par 5, 3d sentence

This is a risk we must take - no guarantee with implied covert phase.

P12, last sentence, 1st par

Not true so long as Soviets man the SAM sites and MIG aircraft.

P12, par a, last sentence

This is a masterpiece of understatement -- there is a moral problem when we have committed intelligence and operational personnel -- and a world-wide and internal U. S. political/psychological problem. Where is the asylum to be?



P13, underlined sentence

Air cover - etc -- what does this mean -- now or as soon as people get in for the assessment? This is one which will shake the JCS.

P14, par d, last sentence

We did this before -- we cannot chance it again. See previous comment above on moral and psychological implications.

PP 16-17

Massive visible assistance will be required to replace the \$1 million per day of the Soviets. Here is where the paper peters out -- insufficient detail on who is compatible and what we want to do in the post-Castro period.



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4th Draft  
G/PH:WCMagathan:mc  
6/1/63

State-Defense Paper

1. Problem. To provide for sufficient US assistance to an anti-Communist revolt in Cuba to assure its success.

2. Assumptions.

a. Plans must be based on alternative assumptions as to the involvement of non-involvement of local Soviet forces, both tactical formations and troops manning air defenses.

b. Two bases for US intervention are assumed:

1) A call for help from the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS action) or

2) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

c. There are two general types of insurrection, a palace revolt or a popular uprising. A palace revolt would probably have some power base in the Cuban Army or militia, particularly if it is to have much chance of survival. The popular uprising would commence outside the governmental framework and might consist of either (1) small, scattered disconnected, more or less contemporaneous guerrilla outbreaks which reflected general discontent with the Regime or (2) a tangibly expanded insurgency in a particularly affected province.

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d. In either the palace revolt or popular uprising, without establishment of an organ, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political legitimacy, it is difficult to visualize an adequate political basis for any US action unless Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots.

3. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the Island. The security and military forces are sizable, well-ordered and effective. Twelve to fourteen thousand Soviet troops remain on the Island. Castro is the unchallenged leader of Cuba. The Regime is organizing a State party with a base of 60,000 members. The Regime still has the confidence of the majority of the people, particularly the peasants and the youth, and anti-regime activity proceeds only with the greatest difficulty and danger. Internal resistance, while slowly increasing, is limited, uncoordinated and badly equipped.

In this environment, the palace revolt seems to be the most likely variant of insurgent action and also that most likely to succeed without outside intervention. A popular

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uprising is unlikely to come about in the absence of greatly increased disaffection, particularly among the peasantry who are unwilling to risk their necks until the Government's chances are poorer than they now appear. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that internal assets are inadequate either to produce reliable information as to the quality of any revolution and its leaders, or to support the revolt with unconventional warfare activities. Moreover, the difficulty of preventing capture of these assets may militate against introducing others much ahead of a US decision to initiate covert paramilitary operations. However, if national policy required that it be done and if the heavy attrition were acceptable, a major effort could significantly increase these assets. These facts are basic determinants of the operational concept developed later in this paper and, therefore, should be kept under constant, searching review.

b. U.S. Capabilities to Respond. The JCS have examined our capabilities to provide support to a spontaneous uprising. Their views are as follows (paraphrased in part):

Assuming that an uprising were truly spontaneous our deficiency of in-country assets would greatly hamper us in providing effective support prior to open US operations. The probable short duration of the

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revolt and compelling need for the US to act openly might allow insufficient time covertly to support the insurgents.

Although the best US military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation on CINCLANT OPLANS 312-316, which permit a high degree of flexibility and selectivity in the amount of force applied, it might prove desirable initially to execute portions of OPLAN 312 (air operations), including its unconventional warfare provisions, and then attempt to evaluate the results before further expanding operations.

"Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental (emphasis supplied) commitment of US forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

"a. The uprising gives promise of success if US aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

"b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the United States.

"c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

"d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piecemeal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63,

"e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk."

The formation and maintenance in being of all-Cuban military units against the contingency of spontaneous revolt are not justified.

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c. Status of Planning with Respect to a Post-Castro Regime. An Interdepartmental group has prepared a number of papers analyzing and developing policy recommendations on the host of problems connected with replacement of the Castro Regime. This work covering politico-military, political, governmental, economic and sociological problems should be reviewed to insure that it is current and provides an adequate basis upon which the various departments of government can draw to formulate specific policy recommendations and implementing directives.

4. Basic Considerations.

There are a number of problems which confront the United States in considering its response to the contingency of an uprising.

a. The JCS point out that "the best US military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312-316." Under present circumstances, however, 18 days are required to put the US armed forces in the requisite state of readiness fully to implement these plans--probably far too late to be of any help in most of the situations envisioned in this paper. At the same time a blunt US invasion is the least desirable course of action from a political point of view. A

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blunt US invasion would raise the spectre of US interventionism in Latin America, could poison our future relations with Cuba, and would be difficult to justify in light of previous Presidential pronouncements. However, an adroitly structured "rescue" of a revolt could be made politically acceptable. Further, a measured execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 (air strikes) could make the difference of life or death to certain types of revolt.

b. A revolt having the characteristics which the JCS indicate would seem to justify the "incremental commitment of US forces," e.g., it is widespread and well led (para 3b above), is the type of insurgency least likely to need material US assistance and least likely to occur. Regardless of its origin, most any uprising is likely (i) swiftly to encounter serious difficulties, (ii) to require US help promptly and (iii) to lack any clear outline. JCS study has been given to the results which might be anticipated from execution of "portions of OPLAN 312 (air) including its UW (unconventional warfare) provisions." It is considered that US forces have the capability to isolate any area of Cuban territory during daylight by interdiction of military vehicles and troop concentrations

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and to make such movement difficult at night. We estimate that air support is the type of help which a group of insurgents is most likely to need and which at the same time would bear the least political onus.

c. Action by Soviet troops to suppress an uprising would more than any other single development call for US intervention. A military response by the US under such circumstances, however, could immediately bring about a direct US-Soviet confrontation. Therefore, an especially important objective would be to deter the Soviets from acting. The chances of Soviet intervention might be reduced by (1) a private warning to them not to intervene, (2) the speed and obvious determination with which the US is intervening, and (3) the avoidance of attacks on Soviet personnel and installations in Cuba.

d. In connection with the popular uprising, if (1) the area controlled is very small, (2) the number of people involved is quite limited or (3) the time during which control may be exercised is short, the ability to establish a fairly respectable internationally acceptable base for intervention would be difficult to achieve. Judgments on these factors will assist us in forming a conclusion on the minimum uprising which would

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permit us to insert forces incrementally. Probably some variant of the popular uprising will most likely to permit a US response.

e. From the foregoing it is clear that the greatest dilemma which will confront us in deciding whether and how to render support will be the need for speed in a situation in which we very likely will lack essential information. Certainly the US cannot afford to commit its prestige to the success of an uprising with poor prospects of survival prior to the point at which US help had become fully effective. Hence, major assumptions of this paper are: (1) that US action in support of an uprising is predicated on a certain minimum degree of its survivability; or (2) conversely that the magnitude of US incremental support would have to vary with the survival prospect of any given revolt.

f. The question of the degree of popular support for Castro would require evaluation in connection with making a decision whether to support a revolt.

g. Any US action must also be considered in light of the desirability of avoiding a direct challenge to the USSR. (For a detailed analysis of the considerations involved see attachment a.)

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Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any US action in support of opponents of the Castro Regime is bound to injure on Soviet interests and thus raise in a rather direct fashion the problem of a US/Soviet confrontation. Khrushchev made this quite clear in his speech of May 23 at the farewell meeting for Castro. He declared:

"If the United States Government...permits itself to be drawn into a dangerous path, a situation even more formidable than that of last October might arise...clearly it would be much more difficult to emerge from the crisis than it was in 1962....

"If the United States Government does not strictly observe the agreement that has been reached and aggravates the situation, we shall have to discharge our international duty, our obligations to the fraternal Cuban people and come to their assistance."

In addition, military action such as a full quarantine, or an attack on the SAM defenses and Soviet combat formations on the Island, would immediately and directly challenge the USSR.. The questions are: are we prepared to accept this risk, what do we estimate to be its probable consequences, and how we would propose to contain and minimize the degree of Soviet involvement?

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In connection with assessing the risk it is noted that the military inferiority of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean area remains; the relative over-all military balance between the US and the USSR likewise remains unchanged and in our favor. If the sympathy of the Cuban people was demonstrably on the side of the insurgents, the United States would have a solid moral basis for action. We also note that Khrushchev was careful to use guarded language in his farewell to Castro. The greatest danger lies in those regions where the USSR may consider itself to possess an advantage, e.g., Berlin. The Soviets might hope to make gains there while our attention was focussed here in Cuba. But, as long as Germany is not united, Berlin will always be a vulnerable point in the Western position and, carried to the extreme, concern over the safety of Berlin could paralyze any resort to arms by the West elsewhere to preserve its vital interests.

The support of our European allies for forceful US action in Cuba, therefore, is an essential requirement for deterring any untoward Soviet action in Europe. It is much more essential now than in October for the US to make every effort to seek allied support for a decision to assist the insurgents with military means.

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On the level of military action the US should conduct operations so as to leave to the Soviet Union the choice of whether to become directly involved with our armed forces. The quarantine is inherently such an action, but our air and ground forces would have to be given explicit instructions to avoid direct attack on Soviet forces in Cuba except in retaliation. We should make this point quite clear to the Kremlin. The most dangerous period from this standpoint will be that during which the US is rendering covert support to the uprising.

3. Operational Concept.

The foregoing considerations point towards a concept of US involvement in two phases: an initial covert phase followed, as required, by an overt phase. In the application of military force, the basic principle to be followed is that of support to the insurgents, of helping them to liberate Cuba themselves, although the US Government must be clear that support, once initiated overtly, will be made sufficient to insure success. From a political viewpoint it is essential that this posture be genuine and not open to the charge of being a facade for a forcible US overthrow of Castro. If the Soviets intervened with their ground forces against the insurgents (Category I), the

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covert phase might turn out to be extremely short or non-existent. At the point of Soviet intervention, the US would side openly with the insurgents. The more rapidly the US can move to incisive overt intervention, however, the less danger of Soviet armed involvement.

a. During the covert phase, the US would establish contact with the uprising by deploying unconventional warfare assets in order (i) to obtain the information essential to making a decision openly to intervene and (ii) to render all possible clandestine assistance to the insurgents. At the same time the US would initiate the generation of forces required for the implementation of CINCPAC OPLANS 312-316 and a full quarantine. In view of the importance of rapid, overt US action to avoiding Soviet involvement, the shorter the covert phase, the better. This consideration points up the desirability of exploiting any favorable changes in the situation in Cuba from the US viewpoint to introduce intelligence and unconventional warfare assets into the country. There could be a problem of asylum if the insurgents were defeated during the covert phase.

b. During the overt phase the US would (i) establish a full quarantine and (ii) render sufficient assistance to the

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insurgents to permit them to continue to operate and to extend their span of control. The US Government, however, would place main reliance on the quarantine and the abandonment of the Castro Regime by the Cuban people in the face of clear evidence of decisive US actions to bring down Castro, and would avoid if possible what might amount in the final analysis to virtually unlimited "assistance" which would scarcely be distinguishable from an invasion, either from the point of view of the Cuban people or of other countries. It is important that we have an estimate of the minimum initial force which should and could be introduced to sustain the uprising, assuming adequate close air support and little prior warning, and how rapidly this initial force could be built up in the ensuing days.

c. During either phase, if the SAM batteries or interceptor aircraft brought down a US plane, the US would destroy the offending nexus of SAM sites or air base. If the incident were repeated, the entire air defense system would be destroyed. If the USSR were to elect to shoot down a US aircraft during the covert phase, the US would then have either: (1) to declare openly for the insurgents with the opening measure in their

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-14-

support being action against the air defenses; or (2) to retaliate against air defense without yet admitting that the US had been engaged in covert assistance to the insurgents (from a political viewpoint this choice could be justified only with difficulty, although we might seek to justify and act on these flights as if they were reconnaissance flights). In the case of a palace coup the danger of losing an aircraft to hostile action might be less than in the case of a popular uprising, since in the former case our initial actions in Cuba itself would probably not need to be so extensive as in the latter.

d. The US would implement the covert phase immediately upon word of sufficient uprising, irrespective of whether the Soviets had intervened or the insurgents had appealed for help. As stated in the assumptions, however, only one or both of the latter events would establish the necessary political basis for announcing a US decision overtly to intervene. Were the uprising to collapse prior to the point at which we had initiated conversations with our allies (see below), we would halt all action.

6. Political Concept.

a. Following the outbreak of an uprising and a US decision to establish covert contact with the insurgents, the US through

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its Ambassador in Moscow would immediately inform the Kremlin of its decision and warn the Soviets of the US intent to take appropriate retaliatory action against any hostile act.

b. After the insurgents had issued a public call for help and the US decided that armed assistance constituted the appropriate response or the Soviets had taken forcible action against our aircraft or the insurgents the US would:

1) Issue a call for the convocation of the OAS as Organ of Consultation (this step might already have transpired if the insurgents had issued their appeal to the OAS) and recommend (i) the immediate establishment of a full quarantine, (ii) the furnishing of all necessary help to the insurgents, possibly under an "OAS Assistance Command" and (iii) formal recognition of the insurgents including their belligerent status under the 1928 Habana Convention.

2) Dispatch Presidential emissaries to London, Paris, Bonn and Rome to consult with heads of governments and the EAC.

3) Send a Presidential missive to Khrushchev informing him of our decision to commit all necessary resources to insure the success of the insurgents, expressing our hope that he will not intervene in this Cuban affair, and specifically requesting



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the Chairman (i) to comply with the sea and air quarantine to be effective at (time) and (ii) to order Soviet Troops to specified concentration points to minimize Soviet loss of life (not to be included if Soviet forces already actively committed in support of the Castro Regime).

4) Inform the UN Security Council under Article 54 of the UN Charter of the action taken in the OAS. Forestall Soviet moves in the UN.

5) Seek the cooperation of selected Cuban exile leaders whose aims are compatible with those of the insurgent group within Cuba.

6) Following recognition of the insurgents as the Government of Cuba convokes a joint session of Congress and announce US determination to commit all necessary resources in support of the new government.

Subsequently the US would:

1) Designate a Special Representative of the President for Cuban Assistance and move him with inter-departmental staff to Cuban territory at the earliest possible moment even during the conduct of combat operations to establish direct liaison between the USG and the provisional Government.

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3) Assist with the establishment of a Provisional Government, as appropriate, and begin assistance in the reconstruction of Cuba.

4) Facilitate the speedy departure of any remaining Soviet forces from the Island, including protection and assistance in evacuation.

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Date:

9/10/63

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DATE:

7 Oct 97



*File  
Curt. plans*

September 10, 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS**  
**Coordinator of Cuban Affairs**  
**Department of State**

**SUBJECT: U. S. Capability to Detect Aircraft Over Cuba**

In accordance with your request this date, enclosed you will find a fact sheet outlining the U. S. capability to detect aircraft over Cuba.

In brief, this paper confirms that the principal radar coverage of Cuba is from fixed radars at Key West, Homestead and Guantanamo, which are operated for the air defense of the United States and its possessions. There is, at present, no practical method to differentiate between a Castro-Communist aircraft and an anti-Castro aircraft due to a lack of IFF, communications with the aircraft or a filed flight plan. In addition, there are existing limitations on the radar coverage of the island itself which would permit undetected entry and exit through selected routes and altitudes.

Signed:  
A. M. Vais  
Lt Colonel, USA

*for* Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
General Counsel

Attachment  
As Stated

Mr. Califano  
Lt Col Haig ←  
ASG

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DATE: 7 Oct

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## US CAPABILITY TO DETECT AIRCRAFT OVER CUBA

1. Problem: This discussion concerns questions regarding US capability to detect aircraft over Cuba and limitations of this detection.

2. General: US radars which are in position to detect aircraft over Cuba are: (a) Stationary at Key West, Homestead and Guantanamo; (b) Airborne in the Key West - Southern Florida area; and (c) Mobile from itinerant US aircraft and naval forces in the area surrounding Cuba. The principal continuous coverage is from fixed radars at Key West, Homestead and Guantanamo which are operated for the air defense of the United States and its possessions.

3. Coverage Capability: US radar coverage is principally dependent upon the altitude of the target and its size. Essentially only the area of Cuba west of Caibarien (less the westernmost tip of the island) and the area surrounding Guantanamo are covered. Only fairly large aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes (6,000 feet and higher) are detected. Low altitude coverage, except in the immediate Guantanamo area, is non-existent.

4. Numbers of Detections: Florida radars detect 25 to 125 unidentified aircraft each day in the area over and surrounding Cuba. Figures on track detections from Guantanamo are being obtained and will be furnished as soon as possible.

5. Identification Limitations: There is no practical method to differentiate between a Castro-Cuban aircraft and an anti-Castro aircraft (no IFF, no communications, no filed flight plan); therefore, all such detections of aircraft over Cuba remain in the unidentified category.

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10009  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OASD  
FROM : PAUL H. NITZE  
TO : SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
TITLE : DRAFT STATE-DEFENSE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA  
DATE : 09/30/63  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA  
COUP IN CUBA  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6. Memo for the Secretary of the  
Army regarding contingencies relating to Cuba,  
including U.S. military actions in the event of a coup.



198-10004-10009

CALIFANO

Originating Agency:

DoD

Subject:

Draft DoD/000 Contingency Plan...

Date:

9/30/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA

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USAF

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Navy

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NSC

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ONI

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State Dept.

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OSD

☒ NO  
OBJECTION

CIA

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CIA

Joint Staff

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Other

(Please specify below)

no objection subject  
to the concurrence  
of the above

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DATE:

7 Oct 97





INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to  
I-36410/63

SEP 16 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

As you know, one aspect of my review of Cuban policy, carried out at your request, has been to provide for important contingencies relating to Cuba.

The attached memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, enclosing a plan for one of these contingencies, a draft "State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba", is forwarded with the recommendation that you sign the memorandum.


In the event that the JCS find important difficulties in the plan, additional work among representatives of State, CIA, and DOD will be required in order to provide a final plan. Other contingency plans are in preparation.

My staff and I are available to you to carry on this work if you desire.

*Paul H. Nitze*

Enclosure

Memorandum for the Chairman, JCS  
(TOP SECRET SENSITIVE)







DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

September 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE

SUBJECT: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup  
in Cuba (S)

At tab A is a memo signed by Mr. Nitze forwarding a draft memo for your signature (tab B) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which in turn requests JCS comments on a draft plan subject as above.

The draft plan (tab C) is the thirteenth draft of a US plan of action in the event of a military coup in Cuba and includes the views of State, CIA and the JCS on previous drafts. Although Mr. Califano has not studied the plan in detail, he recommended that I present it to you in his absence so that it receives your prompt attention. (A summary of the draft plan is at tab D.)

The memo of transmittal to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff outlines the origin of the plan and highlights the requirement of bridging a multitude of complex politico-military problems. Specifically, the JCS are asked to consider especially the criteria on which a Presidential decision to intervene must be based and the concomitant requirement of providing for prompt military action in the event of such a decision. I recommend that you sign this memorandum (tab B), the original of which was prepared by ISA but which has been subsequently revised with ISA concurrence by this office.

In his transmittal memo to you (tab A), Mr. Nitze offers to continue the interdepartmental contingency planning effort by ISA if you so desire. Since this planning effort is of great value, since there are other interagency contingency plans which should be completed and since this plan may require subsequent interagency staffing, it is recommended that you request a continuation of the planning effort by ISA. There is an appropriate memorandum at tab E for your signature.

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DATE:

7 Oct 91

*A. M. Haig*  
A. M. Haig  
Lt Col GS

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10010  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM : J. PATCHELL  
TO :  
TITLE : CONTINGENCY PLAN  
DATE : 01/28/63  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 9. Draft of points to be  
discussed related to military contingency planning  
toward Cuba in meeting on 30 Jan 1963.



198-10004-10010

Originating Agency:

D.O.?

OSD

Subject:

Cuba/Contingency Planning

Date:

1/24/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply)

DIA

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USAF

\_\_\_\_\_

Navy

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NSC

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ONI

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State Dept.

X

OSD

X

CIA

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CIA

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Joint Staff

X

Other

(Please specify below)

OSD: NO OBJECTION

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
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As listed

DATE: 1111 23 1997

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on

1/24/97, Boyle

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OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE:

7 Oct 97

CALIFANO, BOX 6  
FOLDER 9



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28 Jan 63

## CONTINGENCY PLAN

Clint Smith indicated that the meeting on Wednesday, January 30 would concern military contingency planning only. Following are some pertinent items which should be considered with respect to this subject.

1. The JCS represent the one principal source for a DoD position on contingency planning. At the time plans are implemented, other government agencies play a supporting role. It is quite important to have these agencies prepare full blown supporting plans fully coordinated with the JCS. Care should be exercised however to insure that other agencies are not embroiled in the fundamental development of military plans. From past experience, I know that the JCS view has consistently been "you tell us what to plan for and we will develop the plan". I should point out that State is the only government agency concerned which has failed in the past to provide a supporting plan to include any plan for the post action.

There is no requirement for a large number of plans to be developed for the purpose of responding to actions when Castro dies of a heart attack or when there is a specific action in one isolated area. Military plans provide a broad spectrum of actions and can be developed for everything from the insertion of paratroopers down to a full scale invasion. The development of a long list of plans to meet each of a large number of contingencies is confusing and no plan is made in such an inflexible manner that it cannot be readily adapted to any number of developments - even during the process of implementation.

In the past, Department of State pitch has been along the following lines. If a small anti-Castro resistance develops in a certain area, what is your contingency plan? The normal JCS answer to this will be, we can resupply them, we can reinforce them or we can move any way along the road to include a full scale invasion. It should be pointed out however that once U. S.

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operations are undertaken overtly, there is a good possibility that the action could escalate rapidly. Although the military have a capability to introduce special forces and to make ranger type hit and run raids, currently this is not a covert capability. IT CAN BE DEVELOPED FAIRLY RAPIDLY HOWEVER.

There are a larger number of operational plans prepared by a subordinate unit to take care of such steps as the removal of dependents from Guantanamo, the reinforcement of Guantanamo aerial surveillance, etc. These are ~~not~~ <sup>HAZARD</sup> appropriate for introduction at the level of the Coordinating Committee.

It is difficult to anticipate the desires of the Coordinator with respect to military contingency plans. The President and the Secretary of Defense have repeatedly made it clear that they would not look at plans or give their approval of plans which commit U. S. forces in advance of any decision based on the situation pertaining at any particular time. Similarly, State has been reluctant to indicate the precise prerequisites for any military action. For example, in February, the military were requested to answer a question from the Attorney General on what action should be taken in the event the Soviets establish missile bases in Cuba. The military answer to this was considerably stronger than the action actually taken in October. State did not respond to this question despite continued prodding from DoD.

It is difficult for people outside of the DoD to understand timing of military buildup. Present plans have been paired to ~~an amendment~~ <sup>AMINEMUCK</sup> and are being reinvestigated and revised on a continuing basis. The problem does not lie solely with the military units themselves, but with the vast armada of ships, planes and rail cars which must be mobilized to move forces into jump-off positions. Similarly, there appears to be a lack of understanding of military problems with respect to a state of readiness for other contingencies worldwide (Berlin, Korea, Vietnam, etc.). Military thinking is generally Clausewitzian -

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that we should hit with an overwhelming preponderance in order to insure the early defeat of Castro forces and to be ready to spring back into a readiness position to meet other threats of retaliatory actions elsewhere. Inherent in this thinking is a desire for decisiveness rather than involvement in a <sup>long drawn</sup> ~~game~~ out military engagement. Although the insurance factor is undoubtedly written in, the people who have developed these plans indicate that there is not much margin for change. If the Castro regime continues to develop and to receive additional items of sophisticated equipment, contingency planning must be revised upward.

*At P. 2*

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10011  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : R. D. ALBRO  
TO : OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
TITLE : TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA  
DATE : 12/11/63  
PAGES : 11  
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS

ARTIME, MANUEL

CUBAN BRIGADE

KENNEDY, ROBERT

CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo regarding  
training of Cubans in Nicaragua, recruitment efforts  
of Manuel Artime, meeting between Artime and Robert  
Kennedy, and Cubans in US Army.



Originating Agency:

Subject:

Date:

198-10004-10011  
ARMY  
TRAINING of Cuban Refugees  
11 Dec 63 IN Necessity

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

~~DA~~

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USAF

Navy

NSC

ONI

State Dept.

OSD

CIA

Joint Staff

Other

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Folder 10

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ACSI-CX

11 DEC 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

ATTN: MR. JOSEPH CALIFANO, GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (S)

1. (U) References:

- a. ACSI-CX Memorandum 19 Nov 63, above subject, to Office, Secretary of the Army
- b. Intelligence Report #2870006563, 9 Aug 63, Subject: Prominent Cuban Exiled Leaders visit Nicaragua (U), from USARMA, Nicaragua
- c. Intelligence Report #2870009363, 31 Oct 63, Subject: Puerto Cabezas and Cuban Exiles (U), from USARMA, Nicaragua
- d. Summary of Information, 1 Nov 63, 112th INTC Op, Subject: Cuban Officer Training Program (U)
- e. Memorandum for Record, ACSI-CX, 19 Nov 63, Subject: Cuban Brigade Member (U)

2. (S) Reference 1a, prepared at the request of your office, advised that query by USARMA, Managua within the U. S. Embassy there, revealed no indication that Colonel Thomas D. McPhail, O-30613, USA Retired, the former Chief of US Army Mission, was in anyway involved in the training of Cuban refugees in Nicaragua.

3. (C) During the above inquiry, the USARMA, Managua called attention to two intelligence reports he had furnished (references 1b. and 1c above) reporting Nicaraguan press comment on the visit of exiled Cuban refugee leaders Dr. Manuel ARTIGAS Buena, Dr. Carlos PRIO Socarras, Dr. Manuel Antonio DE VARONA, Dr. Francisco FERNANDEZ Pla, Dr. Laureano BATISTA, Dr. Orlando PUENTES, Dr. Miguel DE LEON, and Roberto RODRIGUEZ to Nicaragua during July and August 1963. The USARMA's comment on the newspaper speculation and rumors concerning this visit was that he "does not have any firm information or indicators that anti-Castro forces are being trained in Nicaragua."

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 28738

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DATE: 7 Oct 77

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11 DEC 1963

ACSI-GX

SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (S)

4. (C) Reference 1d, from the A. C. of S, G-2, Fourth Army reports alleged efforts by Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, to get some of his former associates in the Bay of Pigs invasion to resign their U. S. Army commissions and go with him to a revolutionary camp in Nicaragua. A copy of this reference is inclosed for your information. COMARC, Fourth Army and 3rd Army have been directed to continue to report on the alleged recruiting activity by ARTIME.

5. (C) Reference 1e, reports information received from Ft. Holabird, Md., that a former Cuban Brigada member, 2nd Lt Jose Raul VARONA Gonzales, C-2312303, had been invited by 2nd Lt. Enaido OLIVA (former second in command at the Bay of Pigs) to visit Washington, D. C. on 18 Nov 63 to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General. VARONA is a student at Ft. Holabird and reportedly was the G-2 of Brigade 2506 in the Cuban invasion. When VARONA returned from Washington he did not mention seeing Mr. Kennedy, but did say that he had met with Lt. OLIVA. The actual purpose of the meeting is not known. A copy of reference 1e, is inclosed for your information. Mr. Robert Kennedy did confer on 17 Nov 63 with Manuel ARTIME Buesa, Roberto SAN ROMAN aka Roberto Perez SAN ROMAN, Jose SAN ROMAN aka Jose Perez SAN ROMAN, and Enrique Jose RUIZ William Alfert. They were also scheduled to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy on either 21 or 22 November 1963. There is no indication that Ft. Holabird student VARONA was present.

6. (C) This office has no information whether Mr. Kennedy is aware of ARTIME's alleged recruiting activity. The information in paragraphs 3 through 5 above, and the inclosures hereto, are furnished in the event that they may be of some pertinence to your inquiry regarding Colonel McPhail, reference 1a, above.

2 Incl

as

[SgD] R. D. Albro, Col, GS

R. D. ALBRO

Colonel, GS

Director of Foreign Intelligence

OFF CHIEF OF STAFF

DEC 11 5 54 PM '63

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 320-320-10)

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
1963

## PREPARING OFFICE

Region I, 112th Intelligence Corps Group, San Antonio, Texas

## SUBJECT

Cuban Officer Training Program (U)

112th INTELLIGENCE CORPS BR-GP

SECRET CONTROL NUMBER:

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

COPY 1-4 OF 5 COPIES

1. (C) During the month of June 1963, Manolo Artime, a leading political figure among the Cuban refugees in Miami, Florida, in the company of Segundo Gorges, came to Fort Benning, Georgia, for the purpose of recruiting people to go to a revolutionary camp in Nicaragua. Juan M. Quintana-de la Torre, 2d Lt, C2 312 403, Detachment 21, 2d Student Battalion (SB), the Student Brigade, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, presently on Temporary Duty (TDY) with 3628th School Squadron (SS), Lackland Air Force Base (LAFB), Texas; Mario Eloy Jimenez-Rojo, 2d Lt, C2 312 439, Detachment 21, 2d SB, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB; Armando Caballero-Parodi, 2d Lt, C2 312 432, Detachment 21, 2d SB, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB; "Llayo (fmu) Varona" and Source went to visit Artime in his motel in Columbus, Georgia. Artime informed this group that the US Government was not going to do anything for Cuba and that he (Artime) had obtained aid and instructors from Europe. Source opposed Artime's statements and did not believe it, since they were in conflict with the aspirations and plans of the US Government. Source believes Artime succeeded in recruiting at least two members of Detachment 21, Isidro J. Montesino-Acosta, 2d Lt, C2 312 401, and Pedro Acebo-Rodriguez, 2d Lt, C2 312 350. Montesino-Acosta and Acebo-Rodriguez resigned from the Cuban Training Program upon completion of the course at Fort Benning, and their present whereabouts are unknown to Source.

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Manuel de Jesus Perez Marquez, 2d Lt, C2 312 323, Detachment 21, 2d SB, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 23 September 1963.

(F-3)

2. (C) The Officers of Detachment 21 commented among themselves that Manolo Artime came to Columbus, Georgia, to recruit personnel from the Cuban Officer Training Program to go to a camp in Nicaragua. Source did not know anything concerning any officers who were planning to resign upon termination of the course of instruction. (Source refused to elaborate on this subject and it is the opinion of investigators that he was withholding information)

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Juan Quintana-de la Torre, 2d Lt, C2 312 403, Detachment 21, 2d SB, Fort Benning, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 23 September 1963.

(F-3)

3. (C) In June 1963, one Manolo Artime, an anti-Castro leader, visited Fort Benning, but the purpose of his visit was unknown to Source as he did not go to see Artime and had no association with him. However, Source was later informed that the purpose of Artime's visit was to recruit certain individuals from Detachment 21 to go to a training camp in Nicaragua. Source did not know who the individuals were at the meeting with Artime, but did learn later that several members of the Detachment agreed to

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SUBJECT: Cuban Officer Training Program (U)

DATE: 1 November 1963

resign in order to go to Nicaragua immediately following the completion of the course of instruction at Fort Benning which ended on 2 August 1963. Source believes the following individuals resigned due to the influence of Artime and have joined his camp: Pedro Acebo-Rodriguez, 2d Lt, C2 312 371; George M. Navarro-Rodriguez, 2d Lt, C2 312 378; Jorge Lincoln Mas-Canosa, 2d Lt, C2 312 444; Luis de Jesus de Lamar-Maza, 2d Lt, C2 312 390; and Hector Antonio de Lamar-Maza, 2d Lt, C2 312 389.

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Felix Eloy Perez-Tamayo, 2d Lt, C2 312 351, Detachment 21, 2d SB, Fort Benning, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 23 September 1963. (F-3)

4. (C) Source has heard of the existence of a group of officers in the Cuban Officer Training Program who are considering resigning from the Program in the near future. At LAFB, there are a number who are waiting for the termination of their English course to resign, while others plan to turn in their resignation after arriving at a new station. One of them is Rene F. Gomez-Figueroa, 2d Lt, C2 312 397. Source believes that the reason for their leaving is that they plan to transfer to Nicaragua, or another overseas base, in order to continue their fight against Communist Cuba. This group is in contact with Pedro Acebo-Rodriguez and Antonio Iglesias-Pons, both of whom resigned from the Cuban Training Program upon completion of the course at Fort Benning and who are in Nicaragua organizing anti-Castro regime activities. (This group consists mainly of men who fought in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba)

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Ernesto de los Angeles Lluersma-Pares, 2d Lt, C2 312 319, Detachment 21, 2d SB, Fort Benning, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 22 October 1963. (F-3)

5. (S) There is a group within the Cuban Officer Training Program presently undergoing training at LAFB who are planning to submit their resignations upon completion of additional courses. One of these individuals is Ladislao George Fernandez-Martinez, 2d Lt, C2 312 392. The motive for presenting their resignations is to go to Nicaragua and organize an attempt to overthrow Castro. This group is in contact through correspondence with Pedro Acebo-Rodriguez and Antonio Eugenio Iglesias-Pons, both of whom resigned the course while at Fort Benning in August 1963. Fernandez is expecting to hear from Manolo Artime in order to submit his resignation in late November and go to Nicaragua. Artime revealed to Fernandez details about his conference with Charles de Gaulle of France and Conrad Adenauer of Germany. Artime showed documents and pictures to Fernandez corroborating his conferences with de Gaulle and Adenauer. Artime told Fernandez that de Gaulle and Adenauer have promised him help to establish a camp in Nicaragua for the purpose of taking over Cuba. Such help should start to be received by Artime after November 1963. Alberto Maleo Munia-Boris, 2d Lt, C2 312 400, another officer who resigned from the program in August 1963 and now residing in Miami, wrote a letter to Federico Garcia-Geli, 2d Lt, C2 312 393, LAFB, explaining his reasons for

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SUBJECT: Cuban Officer Training Program (U)

DATE: 1 November 1963

resigning the program and requesting that the letter be circulated among the fellow officers of the class at LAFB. The letter said that he (Muina) left the course because many of the men who had applied for the various schools, such as the Intelligence and the Armored Schools, were still at Fort Benning wasting time. Also, Muina had applied for a demolition course and after he was placed on orders to go to the course, the orders were cancelled. Muina did not like this and decided to get out. Source, who knows Muina well, is certain that Muina is working for or with Artime also. Muina has indicated repeatedly to his friends and to the officers undergoing the program that Cuba will not gain its liberty with the assistance of the United States, but needs to look for help from another country. Muina believes that the United States has decided to apply the principle of co-existence towards Cuba. Muina also has stated that the United States Government lacks the ability to understand the Latin American problems, and that he is going to join Artime.

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Isidoro Noriega-Ruiz, 2d Lt, C2 312 369, Detachment 21, 2d SB, Fort Benning, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 24 October 1963. (F-3)

6. (C) Rene Faustino Gomez-Figueroa, 2d Lt, C2 312 397, and Mario Eloy Jimenez-Rojo, 2d Lt, C2 312 439, who will graduate 3 December 1963, are contemplating resignation, exact reasons unknown. Of the officers who have resigned with the intention of joining a group to defeat Castro, Source remembers Antonio Iglesias-Pons who resigned recently. Miranda-Hernandez has heard that Iglesias is recruiting people in Miami to be taken to a camp in Nicaragua which is operated by Manolo Artime. Pedro Acebo-Rodriguez and Luis de Jesus Sierra-Lopez, 2d Lt, C2 312 345, resigned from the US Army and have left with Artime and are believed to have gone to Nicaragua.

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Segundo Melanio Miranda-Hernandez, 2d Lt, C2 312 309, Detachment 21, 2d SB, Fort Benning, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 24 October 1963. (F-3)

7. (S) Diego Emiliano Borges-Torres, 2d Lt, C2 312 431, is attempting to find out if the ultimate purpose of the Cuban Officer Training Program is identical to the program which is controlled by Manuel Artime to train people in Nicaragua. Upon obtaining this information, Borges-Torres is going to inform Source. If the plan is the same, everyone in the program will immediately go to Nicaragua because in Nicaragua the fight against Castro is more imminent. Help has been offered to Artime by Somoza of Nicaragua and by de Gaulle of France, who apparently has offered the Isle of Martinique for the operations against Castro. Manuel Artime visited Columbus, Georgia, a few months ago and spoke to many Cuban officers and tried to recruit them as instructors to go to the camp in Nicaragua. Source was not present at any of the meetings with Artime.

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SUBJECT: Cuban Officer Training Program (U)

DATE: 1 November 1963

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Ramon Perez-Veytia, 2d Lt, C2 312 370, Detachment 21, 2d SB, Fort Benning, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 25 October 1963.

(F-3)

8. (S) There is a group of officers within the Cuban Officers Training Program at LAFB who contemplates submitting their resignations if the United States has not done anything for the freedom of Cuba by December 1963. Many officers have indicated their desire to resign in order to join Manuel Artime who is supposedly organizing a training camp in Nicaragua. Artime has some contacts among the officers undergoing training at LAFB, and for a long time, these officers have been undermining the present training program by spreading dissension among their fellow officers. These men also have developed a recruiting campaign to supply Artime with qualified leaders for the Nicaraguan camp. Artime's recruiters at LAFB are: Diego Emiliano Borges-Torres, 2d Lt, C2 312 431; Ladislao George Fernandez-Martinez, 2d Lt, C2 312 392; Leon Dilio Carrazana, 2d Lt, C2 312 341; Conrado Caballero-Acosta, 2d Lt, C2 312 352. Borges-Torres is the chief representative of Artime at LAFB. He has made several trips to Miami recently and has been spending much money. He also has an expensive apartment in San Antonio, Texas, which he shares with Fernandez-Martinez. Next in command in the above group is Fernandez-Martinez. Carrazana has stated to Source that he intends to submit his resignation in December 1963 to join Artime. Carrazana also offered Source \$250 salary, plus \$25 for each child he might have, plus \$25 for any position he may hold in the training camp, if he resigns and goes to Nicaragua. Antonio Iglesias-Pons will be the man in charge of the of the training camp in Nicaragua. It is being rumored that a Latin American country is going to buy planes from England and make them available to Artime. It is also rumored that contacts exist with France, but Source does not know if they are with the French government or with private enterprises. The Somoza regime in Nicaragua has also promised assistance to Artime in the forthcoming operations against Communist Cuba. In early August 1963 while at Miami, Fernandez-Martinez offered Source \$500 if Source would accept a position in Nicaragua with Artime. On or about 25 October 1963, Fernandez-Martinez told Source at LAFB that he (Fernandez-Martinez) wanted to talk to Source about another offer similar to the first. Source did not stop to listen as he was in a hurry but promised to see Fernandez-Martinez later. Source was told by one Horiberto Villamil, a Cuban national, Private, undergoing English instruction also at LAFB, that Luis M. Fernandez-Barrios, Ensign, 672 450, has submitted his resignation in order to go to Nicaragua. In Source's opinion, Borges-Torres persuaded Fernandez-Barrios to resign.

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Ramon Lorenzo Pineiro-Galban, 2d Lt, C2 312 339, Detachment 21, 2d SB, Fort Benning, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 28 and 29 October 1963.

(F-3)

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SUBJECT: Cuban Officer Training Program (U)

DATE: 1 November 1963

9. (C) Renaldo N. Blanco-Navarro, 2d Lt, C2 312 258, 3628th SS, LAFB, received a telephone call on or about 25 October 1963 from Antonio Iglesias-Pons, currently in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the call was apparently to persuade Blanco-Navarro to resign from the Cuban Officer Training Program and join the camp of Artimo in Nicaragua.

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Angel Roberto Mujica-Herrera, 2d Lt, C2 312 306, Detachment 21, 2d SB, Fort Benning, presently on TDY with 3628th SS, LAFB, on 30 October 1963.

(F-3)

10. (C) Gomez-Figueroa and Fernandez-Barrios submitted letters of resignation to the Liaison Officer, 3628th SS, LAFB, on 28 October 1963.

SOURCE: The above information was furnished by Victor F. Zabelle, Captain, Inf, 02263628, U.S. Army Liaison Officer, Student Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia, presently on TDY with the 3628th SS, LAFB, on 28 October 1963.

(B-3)

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (C)

At 1030 hours 19 November, Major Bryce, G-2 Section, Ft. Holabird, telephoned Exploitation Section and reported that Jose Raul VARONA Gonzales, a student in the Officers' Intelligence Course, had received a phone call from Washington, D. C. on the night of the 18th requesting him to come to Washington the following day. The call was from Lt. Eneido OLIVA who was second in command at the Bay of Pigs and, according to VARONA, now commander of Brigade 2506. OLIVA wanted him to come to Washington to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General.

Major Bryce subsequently stated that VARONA was now assigned to the Department of Non-Resident Instruction inasmuch as he had fallen behind academically as a result of hospitalization. He will resume his studies when the next officers' course begins. Bryce further stated that VARONA was reportedly the G-2 of Brigade 2506, was a second lieutenant, had serial number C-2312303, and that his hospitalization was for injuries received during a fight in a Baltimore nightclub in October.

Colonel Garrison, the G-2 at Holabird, talked to VARONA on another matter after he returned from Washington, stated that VARONA made no mention of seeing Mr. Kennedy but did say that he had met with OLIVA who was enroute to the Artillery GM Center and wanted to see how he was convalescing and to learn the details of the nightclub fracas. Major Bryce doubted if VARONA saw Mr. Kennedy and strongly suspected that he had merely used the Kennedy name to obtain a VOCO.

Exploitation Section's files reveal that VARONA was born in November 1937 and that he was and possibly still is the G-2 of Cuban Brigade 2506. In 1957 he worked for the Tennessee Crippled Children's Society in Nashville. He attended 10th and 11th grades in Franklin, Tennessee and Peabody College in Nashville for two and a half years. He has many relatives who were high officials of the Cuban government before and after Batista's overthrow.

Search of CIA, CAC (Miami) and Exploitation files reveals that due to internal dissension within the Brigade there is no individual who is recognized by all factions as Brigade Commander. Colonel Kail, CAC reports that there are three main groups under Artime, Llaça and Varela respectively who are known as Brigade Commander. None of these individuals are in the U. S. Army.

CIA and Colonel Kail, CAC report no knowledge of the alleged meeting between the unidentified Brigade Commander Varona and Mr.

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*R.G.O. Connor*

ROBERT G. O'CONNOR  
Exploitation Section  
x75085/mdj

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1 NOV 1963

NOTED—OCCOFS US ARMY

20310

ACSI-GI

MEMORANDUM FOR: OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

19 NOV 1963

ATTN: MR. JOSEPH CALIFANO

SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua

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1. (S) On 7 November 1963, this office was informed by a member of your staff that purportedly a Colonel McPhail, allegedly former Army Attache, Nicaragua was training Cuban refugees in Nicaragua. This office was asked to determine the validity of this information.
2. (U) It is established that Colonel Thomas Donald McPhail, O-30613 (Ret) was Chief of the United States Army Mission, Nicaragua from 31 March 1960 to 20 August 1962. (See Incl 1 Resume on Colonel McPhail).
3. (S) In response to a query from this office the Army Attache, Nicaragua reports that Col McPhail arrived in Managua, Nicaragua o/a 15 July 1963 from New York, via Mamenic Steamship Lines (owned by Somoza interest). McPhail was the house guest of an AID official, he initially engaged in fishing and visiting old friends. He called on the Army Attache, Lt. Col. John J. Morgan, stated that while the purpose of his visit was for pleasure and recreation, he had, since his arrival been offered a job as technical Port advisor to the Port Superintendent of Puerto Somosa, by COMABESNIC, a Somoza owned company. The Port Superintendent is Frank Kelly, who may be identical to Frank J. Kelly, a Nicaraguan citizen, 5 June 1963 graduate DEMA. Frank J. Kelly was awarded a B.S. degree but was not commissioned in the U.S. Army. His father is Frederico G. Kelly, San del Sur, Nicaragua.
4. (C) According to available information, McPhail occupied himself for several weeks at Puerto Somosa, then without fanfare or farewells, suddenly departed Nicaragua for the U.S. in early September 1963 via Lanica Airlines. Recently an AID official in Managua received a letter from Colonel McPhail from his current address 511 So. Church St., Mt. Pleasant, Penna.

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ACSI-CX

SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (S)

5. (C) During the period of McPhail's visit to Nicaragua, there was a flare-up of newspaper speculation there concerning Anti-Castro exiles in training and conjecture that such forces were being trained by U. S. Army personnel around Puerto Cabezas. In fact the local French press representative mentioned Col McPhail's presence to the Army Attache, remarked at the coincidence of the visit and inferred that McPhail might be involved in training exiles.

6. (C) The Army Attache and other U.S. Embassy officials do not have any indicators, rumors or confirming information that McPhail is or was engaged in or instrumental in training of Cuban refugees in Nicaragua.

1 Incl  
as

(sgd) Charles J. Denholm

CHARLES J. DENHOLM  
Brigadier General, GS  
Acting ACofS for Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

CIA queried Mr. Califano's office on a Col McPhail, former ARMA Nicaragua, who purportedly was training Cuban exiles in Nicaragua. CIA said McPhail was not involved with any of their activities, therefore they were concerned that he was perhaps involved in some unauthorized action.

Lt Col Haig, Califano's office requested the undersigned to carefully explore McPhail's activities exercising great caution so as not to inadvertently get into a "going operation".

The outgoing query to ARMA, Nicaragua stressed the need for discretion and cautioned against investigative action of any kind. The outgoing message was checked w/Lt Col Haig to be certain it contained the correct information and the caution required in the query.

Operations Br. was queried re: McPhail with negative results. The above Memo contains information provided by ARMA and that info that pertains to McPhail's background developed from his CRF and 201 files.

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DOROTHE E. MATLACK  
Chief, Exploitation Section  
K75085/mdj

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM : PAUL NITZE  
TO : CHAIRMAN, JCS  
TITLE : CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CUBA  
DATE : 04/17/63  
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REVOLT IN CUBA

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in Cuba under study by OSD/ISA.



198-10004-10012

CALIFANO, BOX 6

JCS

FOLIA 9

Originating Agency:

Subject:

~~4/17/63~~ Cuba/Contingency Planning

Date:

4/17/63

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In reply refer to I-35460

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19 April 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**SUBJECT: Contingency Planning For Cuba**

1. OCS/ISA currently has under study (1) possible US reaction to threats to US security interests in this hemisphere posed by actions of the Castro government or the Soviet Union, (2) certain contingencies that might flow from a spontaneous revolt in Cuba, and (3) alternative US policy options toward Cuba.

2. Possible US reactions to hemispheric security threats by Castro. Recent planning activities have considered possible US actions in case reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba are attacked or destroyed. At Attachment A are some additional contingencies and, in general terms, the prepared responses in the event that such contingencies are not to be exploited to the maximum to overthrow Castro. Under the assumption that the US will decide to respond to each contingency, generally in the manner indicated, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military implications of the US responses are requested. If there are alternative responses that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend for consideration, they should be forwarded along with the comments.

3. Contingencies arising from a revolt in Cuba. Of the contingencies that could flow from a revolt in Cuba, three possibilities will be considered by the ISA study.

a. An internal revolt occurs in Cuba which has no possibility of success without immediate and substantial US assistance.

b. An internal revolt occurs in Cuba which appears to have a reasonable chance of success and the US decides to exploit the situation to overthrow Castro.

c. An internal revolt by Cuban military units leads to conflict between Soviet and Cuban troops.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the desirability and feasibility of US military action under each of these conditions is requested. If use of military force is recommended, its recommended nature and scope should be outlined.

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4. Alternative US policy options. One facet of this portion of the study will consider the use of actual or contrived contingencies which could require the threat of the use of force, or its use, to achieve US objectives. Among the possibilities which could require the use of force and which warrant further planning are the following:

a. The US decides to incite and support revolt within Cuba.

b. The US decides to contrive an incident which will provide an opportunity to overthrow Castro. (Any of the events listed in Attachment A may be considered for use as the incident. The "Possible Response" listed would, of course, not apply). The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested on (1) the military implications of each of these contingencies and (2) the feasibility and desirability of pursuing each course from the viewpoint of the national security interests of the United States.

5. A response is requested by 20 May. Members of my staff are available for consultation and staff support as required.

/s/  
Paul H. Nitze  
DSD/LSA

1 Enclosure  
Attachment A

Cyn Made:

Orig & 3 cc to addressee  
cc - ISA reading file yy  
cc - Blue - RMC  
cc - green - OGD file cy  
cc - yellow - comeback  
cc - hold cy

Prep by: Capt Runnelt/dmp/16 Apr 63  
Arms Control/48829/57315

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ATTACHMENT A

1. Contingency. Soviet/Cuban aircraft and/or ships habitually harass US commercial or military ships or aircraft in the Caribbean.

Possible Response. The US would intensify air and sea patrols in the Caribbean. Rules of engagement would remain unchanged. If Soviets are involved, quarantine including prohibition of FCL, would be considered for reinstatement with accompanying political actions.

2. Contingency. Soviet/Cuban aircraft and/or ships attack or destroy a US commercial or military ship or aircraft in the Caribbean.

Possible Response. The US would attack the actual or suspected base of the offending aircraft or ship unless the offending aircraft or ship itself had been attacked under the US rules of engagement. Thereafter, rules of engagement would be modified to allow US forces to attack Cuban forces in international seas or air. A subsequent Soviet/Cuban attack would result in disarming airstrikes against all ship or aircraft bases.

3. Contingency. Cuban resupply of equipment for subversive activity increases steadily throughout Central and South America. Or Castro is caught in a provable act of subversion in Latin America.

Possible Response. The US and OAS would intensify surveillance measures in the Caribbean. FCL shipments to Cuba would be progressively prohibited. OAS sanction for search and seizure of suspected ships on the high seas of the Caribbean would be sought.

4. Contingency. Cuban aircraft periodically or habitually violate US air space, but do not commit an openly hostile act.

Possible Response. Existing rules of engagement will be modified to allow all Cuban aircraft entering US air space to be considered hostile unless aircraft makes known otherwise. Communicate decision to Castro government.

5. Contingency. Cuba initiates measures to impede US operating rights at Guantanamo without committing overt act of aggression.

Possible Response. The US will progressively reinstitute quarantine of Cuba, including FCL. Political actions will be taken to permit Soviets opportunity to dissuade Castro from activities or to assume responsibility for acts.



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6. Contingency. Castro forces attack Guantanamo.

Possible Response. Quarantine of Cuba including prohibition of POL will be reinstituted immediately as the US initiates actions to implement OPLAN 312 and OPLAN 316. US forces world-wide will be alerted.

7. Contingency. Soviet Union uses Cuba as a base for subversive operations.

Possible Response. If political negotiations with USSR fail, quarantine of Cuba will be progressively reinstituted, including POL.

8. Contingency. Soviet Union reintroduces strategic weapons into Cuba.

Possible Response. Quarantine including POL will be established. US will prepare to implement OPLAN 312 and 316. US forces world-wide will be alerted.

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM : EARLE G. WHEELER  
TO : THE RECORD  
TITLE : MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963  
DATE : 12/19/63  
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SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA

LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY

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Latin America Policy Review

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12/19/63

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

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
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*Policy Review*

19 December 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Meeting with President on Cuba, 1100 hrs, 19 Dec 1963**

**1. The following persons were present at the meeting:**

**White House:** ..... The President  
Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Mr. Smith  
**State:** ..... Mr. Thompson  
Mr. Ball  
Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Martin  
Mr. Crimmins  
**Defense:** ..... Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. Vance  
General Wheeler  
**CIA:** ..... General Carter  
Mr. FitzGerald  
Mr. Helms  
**Treasury:** ..... Mr. Dillon  
**USIA:** ..... Mr. Wilson

**2. Mr. FitzGerald briefed the President on Agency operations covering the following areas:**

- a. Collection of intelligence.
- b. Propaganda activities.
- c. Economic denial actions.
- d. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.
- e. Sabotage and harassment activities.
- f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.

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3. a. The President was most interested in economic denial actions. He was informed that talks would be undertaken in the immediate future with representatives of the Canadian and British governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials by Canadian and British firms to Cuba. It was stated that Spanish firms are likewise active in this area, as well as a number of essentially fly-by-night firms located in a number of foreign countries. No reputable American firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact, have been helpful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging in this traffic. Apparently, State regards the Canadian, the British and the Spanish efforts as being the real trouble spots. The President directed that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governments of firms concerned to dissuade them from this practice.

b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated that exploitation of Cuban military disaffection is a long term undertaking. While there are disaffected Cuban military men in important posts, they have not, to date, made any contacts with each other nor formed any sort of group. However, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any successful operation to overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported by the Cuban military if it is to have any real likelihood of success.

c. During the discussion on sabotage and harassment, the President expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at this time for two reasons:

(1) Current attempts to get OAS agreement to various actions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and

(2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new administration's policies toward Cuba, and it might influence unfavorably the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions in Soviet military personnel in Cuba.

4. Mr. Helms briefed on the significance of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of the OAS survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to date, of their survey. He stated that the group apparently had accepted that the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the survey group was asking of the Venezuelan government further information regarding propaganda activities directed against the Venezuelan government, etc. He does not expect that the commission will report

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to the OAS prior to 10 January 1964. In the meantime, our effort is devoted to ascertaining the maximum that the OAS is prepared to do as a result of the Venezuela affair. They are hopeful that the OAS will support an increased surveillance system. He thinks it is too early to expect a complete break in economic and travel relations between OAS countries and Cuba.

5. There was some discussion of further actions we might take to increase pressures and harassments at an appropriate time. Among other items mentioned were the effect of low level reconnaissance flights from time to time and the desirability of executing such flights at intervals to maintain the viability of our "right" to do so. While the President did not express disapprobation, neither did he express approval. In fact, no real decisions were taken at this meeting which must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session.

Signed - Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

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Chairman, JCS  
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Army General Counsel

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TO : JOINT CHIEFS  
TITLE : INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CUBA;  
GUIDANCE FOR USIA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS POLICY  
AND PLANS WITH RESPECT TO CUBA  
DATE : 01/26/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA  
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, CUBA  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 5, Folder 7. Memo for Gen Wheeler,  
Capt. Zumwalt, Maj Gen Abrams, Rear Adm. Wendt, Maj  
Gen Carpenter, and Col Elwood on meeting of ICCC.



198-10004-10014 CALIFANO, BOX 5  
FOLDER 7

Originating Agency:

Army

Subject:

Cuba - ICC

Date:

1/26/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA

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USAF

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Navy

NSC

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ONI

State Dept.

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OSD

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CIA

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Joint Staff

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Other

(Please specify below)

~~USMC, USIA~~

No Army objection to  
declass

UNCLASSIFIED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

DATE: 100772 JLR



~~SECRET~~

January 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)  
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, USN (OSD)  
MAJOR GENERAL C. W. ABRAMS, JR., USA  
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN  
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF  
COLONEL HUGH ELWOOD, USMC

SUBJECT: Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba;  
Guidance for USIA and Psychological Operations Policy  
and Plans with Respect to Cuba.

There will be a meeting of subject Committee on Tuesday, January 29, 1963, to discuss guidance which will be given to USIA and psychological operations policy with respect to Cuba. Any matters which you believe should be considered at this meeting and any comments or suggestions you desire to make should be submitted to me not later than 0800 on Tuesday, January 29, 1963.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

USA, ASG Control No. 1751

cc: ASG FILE  
Mr. Califano  
Col. Patchell

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

DATE: 7 Oct 97 JEB



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10015  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY (ACSI)  
FROM : JEFF W. BOUCHER  
TO : BRIG. GEN. EDWARD LANSDALE  
TITLE : CUBAN OPERATIONS  
DATE : 10/17/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS

ALPHA 66

PFUNTNER, JORDAN JAMES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 1. Memo from ACSI to  
Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale providing  
background information on Alpha 66 and USAOSD contact  
through Mr. Jordan James Pfuntner.



198-10004-10015

CALIFANO, FOLDER 1

BOX 3

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: ARMY

Date: 17 OCT 62

Subject: CUBAN OPERATIONS

Original Level of Classification: SECRET

Third Agency Equities: CIA

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of IFK Act

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

DATE: 7 OCT 77 148



~~SECRET~~



HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to  
ACSI-CO 6.201

17 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF  
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations (U)

1. (S) This memorandum furnishes background information on certain aspects of the Alpha 66 organization, as requested by you following your briefing on this subject by Lt Colonel Rolfe of this office on 16 October.
2. (S) The U.S. Army Operational Survey Detachment (USAOSD), a unit subordinate to this office, has contact with the Alpha 66 group through Mr. Jordan James PFUNTNER, a U.S. citizen who apparently has direct contact with the highest echelon of the Alpha 66 group. Mr. Pfuntner has been cleared through the Interagency Source Registry and has been carded as an Army source. The USAOSD has not been afforded access to members of the Alpha 66 group, and has not furnished requirements or financed any of the group's activities.
3. (S) Initial contact with Mr. Pfuntner was established by the USAOSD team in Miami during September 1962. During this period Mr. Pfuntner made the following statements:
  - a. That he was in contact with a group that was going to conduct raids against Cuba. The group was subsequently identified as Alpha 66.
  - b. That the group refused to work with CIA, but desired to work with the U.S. military.
  - c. That the group desired support of the U.S. Army in the action phase, i.e., funds, equipment, arms, etc. In return the group would provide intelligence information, would furnish captured equipment, and could land agents in Cuba. The group estimated it would require \$100,000 to complete the balance of its program, consisting of four more raids on Cuba.
  - d. Pfuntner refused to identify any member of the group, or to reveal their plans or modus operandi.

DECLASSIFIED BY ARMY

DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY

DATE: 7 OCT 77 /LS

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DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Mr Bilpatie said no  
-SN*

*o/w/r* Copy 1 of 4 copies



~~SECRET~~

17 OCT 1962

ACSI-CO

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations (U)

4. (S) To assess Pfuntner and his claims, and in the hope of obtaining intelligence information, the USAOSD asked Pfuntner to furnish items of Soviet ordnance materiel and intelligence information on Cuba. Communication with Pfuntner on 12 October indicated that Soviet equipment and information would be made available to the USAOSD in the near future as a result of the group's 8 October raid on La Isabela de Sagua. It was further indicated that important information concerning Soviet underwater demolition team (UDT) countermeasures was also obtained on this raid, and that the frogmen who attempted to sink a Russian ship desired to discuss their experience with a U.S. expert in underwater swimming. ONI has stated an interest in participating in a debriefing of these individuals on this subject, and arrangements are being made for the debriefing to take place in Puerto Rico.

5. (S) It is believed that Alpha 66 has an excellent potential to obtain military intelligence information on Cuba as well as items of Soviet ordnance materiel. However, Alpha 66 is an action type organization engaged in combatting Communism by armed force; therefore, any exploitation of the group by the U.S. military is outside the cognizance of this office.

6. (S) The ACSI approved the following recommendations on 16 October:

a. Debriefing of the Alpha 66 frogmen by a USAOSD representative with ONI participation.

b. Exploration by the USAOSD of the possibility of purchasing from Alpha 66 needed Soviet equipment as it becomes available.

c. Briefing of General Lansdale on the Alpha 66 proposal to furnish intelligence information and materiel in return for financial support, pointing out that financing, if any, is the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency.

7. (S) In the event you desire to explore further the Alpha 66 proposal, the USAOSD is prepared to assist in negotiating with the group through their Source, Mr. Pfuntner. No positive action will be taken by the USAOSD regarding this matter, pending your determination of policy and operational interest.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

  
JEFF W. BOUCHER  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Collection Division

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10016  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD (ISA)  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : GENERAL PRESSURES TO CREATE A CONTINGENCY  
DATE : 03/11/63  
PAGES : 10  
SUBJECTS : CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OAS

LATIN AMERICA SECURITY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 9. Portion of Draft #2  
of paper discussing methods of increasing pressure  
upon Cuba.



198-10004-10016

Originating Agency:

DA OSD

Subject:

Cuba/Contingency Planning

Date:

3/11/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA

\_\_\_\_\_

USAF

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Navy

X

NSC

\_\_\_\_\_

ONI

\_\_\_\_\_

State Dept.

X

OSD

X

CIA

\_\_\_\_\_

Other

(Please specify below)

X

OSD: DECLASSIFY/  
RELEASE

N/A

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 7/24/97 Boyle

NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY  
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE:

7 Oct 97

Calzando  
Box 6

Fo Lake 9



SECRET  
Captain Zumwalt/DRAFT # 2  
March 11, 1963  
OSD/ISA

IX.A.3.d. General Pressures to Create a Contingency

In order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban regime without harming the United States image and with minimum distortion of bilateral US-USSR relationships, there must be careful coordination and phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There must be a plan capable of getting us from where we are now to where we want to go, by gradually increasing pressures until the objective is achieved. These pressures should be designed to create opportunities and contingency situations for further exploitation, along the way.

The optimum orchestration of such a Cuban program must obviously be developed as the future unfolds. But in order to provide overall guidance within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort is required. This plan is divided into eight headings with a gradually increasing level of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through the various phases is visualized as taking place in a coordinated but not necessarily symmetrical manner. In other words, we may be in the most vigorous phase of propaganda while not yet having reached the final phase with regard to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the respective phase in either category would be coordinated as part of an overall governmental orchestration.

A program scenario capable of producing a decisive change or exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follows.

US Posture - - Initially the US image should be that of willingness to do all that is necessary to keep Castro's military threat nil and his subversive threat to the Western Hemisphere at an acceptably low level. It should be characterized as one during which the USG, having been



extremely reasonable despite Castro's intransigence, is waiting for signs of more favorable change in Cuba.

Later the US image should change to one in which the US is being "led" by the majority of the OAS into OAS initiated and sponsored pressures against Cuba. These would consist of measures less than those certain to overthrow Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, in the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro or provide an occasion for decisive action. Pressures would be applied in such fashion as to represent both a carrot to the Cuban people to get rid of Castro regime and a stick toward the present regime. Still later the US stance should become publicly, "at last" to join the OAS majority in seeking vigorous pressures on the Castro regime without yet irrevocably committing US prestige to decisive action.

Finally, if and when the orchestration and circumstances have brought the US position to such a point that decisive action is possible, and if earlier pressures have not eliminated Castro or do not give promise of eliminating <sup>him</sup> some decisive action might be considered. This need not be an invasion by US forces and could be re-imposition of total blockade or a disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances.

OAS Action - - The USG will need to devote major attention to the strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly along several lines, quite apart from the covert effort to organize the majority on specific issues. This effort to achieve solidarity should consist of frequent briefings of the OAS nations through all appropriate channels, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, efforts to set up an OAS military organization with occasional commitment of troops



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for training, and all other feasible developments of regional themes, such as intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of the region. It is very necessary, in view of the general IA situation to continue all measures necessary to isolate Castro.

Initial OAS action should be the enlargement of the bases for the invocation of the Rio Treaty. This broadening should be against the continued presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the USSR indicate that this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continued subversive activity. Concomitantly, the recent study of the Special Consultative Committee on Security should be given wide publicity and the US should press for implementation of its recommendations.

The OAS, in the near future, probably after publication of the results of the foregoing study and enlargement of the basis for invoking the Rio Treaty to include subversion, should again formally warn Cuba against promotion of any more subversive activities. The OAS should formally state that should Cuban subversive activities rise above some (unspecified) level, a "new condition" would exist which would justify decisive action against Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which could be attributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority OAS support should be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence theme. Bilateral approaches and economic quid pro quos should be used to win Brazil to the U.S. view within OAS.

Still later, at an appropriate time, the OAS should make an official finding, from its studies initiated earlier, that the Castro regime has continued, despite warnings, to conduct aggressive and subversive actions in Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or



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White Paper should be promulgated through the OAS. Later a "new condition" should be found formally to exist, following which the US would state that the earlier US-USSR modus vivendi regarding Cuba has come to an end. Following the above, an OAS vote should call for the remaining LA nations to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all members to restrict their nationals from travel to Cuba. Castro should be officially labeled as a major threat to the hemisphere and to the objective of the Alliance for Progress.

The OAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes warlike activity and proclaim a prohibition against any warlike activity being conducted by Cuba within an ocean and land area around the entire LA continental and Caribbean area. Intervention of aircraft and ships carrying arms, subversive agents, propaganda materials, etc. could be authorized.

*Free World Actively*  
Still later at an appropriate time the OAS should vote, under the Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could take the form of a resolution for all members to take such action including the use of force as individually considered appropriate or to endorse any specific decisive action to which the members had agreed.

The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the OAS and warn that the situation may get worse. Later, as a result of "OAS insistence" the Free World should be urged to extend or re-affirm trade embargos to all items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; to apply shipping restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited; free world industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cuba



crucial spare parts and equipment which are not on the COCOM list.

Still later the US should increase the vigor with which she seeks, through briefings, pressures, etc., to increase the effectiveness of all economic measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to limit their airline services to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. At an appropriate point in the orchestration, food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, with US using its influence to extend this embargo throughout the Free World.

The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application of a blockade to Cuba. This could be a phased weapon consisting of a blockade on POL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow.

Surveillance over Cuba -- Until it becomes apparent that the Soviet Union has no intention of removing any additional military personnel, aerial surveillance should be limited to appropriate high altitude coverage with low level surveillance avoided except for thoroughly suspicious indications.

Later, at a suitable point in the orchestration, occasional low altitude surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuban people, while avoiding AA defenses.

Still later, suitably timed, the United States/OAS should initiate very frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be increased in intensity to the point at which our aircraft would literally seek out AA defense sites in search of provocative acts or, in the absence of Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image.

In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should be at saturation levels.



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Regional Surveillance -- The OAS or the Caribbean nations should take the initiative in organizing, as a part of a Caribbean security arrangement, a surface ship and aerial surveillance of the coastal and offshore waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively moved out from the shores of the nations being protected into the Caribbean approaches to Cuba, tying in with an OAS proclaimed zone in which movement of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Toward the end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cuba. There should be increasing surveillance and control of land boundaries. There should be improved systematic exchange of intelligence on subversive activity.

Propaganda -- There should be established immediately a radio station (Radio Free Cuba), probably in Florida, using covert funds, with regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuban political groups. Its content should be the middle course between VOA and Radio Swan.

Initially, through public statements, VOA, etc., maintain the theme of the U.S. "watchful waiting" for change in the Castro regime. Maintain the currently enhanced VOA wave facility beamed to Cuba. Highlight positive results in Latin America of the Alliance for Progress. We should warn Cuba unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the consequences of continued subversion and of Castro's present track. Still later, prior to any decisive action, if taken, this theme should go out officially over VOA and in announcements of public officials.

Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations. Infiltrate Cuban exile publications. Play up, on all media, the threat



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of Castro to the regimes of the Western Hemisphere and the objectives of Alliance for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came to power on a pledge to provide political freedom. Remind them of the social goals he held up while he destroyed that freedom. Contrast their present economic chaos with those economic goals of land and housing reform. Remind them that he preached nationalism while delivering their country to the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal was accompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask what Castro has left to offer. Conclude that only the mutual fear of retribution among his elite remains to hold them in power. Use slogans such as "L 64" (Liberty in '64), etc.

Still later initiate through public broadcast, training in the rudiments of seditious activity.

Still later urge the many small revolutionary cells to make contact with neighboring groups. Warn and threaten the Castro regime through all media; exhort the people to organize to join enlarged resistance groups; seek to build up resistance heroes. Endeavor to deflate Castro through these broadcasts. Stress the freedom of the Cuban people, post-Castro, to choose their own political and social structure.

Subversion -- There should be an initial period of no increase in subversive efforts by the U.S., until the bilateral phase of the Cuban affair is completed and it is clear that the Soviet Union will remove no additional military personnel.

After that time minimal covert contacts should be established within Cuba for the distribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts of defiance and sabotage should be initiated. For example, exhort groups

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~~TOP SECRET~~

of 3 or 4 friends, without establishing external rebel affiliation, to paint L'64, etc., on walls or to commit isolated acts of sabotage. The purpose would be to establish rebel connotation and to generate leadership. This would lead to the establishment of rudimentary cellular training in seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical items should be initiated to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders should be identified. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should continue. The number of Cuban exiles taken into the United States Armed Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significantly increased. A similar program for "freedom fighters for Cuba" should be undertaken for volunteers from other LA nations. At a later point in the crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should be encouraged. All covert effort should be exerted toward coordinating the cells, pockets, and groups resisting Castro, inside and outside Cuba. This would be a transition period from sporadic acts in isolation into organized subversion. Fuel and food supplies should be sabotaged. An organized supply system should be put into effect with large numbers of fishing craft situated around the island to make both scheduled supply of deliveries and deliveries of opportunity. As various groups are identified in revolt, they should be worked into the supply system. New LA and Cuban fighters training outside Cuba, should be introduced in the same way into these organized movements within Cuba. There should be frequent leaks of planned US invasion and appropriate denials to frustrate the suspicious Castro. Fleet and air "training" demonstrations should be scheduled off Cuba. At the same time it should be made clear to rebel leaders that an externally launched invasion is not to be expected until a revolution has come from within, with external logistic assistance.



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It should be emphasized to the rebel leaders that the U.S. does not expect the clock to be turned back with regard to social conditions.

Still later a complete orchestration should be woven together, coming to a crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the main-streams discussed in the categories above. Propaganda should reach the maximum denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holding up the prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their resistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of all available externally trained resistance fighters, provision of maximum logistic support, etc. At the appropriate time, if this resistance movement needs the assistance of external forces there should be an OAS structured air strike, related to an appropriate Castro mis-step, to disarm Cuban offensive and defensive power and to destroy all POL storage. This attack should be coordinated with all-out sabotage.

An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if required to save the resistance, once the all-out internal resistance efforts has been initiated.

Criteria -- The pressures discussed in all categories above should be appropriately coordinated. The period of moderation should end after one or two months when it is apparent that no further Soviet military personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures should then commence, lasting for a period of two to three months, until some episode of escalation by Castro or other appropriate event, makes further pressures feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, OAS major insistence should lead to escalation of pressures. After another short period, again preferable triggered by an appropriate Castro episode or alternatively by a majority OAS vote still more vigorous pressures should be initiated.



If Castro has initiated a suitable war-like act, such as firing on surveillance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the maximum immediately rather than gradually.

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10017  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS  
FROM : WILLIAM H. BRUBECK  
TO : MCGEORGE BUNDY  
TITLE : CUBA - BACK-UP PAPERS AND A SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS  
DATE : 01/22/63  
PAGES : 30  
SUBJECTS : PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA

POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA

CUBAN BRIGADE

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OAS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 24. Summary of  
recommendations from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
to McGeorge Bundy and members of NSC Executive  
Committee.



198-10004-10017

Originating Agency:

NSC

Subject:

Cuba-General

Date:

1/22/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA

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USAF

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Navy

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NSC

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NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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State Dept.

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OSD

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CIA

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CIA

Joint Staff

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Other

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DIS: NO OBJECTION

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on

7/24/97

BOX 6  
F. 24



(WITH REVISIONS)

CALIFANO

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(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)


January 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
COPIES TO : All Members of the NSC Executive Committee  
SUBJECT : CUBA - Back-up Papers and a Summary of  
Recommendations of the Coordinator  
of Cuban Affairs

The enclosed papers are submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.
3. United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States.
4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.
5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.

It is understood that the recommendations will be considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on Thursday, January 24.

  
William H. Brubeck  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL  
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)



SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1953, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

- a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
- b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
- c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
- d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;
- e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
- f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

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being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

- g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
- h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
- i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
- j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

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-3-

action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

- a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
- b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

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-4-

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

SECRET



~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

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### Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

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-3-

7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

#### Supporting Actions

- A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further

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actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:
  - a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
  - b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may:
    - 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
  - c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

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2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.
3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
  - a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
  - b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
  - c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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-6-

- d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
- a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
  - b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

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-7-

- 2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
  - 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba;
  - and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.
6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
  7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.
  8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
  9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

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B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m.)

FROM : Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.  
SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of American States.

PROBLEM

To determine the future course of action which the U.S. should seek in the OAS with respect to Cuba.

Discussion

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in January 1962 put the problem of Cuba clearly in the hemispheric context. At that meeting the Foreign Ministers excluded Cuba from participation in the inter-American system, declared an arms embargo, and directed vigilance against Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

The U.S. invoked the Rio Treaty on October 22, 1962. Pursuant thereto, the Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to act provisionally as the Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (OC)

Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanimously passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such action, including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to prevent continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prevent the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere. In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. instituted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic cooperated with us in the quarantine and 9 others offered their assistance and facilities.

With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Consultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing to concern themselves with subversion and possible extension of economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken.

COURSES

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would be prepared to review these cases with the Department of Defense on an individual basis and to consult on possible solutions which would avoid giving any basis for a Cuban claim of the right to denounce the base agreements.

U. Alexis Johnson

MIR  
orig copy sent as reply to Gen Craig's signal  
on 8 Jun 62. JF Parker

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., SPECIAL ASSISTANT  
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Establishment of Support by Castro of Subversive  
Movements in Latin America

1. In view of the juridical problem of convincing Latin American Governments and the OAS that there is sufficient evidence to move against Castro's subversion, some form of evidence is urgently required.

2. The penetration of the Communist mechanism and the setting up of an opportunity to record the delivery of funds, propaganda materials, or other assistance is considered to be a high priority project.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
E. R. FURMAN, Jr.  
Captain USM  
Director for Arms Control

cc's: Mr. Sloan  
Mr. Yarmolinsky

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MAR 1 1963

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs;  
Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

Pursuant to your memorandum, same subject, dated 28 February 1963,  
the following comments are submitted:

1. In connection with a review of the proposed actions against Cuban subversion, it is important to raise again the question which has not been clearly presented to the President of the need to broaden the basis of the OAS/OU to include Castro's subversive activity. This is considered to be the single most important step, given the juridical approach of the majority of the Latin American Governments, to focus hemispheric efforts against Castro/Communist subversion.

2. Under the juridical umbrella suggested above, the following specific suggestions, listed under the topic titles of the basic paper are submitted:

a. Direct controls of travel for training between Latin America and Cuba.

Seek, through OAS resolution and bilaterally, to insure that each Latin American nation shall:

1) Require that each person that crosses from one country into another possess a bonified travel document.

2) Establish covert surveillance of each Cuban embassy and consulate to maintain records of all contacts between these diplomatic facilities and citizens of the resident state.

3) Prohibit trips to Cuba except for emergency or humanitarian purposes.

4) Make sure that immigration systems are operated at optimum efficiency against potential agents or members of the Communist Party.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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b. Direct controls of movement of propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries.

Seek, through OAS resolution and bilaterally, to insure that each Latin American country shall:

- 1) Establish strict control over businessmen and technicians of countries of the Communist Bloc and of all freight and baggage, whether or not accompanied by the owner.
- 2) Limit the size of the staffs of all bloc missions.
- 3) Maintain strict controls over national organizations that do commercial business with bloc countries.
- 4) Maintain strict control over all organizations that produce or distribute propaganda and/or subversive information.
- 5) Exercise strict control over radio broadcasting stations and programs.

c. Direct controls of movement of funds from Cuba to and within Latin American countries.

Seek through OAS resolution and bilaterally, to insure that each Latin American nation shall extend the controls discussed in a. and b. above, to the movement of funds.

d. Direct controls of movement of arms to and within Latin American countries.

Seek through OAS resolution and bilaterally, to insure that each Latin American nation shall:

- 1) Extend the controls discussed in a. and b. above to movement of arms.
- 2) Initiate Caribbean surveillance forces and exchange of intelligence in order to interdict movement of arms.

e. Exchange of intelligence among OAS countries on Communist subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

This item has been discussed, staffed, listed and re-listed. It should be studied no further. The Cottrell Committee should obtain the decision to establish, in cooperation with the OAS countries, the exchange of intelligence. Appropriate USC agencies should be instructed to proceed.

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**f. The organization of a Caribbean surveillance force.**

The comments under e. are applicable here.

**g. Consider the use of Latin American forces in connection with U. S. contingency plans to assist Latin American nations which may be seriously threatened by a Communist takeover.**

The JCS should be required to make recommendations on this item.

**h. Consider expanded training programs for Latin Americans in the U. S. to counter Cuban Communist efforts in Latin America.**

1) Greatly expanded programs for training of students and selected representatives of all the professions and technical skills should be initiated in order to compete with and smother the effect of the Cuban training program.

2) Orientation tours for even larger numbers of Latin American citizens should be initiated.

3) Encourage the Latin American Governments to make fuller use of the Inter-American Defense College and consider funding this operation under the Military Assistance Program.

E. R. EIMWALT, JR.  
Captain USN  
Director for Arms Control

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED BY 6032 GUTIERREZ  
DATE 10-10-2001  
BY 6032 GUTIERREZ



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

23 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Consequences of a Blockade of Cuba

## THE PROBLEM

To estimate the consequences of and general reactions to a blockade of Cuba and the likelihood that it would bring about the downfall of the Castro/Communist regime.

## NOTE

A blockade could be imposed upon Cuba by a variety of means, ranging from the use of all necessary US air and naval forces to a token blockade consisting largely of announcements and warnings issued by a Cuban government in exile. To be effective, however, any kind of blockade would require such a degree of support from the US as to make it virtually indistinguishable from an openly announced and acknowledged US Government action.



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Reactions in the Non-Communist World

1. The general attitude of world opinion toward the US-Cuba dispute is that the Castro regime does not pose a substantial threat to US security, or indeed to any important US interest. A blockade of Cuba by US forces would be regarded as an act of war. Hence, the reactions to a determined US effort to overthrow Castro would range from lack of sympathy or support to expressions and acts of opposition. ?

2. In Latin America in particular public opinion would be strongly opposed to a US blockade of Cuba. Attitudes toward the US would be sharpened by the belief that its action in trying to bring down the Castro regime would also impose suffering upon the Cuban people as a whole. Many leaders of Latin American countries would like to see Castro disposed of, but would be moved by the pressure of public opinion to withhold any approval, let alone support, of the US action. Moreover, some of these leaders would genuinely fear a recrudescence of "Yankee imperialism." There is virtually no chance that the OAS would approve the blockade. ?

3. Outside Latin America, popular feeling would range from distaste to revulsion. Some people and governments would consider



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that the methods adopted by the US were out of all proportion to the stature and importance of the intended victim. Among these elements, US judgment and sense of balance would be called in question. Moreover, the action would undermine the US posture as a sincere advocate of decolonialization.

4. In the underdeveloped countries, opinion would be especially unfavorable, and the blockade would be looked upon as bullying, at best. Misgivings would be reinforced about US good will and the genuineness of US claims to support the principle of self-determination. The US would be rendered less able to influence these countries on a wide range of issues: e.g., Palestine, Kashmir, West New Guinea.

5. Many countries, particularly in Latin America and in Africa and Asia, would vigorously support UN action to put a stop to the US blockade -- a situation which the Soviets would find easy to exploit.

#### Soviet Reaction

6. The Soviet leaders would regard a US blockade of Cuba with great seriousness. They would do all in their power, short of assuring grave risk of general war, to save the Castro



regime and to defeat the US purpose in Cuba and humiliate it before the world. We do not believe, however, that they would resort to military action themselves. They are likely to believe that they could obtain their objectives more effectively by means entailing less risk.

7. In addition to the usual outcry against US "imperialism" and suggestions that US actions had evoked the danger of general war, there would probably be worldwide drives to raise money and organize measures of relief for the starving Cuban people, perhaps under UN auspices. Soviet actions would probably be primarily political and focused in the UN. They would seek a resolution concerning the US, and they might sponsor a UN commission of inquiry and conciliation. They would probably seek to impose legal and other sanctions upon the US through the UN, the International Court of Justice, and other international bodies. In all these efforts they would be likely to find widespread support.

8. One of the most promising lines of activity from the Soviet point of view would be attempts to send cargoes through the blockade. The value of such efforts would lie in the fact that if they succeeded the problems of the Castro regime would be in some degree alleviated, and if they failed would create



incidents which could be exploited against the US. Ships, including some flying non-Bloc flags and manned by non-Bloc crews, would probably be sent to run the blockade carrying food-stuffs and medicines paid for by popular subscription contributed to by individuals from many parts of the world. Chartered non-Bloc aircraft carrying relief supplies could probably be sent to Cuba with crews which would be willing to accept the risks involved in defying the efforts of US military aircraft to turn them back. To contend with these maneuvers, the US would be obliged to interfere with the ships and aircraft of many countries and risk taking the lives of their nationals.

Effect of the Blockade in Cuba

9. A total blockade of Cuba -- which the US could impose if it were willing to accept the heavy cost to its standing, prestige, and alliances -- would present the Castro government with formidable problems. The more than \$500 million worth of equipment, supplies, and food now coming into the country annually would be cut off and Cuba would be thrown back on its own resources. A blockade would quickly bring the economy to a virtual standstill. Food shortages are already marked. Petroleum supplies could be stretched out to meet priority needs for only a

How  
quickly?  
How  
many  
days?



few months. Many manufactured items, like most medicines, would quickly become unavailable. Most industrial and manufacturing activities would have to be sharply curtailed or stopped. A total blockade would cut off food imports which now account for about one-third of present caloric intake, though sugar, citrus fruits, and other foodstuffs presently exported would make up part of the loss. Strict rationing and careful reallocation of available nutrition would be necessary, but the country probably would not starve. The regime would count on worldwide opinion and the actions in the UN and elsewhere described above to force the US to abandon its blockade before the internal situation became desperate.

*time factors?*

10. Within Cuba the political consequences of a blockade would be mixed. The proportion of pro-and anti-Castro reaction in the mixture would depend upon a wide variety of factors. Anti-Castro Cubans would take heart from the blockade because they would conclude that it meant the US was about to dispose of him and the Communists. Unrest and resistance might increase, but if a blockade were not soon followed by intervention, most of these hopes would be dashed and disillusionment would grow with deprivation.



11. The number of Castro's supporters would probably not for some time be decreased by the fact of a US blockade or its consequences. Their numbers would probably be augmented by persons antagonized by the blockade. Castro's security forces would probably be able to contain efforts at rebellion from inside, even if the rebels were to be supplied by the US. We believe it likely that the Castro regime could maintain itself in power for some time even in the face of an effective blockade. However, if such a blockade did bring about the downfall of the Castro regime, this would occur in circumstances in which it would be difficult to establish a successor regime genuinely friendly to the US.

*rationing  
to security  
forces vs  
food to  
population*

12. Another possibility is a blockade which would permit ample quantities of foodstuffs to enter Cuba but prevent all other goods from entering or leaving. Such a blockade would not significantly reduce the emotional content and intensity of the world public reaction. Most Cubans would probably blame the US rather than Castro for the many inconveniences and deprivations consequent on the blockade. We believe that in these circumstances also it is unlikely that enough Cubans would take the risks involved in rebellion to overthrow Castro, except in the presence of an invading force deemed likely to defeat him.



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AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10022  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.  
TO : MILITARY MEMBERS OF ICCCA  
TITLE : INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN  
AFFAIRS: INQUIRIES ON RECENT CASTRO GOVERNMENT  
ALLEGATIONS  
DATE : 11/01/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : CASTRO, FIDEL  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/08/97  
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COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 5. Memorandum #76 from Joseph  
Califano to Gen. Wheeler, Capt. Zumwalt, Gen. Alger,  
Adm. Wendt, Gen. Carpenter, and Gen. Jones on Castro  
allegations.



Box 5  
198-10004-10022 *Califano*

Originating Agency:

Army

Subject:

Cuba - ICC

Date:

11/1/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

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Navy

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
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November 1, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 76 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)  
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)  
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA  
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN  
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF  
BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM K. JONES, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs;  
Inquiries on Recent Castro Government Allegations

Addressees are requested to insure that any inquiries from non-Defense sources concerning the allegations made by Fidel Castro during his television speech of November 30, 1963 be referred to this office for reply.

Signed:  
A. M. Haig  
Lt Colonel, USA

*for* Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
General Counsel

cc: OASD/PA  
Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)  
DIA

Mr. Califano  
Lt Col Haig  
ASG

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.  
TO : ICCCA  
TITLE : ICCCA: IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGUA RESOLUTIONS  
DATE : 04/15/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGUA RESOLUTIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano, Box 5, Folder 8. Memo no. 30 for ICCCA  
regarding trips to Latin America to implement Managua  
Resolutions.



Originating Agency:

Army

Subject:

ICCCA - Implementation of Managua Resolutions BOX 5

Date:

4.15.63

BOX 5  
Califano

198-10004-10042

FOLDER 8

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

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Navy

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State Dept. ☒

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DATE: 7 OCT 97 / AB

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April 15, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 30 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)  
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN(OSD)  
MAJOR GENERAL C. W. ABRAMS, JR., USA  
ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN  
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, US  
BRIGADIER GENERAL H. M. ELWOOD, USM

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:  
Implementation of Managua Resolutions

At a meeting of subject committee this afternoon it was determined that a team of representatives from State, Defense, CINCARIB, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Agency for International Development would visit each of the Central American countries, beginning next week, to begin implementation of the resolutions passed by the Ministers of State at the Managua Conference on April 3.

This team should be assembled within the next 24 to 48 hours and will begin its trip next week. The team will be headed by the State representative, who will either be Lansing Collins or John Fisher.

It is requested that the JCS designate a member of General Krulak's staff, preferably someone who is fluent in Spanish, and that CINCARIB designate a representative, definitely fluent in speaking Spanish, to be members of this team. Please inform me of the name of the Washington representative by 0900 on April 17 and of the CINCARIB representative as soon as possible.

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DATE: 700717/18

cc: General Krulak

Mr. Yarmollinsky  
Mr. Callifano  
Col Patchell

Joseph A. Callifano, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : HERBERT D. RILEY  
TO : SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
TITLE : THE USE OF THE OAS  
DATE : 01/21/63  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : USE OF THE OAS TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL  
FROM CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano, Box 5, Folder 8. Memo from Riley to  
Secretary of the Army regarding use of the OAS in  
Cuban situation.





**SECRET**  
 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*Box 5  
 Califano*

DECLASSIFIED BY: **STAFF**  
 DATE: **OCT 07 1997**

JCSM-71-63  
**21 JAN 1963**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

**Subject: The Use of the OAS (U)**

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army, dated 19 January 1963, subject as above, which forwarded a proposed memorandum for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed memorandum as requested. Subject to the following remarks, no objection is interposed to the proposed memorandum from the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba, to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, concerning the future courses of action which the United States should seek in the OAS with respect to Cuba:

a. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba should constitute a basic tenet of hemispheric defense policy. The wording of Course of Action (2) should be rewritten as follows:

"Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, ~~condemns the presence~~ calls for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities."

This rewording will strengthen the proposed resolution. If ignored or rejected by the Soviets, such a resolution will furnish a clear basis for further actions--political, economic, or military by the OAS.

GSA, ASG Control No. **165**

COPY 1 of 9 Copies each  
 of 2 pages series "A"

**SECRET**

*ASG*

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

OAS 092.3 OrG. of American States 1-21-63 PW 1-12-63

(CUBA)



b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the valuable role of the Council of the Organization of the American States/Organ of Consultation (COAS/OC) during the recent crisis, and believe that the Organ of Consultation should continue in being to consider the resolutions envisioned in the paper under review. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Soviet offensive threat which occasioned the convocation of the COAS/OC could reappear at any time. Soviet armed forces remain in Cuba. Surveyed and secure missile launching sites, essential ancillary equipment, and skilled personnel for missile warfare are on hand in Cuba. The missiles themselves could be rapidly reintroduced, perhaps by air. Thus, in a matter of hours, a new direct Soviet missile threat could materialize. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that Course of Action (3) on page 2 of the draft memorandum, with its considerations, be deleted and the following substituted with the rationale substantially as above:

"(3) Continue the COAS/OC in being under the 23 October Resolution."

c. In regard to Course of Action (12), it can be expected that requirements for inter-American military consultation and coordination will continue and increase as long as Cuba is under communist domination. Therefore, action should be initiated now leading toward establishment of a relationship between the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board.

d. It is assumed that approval of the draft memorandum does not exclude further consideration of related proposals now under discussion or the submission of other recommendations at a later date.

3. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the implementation of Courses of Action (4), as modified above, and (9), and recommend that suitable steps be initiated to implement (12).

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



HERBERT D. RILEY  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director, Joint Staff



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY  
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10078  
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.  
TO : ICCCA  
TITLE : ICCCA: EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE  
DATE : 00/00/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. Memo No. 19 for  
Wheeler, Zumwalt, Abrams, Wendt, Carpenter, and Elwood  
regarding paper about exchange of intelligence.  
Attachment not included.



Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Califano, Fred #10  
BOX 3  
198-10004-10078

Originator: Army

Date: —

Subject: Intel Exchange

Original Level of Classification: Secret

Third Agency Equities: CIA

Remarks: —

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY  
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE:

7 Oct 97

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM NO. 19 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)  
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)  
MAJOR GENERAL C. W. ABRAMS, JR., USA  
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN  
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USA  
BRIGADIER GENERAL H. M. ELWOOD, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:  
Exchange of Intelligence

Attached is the final draft of the paper on Exchange of Intelligence concerning communist subversive activities prepared by the Subcommittee on Subversion of the subject committee.

As indicated in Memorandum No. 15, it is requested that your comments on this paper be submitted to me not later than 1500 hours on March 15, 1963. This will be the last opportunity to comment on this paper before it is presented to The President.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

Attachment  
as stated } less

cc: Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky  
Colonel Patchell  
Colonel Frede  
Mr. Califano  
ASG

NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY  
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE: 7 Oct 97

OSA, ASG Control No. 79.1

~~SECRET~~

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## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10212  
RECORD SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 213

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**August 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**

**Number of Postponements: 4**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10212  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 213

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : THE CUBA PROJECT  
DATE : 03/02/62  
PAGES : 8  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C, 4  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.



TOP SECRET

2 March 1962

by Brig. Gen. Lansdale.

# THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal: The United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

## Developments:

30 November 1961: The above goal was set for the United States with Brig. Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Operations and with operational lieutenants appointed as direct representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director, Central Intelligence. The Special Group (NSC 5412) was to be kept informed and be available for advice and recommendation.

December-January: Decisive effort was made to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success. A joint effort was mounted to obtain intelligence in depth from refugees at Opa-Locka, Florida, and to provide more thorough access to operational assets. At the same time, reports from significant population groups, including religious and labor groups, indicated that the spirit of the Cuban people was dying under the Communist police-state controls and that some evidence on which to base hope for a better future was needed promptly to prevent this death of spirit. A review of operational assets dictated that the U.S. was powerless to hamper the sugar harvest, without U.S. attribution.

February 1962: The Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two lieutenants and Agencies, for a realistic assessment and capabilities.

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

COPY 3 OF 5 COPIES

GASD(PA) DEFOUR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	8
Case No.	91-101-0316
T.S. No.	91-15-39
Document No.	23

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
AS SANITIZED 23 JUNE 48 mtk

6(1)(B)  
OSO: NO OBJECTION AS  
REACTED 25 JUN 98

The Department of State releases this document in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 7/30/98 mjr

Portion(s) Postponed Under 6.1(c)

See List 1, Item

(doc 20) #213  
8 pp



of the need for a comprehensive and definitive intelligence. Regarding the Cuban population vis-a-vis the regime, CIA requested that the initial period be extended through July 1962. This practical realism is reflected in the plan. Also, responsible CIA operational officers noted that at least 6 months should be added to the timing of phases set forth in the original basic action plan, if a decision to seek an internal revolution is deferred until the end of the collection and reporting period.

The attached plan reflects the Special Group's desire to collect definitive intelligence inside Cuba prior to a decision, while being consistent with giving the impression that the U.S. effort is to isolate Castro and to neutralize his influence in the Western Hemisphere. The plan gives maximal commitments of U.S. assets for intelligence collection in the periods shown.

#### DISTRIBUTION

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To</u>
1.	The Attorney General.
2.	General Taylor.
3.	The Secretary of State (through Deputy Undersecretary Johnson)
4.	The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
5.	The Chairman, JCS (through General Craig)
6.	The Director, CIA (through Richard Helms, William Harvey)
7-8	The Chief of Operations



19 February 1962. Detailed staff papers were received from the Departments and Agencies, responding to assigned tasks. A basic concept was then made, for the step-by-step development of an internal revolution, by the Chief of Operations with joint consideration and approval by the operational representatives (CIA, State, Defense, and USIA).

20 February 1962. Completed basic plan for paced operations inside Cuba, and support plans for political, economic, psychological, military sabotage, and intelligence actions. The outlined concept would develop assets inside Cuba for a popular revolution in October (judged to be the earliest possible date by those responsible for operations), with U.S. and Latin American help from the outside. Each step would be taken as operationally feasible, collecting intelligence, building revolutionary assets, and taking advantage of targets of opportunity.

21 February 1962. Plan was discussed by Special Group (NSC 5412) and decision was made to meet again on it the following Monday with Secretary McNamara.

26 February 1962. Special Group (NSC 5412) met with Secretary McNamara. Chief of Operations was asked to submit a plan for an initial intelligence collection program only.

1 March 1962. Special Group (NSC 5412) agreed that the immediate objective of the U.S. during March, April, and May will be the acquisition of intelligence, and that other U.S. actions must be inconspicuous and consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. At the end of May, the situation will be reviewed and a decision made as to the next phase. The Chief of Operations is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412) augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS; the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for conducting covert operations, and for monitoring progress.

#### INTELLIGENCE PLAN

As requested by the Special Group (NSC 5412), a plan for basic intelligence collection, upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro, is submitted herewith. In view



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

MARCH

(1 - 31 March 1962)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

INSIDE CUBA

1. Establish three intelligence agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.

Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

There will be no assumption of risking viability of this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. First team has 2 agents, second has 3, and third has 3 or possibly 4, for total of 8 or 9. Three areas in which resistance has been reported have been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams are expected to start in April.

OUTSIDE CUBA

2. Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 42 at work. The staff is now being increased in phases, as quickly as personnel are trained, to supplement the initial staff of 9. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USA.)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

MARCH (cont)

ACTIVITY

3. Develop additional Interrogation centers in other areas, during March 1962.

4. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage, as required.

5. Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

6. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

To add to the increased U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

CONSIDERATIONS

As Ops-Locks becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers in Puerto Rico, San Juan, and other areas. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense responsibility, in collaboration with CIA.)

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U.S. cities which are "Little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provide unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (Justice/FBI responsibility, with support from CIA and others as required.)

(Responsibility of Defense, with support by others as required.)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

MARCH (cont)

ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
7. Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.	To update NIE 85-42, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy forums.	As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an intelligence estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an intelligence estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIEs) may have to be followed. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)
8. Continue political, economic, and psychological operations to isolate Castro and neutralize his influence in the Western Hemisphere.	To continue activities in consonance with U.S. policy established shortly after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.	These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, but are separate actions, independent of this special operation, and are now being carried out by U.S. Departments and Agencies under other programs and projects.
9. Provide logistic and personnel support.	To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.	The intelligence plan requires effective support by U.S. military, as necessary. (Defense responsibility.)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

JUNE-JULY

(cont)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

13. Collection of psychological material.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

This evidence will be used by CIA and NSIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.

14. Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers.

To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

15. By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime.

To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."

END OF JULY 1962

16. Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.

To provide the Special Group (NSC 5412) augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S. military intervention.

17. Negotiate for [ ] help in contaminating lubricants and fuels. (C)

To cripple Cuba's transportation. (C)

[ ] assistance is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban fuels and lubricants. The [ ] want to know, "how serious are you before risking their assets to help the U.S." By the end of July, the U.S. should know how serious it is and be able to provide requisite answers to the [ ] (C)

*State  
Concerns*



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10213  
RECORD SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 214

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**August 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**  
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The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10213  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 214

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
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COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.



✓

**OPERATION MONGOOSE**  
**PRIORITY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE**  
**21 MAY - 30 JUNE 1962**

TOP SECRET - FROTH  
 SPECIAL AG 7-5261

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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 AS SANITIZED BY [unclear]  
 6/1/80 (C)  
 ON: NO OBJECTION  
 AS REQUESTED

*Elites Johnson*  
 17 May 1962

#214  
 121P  
 (Doc 7)

TASK

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

POLITICAL

1. Obtain some special and significant action within the OAS organization against the Castro-Communist regime.  
 (STATE)

To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba.

Members of OAS need to be inspired to push some special action through. Current events offer a number of opportunities for exploitation through such OAS bodies as the Commission on Human Rights, the Peace Committee, the Council of Jurists, and the Children's Institute, as well as the Special Consultative Committee on Security.

2. Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban workers, students, farmers, and freedom.  
 (STATE)

To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba.

Under the Ambassador's initiative, each Country Team by now has the means to generate more open and active commitment of Latin American political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, and military leaders. One significant action in each Latin American country, for hard impact on Cuba, is a minimum need.

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 REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10  
 DOES NOT APPLY

The Department of State releases this document in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

This document contains 12 pages.  
 Copy No. 1 of 12 copies. Series 11

Reviewed on 5/30/98 *mfr*

Portion(s) Postponed Under 6.1(C)

*App. 2*

12

OSD(PA) DFOISR  
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Copy No. Original  
 Case No. 97-FOI-0336  
 T.S. No. 91-TS-39  
 Document No. 20

(284)  
 (320)



TASKPURPOSECONSIDERATIONSPOLITICAL - continued

3. Cause a major political action to take place in an influential Latin American country, to worsen sharply that country's relations with Cuba, to open rupture and criticism; [F] is nominated. (STATE)

To produce material for major psychological impact on Cuba, undermining the power and prestige of the hierarchy of the Castro regime.

[F] is nominated due to its own past history of a Communist attempt at armed overthrow of the people's government, which is ripe for further exploiting in connection with the Castro threat. Country Team means can be used to bestir sharp criticism by [F] workers and farmers of Castro's betrayal of Cuba's revolution. Tours of Cuban exiles of stature can bear telling witness to the dangers of Communism to [F] and the shame of condoning betrayal of the Cuban people. The special film alerting [F] to danger, with its religious message, should be replayed; labor audience films, strengthened by moral of the story in today's events, should be used to provoke sober thought and pressure on the government to "break with Castro now." Ultimate loss of Habana embassy is greatly outweighed by psychological value at this time, impairing Castro's power over the people and his machine cadre.



TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL DELIVERY

PAGE -3-

<u>TASK</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<u>POLITICAL - continued</u>		
4. Develop a suggested platform of Cuban political-economic objectives for possible adoption by Cubans in freeing their country. (STATE)	For the guidance of Operation Mongoose personnel, particularly in the selection and readying of agents to ensure that they are committed to acceptable political beliefs before introduction into Cuba.	There are a number of statements of Cuban political objectives, including drafts by State and CIA. What is needed now, and promptly, is a single working document for the guidance of U.S. operational staffs.
5. Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA)	These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have purposeful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support the project.	CIA and State both have had roles with the CRC and others. Cuban leaders also make contact at a number of high offices of the U.S. government. For the good of the U.S., the Cuban refugees, and our project, there must be coordinated management. The Director, Central Intelligence, should have this responsibility, particularly with leaders of the stature of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona.





<u>TASK</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL</u>		
6. Steer psychological-propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Cuba operations. (STATE)	To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special psychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and to inform the public.	This has been a normal State-chaired working group. It needs to be sharply geared to the project's operations, including consideration of declassifying material for operational use. Defense should be added to the membership. It is possible that USIA should assume leadership.
7. Make strong, repetitive theme on radio broadcasts to Cuba of the overwhelming disapproval throughout the Western Hemisphere of the Castro-Communist regime, along with sympathy for the captive Cubans. (USIA)	To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control over the Cuban people and the lower echelons of the regime's bureaucracy.	This is to make full use of material produced by actions in the Western Hemisphere.



TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL AG

PAGE -5-

TASK

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

8. Give fullest play into Cuba (and the Western Hemisphere) of Cuban refugees and defectors, as dramatic witness against the Castro-Communist regime. (USIA)

To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control and to build the tone for anti-Castro actions in the Western Hemisphere.

Note the inclusion of defectors in this task; it is still a CIA task to produce the defectors. Also, this task includes exploitation of Dr. Miro Cardona's intensely moving statement at the end of the Armstrong Circle Theater drama, "Anatomy of Betrayal."

9. Ready the "Voice of Cuba" for radio broadcast. (CIA)

To provide a ready capability for giving a "voice" to encourage resistance elements inside Cuba and to undermine the morale of the Castro regime.

Initially, this would be for brief news broadcasts of local events inside Cuba, simulating a location in Cuba, but actually [A] A plan of how best to do this, with the proposed program format, is needed to obtain policy decision.

TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL AG



TOP SECRET - NOFORN  
SPECIAL HANDLING

PAGE -6-

TASK

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

- b1+3
10. Ready a propaganda action, for balloon delivery. (CIA) (C)

To provide a ready capability for low-risk propaganda dissemination inside Cuba.

A plan of how best to do this, including types of propaganda content (with thought given for delivery of symbolic gifts, such as scarce foods or medicines, as well as leaflets), is required for decision. It is noted that USIA has a brief recording of Castro's broadcasts, sharply contrasting his promises when he took power with what he said when he admitted his Communist affiliation; these could be put on cheap plastic discs and into leaflets.

11. Deliver copies of Time magazine, with Blas Roca cover story, into Cuba. (CIA)

To make the truth available to the Cuban people about the Communist regime.

This is seen as smuggling in copies, for passing from hand-to-hand. The smuggling could be done by third-nationals. (C)

b1+3  
3



TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL HANDLING

PAGE -7-

TASK

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

12. Intensify psychological effort at Guantanamo. (DEFENSE)

To make fullest possible use of the existing Cuban labor population on the base.

Activities include sports broadcasts, in Spanish, over the base radio station on ball games, news broadcasts using regular wire service news, and making Spanish-language periodicals and literature available for reading on base. USIA has a number of selected titles, published in Mexico and Rio, for stocking base libraries. Also, USIA has a number of VOA "backgrounders" and refugee interviews on tape which could be used for radio broadcasts to Cuban employees on the base.

13. Create musical and visual symbols to express anti-regime sentiments. (USIA)

To provide catchy expressions of popular resistance against the Communist regime.

New words to a favorite song, a new tune, a visual symbol for wall-painting, a hand symbol as easy to do as "V for Victory," are the types of expressions sought. USIA should call on CIA for assistance, since some thought has been given to this already.



TOP SECRET - FROTH  
SPECIAL HANDLING

PAGE -8-

TASKS

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

14. Select a sabotage operation.  
(CIA)

To make a psychological impact upon the regime and public, which symbolizes popular resistance to the regime and which causes talk encouraging to resistance.

CIA should select a feasible sabotage operation, a "showy" one against the regime, but not against the people, and present a specific proposal for approval.

INTELLIGENCE

15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA)

To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is adequate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions.

Feasibility depends on CIA's judgment, both operationally and for depth of intelligence required. The schedule was for 14 teams, 2 singleton agents, 14 third-country residents, and 26 third-country legal travellers by the end of May.

b1+3  
(c)



TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL DELIVERIES

PAGE -9-

TASKS

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE - continued

- 16 Intensify use of third-country collection for specific psychological information which can be exploited in propaganda. (CIA)

To provide material for operations putting pressure on the Castro regime inside Cuba, and for use on the OAS-UN opinion stage.

Really current "inside" news tips can do most to undermine the regime's morale and interest the Cuban public. Classification may be a problem but this use must be pressed as a priority.

- 17 Intensify the exploitation of the intelligence potential which exists on the base at Guantanamo. (DEFENSE)

To take the fullest possible advantage of this open U.S. "listening post" on Cuban soil.

ONI can call upon CIA for assistance. A communication link to Miami would permit use of extensive CIA background information available there and leads for further exploitation, not only for positive intelligence, but also for counter-intelligence. A number of further steps are possible.



TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY  
SPECIAL HANDLING

PAGE -10-

TASKS

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE - continued

18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA)

To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed.

Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CIA mount such operations with Cuban <sup>b1</sup>for Latin American <sup>c</sup> personnel, an acceptable means must be found promptly. CIA, with Defense assistance, as a priority will review feasible means of mounting these operations, and recommend the most practical method for a policy decision.

MILITARY

19. Develop a real dual-purpose capability of intelligence teams in building up the agent pool for infiltration. (CIA)

To assure that skills needed for guerrilla operations are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made.

While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training program to anticipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be trained for possible introduction in September, it is known that at least 3 months "lead time" is required for minimum selection and training. That means now. It is possible that Defense can be of far more help than called upon at present. Also, it is possible that further policy guidance might be required.



TOP SECRET NO. 111  
SPECIAL HANDLING

PAGE -11-

TASKS

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

MILITARY - continued

20. Induct Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces for training. (DEFENSE)

To fulfill Cuban exile leadership desires and to build up a potential reserve for possible future military action inside Cuba.

ECONOMIC

21. Tighten effect of sanctions by increased effort to enlist further participation by NATO nations, Mexico, Japan, and others. (STATE)

To further restrict Cuba's economy.

22. Penetrate black market operations in Cuba for economic sabotage. (CIA) (C)

To worsen Cuba's economic situation.

For instance, gangster elements should offer a possible means to accomplish this task, particularly in Cuban cities. This could be a test mission for alleged resistance cells, without undue risk to "noise level."

TOP SECRET NO. 111  
SPECIAL HANDLING



TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL

PAGE -12-

TASKS

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

ECONOMIC - continued

b1+  
3  
2J. Submit plan for introduction of counterfeit money and other negotiable instruments (coupons, deeds, etc.) (CIA) (C)

To obtain policy approval for creating economic chaos inside Cuba. (C)

Cuba's economy is the Castro-Communist regime's greatest vulnerability and is open to much greater exploitation. (C)



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10214  
RECORD SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 215

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**August 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**  
**Number of Postponements: 15**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Originality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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TOP SECRET

(176)  
(216)

SENSITIVE

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

The Department of State releases this document in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Attachments

Reviewed on 7/30/98 mjm

Distribution:

Portion(s) Postponed Under 6.1(C)

Copy: To:  
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2 - The Attorney General  
3 - Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson  
4 - Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatrick  
5 - General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)  
6/7 - Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)  
8 - Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson  
9/10 - Chief of Operations

USD; NO OBJECTION  
AS 28040700 25/1/97

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TOP SECRET CONTROL	
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Case No.	91-75-39
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Document No.	18

SENSITIVE  
TOP SECRET

(DEC E) #215  
8 PP



PHASE I (CIA)

1 - 15 March 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. \* Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.

Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant. (C)

To collect intelligence.

To collect intelligence.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

4. \* Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

5. \* Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

*State connects*

OTHER OPERATIONS

6. [X] Continue negotiating for [F] help in contaminating locomotive lubricants. (C)

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation. (C)

[F] assistance is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced. (C)

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16 - 31 March 1962

7. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

- \* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



15 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

To collect intelligence. /

Possible future use in communications and support. ]

b1+3  
8  
[A]  
9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

To ready agent operations. 1

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

10. \* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U. S. citizens) now in the United States.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

11. \* Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U. S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. [E] Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible. [E] [E] [E] San Juan, Puerto Rico [E] [E] [E] Are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



1 - 15 April 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

12. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Number of agents undetermined as yet.

To collect intelligence.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 30 April 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

14. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

To collect intelligence.

Possible use for communications and support.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

1 - 15 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

To collect intelligence.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



	<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>
(b)1+3	18. [A] - ]	To collect intelligence. ]
	19. Ten legal travellers in Cuba (C) ]	To collect intelligence. ]

### CONSIDERATIONS

"Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods. ]

### OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 31 May 1962

### INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

- |  |                            |
|--|----------------------------|
| 20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.                                   | To collect intelligence.   |
| 21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.                       | To collect intelligence.   |
| 22. [ [A] ]  | To collect intelligence.   |
| 23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.                                      | To collect intelligence.   |
| 24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents. | To ready agent operations. |

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.

Difficult

CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable. ]

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



10 - 31 MAY 1962 (CONT)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

OTHER OPERATIONS

25. [A] To debase the economy of Cuba.

[A] 6143

1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. \* 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. To collect intelligence.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba. To reinforce and resupply, as possible.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents. To ready agent operations.

29. \* Collection of psychological material. To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.

30. \* Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers. To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

31. \* By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime. To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962  
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



ACTIVITY  
OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

PURPOSE

End of July 1962

CONSIDERATIONS

32. \* Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.

To provide the Special Group (SEC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U. S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U. S. military intervention.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (State)

ACTIVITY

Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U. S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.

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~~23 DEC 1989~~  
23 DEC 1989  
25 NOV 98  
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216  
788

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 1/30/98

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Case No.	91-FOI-0336
T.S. No.	91-TS-39
Document No.	17

(Doc4)



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (Defense)

March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.
2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.
3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U. S. military capability for intervention.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U. S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U. S. military manpower and equipment.

The U. S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures is reduced to a minimum.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



**OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (USIA)**

**ACTIVITY**

Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

**March - July 1962**

**PURPOSE**

Activities in consonance with U. S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

**CONSIDERATIONS**

These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (State) ✓

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Make political decision to intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba.	To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.	This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U.S. security interests.
2. U.S. officials and news releases on policy decision.	Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.	Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.
3. Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.	Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.	Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (Defense)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. After political decision, provide maximum U. S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spotted in Phase I.	To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime's military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U. S. support must include the immediate commitment of U. S. leadership personnel in combat operations.	DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration.
2. After political decision, commit U. S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.	To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.	Consistent with security aspect, U. S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (CIA)

ACTIVITY

1. Support U. S. military actions in Cuba.

PURPOSE

To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U. S. military operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U. S. military commander of the U. S. intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operations.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (USIA)

ACTIVITY

- I. Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the outside to help the Cuban movement.

PURPOSE

To neutralize opposition to U.S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS

Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

223

5 March 1962

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CRAIG

FROM: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

SUBJECT: Operation Mongoose

At today's policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, held in Secretary Rusk's office, I was asked to provide some further planning to the Special Group. I intend to complete this planning by Friday, 9 March.

The new planning will use information supplied by Defense and CIA. Thus, it is requested that you supply me, by Thursday morning, 8 March, as firm an estimate as possible on the date you will have the support means ready, as requested by CIA in its 5 March memo to you, subject: "Transmittal of Task 31." The new planning will be week by week, so I need firm estimates of what you will have to do each week, to get these Defense means ready, and when ready, where each will be and how quickly it can be deployed in an operation.

Further, it is requested that you give me, by the same deadline, a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable for direct military intervention. It is recognized that the action which becomes the pretext must lead to a political decision, which then would lead to military action.

OSO: RELEASE IN FULL  
24 JUN 98

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~~AS-SUBMITTED~~ 23 June 98 mhl

The Department of State has no objection to the  
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Reviewed on

7/30/98 mjr

SENSITIVE

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TAB II  
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(91-160)



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(13)  
(222)

6 March 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD GOODWIN, STATE

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *SL*

At the 5 March meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk, on our favorite subject, the Secretary spoke of "other tracks" which might be opened for the U.S. to achieve its objective. He mentioned proof of "their" plots in Latin America, as an example. Also, there was joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps Guatemala, as a notional clandestine action for which "they" could be blamed.

General Taylor has asked me to report on these alternate "tracks," among other things, to the Special Group he chairs. I intend to complete this report on Friday, 9 March. Thus, request that you provide me the section on alternate "tracks" Secretary Rusk sees as possibly open to the U.S., by Thursday 8 March. I plan to include this, as the State response, in my report. Alexis Johnson was present when Secretary Rusk mentioned this, and perhaps could be of assistance.

Along these same lines, and in response to direction, I am asking the Defense representative (Gen. Craig) to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention. I would appreciate it if you could provide a companion statement, a brief but precise description of pretexts which the State Department believes desirable in connection with any such direct military intervention.

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)  
Reviewed on *7/30/98*

OASD(PA) D-01SR	
TOP SECRET CONTROV <i>R-1</i>	
Copy No.	<i>Original</i>
Doc No.	<i>91-FOI-0336</i>
File No.	<i>91-TS-34</i>
Document No.	<i>14</i>

OASD: RELEASE IN FULL  
24 JUN 98

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~~SECRET~~ 23 JUN 98 mldv

#218.1P.  
(DOC 1)

DR DIO  
R-1



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10219  
RECORD SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 220

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**August 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**

**Number of Postponements: 2**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

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**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Office  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10218  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 219  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 03/06/62  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED *OPEN IN FULL*  
CURRENT STATUS : ~~OPEN~~  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from OSD, CIA, State.





**TOP SECRET**

*Dupe*

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

222

STATE

6 March 1962

**SENSITIVE**

**MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD GOODWIN, STATE**

**From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale**

At the 5 March meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk, on our favorite subject, the Secretary spoke of "other tracks" which might be opened for the U. S. to achieve its objective. He mentioned proof of "their" plots in Latin America, as an example. Also, there was joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a notional clandestine action for which "they" could be blamed.

General Taylor has asked me to report on these alternate "tracks," among other things, to the Special Group he chairs. I intend to complete this report on Friday, 9 March. Thus, request that you provide me the section on alternate "tracks" Secretary Rusk sees as possibly open to the U. S., by Thursday, 8 March. I plan to include this, as the State response, in my report. Alexis Johnson was present when Secretary Rusk mentioned this, and perhaps could be of assistance.

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RI

RI

87-DR-155 (43)  
87-104

GSD: RELEASE IN FULL  
24 JUN 98

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

23 JUN 98 mkk

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under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 7/30/98 mjr

**TOP SECRET**

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Copy No. 2 of 3 copies. Series



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10219  
RECORD SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 220

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**August 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**

**Number of Postponements: 2**

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In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Postponed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10219  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 220

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : OPERATION MONGOOSE PROGRESS  
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SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
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RESTRICTIONS : 1B  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20  
133

31 May 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed

Subject: Operation Mongoose Progress

Intelligence build-up by CIA includes efforts to recruit a Cuban diplomat in-place and an official in an airline office in Havana. The CIA team placed in Finar del Rio Province last March was successfully re-supplied by maritime means on 24 May. The Navy and CIA have worked out a cooperative effort to strengthen the U.S. security and intelligence program at Guantanamo.

The CAC continues to provide word from inside Cuba covering local security moves and popular unrest (unrest reportedly increasing). A substantial reduction in oil refining and manufacture of tires and tubes is reported from CAC sources.

Economic pressure upon the Communist regime may be increased by a Department of Commerce move denying bunkering facilities at U.S. ports to vessels under Sino-Soviet bloc charter carrying cargo to Cuba. State Department reports having solicited views of our Ambassador to Japan regarding possible approaches to the Japanese asking them to cease sugar purchases from Cuba.

Propaganda efforts of USIA and CIA continue to apply pressure upon the Cuban regime by focusing upon abuses of power and failure of key programs such as medical and food. The VOA use of refugees in interviews especially underlined this theme. I am looking into a USIA proposal that we counter Communist Cuba moves to impress Latin America by participation in the athletic North Central American and Caribbean Games set for August 11-23 in Kingston, Jamaica; a "free Cuba" team might be effective, with good publicity support.

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AS SANITIZED

6(1)(B)

OSD: RELEASE AS

REACTED

23 JUNE 98

TOP SECRET FROTH ON  
SPECIAL IN 1962

EXCLUDED FROM GDS  
RECEIVED 23 JUNE 1962  
2000 101 101

#220

This document contains 3 pages.  
Only the 1st page is to be released.

300

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526).

Reviewed on Apr 17/90/98



TOP SECRET  
[REDACTED]

Incident at Guantanamo occurred 26 May when a light Cuban aircraft landed there. Three Cubans had forced the pilot, at pistol point, to land them at our Naval Base. With State's concurrence, Defense acted: the Cuban pilot flew home, the 3 Cuban escapees stayed on the base.

Fracturing the Enemy has been given priority attention by CIA. A senior case officer has been assigned full-time to this specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of 24 desirable defection targets, CIA has found several who seem vulnerable (including the [ [6] ]

Priority Operations Schedule of 21 May, seeking some positive actions in behalf of our project during the next several weeks, has brought a very healthy response from CIA and USIA. The CIA determination to meet the challenge has surfaced four policy-type questions which I note for you on behalf of CIA:

1. Task 7, "Voice of Free Cuba," is almost immediately feasible, if the Group will approve CIA arranging [ [A] ] CIA has firm plans for worrying the Communist regime through broadcasts which would appear to come from local dissident groups actively planning to harass the regime. ] R1,5

2). Task 12. CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castro's failure to the Cuban population via balloon with a view of increasing instability of the Communist machine. The technique is tested and CIA has plans to operate from a surface ship in international waters. The Group is asked to approve the idea, including Navy support. This could be operating in time to exploit the 26 July anniversary of Castro's attack upon government forces at Santiago de Cuba in 1953, for "the revolution" he has now betrayed.

3). Task 18. CIA believes it can recruit some 23-man teams for possible use in building up resistance groups within Cuba. Group approval is asked for Defense support in training, holding, logistics. The "noise level" hazard is noted, but this special project could be almost unnoticed if tied with proposed U.S. military enlistment of Cubans.

TOP SECRET  
[REDACTED]

Let's Please  
Inform



- [ ] 2
- 4) Task 23. Counterfeit Currency to increase Cuban economic problems is considered feasible within 30-60 days upon a limited basis and in considerable scale within six months. CIA asks the Group approval before proceeding with this action.

Other Tasks.

I note here that CIA does not feel it has the operational means to undertake Task No. 22, black-market activities, at this time. Further that Task No. 11, Time magazine dissemination, would require operational facilities not now available. I accept indefinite deferral of Task No. 22 and scrubbing of Task No. 11 on this basis.

The Department of State reaction, to my effort to get the U.S. into priority actions towards our project's goals, has been disappointing to me thus far. Apparently, my schedule of targets for special efforts is accepted only as it may fit into long-range, existing programs already under way. If this is the theory of our project, I believe that the project then becomes only a special reporting device and not a special U.S. effort to win the goal of helping the Cubans recapture their country from a gang of Communists.

"Eyes Only" copies to:

- |                   |                        |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| 1. General Taylor | 5. Mr. Kennedy         |
| 2. Mr. Johnson    | 6. General Leuninger ← |
| 3. Mr. Gilpatrick | 7. Chief of Operations |
| 4. Mr. McCone     |                        |

100-5



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10220  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 221  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :  
TITLE : STATUS OF REQUESTED STUDIES  
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SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
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COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.



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CURRENT STATUS : ~~OPEN~~  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from ~~OSD~~, CIA, State.





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 June 1962

SPECIAL HANDLING

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *SL*

Subject: Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose

At your 26 April meeting, I noted that several studies were in preparation, as had been requested in connection with Operation Mongoose. The following is a report on the status of each study.

Blockade of Cuba.

Defense was asked to determine how a blockade could be imposed on Cuba, if it were decided to do so. CIA was asked to estimate the effects of such a blockade on Cuba.

The Defense and CIA studies have been completed and are attached hereto. The Defense representative notes that the blockade study was submitted in response to a stated problem, and that it is neither a Defense nor JCS recommendation for the United States to undertake this course of action. If such a course of action were decided upon, it would be an act of war.

Cubans in the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Defense plan for taking Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces, on a more liberal basis than in the past, is being submitted separately, through appropriate channels.

List of Cuban Anti-Castro Organizations

Task completed. The Director, Central Intelligence, provided copies to members.

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
23 JUNE 98

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

DISA(DFOISR) 87 JS 164  
87-OR 155

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 10 1962	
FBI - WASHINGTON	

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on

7/30/98 *MP*

This document contains 3 pages.  
Copy No. 6 of 7

#221  
388

(21)



TOP SECRET  
[ ] 2

Security Committee, OAS.

A continuing task, in which the Department of State has noted that it will keep Operation Mongoose informed of significant developments as they occur. The Special Consultative Committee on Security submitted its initial General Report to the Council of the OAS (COAS), 1 May. The COAS distributed copies to OAS member governments, with a request for observations within forty-five (45) days.

Evidence on Supportive Military Facilities in Cuba.

This task arose during a discussion of the reported construction of underground hangars, storage sites, etc., in Cuba. Defense and CIA were tasked with undertaking joint analysis of all such reports. The joint analysis was initiated promptly and continues. Results are reflected in the daily and weekly summaries published by CIA for Operation Mongoose.

Census of Hemisphere Travellers to Cuba.

In progress. Action has been taken to stimulate and systematize reporting; one of CIA's Operation Mongoose officers made a field trip to all Central American countries, Colombia, and Venezuela for this purpose; remaining Latin American visits are in progress. CIA is collecting and assessing information for a meaningful report.

"Patrol Posts" in Caribbean, with Particular Reference to Haiti and Dominican Republic.

Completed. Based upon Cuban capabilities, the likely nature of the threat, actions taken by the U.S. to offer assistance, and status of U.S. forces in the Caribbean, Defense recommends no further action at this time to establish "Patrol Posts." Defense points out that the requirement for a facility in Haiti, presented to State on 6 March 1962, would facilitate the establishment of a "patrol post." In an interim reply of 21 March 1962 State indicated the underlying problems with respect to U.S. policy toward the Duvalier regime. Defense reports that State is conducting an analysis of this policy question.

TOP SECRET  
[ ] 2



TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL HANDLING

U. S. Policy in the Event USSR Establishes a Base in Cuba.

As noted at the 7 June meeting, this is still open. Mr. Gilpatrick asked that the Defense paper, reminding the members of the question raised by Mr. Robert Kennedy 22 March, be distributed. The Defense paper is transmitted herewith.

Attachments

"Eyes Only" copies to:

- |                   |                        |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| 1. General Taylor | 5. Mr. Kennedy         |
| 2. Mr. Johnson    | 6. General Lemnitzer ← |
| 3. Mr. Gilpatrick | 7. Chief of Operations |
| 4. Mr. McCono     |                        |

TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL HANDLING



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10221  
RECORD SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 222

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**August 10, 1998**

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The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Provided to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Residency

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10221  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 222

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*Dupe*  
TOP SECRET

(26)

SENSITIVE

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

Attachments

Distributions

Copy: To:  
1 - General Taylor  
2 - The Attorney General  
3 - Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson  
4 - Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatrick  
5 - General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)  
6/7 - Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)  
8 - Mr. Murrell/Mr. Wilson  
9/10 - Chief of Operations

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AS SANITIZED 23 JUNE 98 mhh

6 (1)(B)(C)

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
23 JUNE 98

Excluded from automatic  
regarding: DOD Directive  
5200.10 does not apply.

DISA(DFOISR) 87 TS 104  
37-155

Document contains \_\_\_\_\_ pages.  
Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_ of 10 copies. Series A.

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

#222  
16 PP

(R1)

The Department of State releases this document  
in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination  
Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 7/30/98 mhh State concurs in CIA opinion.  
Portion(s) Postponed Under 6 (1)(B)(C) of word "British" on p.3



ACTIVITYPURPOSECONSIDERATIONSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. \* Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.

Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.

2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.

To collect intelligence.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.

3. 2 third-country trained intelligence officers, readied to travel in Cuba for temporary periods.

To collect intelligence.

- \* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.



ACTIVITYPURPOSECONSIDERATIONS

4. \* Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

5. \* Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

6. \* Continue negotiating for help in contaminating locomotive lubricants.

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

[L] assistance is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

7. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

- \* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



## ACTIVITY

## PURPOSE

## CONSIDERATIONS

8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Possible future use in communications and support.

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

To ready agent operations.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

10. \* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U. S. citizens) now in the United States.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual, personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

11. \* Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U. S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

As Opa-Locha becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A center is being activated in Spain. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in Mexico City, Caracas, Aruba, San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, Chile are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

## OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.



ACTIVITYPURPOSECONSIDERATIONSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

12. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Number of agents undetermined as yet.

13. 5 third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 30 April 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

14. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana.

To collect intelligence.

Possible use for communications and support.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

1 - 15 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

17. 3 legal resident agents in Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.



18. One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers (non-U.S.) resident in Havana.

PURPOSE  
To collect intelligence.

CONSIDERATIONS

19. Ten legal travelers in Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

"Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

16 - 31 May 1962

20. \* Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.

21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.

To collect intelligence.

Difficult

22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable.

23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.

To ready agent operations.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

OTHER OPERATIONS

25. By 31 May, develop a plan for counterfeiting currency, which would not be implemented until a decision was made to debase the economy in Cuba.

To debase the economy of Cuba.

A counterfeiting program is being developed. Needs are to staff the proposal thoroughly to permit a policy decision to be made and to staff out a feasible distribution plan. It is expected that no decision to implement such a plan would be made immediately.

1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. \* 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba.

To reinforce and resupply, as possible.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents.

To ready agent operations.

29. \* Collection of psychological material.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.

30. \* Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers.

To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

31. \* By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime.

To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962



ACTIVITY  
OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

PURPOSE

End of July 1962

To provide the Special Group (ILC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

CONSIDERATIONS

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U. S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U. S. military intervention.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (State)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Make political decision to intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba.	To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.	This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U. S. security interests.
2. U.S. officials and news releases on policy decision.	Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.	Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.
3. Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.	Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.	Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (Defense)

ACTIVITY

1. After political decision, provide maximum U.S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spotted in Phase I.
2. After political decision, commit U.S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.

PURPOSE

To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime's military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U.S. support must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.

To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.

CONSIDERATIONS

DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration.

Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (CIA)

ACTIVITY

1. Support U. S. military actions in Cuba.

PURPOSE

To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U. S. military operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U. S. military commander of the U. S. intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operations.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (USIA)

ACTIVITY

1. Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the outside to help the Cuban movement.

PURPOSE

To neutralize opposition to U. S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U. S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS

Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (Defense)

March July 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.   | To develop increased "hard" intelligence.  |
| 2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.   | To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security. |
| 3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.  | To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.   |
| 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention. | To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.   |

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S. military manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter measures is reduced to a minimum.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (USIA)

ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U. S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.



T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

\*Teams = 2 to 5 bodies

	<u>TEAMS*</u> <u>INFILTRATED</u>	<u>3RD COUNTRY</u> <u>RES. AGENTS</u>	<u>3RD COUNTRY</u> <u>STAFF IO'S</u>	<u>LEGAL</u> <u>TRAVELERS</u>	<u>AGENTS</u> <u>SELECTED</u>	<u>AGENTS</u> <u>TRAINED</u>
31 May 1962	13	10+5 temp. Leg. Travls.	5in/2ready	30-5 temp.	155	85
31 July 1962	23 to 28	15	7	25	255	155
30 Sept. 1962	28 to 33	20	7	35	255	155
30 Nov. 1962	33 to 38	20	7	40	255	155
28 Feb. 1963	48 to 53	30	9	50	255	165

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10222  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 223  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : OPERATION MONGOOSE 1-17 MAY  
DATE : 05/17/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10222  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 223  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : OPERATION MONGOOSE 1-17 MAY  
DATE : 05/17/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED *REF IN FILE*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from OSD, CIA, State.





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

17 May 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *SL*

Subject: Operation Mongoose, 11-17 May

The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the week, in addition to those reported separately by CIA:

**Intrusion.** At the 3 May Special Group (Augmented) meeting, CIA reported on its intrusion of Habana TV, which raised questions. A review of this intrusion program indicates that this was only a test of voice broadcasts, making use of inactive TV channels, and not cutting in on Cuban TV broadcasts. The broadcasts were made by Cuban students (DRE) from a boat 15 miles off-shore. The weak signal, the limited number of TV sets in Cuba, and the use of an inactive channel gave marginal results. The students, who formerly had their own home-made radio transmitter and used it for revolutionary broadcasts in Havana, appear to have marked talent for program content. This talent would be invaluable for use in case we launch a "Voice of Cuba" radio operation, or find TV intrusion possible and desirable in the future.

**Team.** CIA has reported separately on its successful infiltration of a 3-man team into Oriente. This makes a total of four teams now inside Cuba.

**Intelligence.** It is noted that reports on the construction of underground military facilities in Cuba are now being screened further, within the U.S. intelligence community, before publication in the CIA summary on Cuba. Most reports fail to be confirmed.

**May Day.** There were meager results from the special effort we made to get incidents and other material, from Latin American May Day celebrations, for use in propaganda aimed at Cuba. While

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23 JUN 68

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no Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 7/30/98



[REDACTED] 2

Castro had a poor show, himself, the U.S. effort did not appear to rise above the level of its long-term program aimed at labor groups in Latin America.

CRC. State reports that Dr. Miro Cardona apparently has weathered the storm of dissension within the CRC. As a result of his talk with John McCone, apparently Miro's personal story also was calmed.

Patrols. Defense has submitted a thoughtful study on methods of destroying Cuba's capability to patrol coastal waters. This is being passed to CIA and will be developed between Defense and CIA.

Sanctions. State reports that NATO countries are favorable to denying arms to Cuba, but other sanctions are difficult to arrange. Treasury has extended its embargo which restricts U.S. citizens and alien residents from importing Cuban products.

Information. USIA reports further publication and dissemination of cartoon books in Latin America, about Cuba. They effectively publicize the Castro betrayal of religion, students, labor, and farmers. The program of radio interviews with refugees was curtailed by Immigration authorities in Miami, due to a misunderstanding. The Attorney General corrected the situation.

Pan-Am. During a discussion with State officials about the status of our project, it was disclosed that Pan-American is seeking approval to discontinue its Habana flights. The airline states it is losing heavily on these flights, being unable to convert its Cuban currency holdings or use them locally. The problem is being examined by State, noting that the cutting off of this refugee escape route would need to be blamed on Castro. Cessation of the flights would reduce drastically our explosive refugee problem, but also would deprive us of valuable assets, including psychological benefits.

"Eyes Only" copies to:

- |                   |                        |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| 1. General Taylor | 5. Mr. Kennedy         |
| 2. Mr. Johnson    | 6. General Lennitzer   |
| 3. Mr. Gilpatric  | 7. Chief of Operations |
| 4. Mr. McCone     |                        |
- 2-



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10223  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 224

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
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TO :  
TITLE : OPERATION MONGOOSE 1-17 MAY  
DATE : 10/16/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10223  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 224  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : OPERATION MONGOOSE 1-17 MAY  
DATE : 10/16/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : ~~REFERRED~~ *OPEN IN FULL*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from ~~OSD~~, ~~CIA~~, ~~State~~.



~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

STATE  
USIA  
USIA

333

Operation MONGOOSE

16 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)  
on Operation MONGOOSE, 16 October 1962

PRESENT: The Attorney General, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, General  
Carter, Mr. Wilson, and General Lansdale.

(General Taylor was unable to be present, but expressed  
himself in advance of the meeting as being in favor of  
the three major proposals.)

1. The proposal for a sabotage program against Cuban flag  
ships was approved. It was noted that General Lansdale's covering  
memo which rules out such action in friendly ports prevails.

2. The proposal to institute a shortwave Russian language  
broadcast on the Voice of America, directed against Soviet technicians  
in Cuba, was deferred until after the first week in November. Other-  
wise the members of the Group appeared to think it was worthwhile.

In answer to a question, Mr. Wilson said there is no  
reliable information on the extent of potential Soviet listenership,  
but he emphasized that the principal objective is to call the attention  
of people throughout this Hemisphere to the existence of the Soviet  
technician.

3. The balloon proposition was approved, subject to resolution  
of what flag the vessel would sail under. It was noted that there  
will be a good possibility that Cuban ships may attack this ship in  
international waters; it was agreed that we should be prepared to  
react vigorously, probably by U.S. naval action against the attackers.

4. The Attorney General said that a Texas oil man, named  
Thompson, has a 3300 ton freighter which he is willing to donate to  
a worthy cause. He said he would explore this further. The Group  
felt it probably would be useful if this vessel could be offered to  
a Cuban group such as the CRC.

5. The Group then considered a list of sabotage actions  
proposed by General Carter. A number of members felt that actions  
which could appear to come from within are highly acceptable, but  
those that have a flavor of "naval warfare" require a closer look.  
Mr. Bundy undertook to discuss the list with higher authority.

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-536)

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

23 JUNE 98 mkl  
OSD: NO OASIS  
23 JUNE 98

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#23412 PP



TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

- 2 -

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any case it was agreed that proposal (h) - involving possible attack on a tanker - should be restricted to a Soviet or Bloc ship. Mr. Johnson urged that the information that mines - either real or notional - have been planted in Cuban waters should be as widely disseminated as possible, through unattributable means, in order to discourage shippers. Mr. Bundy advised that any sabotage actions of the type proposed should not look too efficient, so that they could seem to be run by independent organizations such as Alpha 66. General Carter agreed with General Lansdale that some of the operational planning could be combined so as to provide alternate targets in case it was not possible to hit the first one. In connection with ship sabotage, it was also agreed that actions less than actual destruction of the vessel (provided they would not involve "inhumane" actions) would be acceptable.

6. Mr. Bundy reviewed for the benefit of those members of the Group who had not been present at last Friday's meeting, the discussion about possible support to Manolo Ray. It was agreed that State, CIA and General Lansdale should cooperate in carrying out approach to Ray. It was emphasized that this in no way rules out support to other ~~competing~~ groups, and ~~General Lansdale is to follow through with State and CIA, in developing~~ *General Lansdale is to follow through with State and CIA, in developing* ~~and other groups~~ *and other groups* ~~of such support~~ *of such support*.

7. Finally, after a brief discussion with the Attorney General and Mr. Bundy, it was agreed that minutes of MONGOOSE meetings will be made available to the Chairman, JCS, and to the DCI. This partial relaxation of previous security restrictions was predicated on the understanding that other principals have not been inconvenienced by not receiving the minutes.

*Gay Smith*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution  
Chairman, JCS  
DCI  
General Lansdale - *listings - 12145*



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10224  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 225  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP 4 OCT 62  
DATE : 10/04/62  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10224  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 225  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP 4 OCT 62  
DATE : 10/04/62  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : ~~RESTRICTED~~ *OPEN IN FALL*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from ~~OSD~~, ~~CIA~~, ~~State~~.



TOP SECRET  
EYES ONLY

336

4 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on  
Operation MONGOOSE, 4 October 1962

PRESENT: The Attorney General; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General  
Taylor, General Lansdale; Mr. McCone and General Carter;  
Mr. Wilson

1. The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying that higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General said that he wondered if a new look is not required at this time in view of the meager results, especially in the sabotage field. He urged that "massive activity" be mounted within the entire MONGOOSE framework. There was a good deal of discussion about this, and General Lansdale said that another attempt will be made against the major target which has been the object of three unsuccessful missions, and that approximately six new ones are in the planning stage.

Mr. Johnson said that "massive activity" would have to appear to come from within. He also said that he hopes soon to be able to present to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand, with the full realization that this would give more visibility to their activities. On this latter point, Mr. McCone said that he reserves judgment as to the feasibility and desirability of such a program. (Mr. Johnson agreed that he has reservations as well.)

2. Mr. McCone then said that he gets the impression that high levels of the government want to get on with activity but still wish to retain a low noise level. He does not believe that this will be possible. Any sabotage would be blamed on the United States. In this connection, he cited the enormous number of telephone calls that had been directed at CIA at the time that the skin divers landed in Eastern Cuba and at the time Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house. He urged that responsible officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they want to get on with operations.

In partial rebuttal, the Attorney General said that the reasons people were so concerned at the times mentioned were: (a) the fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) that the student

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

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23 JUNE 98 mbl

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
23 JUNE 98

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

#225,399 (21)



TOP SECRET

- 2 -

activity was irresponsible and foolish, and if either of these had in fact been engineered by the U.S. it would have been a great mistake. He went on to say responsible people do wish to get on with operations but want to relate the possibility of attributability to the importance of the particular undertaking. He also questioned whether we are going down the right road or whether "more direct action" is not indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed for accomplishing the overall objective.

3. Returning to Mr. Johnson's point about the necessity of massive activity coming from within, Mr. McCone pointed out that internal security ~~missions~~ are now so rigid that internal uprisings are sure to be brutally suppressed. It was agreed that the current guidelines do not call for inciting such an uprising.

4. Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous efforts which are necessary to insure that an operation such as the sabotage one previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the U.S. After considerable discussion, the Group agreed that it is not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to guarantee non-attributability and that short cuts will be acceptable.

5. Mr. Gilpatric reported that Defense is now working hard on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits will be trained for four or five months and will then be on call for any future action.

6. General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining various military contingency plans, based on a variety of possible situations. Such situations include: Soviet action against Berlin; presence of Bloc offensive weapons in Cuba; attack against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere; and the establishment of a direct threat to the U.S.

7. The Group then turned to the subject of reconnaissance of Cuba. (Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley joined the Group for this part of the discussion.) It was pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using its high performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM sites. It was questioned whether this is a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly when the SAMs are almost certainly not operational.

Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described for the Group a spectrum of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken, ranging from low-level Navy fighters through drones, up to the Agency's capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar countermeasures.

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TOP SECRET  
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

The result of this discussion was that it was agreed that DOD and CIA should get together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require coverage and on recommendations as to how to achieve this coverage. A meeting was set for next Tuesday, at which time DOD and CIA should be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

1, 2, 4, 5 8. There was some discussion of the desirability of mining Cuban waters. It was pointed out that non-U.S.-attributable mines, which appear to be homemade, are available and could be laid by small craft operated by Cubans.

9. It was agreed that the Attorney General should act as Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) at least for the time being.

10. It was agreed that four major points emerged from today's discussion:

- ✓ a. We ought to go all out for increased intelligence.
- b. There should be considerably more sabotage.
- c. Restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that training and other preparations can be subject to some short cuts.
- d. All efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.

*Y. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale

11-10-63 - 11-10-63



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10225  
RECORD SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 226

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**August 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**

**Number of Postponements: 5**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Requested to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10225  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 226

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
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TO :  
TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP 14 SEP 62  
DATE : 09/14/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 4  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by CIA, State, OSD.



33°



7. General Carter reported on CIA's contacts with [A] regarding its Havana flights. He said that the company had asked the Agency to buy its blocked pesos at a one-for-one rate at a scale of \$140,000 a month retroactive to last May 1st. He said that in the face of this proposal, CIA had agreed to buy \$200,000 worth, provided [A] makes no move at this time to discontinue its service. He said there were assurances that no such move would be made before October 1st at the earliest.

CIA  
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After some discussion, the Group agreed that it is highly desirable to maintain this service. On the other hand, it appears that [A] estimates of the amount of money it is losing and the amount of subsidy required to break even are apparently excessive. General Carter undertook to look into the possibility, suggested by the Attorney General, that [A] could lower its quoted fare, inasmuch as the company is not getting the benefit of the \$20 now in any case.

It was generally agreed that government operation of this service would be just as expensive as having [A] continue it.

8. The Attorney General raised the question of actions by Cuban exile students against the Castro regime. He recognized, as did the rest of the Group, the fact that these activities can serve as a cover for future U.S.-sponsored operations. On the other hand, it was recognized equally that bad publicity could result. It was suggested that CIA might talk to selected students and spread the idea that any active operations planned by them must in fact be reasonable and worthwhile ones, and to leave the idea that irresponsible actions might lead to trouble for them in the future.

Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale  
— [signature] —



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10226  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 227

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
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TO :  
TITLE : SM-152-64  
DATE : 01/28/64  
PAGES : 5  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SM-152-64  
28 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Taylor  
General LeMay  
General Wheeler  
Admiral McDonald  
General Greene

Subject: Sabotage Operations Against Cuba (TS)

1. During the past six months, the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted a program of externally mounted sabotage operations against Cuban targets. The primary objective of these operations was to contribute to the disruption of political and economic stability in Cuba, with operations conducted in a manner designed to ensure nonattributability to the United States. This raid program is currently being re-evaluated at the highest level of government.

2. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has requested that the attached paper be provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

3. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, only two copies of the paper are being provided addressees. Following discussion of the subject, all copies of this paper should be returned to the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities. This subject will appear on the agenda as "Unconventional Warfare Program CHARLIE."

*M. J. Ingelido*

M. J. INGELIDO  
Brig Gen. USAF  
Secretary

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

JCS Case File  
1907/24

JCSM-85-64

3 FEB 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Sabotage Operations Against Cuba (TS)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to present and analyze the pros and cons of continuing the program of externally-mounted sabotage raids on Cuban targets.

2. During the past six months, CIA has requested authority to conduct eighteen externally-mounted sabotage operations against Cuban industrial facilities and patrol craft. Eight of these requests were approved; ten operations were aborted and five were executed. The five operations conducted to date are described below and are shown on the attached map. All were executed by Cubans landing in small craft launched from a mother ship. The primary objective of these operations was to contribute to the disruption of political and economic stability in Cuba, with operations conducted in a manner designed to ensure nonattributability to the United States.

No.	Place	Date	Targets	Results
1	Casilda	17-18 Aug 63	Oil Storage Facilities	4.2 mortar fire destroyed one tank car and breached one storage tank, causing considerable fire damage.
2	Santa Lucia	18-19 Aug 63	Sulphuric Acid Plant Powder Plant POL Tanks	Considerable fire damage. Fuel lines were broken, acid entered the turbines causing additional damage.

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of 4 pages series "A"

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No.	Place	Date	Targets	Results
3	Marabú	30 Sep - 1 Oct 63	Lumber Mill	This minor installation of local economic importance was 70% destroyed by a raiding party.
4	La Isabela	21-22 Oct 63	1. Port Guard Patrol Boat 2. Oil Storage In the Cuban flag- ship (if in port)	Primary targets (Cuban vessels) could not be found. A large floating crane in the harbor was sunk. U.S. members entered and exited harbor without discovery.
5	Isle of Pines	22 Nov 63	Cuban Patrol Vessels	Naval 11-6 patrol boat was badly damaged or sunk. Three Cuban naval personnel were killed and 18 others injured in the explosion. Attack made by swimmer team using limpet: swimmers entered and exited harbor without compromise.

3. The five operations conducted to date have gained a definite reaction from Castro. Cuban military defensive surveillance procedures have been improved through more frequent military alerts, increased coastal surface patrols, improved day and night helicopter search techniques, improved radar capabilities, and improved response of jet interceptors which have demonstrated their ability to operate at night and to employ flares for night operations. The over-all effect on the political and economic stability cannot accurately be calculated. Had more operations been conducted, under the same concept, a more definitive gauge of effectiveness would have been realized.

#### 4. Pros and cons of continuing the program of sabotage operations:

##### PROS

Disrupts political and economic stability in Cuba, as reported by CIA and Cuban defectors.

##### CONS

Could be an excuse for stopping Soviet troop withdrawals or even augmenting Soviet forces in Cuba.

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SENSITIVE



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

PROS

Create an atmosphere of uncertainty and nervousness in Cuba; expend energy of armed forces during frequent alerts.

Reveals any weaknesses in Cuban defenses to the population.

Detracts from the economy by resulting in militant Cuban reaction, which in turn requires people who would otherwise be used in the fields and in factories.

According to reports, raids have boosted the morale of the opposition in Cuba, have increased their will to resist, and could lead to increased internal sabotage.

These raids may lead to a militant Cuban reaction which is contrary to the current Soviet peaceful coexistence theme, thereby reducing Cuban-Soviet rapport, and leading to increased dependence on CINCPAC support with less sophisticated and less effective equipment.

Might encourage similar operations by the major autonomous exile group from bases in Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

5. Discussion

The following factors bear on any decision to increase or diminish the current sabotage program:

- a. The pressures on Castro under this program are a source of Moscow-Havana discord and, as a minimum, provide a means of

CONS

Could harden the Soviet line and assist in a Soviet-CINCPAC reunion.

The possible capture of additional Cubans who are knowledgeable of the US sabotage program would reduce US deniability.

Provides basis for Cuban demands for more sophisticated Soviet military equipment to counter externally launched raids.

The Cubans are developing a more systematic response to externally launched raids. Their increased military response capability may require US to proportion military protection forces to ensure security of mother ship.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



TOP SECRET

impeding the consolidation of the Castro regime. The loosening of these pressures at this time would favor a course toward apparent US-Cuban coexistence. The pressures resulting from continuation of these sabotage raids should result in maintaining US flexibility for a variety of contingency actions pending a broad US policy decision on Cuba.

b. The effectiveness of the US economic program against Cuba has been degraded by the sale of US wheat to Russia, the Cuban purchase of buses from the United Kingdom, and by the possible future increase in airline service to Cuba by Free World countries. Cuba is vying to be isolated. If we stop the sabotage program, we will have removed one of the few remaining indications that there are forces that actively challenge the continued existence of the Castro regime.

c. The recent rioting and violence in Panama, an event to which Castro made some contribution, will inject new revolutionary fervor into Castroite activities. Panama and its aftermath will take the play away from the Venezuela brown cache. Recent developments will add validity to Castro's claim that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a US effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, a claim likely to impress many Latin Americans as well as Cubans.

d. The cost of the current sabotage program is not great. The raid equipment and the trained Cuban personnel are now on hand and comprise a motivated team eager to accomplish assigned tasks. Dismantling this capability now and later recreating it would be costly and time consuming.

e. The current system of low-key sabotage is not one which has a high likelihood of exposing definite US complicity.

6. Recommendations

It is recommended that externally-launched sabotage operations of the present type be continued and that the intensity be increased to the level of three to four operations per month, which has been requested previously but not wholly approved.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Attachment



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(344)  
MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on  
Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT: State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin,  
Mr. Hurwittch

White House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatrick, General  
Lemnitzner, General Lansdale

CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

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207 6/21/98

1. Mr. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro regime fail because of its own inherent weaknesses. This thought had not been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meeting, Mr. McCone said that he believes we must face the fact that Cuba will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his personal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MRBM base in Cuba. He noted that these two points are not necessarily concurred in by the Board of National Estimates or by the USIB.

2. At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent papers. He then summarized progress to date by saying that during Phase I, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of resistance potential.

3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a blockade of Berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping, etc. He suggested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency plans should be closely meshed. Mr. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying that he did not believe limited retaliation of this kind would constitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-wide harassment of Soviet facilities would be a different matter.

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23 June 98

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4. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists. He pointed out that such a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.S. interests no matter which way the balance of power swung. In this general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen. However, should reasonably viable resistance develop to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support to such provincial officials.

In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at the moment the previously-cited frictions between Castro and the old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no issue currently exists. There has additionally been at least a temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. He indicated that this of course may be temporary. He said that there has been some success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work for the U.S., and that there have been some defections. 1,2,4

5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether we cannot separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure.

In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military force. Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary-type blood bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed, but there would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a situation would be created which would require intervention.

On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated his view that the U.S. might, however, face a stronger Cuba in the future.



6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with this view.

8. Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly "disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they could generate on their own.

9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.

10. Action to be taken:

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15th.

Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale  
                     - 10-13-64

Attachment - Agenda for Meeting



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COMMENTS : Requires review from CIA, State, OSD.



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f. Operation MONGOOSE  
12 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting, 12 July 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor; the Attorney General; Mr. Johnson;  
Mr. Gilpatric; Mr. McCone and General Carter; General  
Lemnitz; General Lansdale

Dr. Cline was present for part of Item 2, as well as Item 3.

1. Guideline for Political Platform

The Group noted the paper entitled "Guideline for a Post-Castro Political Program," which had been produced by the Department of State.

2. General Lansdale gave the Group a briefing on the number of agents now in Cuba, including people there legally, plus infiltrated teams. In connection with these teams, it was decided that the proposal submitted by CIA for resupply of agent teams, and possibly of resistance groups, should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation. General Taylor specified, however, that if an urgent need for air supply should arise in the meantime, a proposal could be made to the Special Group (Augmented) at any time.

Mr. McCone and General Lansdale said that a sizeable number of intelligence reports are coming out of Cuba, largely on political and economic matters. Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban Government have yet been attained.

The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him. General Lansdale replied that the intelligence indicates that while there is widespread disaffection with Castro, there is no rallying point for active opposition.

The Attorney General and Mr. Johnson once again emphasized the desirability of making effort to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by the Castro regime in the Hemisphere. Mr. McCone said that efforts to get hard intelligence of this nature have to date proved fruitless.

Dr. Cline showed the Group the extent of reconnaissance coverage of Cuba. Mr. McCone emphasized that this program has

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developed complete information on deployments and facilities for the Army, Air Force and Navy, and particularly that these missions have verified that there is sufficient logistical support for a 75,000-man military force. No missile sites have been found.

3. The Group decided that in accordance with the previously-established schedule, it should conduct a complete review of MONGOOSE toward the end of July. It was felt that the Secretaries of State and Defense would wish to participate. General Taylor emphasized that in preparation for such a review, summaries of results obtained to date should be prepared, with particular emphasis on the intelligence developed; and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed. The latter should include possible activities in the rest of Latin America. General Lansdale said that he had asked the operational representatives to be prepared for a preliminary discussion of these points by the 20th of July, and it was agreed that immediately after that meeting, a date should be set for the full-scale meeting.

4.5 Mr. Johnson said that certain officials in the State Department have been investigating the possibility of subsidizing Japanese purchases of Dominican sugar so that the Japanese could divert these purchases from Cuba, thereby depriving Cuba of an eventual source of dollars. He asked that this be looked at in further detail by the MONGOOSE operational representatives.

In answer to Mr. Johnson's question, Mr. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned, however, that it would not be legal for CIA to use its covert funds as a means of evading the intent of Congress.

*Yapant*  
Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale  
- 2 -



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10229  
RECORD SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 230

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**August 10, 1998**

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**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Disclosed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Office  
I. The Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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35  
3 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on  
Project Mongoose, 3 May 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric,  
General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craig;  
Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey

1. General Lansdale gave an interim report on the progress of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army. He said the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected. The Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large number. General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training of such Cubans are being looked into.

It was agreed that such a cadre of Cubans would be an asset to the U.S., which might be used in a number of ways. General Lansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in this connection the matter of holding the individuals and giving them useful employment after they are trained is an important and a difficult one.

2. Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and the [A] interrogation center. He outlined various difficulties encountered, and said that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets are in place. Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources are also in place. [A significant development is that Major Duque has refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely intelligence-gathering missions. (This sort of attitude had been forecast earlier as a possibility, but it now assumes particular importance in view of Duque's stature.)]

3. [Mr. Harvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude into Havana TV programs.] The Group asked that a check be made, as soon as possible, on how effective these operations were. They also asked that a copy of the scripts used be made available. The Group felt that it is worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now being done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time.

Thapar  
Thomas A. Parrott

#230

lp

cc: General Lansdale

(122)

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## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



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U.S.

17 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on  
Operation Mongoose, 17 May 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone,  
General Lemnitzer, and General Lansdale

1. Mr. McCone said that he had responded to General Lansdale's memorandum of 7 May, that he had recognized his worries, and had made available to him an office at CIA Headquarters. Lansdale stated his full satisfaction with this arrangement, and said that he was now proposing a new operations schedule to cover the period through 30 June. Copies of the schedule were distributed, with the request that the members study it and pass any comments to the Chief of Operations, with the understanding that the schedule will be considered formally next week.

General Lansdale commented that the purpose of the schedule is to stimulate further action. He said that he was encouraged by the fact that a sizeable number of intelligence operations have been mounted without attracting very much attention and without serious losses. He felt that operational handling so far has been expert.

2. Mr. McCone said that refugee interrogations at Opa-locka had indicated that the Shell and Texaco plants in Cuba had been on the verge of shutting down but that shipments of equipment and materials from Canada and the UK had enabled them to continue operation. Mr. Johnson said that State is well aware of these situations. He had had very little success in persuading our allies to cooperate. He cited particularly the negative reaction among the NATO powers to the U.S. demarche on this subject, spearheaded by Mr. Rostow.

Mr. McCone said also that the interrogations had revealed a need for medium-wave radio broadcasts. General Lansdale said that the possibility of transmitting is being examined.

3. The Attorney General asked why higher power transmissions on medium-wave could not be arranged from Miami. After some discussion of the pros and cons of this, including the danger of retaliation from the Cubans, it was agreed that Mr. Murrow would be asked to meet with the Group next week or the week after to discuss the matter.

LaParrott  
Thomas A. Parrott

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cc: General Lansdale

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10231  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 232

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP 5 MAR 62  
DATE : 03/05/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
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COMMENTS : Reviewed by CIA, State, OSD.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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TO :  
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DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED *den*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from CIA, State, OSD.



The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 7/30/98 apn

5 March 1962

364

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) on Project  
Mongoose, 5 March 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Rusk and Mr. Johnson;  
Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and  
General Lansdale; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey

1. After considerable discussion, the following was agreed:

a. The intelligence-collection program presented in  
General Lansdale's paper of 2 March was approved. General Taylor  
emphasized that this should not be interpreted as a completely rigid  
plan, but should serve as a general outline at this stage. Any  
actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem  
to be desirable as the project progresses, will be brought to the  
Special Group for resolution.

b. We cannot afford to concentrate on the intelligence  
aspects to the exclusion of preparations for other eventual actions,  
during the next five months. Accordingly, General Lansdale will  
prepare a phased plan for circulation before the next meeting to  
provide for possible actions which could lead to an internal revolt  
and eventual U.S. intervention.

c. In addition certain preliminary actions can be begun  
in the very near future, involving such things as spotting, assessing  
and training action-type agents. As the danger of blowing our plans  
by doing this is recognized, the Special Group (Augmented) must keep  
its hand tightly on these preliminary actions.

d. The Guidelines prepared by General Taylor will be  
examined by all members, with a view to concurrence at a meeting a  
week from today. These will be shown to higher authority, but in the  
context of information rather than a request for specific approval.  
The Secretary of State felt that the Guidelines should make it clear  
that, while Mongoose is concerned with covert operations, the U.S.  
is simultaneously pursuing an overt course which may contribute to  
the same end. He added that the covert operators should keep in  
touch with the overt programs.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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EAB 4/27/98

OSD: No OBJECTION  
23 JUN 99

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2. In making the above point, Mr. Rusk pointed out that if it should be possible to prove Castro's involvement in efforts to subvert other Latin American countries then this might present an excuse to intervene either unilaterally or multilaterally. He said that Cuba could be viewed as the "East Germany" of the Western Hemisphere. He added that the Department is looking into the possibility of enlisting the aid of other Hemisphere countries in establishing mechanisms for patrolling and controlling movement of Cuban operatives in the Caribbean area.

Mr. Johnson was asked to have a list prepared of various situations which would serve as a plausible pretext for intervention

3. It is recognized that many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba would be of an all-purpose type; that is they would be trained in paramilitary skills as well as those of exclusively intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S. although every effort will be made to attempt such control. It was noted that the scale of this covert intelligence effort is about the maximum that can be supported within the framework of assets available, unless there is some dramatic change for the better.

Thomas A. Parrott

No distribution



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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10232  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 233

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :  
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DATE : 10/11/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by CIA, State, OSD.



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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 233  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :  
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DATE : 10/11/62  
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CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : ~~REFERRED~~ *OPEN IN FULL*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
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COMMENTS : Requires review from CIA, State, OSD.





TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

11 October 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *Ed*

Subject: Action Proposals, Mongoose

At your 4 October meeting, it was your desire that Mongoose be stepped up. The Operational Representatives were so tasked, promptly, and we can expect a series of proposals in the near future (with sabotage given priority attention).

The Operational Representatives have discussed the three attached proposals thoroughly and they reflect a consensus of our operational views. I believe the proposals are realistic and doable, and thus recommend early approval.

Comments on each proposal:

Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Ships.

23 Cuban-owned ships are known, ranging from 6500 tons down to 500 tons. Several make frequent voyages to Europe, including visits to both Bloc and NATO-country ports. The Operational Representatives and I agree that actions to destroy these ships (with time delay fuses) should aim to have actual destruction take place on the following priority:

- A. In a Cuban or Bloc port
- B. At sea.

Broadcasting in Russian to Cuba.

It is noted that many of the Bloc technicians now in Cuba are young, in their early 20's, and that the proposed VOA programs will be specifically tailored for them, as well as being consistent with open U.S. policy. It is believed that advantages far outweigh the disadvantages listed.

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2-23 4/23/84  
OSD: RELEASE IN FULL  
23 JUNE 87

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SENSITIVE  
TOP SECRET

# 233

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TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

Propaganda Balloon.

This proposal is now planned as a Cuban-run operation, with the U.S. helping the Cubans to help themselves.

3 Attachments

"Eyes Only" copies to:

Mr. Kennedy

Mr. Bundy

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCons

General Taylor

Mr. Murrow

Chief of Operations



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10233  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 234  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP 12 APR 62  
DATE : 04/12/62  
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
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TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP 12 APR 62  
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CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from CIA, State, *OSD*.



12 April 1962

357

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoosa, 12 April 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone

Mr. Bundy joined the Group later for a summation of the discussion.

1. The Group discussed the major points made at yesterday's meeting, particularly the views of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

2. Mr. McCone reiterated his belief that the operation as presently conceived may not accomplish the desired purpose. He said that activities in addition to intelligence (e.g., guerrilla warfare teams and sabotage), should be authorized in order to permit operations to move in the direction of the original objectives. He felt that if only intelligence is to be involved, then the present scale of CIA effort may be too large. Mr. McCone also urged that the U.S. be prepared to accept a greater degree of attributability than it perhaps now is.

3. Mr. Gilpatric felt it is necessary to achieve as high a posture of readiness as possible. For example, PT boats and other material necessary for more active operations should be acquired. In addition, more Cubans should be inducted into the U.S. Army. In this connection he pointed out that the restriction on service of such Cubans outside of this country has been lifted. The Attorney General concurred in Mr. Gilpatric's comments that a more imaginative approach toward enlistment of Cubans can be devised.

4. It was agreed that the guidelines do not require revision at this time. Instead the operation as presently conceived, with the stepping up indicated above, will be continued until August. At that time a review will be conducted of progress made and of the long-range objective. It was noted that the effect of any increased training connected with the new activities mentioned by Mr. McCone, would not be apparent before August.

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 7/30/98

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
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FULL  
23 JUN 98

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5. Mr. Gilpin agreed to look into the status of the underwater reconnaissance operation which had been approved at the meeting of 13 March 1962, which has apparently been the subject of some misunderstanding by the Joint Reconnaissance Center. General Taylor called the Group's attention to the JCS paper, Justification of U.S. Military Intervention, which most of them had not yet received. Mr. McCone said that he would probably make additional recommendations for action within the established time-phased schedule, and that he would also examine the effects on the motivation of agents, which might result from an extended period of activity within the current framework.

Thomas A. Parrott

No distribution, except

General Lansdale - 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100



# Assassination Records Review Board

## Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10234  
RECORD SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 235

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**August 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**  
**Number of Postponements: 1**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :  
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SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
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COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Reviewed  
by State, OSD and CIA.



MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING	ORIGIN OR REFERENCE TO STAFF	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	OP IMMEDIATE	BOOK	MULTI	SYMBOL	MESSAGE CENTER	
INFO	OP IMMEDIATE		X	DA	680(2) TIME	

FROM:

JCS

TO:

CINCAL

CINCLANT

CINCARIB

CINCONAD

USCINCEUR

CINCPAC

CINCSTRIKE

CINCNELM

CINSAC

DA

COFS USAF

CNO

CMC

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JACE ANLOAT NORFOLK VA

JACE AIRBORNE ANDREWS AFB MD

TOP SECRET JCS

6830

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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J-3 (1)

J-4 (1)

J-5 (1)

SECDEF (2)

White House (2)

State (1)

SMITH-BUNDY  
 FEELE  
 RUPPIS  
 DAVIS  
 LUNGAN  
 FELDMAN  
 FORRESTAL  
 HIRSCH  
 JOHNSON  
 KAYSEN  
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FILE

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Reviewed on

7/30/98

by 14 destroyed  
11/31

DATE	TIME
21	1700
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1962

SYMBOL		SIGNATURE	
OCJCS		M. J. Ingelido	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, Gen, USA		M. J. INGELIDO	
PHONE	PAGE	Brig. Gen., USAF	
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JCS 6830

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# MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

addressees only from Taylor.

THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE.

1. The President of the United States has under consideration the initiation of blockade operations against Cuba.

2. The reaction to these operations by Cuban military forces could lead to U.S. air strikes against Cuban armed forces, and invasion of the island of Cuba. Preparations for these contingencies are in progress. These subsequent actions, if initiated, would probably result in the use of force against Soviet military and civilian personnel in Cuba and would directly challenge the prestige of the Soviet Union. The reaction of the USSR cannot be predicted with accuracy.

3. It is imperative under the circumstances which could arise to present the strongest possible deterrent to any course of Soviet military action. The U.S. must demonstrate unequivocally that it is ready militarily to meet and to defeat retaliatory Soviet actions at whatever level is necessary. At the same time, we must avoid actions in other areas which may be considered provocative or which may create civil alarm.

4. At the time of the public announcement by the

JCS 6830

PAGE NR 2



MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

President of the United States of the decision to initiate blockade operations DEFCON 3 level of readiness will be effected world-wide. It is expected that the announcement will be made on the evening of 22 October Washington time. The time of initiation of blockade operations will tentatively be 24 to 48 hours later.

5. Should the action taken against Cuba include air attack and invasion of Cuba, reinforcement capabilities

[A]  
[ ] may be delayed.

6. JCS desire all commanders to review applicable plans, and be prepared to report critical limitations to the conduct of general war operations in their respective areas.

7. The contents of this message are sensitive and must be closely held. Gp-3.

00151 10 13 45

ACTION: DCSOP-3, CSAF-2, CNO-2, CMC-6

DISTR: CJCS-3, DJS-3, SJCS-1, J2-1, J3-1, J4-1, J5-1,  
SEC DEF-2, WHITE HOUSE-2, STATE-1, CSA-3

JCS 6830

PAGE NR 3

SCD 705M

35-4

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## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10240  
RECORD SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 241

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July 10, 1998

**Status of Document:** Postponed in Part

**Number of Postponements:** 3

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**Board Review Completed:** 07/08/98

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



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AGENCY INFORMATION

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 241

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
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DATE : 11/03/62  
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SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

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RESTRICTIONS : 1C  
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DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
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OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Remainder  
of document requires review from OSD, CIA and State.



# NAVAL MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

38

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
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OPERATIONAL	IMMEDIATE			

TO 032228Z  
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TO CTF ONE THREE FIVE

INFO CINCLANT  
JACE AJCC  
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CTF ONE THREE SIX  
COMNAVAIRLANT  
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COMKWESTFOR  
CINCLANT  
COMANTDEFCON  
CINCARIB

CTF EIGHT FOUR

JCS  
JACE AFLOAT  
CNO  
COMSECONDFLT  
CINCONAD  
COMNAVBASG BTMO  
CINCSTRIKE  
COMCARDIV SIX  
COMASVFORLANT

FILE

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Reviewed on

4/12/96  
DOD

G 40442

Disagreed 11/5

NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
6/25/92

CSO: NO 06122724  
2410298

// TOP SECRET //

AIR QUARANTINE OF CUBA

THIS IS CINCLANTFLT OPORD 49-62 (REVISED)

- A. CINCLANTFLT 271346Z OCT NOTAL
- B. CH-2 CINCLANT OPLAN 308-62 (CINCLANT 012350Z) CASEP

REF A IS CANCELLED AND SUPERSEDED BY THIS OPORD.  
PARA SITUATION. THE INCREASED INFLUX OF ARMS AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO CUBA HAS REACHED A LEVEL WHICH CAUSES CUBA TO BE A THREAT TO THE DEFENSE OF NATIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. CINCLANT HAS DIRECTED CINCLANTFLT TO CONDUCT AN AIR QUARANTINE OF CUBA FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING SOVIET BLOC NATIONS FROM AIRLIFTING MATERIAL INTO CUBA FROM WHICH OFFENSIVE WEAPONS CAN BE ASSEMBLED PRODUCED OR PUT INTO OPERATION.

A. FRIENDLY FORCES.

COG...33(57) SECNAV(58) 943T4(59) 00(60-61) 09(62) 06(63) 03(64) 09M(65) 04(66) 05(67) 60(68-70) 1P(71-72) FPSWO(73)

COG...CNO...JCS/J3-5  
CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J2-1 J4-4 J5-2 SACS-1 DIA/CITC-3 NMCC-8 NWSB-1 SEC DEF-8  
WHITE HOUSE-3 FILE-1 HIST-1(1-44) two  
CSA(45-46) CSAF(47-48) CMC(49-56) CNO(57-73)

41

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				DATE TIME GROUP
				032228Z NOV 62

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Doc 241



NAVAL MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE

(ACTION)

RELEASED BY

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EXT. NO.

(INFO)

[A]

6(1)(C)

PARA MISSION. WITHOUT DEGRADING READINESS POSTURE FOR RESPONSE TO CINCLANT OPLANS 312-62, CONDUCT AN AIR QUARANTINE OF CUBA ALONG THE SOUTHERN TRANSATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN ROUTES IN ORDER TO PREVENT SOVIET BLOC NATIONS FROM AIRLIFTING PROHIBITED MATERIAL INTO CUBA.  
PARA EXECUTION.

6(1)(C)

[A]

Continued

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NAVAL MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
	(INFO)			

PARA ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. IAW CINCLANTFLT OPORD (1-YR). PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE PROMULGATED SEPARATELY.

PARA COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

A. COMMUNICATIONS IAW LANTFLT COMMOPLAN AS MODIFIED HEREIN.

B. CINCLANTFLT AT HQ NORVA.

ANNEX A - CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

(1) AIR QUARANTINE IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO SUSPECT AIRCRAFT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED BY CINCLANTFLT.

(2) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AS SET FORTH REF B.

ANNEX B - PROCEDURES FOR SAC AIRCRAFT.

SCP-1

[A]

60(c)

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CONTROL NO.	CIRCUIT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10243  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 244  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : CHAIRMAN'S TALKING PAPER FOR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT  
DATE : 11/16/62  
PAGES : 6  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : TALKING PAPER  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10243  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 244  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : CHAIRMAN'S TALKING PAPER FOR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT  
DATE : 11/16/62  
PAGES : 6  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : TALKING PAPER  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : ~~REFERRED~~ *OPEN IN FULL*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from OSD, CIA and State.



DOD

TOP SECRET

CHAIRMAN'S TALKING PAPER FOR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

16 November 1962

1. The Chiefs appreciate the opportunity to discuss some aspects of the current negotiations bearing on the IL-28's and other matters related to Cuba. To lead-off, they would like to express their unqualified support for the insistence of our government upon the withdrawal of the IL-28's. While these aircraft are of less military significance than the IRBM's and MRBM's which have withdrawn, their continued presence in Cuba would present a long-term threat to the continental United States, would consequently require a higher level of air defense of our southeastern states and would give deep concern to many parts of Latin America. These factors added to the public statements of our Government on the need for their withdrawal convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the IL-28's must go.
2. The Chiefs are aware of the offer to exchange a lifting of the quarantine for Khrushchev's removal of the IL-28's and will regret the possible loss of this useful naval tool if the offer is accepted. If the Soviets decline the offer, the quarantine will provide an immediate means to apply pressure both on Khrushchev and on Castro not only to remove the IL-28's but also to obtain other ends such as the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and the acceptance of an inspection system. After appropriate warning to Khrushchev of our intentions, the Chiefs would favor a general extension of the quarantine to include a complete blockade of POL products. Concurrently, we should continue air surveillance and withhold any assurance against the invasion of Cuba. If the expanded quarantine did not succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of the IL-28's, we should be prepared to take them out by air attack.
3. Even if the IL-28's are negotiated out of Cuba, there will remain weapons systems of significant military importance; the MIG's, the SAM's, the air defense control system, and the large stocks of modern Army equipment which we have seen in our recent photography. The air defense weapons will be a constant threat to our air surveillance of Cuba while the Army weapons may be used against Guantanamo or against any invasion attempt. But more important than this equipment are the thousands of Soviet military personnel who remain in Cuba to man it. The Soviet presence in Cuba poses a particularly sensitive problem to the United States. When the extent of this presence is known and the weapons systems remaining in Soviet hands are thoroughly appreciated, it will be clear to the Western Hemisphere that it has indeed been invaded and remains invaded

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24 JUN 98The Department of State has no objection to the  
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060244



by the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, we may anticipate a loud popular demand in the United States and in Latin America for the removal of the Soviet personnel and neutralization of their weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the United States should generate now all the pressure possible to get the Soviet personnel out, feeling that their eviction is far more important than that of the equipment.

4. The Chiefs are very much interested in the terms in which any assurance to Castro may eventually be couched, feeling that it would be damaging to our national interest and to the sense of security of our Latin American allies to create the impression of underwriting Castro for an indefinite period without careful qualification. If it is considered necessary to give Castro any assurance, the Chiefs feel that it should be tied to Khrushchev's proposal in his 26 October letter to withdraw Soviet forces from Cuba, and to cease giving military aid to Castro. Also the assurance should be given without affecting our commitments under the Rio Pact and should be linked to concurrent good behavior on the part of Castro and to acceptance by the Castro government of continued air surveillance.

5. The Chiefs recognize both the importance and the difficulty of obtaining an adequate verification system in Cuba. While sympathetic with their purpose, the Chiefs do not like two of the current proposals for inspection and verification. The first is the proposal from Ambassador Stevenson for a UN inspection system of the Caribbean or Central America. The Chiefs do not favor it because of its reciprocal features, its doubtful effectiveness and the danger of having it regarded as a substitute for effective aerial surveillance. The second is the Brazilian suggestion for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America. Apart from objections to the precedent of supporting such a proposal for any part of the world, and the divided opinion among our allies on this subject, we do not see any way to obtain from the proposal a satisfactory verification system for Cuba. Consequently, we would advise against supporting it.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend at this juncture:

a. That the IL-28's be removed from Cuba, preferably by negotiation -- otherwise by blockade followed, if need be, by military action.



**TOP SECRET**

b. That the removal of Soviet personnel from Cuba be made an immediate objective of negotiations with the USSR.

c. That any assurance to Castro be hedged by conditions protecting our obligations under the Rio Pact and linking the duration of the assurance to good behavior by Castro and the acceptance of air surveillance.

d. That in seeking a means of long-term verification and inspection, which we consider essential, we oppose the proposals for a reciprocal UN inspection of the Caribbean and for a nuclear free zone in Latin America.

- 3 -

**TOP SECRET**

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## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10244  
RECORD SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 245

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**July 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**

**Number of Postponements: 1**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 07/08/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10244  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 245  
-----

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : MAXWELL TAYLOR  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
TITLE : JCSM-910-62 STATUS OF READINESS FOR THE CUBA OPERATION  
DATE : 11/16/62  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : CUBA OPERATIONS  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS :





DOD

NLK-93-76

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## THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

JCSM-910-62

Reviewed on

6/17/86

November 16, 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Status of Readiness for the Cuban Operation (C)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
125145-203

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are glad to report that our Armed Forces are in an optimum posture to execute CINCLANT OPLANS 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba) and 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba). We are not only ready to take any action you may order in Cuba, we are also in an excellent condition world-wide to counter any Soviet military response to such action. Our status of readiness includes:

a. SAC is maintaining 1/8 airborne alert and has implemented its force dispersal plan. An increased SIOP generation rate - [ ] is being maintained. 6(1)(c) [A]

b. Continental Air Defense Command interceptor forces have occupied their wartime dispersal bases and are partially deployed at increased alert (about 1/3). Special defensive measures have been taken to protect the Southeast, with particular attention to Florida.

c. Air forces involved in CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 in daylight hours can respond for selective attack in graduated increments from two to twelve hours, according to the application of force desired.

d. Amphibious and assault forces are at a high state of readiness, providing a seven-day reaction capability for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 following the air strike (CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62), with accelerated introduction of follow-on forces.

e. All naval units are in a high state of readiness.

2. In response to your request, we have studied the need for augmentation of forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 and have concluded that while the forces originally included in the plan are probably adequate, it would be prudent to earmark additional forces as a ready reserve for the

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of 2 pages series "A"

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operation. Accordingly, we are planning to earmark the 5th Infantry Division, at approximately 20,000 strength including supporting forces, and a combat command (strength 6,800) of the 2nd Armored Division for possible commitment as reserve forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62; but these units will not be moved from home stations until S-day for OPLAN 312-62. Utilization of the increased Army and Marine forces will require an additional 16 transports, 68 cargo ships, and 11 LSTs. The LSTs and 15 transports would come from the Reserve Fleet, would require approximately 45 days to activate and assemble on the east coast, and would cost an estimated \$28 million. For the total shipping requirements of the augmented Plan, chartering, requisitioning, and prepositioning of 60 cargo ships must be accomplished well in advance of execution of the Plan. The chartering/requisitioning of the remaining 105 cargo ships would require at least 30 days. The 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade), at approximately 9,000 strength, has transited the Panama Canal, is in the Caribbean and has been added to the assault force.

3. The advanced alert levels, if maintained for a protracted period, can reduce the over-all capability of the force because of maintenance and training short-falls. The current status of alert can be maintained for about 30 more days without adverse effect. After that time we could maintain the following reaction capability:

a. With forces in present posture (Defense Condition 3)

(1) OPLAN 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba) - 12 hours

(2) OPLAN 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba) - 7 days

b. With forces largely returned to home bases (Defense Condition 5)

(1) OPLAN 312-62 - 2 days

(2) OPLAN 316-62\* - 10 to 12 days

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend staying in the present posture for the immediate future.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*Maxwell D. Taylor*

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

\* 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its organic shipping excepted.

2  
TOP SECRET



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10245  
RECORD SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 246

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**July 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**

**Number of Postponements: 1**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 07/08/98**

---

A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Issuance/Classification Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10245  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 246  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 11/17/62  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : CUBA OPERATIONS  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS :



MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	PRIORITY	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO	PRIORITY		X		DA		
FROM: JCS						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO: CINCONAD						Regular JCS Distribution	
CINCLANT						JACE Not Necessary	
CINCSAC						✓ Bundy	
INFO: CINCARLANT						40 destroyed 11/19	
CINCAFLANT						12 destroyed 11/20	
TOP SECRET JCS 7441						From JCS.	
<p>1. On 16 November 1962 JCS met with President and reported on readiness status of forces involved in OPLANS 312-62 and 316-62. The following memoranda on this subject was given to the President:</p> <p>"Subject: Status of Readiness for the Cuban Operation (C)</p> <p>"1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are glad to report that our Armed Forces are in an optimum posture to execute CINCLANT OPLANS 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba) and 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba). We are not only ready to take any action you may order in Cuba, we are also</p>							
SYMBOL						DATE	
JCS						TIME	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)						MONTH	
JOHN A. HEINTGES, MGEN, USA						YEAR	
PHONE						NOV	
75528						1962	
PAGE NR. 1							
NR. OF PAGES 4							
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION							
TOP SECRET							
SIGNATURE							
JOHN A. HEINTGES							
Major General, USA							
Deputy Director, Joint Staff							

JCS 7441

172324Z NOV 62

PAGE NR 1

SDO FORM 35-4

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MESSAGE

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STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

in an excellent condition world-wide to counter any Soviet military response to such action. Our status of readiness includes:

"a. SAC is maintaining 1/8 airborne alert and has implemented its force dispersal plan. [An increased SIOP generation rate-

] is being maintained]

"b. Continental Air Defense Command interceptor forces have occupied their wartime dispersal bases and are partially deployed at increased alert (about 1/3). Special defensive measures have been taken to protect the Southeast, with particular attention to Florida.

"c. Air forces involved in CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 in daylight hours can respond [for selective attack in graduated increments from two to twelve hours, according to the application of force desired]

"d. Amphibious and assault forces are at a high state of readiness, providing a [seven-day reaction capability for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 following [the air strike (CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62), with accelerated introduction of follow-on forces.]

"e. All naval units are in a high state of readiness.

"2. In response to your request, we have studied the need for augmentation of forces for CINCLANT OPLAN

[A]

60(B)(C)

JCS 7441

SCD FORM 35-4  
1 JUN 57

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2



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STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

316-62 and have concluded that while the forces originally included in the plan are probably adequate, it would be prudent to earmark additional forces as a ready reserve for the operation. [Accordingly, we are planning to earmark the 5th Infantry Division, at approximately 20,000 strength including supporting forces, and a combat command (strength 6,800) of the 2nd Armored Division for possible commitment as reserve forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62; but these units will not be moved from home stations until S-day for OPLAN 312-62. Utilization of the increased Army and Marine forces will require an additional 16 transports, 68 cargo ships, and 11 LSTs. The LSTs and 15 transports would come from the Reserve Fleet, would require approximately 45 days to activate and assemble on the east coast, and would cost an estimated \$28 million. For the total shipping requirements of the augmented Plan, chartering, requisitioning, and prepositioning of 60 cargo ships must be accomplished well in advance of execution of the Plan. The chartering/requisitioning of the remaining 105 cargo ships would require at least 30 days. The 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade), at approximately 9,000 strength, has transited the Panama Canal, is in the Caribbean and has been added to the assault force.]

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PAGE NR 3

SCD FORM 35-4  
1 JUN 57

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"3. The advanced alert levels, if maintained for a protracted period, can reduce the over-all capability of the force because of maintenance and training shortfalls. The current status of alert can be maintained for about 30 more days without adverse effect. After that time we could maintain the following reaction capability:

"a. With forces in present posture (Defense Condition 3)

"(1) OPLAN 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba) - 12 hours

"(2) OPLAN 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba) - 7 days

"b. With forces largely returned to home bases (Defense Condition 5)

"(1) OPLAN 312-62 - 2 days

"(2) OPLAN 316-62\* - 10 to 12 days

"4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend staying in the present posture for the immediate future.

"\* 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its organic shipping excepted."

2. Commanders addressed will maintain the readiness posture as quoted in memorandum above for the immediate future and until otherwise advised. OP-1.

DISTR : CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-3, J2-1, J3-5, J4-4, J5-1, SACSA-1, DIA/CIIC-3, NMCC-5, NWSB(JWRA)-1, JSSC-1, SEC DEF-8, WHITE HOUSE-3, RRA-1, JRG-2, HIST-1, CNO, CSAF, CMC, CSA, DCSOP

JCS 7441

PAGE NR 4



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10246  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 247  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 11/20/62  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : CUBA OPERATIONS  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by CIA, OSD and State.



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TITLE :  
DATE : 11/20/62  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : CUBA OPERATIONS  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED *OPEN BY RILL*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from CIA, OSD and State.



MESSAGE **TOP SECRET**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE**TOP SECRET**

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ATTACHING STOCK	ORIG OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	OP IMMED	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
INFO	OP IMMED		X		DA	

FROM:	JCS	DOD	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO:	CINCLANT		Regular JCS Distribution plus SECDEF & White House
INFO:	CINCONAD		
	CINCSAC		
	CINCPAC		
	CSA		
	CNO		
	CSAF		
	CMC		

*Ceb*  
*Cap 39240*  
*11/21*

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Reviewed on 6/18/96 *mp*

**FILE**

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6/18/96  
GPO: NO COLLECTION 24 JUN 98

TOP SECRET JCS 7476 From JCS.

Lift quarantine effective immediately. Return LANTFLT ships to home ports and normal operating areas at your discretion. Maintain one CVA with air group in ready status in Mayport - Caribbean area. Instructions will be furnished later as to future movements and disposition of PACFLT amphibious forces. Anticipate requirement for sighting and photographing Soviet ships departing Cuban ports with IL 28 aircraft. Gp 3.

DATE	TIME
20	
MONTH	YEAR
Nov	1962

WRITER	SYMBOL		JCS		RELEASER	SIGNATURE	<i>Herbert D. Riley</i>
	TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)					TYPED (or REPRODUCED) NAME AND TITLE	
	PHONE	PAGE NO.	1	NO. OF PAGES		1	HERBERT D. RILEY
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		TOP SECRET			Vice Admiral, USN	
						Director, Joint Staff	

DISTR: CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-3, J2-1, J3-5, J4-4, J5-1, SACSA-1, DIA/CIIC-3, NMCC-5, NWSB (JWRA)-1, SEC DEF-8, WHITE HOUSE-3, RRA-1  
CNO, CSAF, CMC, CSA, DCSOP, DCSLOG, ACS I, DCSPER

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JCS 7476 TOP SECRET 202345Z Nov 62

PAGE NR

000247



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10247  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 248  
-----

## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CINCLANT  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 11/21/62  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : CUBA OPERATIONS  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by CIA, OSD and State.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
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RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
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ORIGINATOR : CINCLANT  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 11/21/62  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : CUBA OPERATIONS  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from CIA, OSD and State.



AL MESSAGE

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TOP SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

69

PRECEDENCE	ACTION	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		S	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE				

7 0 210250Z

FM CINCLANT

TO ZEN/CINCLANTFLT

INFO JCS

TOP SECRET

*Cuba* *Bundy*  
*File*

*Cy 36 + 38 destroyed*  
*11/21*

FILE

A. JCS 7476 DTG 202345Z (PASEP)

1. DISCONTINUE CUBAN QUARANTINE OPERATIONS IMMEDIATELY. RETURN FORCES TO NORMAL OPCON.

2. MAINTAIN ONE READY CVA GROUP OFF EASTERN CUBA. RETURN REMAINDER OF TF 135 TO NORMAL OPCON.

3. BE PREPARED TO LOCATE AND PHOTOGRAPH SOVIET SHIPS DEPARTING CUBA WITH IL 28 AIRCRAFT ABOARD. THIS IS EXPECTED WITHIN NEXT THIRTY DAYS.

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
24 JUN 97

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
6/23/93

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 6/18/96

COG....JCS/J3-5

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J2-1 J4-4 J5-1 SACS-1 DIA/CIIC-3 NMCC-5 NWSB-1 SECDEF-3  
WHITE HOUSE-3 HISTORICAL-1 FILE-1 (1-40)

41- (43-44) CMC (45-52) CNO (53-76)

33(53)...COG

SECNAV(54)943T4(55)00(56-57)09(58)06(59)03(60)09M(61)04(62)05(63)60(64-66)

92(67-72)1P(73-74)FPSWO(75)BFR(76)

ADVANCE COPY (1-A) DLVD TO JCS

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15283/TF/JA/4	CBD011	PAGE 1 OF 1	TIME OF RECEIPT 0352Z/21 NOV	DATE TIME GROUP 210250Z NOV 62
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TOP SECRET

(When filled in)

001248



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10248  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 249

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 11/25/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : CUBA OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/23/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by CIA, OSD and State.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10248  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 249

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 11/25/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : ~~CUBA OPERATIONS~~ DEFCON

DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from CIA, OSD and State.

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


# TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

# TOP SECRET

*50D*

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	OF IMMEDIATE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
INFO	OF IMMEDIATE		X		DA	
FROM: JCS						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Regular JCS Distribution Plus SECDEF White House DCA DIRNSA
TO:						
CINCAL						
CINCLANT						
CINCARIB						
CINCOMAD						
USCINCEUR						
CINCPAC						
CINCSOUTH						
CINCSAC						
INFO: CSA						JACE AJCC FT RITCHIE MD JACE AFLOAT NORFOLK VA JACE AIRBORNE ANDREWS AFB MD MATS
CNO						
CSAF						
CIC						
TOP SECRET JCS 7575						From JCS.
Refs a. JCS 5830 DTG 211814Z NOTAL b. JCS 6864 DTG 221809Z						DATE 25 MONTH Nov YEAR 62
1. Ref b is cancelled with. DEPCON 5 may be						
SYMBOL JCS TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) VADM HERBERT D. RILEY, USN, DJS PHONE 74084 PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 2 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <h1>TOP SECRET</h1>				SIGNATURE  TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE HERBERT D. RILEY Vice Admiral, USN Director, Joint Staff The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526) Reviewed on 11/18/98		

JCS 7575

272124Z Nov 62

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on 6/23/98

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
23 JUNE 98

PAGE NR. 1

Doc 249 0043

# TOP SECRET

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resumed world-wide except as may be specified otherwise by Commanders in Chief at their discretion with regard to their respective areas or for forces under their respective operational commands which in their judgement require higher DEFCONs to assure appropriate responsiveness to military requirements of current Cuban situation and/or other world tensions.

2. For CINCONAD. Required consultation with Canadian representatives prior to modification of DEFCON has been effected. GP-3

NOTE: This message has been relayed OP to DIRNSA, DCA and the WHITE HOUSE.

DISTR: CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-3, J1-1, J2-1, J3-5, J4-4, J5-1, J6-3, SACSA 1, DIA/CIIC-3, NMCC-5, NWSB(JMRA)-1, JSSC-1, SEC DEF-8, WHITE HOUSE-3, USRSG-3, RRA-1, JRG-2, CNO, CSAF, CMC, CSA, DCSOP, ACSI, DCSLOG, DCSPER

JCS 7575 TOP SECRET

PAGE NR 2

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## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10249  
RECORD SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 250

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July 10, 1998

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of Postponements: 2

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 07/08/98

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10249  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 250

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : READINESS POSTURE REQUIREMENTS  
DATE : 11/28/62  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Review  
completed by OSD, CIA and State.



DUV85

PP RUEPWV

DE RUEPCR 225

U P 282249Z

FM JCS

TO ZEN/CINCLANT

INFO ZEN/CSA

ZEN/CMO

ZEN/CSAF

ZEN/CMC

RUCRC/CINCLANT

ZEN/CINCAFLANT

ZEN/CINCONAD

ZEN/CINCSAC

ZEN/CINCSTRIKE

ZEN/COMATS

ZEN/COMSTS

ZEN/CINCPAC

RUEKCR/JACE AJCC FT RITCHIE

RUEKMH/JACE AIRBORNE

RUEKVDA/JACE AFLOAT NORFOLK

RUEPWV/WHITE HOUSE

DA GRNC

BT

Received  
24 03 10

*Cal-n*

7955

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Date & Time Received: \_\_\_\_\_

✓ *Copy to L-100*

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Reviewed on 4/11/96 AW

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO JCS7600 FROM JCS.

1. THE JCS APPROVED AND FORWARDED JCSM-955-62 TO SECDEF ON WEDNESDAY 28 NOV. IT IS QUOTED HERewith:  
QUOTE:

SUBJECT: READINESS POSTURE REQUIREMENTS (U)

1. FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT ON 28 NOVEMBER 1962 WITH REGARD TO THE LIFTING OF THE MARITIME QUARANTINE OF CUBA IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET AGREEMENT TO REMOVE THE IL-28S FROM CUBA WITHIN A PERIOD OF ABOUT 30 DAYS, WE ARE ENTERING A NEW PHASE OF THE CUBAN  
CFN 7600 1 955-62 28 1 28 1962 IL-28S 30

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

*Don 6/23/98*

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RELEASE  
23 JUNE 98

*DOC 250*



SITUATION.

2. THE NEW PHASE HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED BY THE TERMINATION OF THE 1/8 AIRBORNE ALERT; THE RETURN OF B-47 AIRCRAFT TO HOME BASES, EXCEPT FOR THOSE IN FLORIDA; AUTHORIZATION FOR THE COMMANDS TO RETURN TO DEFCON 3 STATUS EXCEPT WHERE SPECIFIC SITUATIONS DICTATE OTHERWISE; THE RELEASE OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE TROOP CARRIER UNITS; AND THE AUTHORITY FOR THE RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS OF US NAVAL SHIPS AND AIR SQUADRONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MARITIME QUARANTINE. ALL OTHER FORCES, HOWEVER, ARE BEING MAINTAINED AT HIGH READINESS, AND MILITARY FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF REACTING ON A 12-HOUR BASIS FOR CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 AND A 7-DAY BASIS FOR CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, EXCEPT THAT NECESSARY SHIPPING HAS NOT BEEN ACCUMULATED.

3. IN THIS NEW SITUATION, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR HIGH- AND LOW-LEVEL AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OVER CUBA AND OVER SOVIET SHIPPING IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE SOVIET COMMITMENTS ARE IN FACT FULFILLED. AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST RECOGNIZE THE MAINTENANCE NEEDS OF OUR FORCES AND THE PERSONNEL HARSHIPS WHICH HIGH ALERT

CFM 2 1/8 B-47 5 12 312-62 7 316-62 3

Call off



PAGE THREE RUEPCR 225

LEVELS HAVE IMPOSED.

4. IN RECOGNITION OF THESE FACTS, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING ALERT POSTURE CRITERIA TO BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME, WITH FURTHER REDUCTION TO NORMAL PRE-CUBA POSTURE PRIOR TO CHRISTMAS CONTINGENT ON ACTUAL SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF IL-28 AIRCRAFT FROM CUBA:

A. OVERFLIGHT RECONNAISSANCE:

(1) HIGH-LEVEL: [

[A]

6(C)(C)

(2) LOW-LEVEL: ] FOUR AIRCRAFT ON 12-HOUR ALERT AND EIGHT AIRCRAFT ON 24-HOUR ALERT, AND SIMILAR READINESS FOR ALL AIRCRAFT WHICH SUPPORT THE FOREGOING RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS (I.E., FIGHTER ESCORT, CAP, SAR, ELINT, ETC.).

B. LOCAL REPRISAL STRIKE AIRCRAFT: 24 HOURS FOLLOWING A DECISION TO EXECUTE A REPRISAL.

C. REIMPOSITION OF THE QUARANTINE OF CUBA: 72 HOURS.

CFN 4 IL-28 (1) U-2 21 U-2 (2) 12 24 24 72



D. [

]

E. EXECUTION OF CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62: 72 HOURS.

F. EXECUTION OF CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62: 18 DAYS.

G. AIR DEFENSE: RESUME NORMAL POSTURE EXCEPT FOR

THOSE UNITS WHICH MAY BE NEEDED TO INCREASE THE AIR  
DEFENSE OF THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES ON A PERMA-  
NENT BASIS. LONG-TERM AIR DEFENSE NEEDS FOR THIS  
REGION ARE UNDER STUDY.

H. STRATEGIC FORCES: MAINTENANCE OF NORMAL ALERT  
LEVELS.

5. RELAXATION OF READINESS POSTURE TO THE FOREGOING  
LEVELS WILL PERMIT THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AT  
THIS TIME:

A. CINCLANT AND COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS: CINCLANT  
AND THE COMPONENT COMMANDERS WILL MAINTAIN THE PRESENT-  
LY ACTIVATED COMMUNICATIONS NET. CINCLANT AND  
CINCLANT HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS CAN BE RETURNED TO  
HOME STATIONS EXCEPT FOR REDUCED STAFFS MAINTAINED AT  
HOMESTEAD.

CPN 1L-28S 48 312-62 72 312-62 18 5

6(1)(c)

[A]



PAGE FIVE RUEPCR 225

B. AIR FORCES: THE REACTION TIMES PROVIDED PERMIT THE RETURN OF ALL UNITS, LESS THOSE REQUIRED FOR CONDUCT OF AND COMBAT SUPPORT TO RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS, TO HOME BASES AND RESUMPTION OF NORMAL TRAINING. WAR RESERVE MATERIEL AND SELECTED SUPPORT AND CONTROL PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN AT FLORIDA BASES.

C. MARINE FORCES: ALL WEST COAST UNITS LESS 3D LAM BATTALION WILL BE RETURNED TO HOME STATIONS AT ONCE. THE FMF ATLANTIC UNITS WHICH ARE PRESENTLY PART OF THE RECENT GUANTANAMO DEFENSE AUGMENTATION WILL REMAIN AS PRESENTLY DEPLOYED WITH A GOAL OF RETURNING THESE UNITS TO HOME STATIONS BY 28 DECEMBER 1962. 5TH MEB SHIPPING SHOULD BE UTILIZED INSOFAR AS PRACTICABLE IN RETURNING THE 2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES, TO THE WEST COAST.

D. ARMY FORCES: ALL ARMY UNITS CAN BE RETURNED TO HOME STATIONS EXCEPT THOSE REQUIRED TO MEET THE PROVISIONS OF SUBPARAGRAPH 5A ABOVE, AND THE 159TH BOAT BATTALION, WHICH WILL REMAIN TEMPORARILY AT FORT LAUDERDALE PENDING COMPLETION OF STUDIES TO DETERMINE A SUITABLE LOCATION THAT WILL ENABLE IT TO MEET THE

BT

CFN 3D 28 1962 5TH 2D 1ST 5A 159TH

28/2310Z RUEPCR

TOP SECRET



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10250  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 251  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 11/28/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/23/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State.



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IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10250  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 251

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE :  
DATE : 11/28/62  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from OSD, CIA and State.



MESSAGE SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Chen)		ACCOUNTING CENTER	OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	PRIORITY	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	SYMBOL (2) TIL	
INFO	PRIORITY		X		DA	
FROM: JCS						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO: CINCLANT						Regular JCS
INFO: CINCARLANT						Distribution
A						+ SECDEF
CINCPFLANT						and White House
A						
CINCLANTFLT						
CINCSTRIKE						
CINCONAD						
CINCSAC						
CSA						
CNO						
CSAF						
CMC						
COMATS						
JACE AJCC FT RITCHIE MD						
JACE AIRBORNE ANDREWS AFB MD						
JACE AFLOAT NORFOLK VA						
TOP SECRET JCS 7590						DATE
From JCS.						TIME
						MONTH
						YEAR
						Nov
						1962

SYMBOL		SIGNATURE	
JCS		<i>Herbert D. Riley</i>	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		TYPED (or REPRODUCED) NAME AND TITLE	
CAPT M. A. HADDEN, USN		HERBERT D. RILEY	
PHONE	PAGE NR.	Vice Admiral, USN	
54773	1	Director, Joint Staff	
NR. OF PAGES			
2			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
TOP SECRET			

JCS 7590

281745Z Nov 62

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Reviewed on 6/18/96 DIN

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

6/23/98

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
PENDING REVIEW BY  
THE JOINT STAFF  
23 JUNE 98

PAGE NR

100251

SGO FORM 35-4  
JUN 87

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MESSAGE SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

Refs: a. CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62; b. CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61; c. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62.

The JCS have been directed to review the contingency plans for Cuba with a view to determining ways and means of compressing the time of reaction. Accordingly, it is requested that you review refs a, b, and c in light of recent experience, confirm or recommend modifications to their basic concepts and force requirements, and advise as to possibilities of reducing reaction times both within the plans and between the S-Day for 312 and D-Day for 314/316. It is timely now to review all possible alternative concepts which may have suggested themselves in the course of recent preparations to invade Cuba. Because of the suspended status of ref b, priority attention should be accorded to refs in the order ref c, ref a, ref b. Gp 3.

DISTR: CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-3, J2-1, J3-5, J4-4, J5-1,  
SACSA-1, DIA/CIIC-3, JWR-2, JWRA-1, JSSC-1,  
SEC DEF-8, WHITE HOUSE-3, BRA-1, SAMAA-1, JRG-1,  
JCCRG-1, CNO, CSAF, CMC, CSA, DCSOP, DCSLOG, DCSPER, ACS I

JCS 7590

PAGE NR 2

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10251  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 252  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : DRAFT MESSAGE  
DATE : 00/00/00  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State.



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10251  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 252

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
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DATE : 00/00/00  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN ~~TOP SECRET~~ *OPEN IN FULL*  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from ~~OSD~~, ~~CIA~~ and State.



SECRET

DRAFT

FROM: JCS  
TO: CINCARIB  
CINCLANT  
INFO: CINCSAC  
CINCOMAD  
CINCSTRIKE  
CSA  
CNO  
CSAF  
CNC  
JACE AJCC FT RITCHIE MD  
JACE AFLOAT NORFOLK VA  
JACE AIRBORNE ANDREWS AFB MD

Regular JCS  
Distribution

CC 70515 1a  
AF IN 3636

SECRET JCS

From JCS

Ref: CINCARIB Msg CC 70515, DTG 3242025Z Mar 63

US Military Alerting System

1. On 8 March 1963, the President approved a comprehensive US program dealing with the movement of subversives and subversive trainees to and from Cuba.

2. One of the recommendations approved by the President proposed the establishment of a US military alerting system by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly

to concerned.

3. It is requested that CINCARIB and CINCLANT take the following actions to implement the approved recommendation:

- a. Establish a military alerting system as quickly as possible.
- b. Expedite installation of the planned communications circuits which were listed in reference.

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*Jm 6/23/98*

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SECRET

c. Coordinate closely with CIA field offices to facilitate  
arrangements for intelligence inputs and for the use of CIA  
communications for emergency transmissions.

d. Dispatch messages on subversive movements directly  
to the Ambassadors concerned through the resident executive  
agent attache with a copy to DIA and other interested agencies.  
The requirement for timely transmittal is of paramount  
importance. Gp-1

WRITER:  
Lt Col Higgio  
Ext 56538

SECRET



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10252  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : DRAFT MESSAGE  
DATE : 03/29/63  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

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TITLE : DRAFT MESSAGE  
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DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
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CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from OSD, CIA and State.



SECRET

29 March 1963

STAFF STUDY REPORT  
US MILITARY ALERTING SYSTEM

PROBLEM

1. To determine the best means of establishing a US military alerting system by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors to countries concerned (contingent upon the decisions made as a result of the study under A 3 through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command).

REFERENCES

2. a. JCS 5759 190013Z August 62.
- b. CINCLANT Mag 061348Z November 62.
- c. SM 397-62, 20 August 62.
- d. SM 1267-62, 20 November 62.
- e. Ltr, DIA, Subject: Caribbean Security Arrangements, 14 December 1962.
- f. Mag, CINCARIB, 0070515, DTG P242026Z March 63.

DISCUSSION

3. a. By reference 2 a the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCLANT in coordination with CINCARIB to develop a US Military Alerting System throughout the Caribbean area using current resources which would channel information to both commands.

b. Reference 2 b forwarded the joint views and recommendations of CINCLANT and CINCARIB for establishing the system. Essentially, the CINCLANT/CINCARIB views were that they could establish a US military alerting system in the Caribbean to provide intelligence on movement of subversives. Since the current capability of the proposed alerting system is limited by current resources, CINCLANT/CINCARIB recommended that DIA

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*Jan 6/23/98*

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
23 JUNE 98

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under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 9/30/98 *MP*

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

Doc 253



obtain from CIA an intelligence input and permission to use CIA communication nets for emergency transmission of information to focal points. They also recommended that additional military communication capabilities within the Latin American countries be provided. CINCLANT/CINCARIB reported that the Caribbean Alerting System could become operational immediately upon receipt of JCS authority.

c. In reference 2 c and 2 d the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that DIA provide intelligence inputs into a military alerting system in the Caribbean area, and that DIA obtain intelligence inputs from CIA and permission to use CIA communications facilities for emergency transmission of intelligence to focal points.

d. In reference 2 e DIA informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it had prepared a Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR) designed to provide an intelligence input for the Caribbean Alerting System. This SICR was levied on CIA and the three Services in August 1962. The Services were also requested to furnish weekly consolidated reports. The CIA advised that they were willing to cooperate with and assist the JCS in the emergency transmission of intelligence to the desired focal points.

e. In reference f CINCARIB, on 24 March 1963, recommended that CARIBCOM establish an intelligence center which could handle intelligence on the movement of subversives. The communications with Latin American countries both available and planned were listed as follows:

(1) Available now are military voice and secure teletype circuits from the Canal Zone to La Paz, Bolivia, San Jose, Costa Rica and Guatemala City. USNAVCARIB, Latin American Naval Control of shipping net, is now operating on an unclassified basis. By 1 April 1963 there will be a high quality



voice and secure teletype circuit via leased ocean cable from the Canal Zone to the United States. A secure voice circuit from CINCARIB to Washington will follow. Circuits to Jamaica can be obtained via this cable. By 1 July a secure teletype circuit will be available via I.T.T. leased radio circuit from the Canal Zone to Lima, Peru, Santiago, Chile, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Caracas, Venezuela, and Buenos Aires, Argentina. By 30 June a voice and secure teletype circuit will be available from the Canal Zone to Tegucigalpa, Honduras; Managua, Nicaragua; Bogota, Columbia and Quito, Ecuador. Within 10 months from the date of placing order a high quality voice and secure teletype circuit via ocean cable can be available from the Canal Zone to Puerto Rico. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation relative to this circuit is pending DOD approval.

f. From all indications, CINCLANT/CINCARIB are prepared now to initiate a military alerting system with the military resources available supported by emergency communications back-up from CIA. All that remains is for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct that the system be implemented. Once the system is established, it should progressively improve as programmed communications are installed and as the CARIBCON Current Intelligence and Indications Center is strengthened.

#### CONCLUSIONS

a. That CINCARIB/CINCLANT are capable of initiating a military alerting system now, and that this system could be rapidly improved as additional programmed communications become available.

b. That CINCARIB and CINCLANT should be directed to expedite the installation of the communications circuits which were listed in CINCARIB message, CC7C515, 24 March 1963.



SECRET

c. That CINCARIB and CINCLANT should coordinate closely with CIA field offices in order to facilitate arrangements for intelligence inputs and for the use of CIA communications for emergency transmissions.

d. That CINCARIB and CINCLANT be authorized to send messages on subversive movements directly to the Ambassadors concerned through the resident executive agent attache with a copy to DIA and other interested agencies. The requirement for timely transmittal is of paramount importance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. a. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions in paragraph 5, above.

b. That the attached message, which reflects the conclusions in subparagraphs 5.a, b, c, and d be forwarded to CINCARIB and CINCLANT.

c. That this study should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent, DOD.

SECRET



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10254  
RECORD SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 255

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**August 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**

**Number of Postponements: 1**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 08/06/98**

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP OF THE NATIONAL  
SECURITY COUNCIL  
DATE : 07/09/63  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
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OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Reviewed  
by OSD, CIA and State.



10a



**TOP SECRET**

**SENSITIVE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

9 July 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP OF THE NATIONAL  
SECURITY COUNCIL**

**SUBJECT: Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights -- Contingency  
Plan (submitted 28 May 1963)**

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this plan, and offer the general and specific comments and recommendations set forth below.

2. General

a. The proposals in the plan are considered only a segment of the spectrum of possible provocative measures that could be taken to incite the Castro-Communist regime to take actions which would justify U.S. reprisals aimed at the elimination of the Castro regime. It is understood that other provocative measures may be considered which would provide an equally just and credible framework for overt military action on the part of the U.S. to achieve the same end result.

b. It must be recognized as probable that there would be a requirement for CINCLANT Op Plans 312 and 316 to insure the elimination of the Castro-Communist regime.

3. Specific

a. Subparagraphs 2d, 4a, and 7b(1); the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree with these provisions for medium altitude overflights. They consider that the military feasibility of such flights is a matter which should be evaluated at the time.

b. Subparagraph 3a: while the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that response to Cuban provocation is the "most feasible" means of action, they would not rule out unilateral actions without provocation should circumstances so indicate.

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Reviewed on 7/30/98 *apn*

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*In 6/20/98*

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AS REQUESTED  
23 JUN 99

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**SENSITIVE**

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Page 1 of 3 Pages



**TOP SECRET**

SENSITIVE

c. Subparagraph 4a: the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this paragraph be revised to indicate timing, i. e., how soon after the incident occurs the actions described in subparagraph 4a are to be taken. (Comments 3a and 3f of this memorandum also apply.)

d. Subparagraph 4c: the parenthetical phrase "(DEFCON 3 for SAC)" should be deleted, as all U.S. forces would be placed in appropriate states of readiness.

e. Subparagraphs 6b(5) and 6c(2): in connection with these subparagraphs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the paper should be expanded to include consideration of the possibility of building up in advance a potential for revolt within Cuba.

[A]

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Page 2 of 3 Pages



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1. In view of the gravity of the matter, more detailed analysis should be made of the question of U.S. -U.S.S.R. confrontations likely to result from the proposal in Cuba and elsewhere, the impact of possible Soviet reactions upon the time phasing proposed, the possibility of escalation, and the capability of U.S. forces to cope with simultaneous crises.

4. It is recommended that the Contingency Plan be revised in accordance with the foregoing, and made available for further review when revised.

  
A. J. GOODASTER  
Major General, USA  
Spec. Asst. to Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Page 3 of 3 Pages



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10255  
RECORDS SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 256

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
DATE : 11/21/63  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
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RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 256  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
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TO :  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
DATE : 11/21/63  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : ~~REFERRED~~ *OPEN IN FULL*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from OSD, State and CIA.



TOP SECRET

21 November 1963

File

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: U-2 Accident

FROM: NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

1. At 201529Z, a U-2 aircraft on BRASS KNOB Mission 3777 was observed in a rapid descent from 69,000 feet on bearing 340 degrees, 42 miles from JARCC RADAR. Aircraft faded from scope at 1633Z on bearing 340 degrees at 41 miles.

2. At 1533Z, 2 P-4 aircraft were diverted and at 1537Z located oil and fuel slick at 335 degrees 40 miles from Key West TACAN. Debris was observed in the oil slick.

3. Coast Guard Cutter NEMESIS marked oil slick and recovered debris which included three oxygen bottles, pilot seat cushion and other minor debris.

4. Torpedo Recovery Boat with divers arrived on scene at 202100Z. Three dives were made with negative results. Diving secured until first light on 21 November.

5. USS PETREL (ASR) and USS SHRIKE (MSO) arrived on scene for underwater search. Petrel located wreckage on bearing 273 degrees 2140 yards from original datum of crash. Divers reported ejection seat missing from aircraft. Wreckage is in two large sections. Cockpit and fuselage telescoped to length of 25 to 30 feet. Flight crews check list was recovered and pilots name was verified as that of Captain Joe Hyde, Junior as previously released on commercial radio.

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Jan 6/23/98

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
23 JUN 89

*C. H. Anderson*  
C. H. ANDERSON  
COL, USA  
Command Center  
Operations Team Chief

TOP SECRET

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release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)  
Reviewed on 7/30/98 *myr*

Doc 256



5  
November 20, 1963

Statement to be put out by SAC:

A WU-2 aircraft returning from a routine reconnaissance mission is reported down forty miles northwest of Key West. The plane disappeared from land-based radar scopes at 10:32 AM EST today, November 20. A pilot in the area observed and reported an oil slick at about 10:40 AM EST. It is believed that cause of the crash was a mechanical failure. There is no indication or evidence that any hostile action was involved. An air and sea search of the area is in progress.

Approved by the President



November 20, 1963

Mr. Smith:

Mr. Scott left the following message:

The statement has been cleared with Mr. Alexis Johnson (who is Acting Secretary today).

All agree that the sentence beginning with "It is assumed" should be left in. (It may turn out that the pilot had a heart attack, which would be shown in an autopsy.) This is the operational people's view.

They suggest amending the next-to-last sentence as I have indicated on the attached.

\*\*\*\* They have not been able to get Defense clearance since Mr. Gilpatric is on the Hill today and there is no indication as to when he will be back. However, the Pentagon Public Affairs people are aware of it.

All agree that the President should have a look at the proposed release.

pay

Mr. Scott would like you to call him when this is cleared.  
X-4134

\*\*\*\*Mr. Lenartson called to say that he has had a chance to ask Mr. Gilpatric about this. Mr. Gilpatric does not have an unbending feeling about the sentence which I amended in the attached, but does think it is better to leave some flexibility in case something bordering on hostile action should be evidenced in the future. Also, this should be put out by SAC, who normally makes this sort of announcement.



November 20, 1963

A WU-2 aircraft returning from a routine reconnaissance mission is reported down forty miles northwest of Key West. The plane disappeared from land-based radar scopes at 10:32 AM EST today, November 20. A pilot in the area observed and reported an oil slick at about 10:40 AM EST. It is ~~assumed~~ <sup>believed</sup> that cause of the crash was a mechanical failure. ~~There is~~ <sup>but</sup> ~~no~~ <sup>or evidence</sup> indication ~~that any~~ hostile action was involved. An air and sea search of the area is in progress.

Approved by The President  
To be released by SAC



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10256  
RECORD SERIES : JFK LIBRARY SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 257

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July 10, 1998

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of Postponements: 1

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 07/08/98

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A. Operational Details  
B. Name of Person  
C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Proposed to Protect the Privacy of an Individual  
E. Location  
F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization  
H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer  
I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10256  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 257  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : JCS  
TO :  
TITLE : DISRUPTION OF COMMUNIST ARMS SMUGGLING INTO LATIN  
AMERICA  
DATE : 11/20/63  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
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OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Review  
completed by OSD, CIA and State.



MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

STATE COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

42

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERENCE TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION PRIORITY	BOOK	DA		
INFO ROUTINE	MULTI X			

FROM:

JCS

TO:

CINCLANT

CINCONAD

CINCSTRIKE

USCINCSO

INFO: CINCPAC

CINCSAC

TOP SECRET JCS 3642

From JCS.

Disruption of Communist Arms Smuggling into Latin America

This msg in two parts.

Part I: For all

1. Background: Evidence is accumulating that Communist Cuba is smuggling significant quantities of weapons into Venezuela for subversive purposes. Delivery methods include small craft, air land, and air drop. This traffic represents a serious threat to hemisphere security and must be eliminated.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Regular JCS  
Distribution  
Plus  
OASD-ISA

DATE	TIME
20	1420
MONTH	YEAR
Nov.	1963

SYMBOL	JCS (J-3)
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)	Col. W. Greenwood
PHONE	53517
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE	<i>J. E. Bradbury</i>
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	JACK E. BRADBURY Lt Colonel, USAF Chief, Implementation Division DTG 201923Z NOV 63

JCS 3642

201923Z NOV. 63

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Jan 6/23/98

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000257

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TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

2. Assumption: It is assumed that:

a. Government of Venezuela (GOV) will request USG to provide operational forces to assist in terminating arms traffic.

b. Required US forces may operate from bases in Venezuela.

c. Combat actions by US forces in territorial waters/air space of Venezuela will be authorized.

3. US forces, in conjunction with those of GOV, conduct operations to eliminate clandestine arms traffic into Venezuela.

4. Concept of Operations:

a. USCINCSO supported by CINCLANT conducts operations to eliminate clandestine arms traffic from Cuba into Venezuela, places necessary forces in that country to establish surveillance, and conducts intercept operations to destroy hostile delivery vehicles.

b. USCINCSO - Provides 3 levels of assistance to Venezuelan forces as outlined below:

(1) First Level.

(a) On order, dispatch to Venezuela a joint survey and mobile training team to provide training, assistance, and advice in the following areas:



~~TOP SECRET~~

Organization and operation of a joint operations center, communications, processing intelligence data, aerial photography, and coordination of all Venezuelan military and paramilitary forces and US forces involved in surveillance and interception operations. The survey and training team will make recommendations as to additional requirements for assistance.

(b) CONAD provide USSOUTHCOM 3 RC-121 aircraft for all-weather and intercept control to support Venezuelan effort.

(2) Second Level.

[A]

(C)(C)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

This detachment should be in Canal Zone within 12

hours after decision is made to provide this level of assistance.

c. USCINCSO: Augmented by forces from CINCSTRIKE and CINCONAD, USCINCSO conducts operations to assist GOV in elimination of clandestine arms traffic.

d. CINCLANT supports USCINCSO by conducting operations in Caribbean seaward approaches to Venezuela to support USCINCSO, establishes air and surface surveillance screen to provide early info of approaches of suspect ships/aircraft, and coordinates deployment of all Naval forces committed to this plan.

e. CINCONAD: Provides forces to USCINCSO as indicated above.

f. CINCSTRIKE: Provides forces to USCINCSO as indicated above.

5. Coordination: DIRLAUTH.

Part II: For USCINCSO

1. Submit plan to JCS NLT 25 Nov 1963.

Gp-3.

DISTR: CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-3, J3-7, J4-2, J5-1, SACSA-1, DIA/CIIC-1, NMCC-2, RRA-1, SAMAA-1, CNO, CSAF, GMC, CSA, DCSOP, ACSFOR, DCSLOG, ACSI, OSD/ISA

JCS 3642

TOP SECRET

PAGE 4

ADDED DIST: WHITE HOUSE (VIA JCS) (TOP SECRET)



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
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DOCUMENT TYPE : MESSAGE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
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# NAVAL MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

NAVY DEPT. WASH.

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	CLASSIFIED	EXT. NO.
ROUTINE	(INFO)			

7 R 221450Z  
FM CINCLANT

TO RUECW/JCS

INFO RULPC/USCINCSO  
RUEKDL/CINCSRIKE  
RUWALB/CINCONAD  
RUXPA/CINCPAC  
RUCSBR/CINCSAC

- TOP SECRET

DISRUPTION OF COMMUNIST ARMS SMUGGLING INTO LATIN AMERICA

A. JCS 3642 DTG 201923Z  
B. CINCLANT 170330Z NOTAL

1. REF A DIRECTS CINCLANT TO SUPPORT USCINCSO BY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN CARIBSEAN SEAWARD APPROACHES TO VENEZUELA, BY ESTABLISHING AIR AND SURFACE SURVEILLANCE SCREEN TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING OF APPROACHES OF SUSPECT SHIPS/AIRCRAFT, AND TO COORDINATE DEPLOYMENT OF ALL NAVAL FORCES COMMITTED TO THIS PLAN.

2. REF B PROVIDES INITIAL ESTIMATE OF LANTCOM COURSES OF ACTION TO ASSIST IN AIR INTERCEPTS. FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES FEASIBLE LANTFLT FORCES AND COURSES TO SUPPORT USCINCSO IAW REF A.

A. PATROL AIRCRAFT FOR SURFACE SURVEILLANCE. THE EXISTING SURVEILLANCE PATROL PATTERNS CURRENTLY BEING FLOWN TO SURVEIL SHIPPING INTO AND OUT OF CUBA CAN BE DIVERTED AND/OR AUGMENTED TO PROVIDE AERIAL COVERAGES OF DESIGNATED CARIBBEAN SEA ROUTES AND APPROACHES TO VENEZUELA.

B. AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT FOR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE. MEANINGFUL EARLY WARNING OF SUSPECT AIRCRAFT ENROUTE TRANS-CARIB FROM THE NORTH CAN BE PROVIDED ONLY IF CERTAIN PARAMETERS ARE

- ACT...JCS/J3-7  
CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-3 NMCC-2 SACSA-1 RIDE-2 (1-20) two  
CSA(21-22) CSAF(23-24) CMC(25-32) CNO(33-55)  
ADD:OSD(57-71) WHITE HOUSE VIA JCS(72-74) SDO VIA JCS(75-82)

ADV COPY (A-1) SENT TO JCS 11-22 1500Z 20 JUN 69

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23 JUN 69

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00258

Jan 6/23/98



## NAVAL MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENCE	(ACTION)	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	EXT. NO.
	(INFO)			

7. DEFINED. SPECIFIC ROUTE COVERAGE SHOULD BE DESIGNATED AS WELL AS FINITE AND PREFERABLY LIMITED TIME PERIODS. IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO ESTABLISH A CONTINUOUS BARRIER TO CORRELATE AND REPORT ALL TRANS-CARIB FLIGHTS. AEW AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM NAS ROOS RDS CAN PROVIDE COVERAGE WITHIN DEFINED PARAMETERS.

C. SURFACE FORCES FOR SURFACE AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, AS WARRANTED BY THE SITUATION EXTANT AT THE TIME, SURFACE UNITS VARYING FROM SINGLE DE ON STATION TO DESRON DEPLOYED IN QUARANTINE BARRIER CAN BE EMPLOYED.

3. ALL OF THE ABOVE HAVE SINGLE-SIDE BAND CAPABILITY FOR CONTACT REPORTING PURPOSES.

4. UPON RECEIPT USCINCSO PLAN, WILL PREPARE PLAN TO EMPLOY LANTCOM FORCES TO SUPPORT IAW THE ABOVE.

5. GP-3.

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 259  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :  
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RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED *OPEN IN FULL*  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from OSD, CIA and State.





THE JOINT STAFF

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBA SUBVERSION

18 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Subject: Committee Meeting, 1330 Wednesday,  
20 March 1963

1. This will confirm that our next meeting will be held  
at 1330 Wednesday, 20 March 1963, at the Department of  
State. *Rm. 7514*

2. The agenda for the meeting is as follows:

a. Submission by committee members of recommended  
format for report to the President.

b. Consideration of paper on "Movement of Funds"  
prepared by Treasury Department.

c. Discussion of outline for paper on training of  
personnel in the United States.

d. Further discussion of implementation procedures.

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*Jm 6/23/98*

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
23 JUNE 98

V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC  
Chairman

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

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*6/21/96 ew*

SECRET

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 260

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TO :  
TITLE : TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED  
STATES  
DATE : 03/18/63  
PAGES : 5  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : OUTLINE OF PAPER  
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TITLE : TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES  
DATE : 03/18/63  
PAGES : 5  
SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING

DOCUMENT TYPE : OUTLINE OF PAPER  
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET  
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CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
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OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from ~~OSD~~, ~~CIA~~ and ~~State~~.





164  
✓ 2  
**SECRET**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
**SUB-COMMITTEE ON SUBVERSION**

18 March 1963

**TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS:**

This is a rough initial outline for the paper on training Latin American students in the United States. Please be prepared to give your views on amending it, or substituting a different one, at our meeting on Wednesday, March 20th.

V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC  
Chairman

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7/30/98 *mgp*

CIA  
DECLASSIFICATION  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

6/21/96 *ea*

In 6/23/98

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23 JUN 98

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DOES NOT APPLY

Doc 760



SECRET

TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Introduction

The fact that 2,000 Latin Americans have recently received an infusion of Communist ideology and subversive violence in Cuba is cause for concern, and warrants an energetic response. Our actions to frustrate this movement are already beginning to generate momentum, but it will be idle to conclude that impediments to travel, to and from Cuba, will go very far toward eliminating the strength of Castro-Communist inspired subversion in Latin America. To remove the ability of Latin Americans to travel to Cuba is important, but much more important is to remove their desire to go there in the first place.

The root causes of this desire are numerous, but prominent among them is the dissatisfaction of the young people of Latin America; their impatient hope for better things; their curiosity about the world at large. The younger generation of Latin Americans cannot be expected to stand still, and if it were not Communism that fascinated and attracted them, it would be something else. This paper proposes to offer actions which may represent a part of the something else - a means of infusing more of the youth of Latin America with an understanding of democracy and a decent regard for its institutions, and from this source to develop a much more powerful base of counter-subversive strength.

The actions proposed have been limited to the area of training in military and certain technical fields - the latter selected on a basis of their special significance to our program for countering Castro-Communist subversion. It is recognized that the broader area of increasing secondary school and college-level education in the United States for Latin American students also requires examination; however, this is considered beyond the scope of this study.

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II. The Areas of Opportunity

1. Discuss virtues of getting Latin American youth out of their countries and into the U.S., where they can (a) see and appreciate the U.S., and learn what we are and how we think; (b) teach them useful technical skills - skills identified with critical activities - and (c) identify, for possible subsequent use where desirable, those friendly individuals who show the greatest likelihood of usefulness in countering Castro-Communist subversion in the areas of the technical competence which we teach them.

2. Discussion of some of the most fruitful areas for training - police, customs, military, utilities, transportation, mechanisms, air control, etc., explaining why they are important to us in countering subversion.

3. Discussion of some of the problems - cost, etc. Note extent to which Russians, Poles, Czechs, Chinese are doing it now - with figures.

4. Comment on what we are now doing in this area, being careful to exclude the areas of undergraduate schooling, general education, graduate work, etc.

III. Actions

Make some sort of logical breakdown of proposed actions perhaps by technical field - military, police, customs, etc. Cover what should be done, who should do it, and as much of the details of when, how, etc., as possible.

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TRAINING L.A. STUDENTS IN USA

It is suggested this project can be divided into two phases with beneficial results.

The first phase would be to bring LA students in sizeable numbers to this country during their vacation periods, usually two to three months, for an intensive course in English at an American college. An unannounced portion of the curriculum would be an informal orientation course on "Life in the USA."

The second phase would be to bring from these students more selective and smaller groups for longer periods to attend technical courses in those fields we deem important for the achievement of our objectives.

A number of cogent reasons recommend this approach:

1. At a relatively low cost a large number of Latin youths can be exposed to U.S. Customs, ideas, etc., and get a pretty good grasp of the language.
2. A fair knowledge of English is essential for adequate progress in any technical training, unless we propose to provide the courses in Spanish. The latter is not recommended.
3. The first phase permits us to screen candidates for the second phase. In this way there would be fewer failures in the technical courses, and it would enable us to select the brighter and more "cooperative" types we are seeking.
4. The vacation periods are staggered throughout Latin America so there need not be one peak period. Several U.S. colleges already specialize in the teaching of English. Others would be glad to cooperate



is the project. There are no problems of importance in setting up the program.

The age group is important. We feel the 15-19 span is the top priority. Latin youths mature somewhat earlier than ours, and this is the period when their career decisions are made. The bloc efforts are concentrated on this age group.

As to what technical training is important to us, there are so many fields the list seems limitless. We should like to suggest one rather obvious area, and another which may appear odd, but which we think has real possibilities.

The entire communications field offers opportunities. In this area we suggest the postal service might receive some emphasis.

Another which we feel can be exploited is that of athletic coaches. Few people exert more influence in the life of a youth than his coach. This is true in such of Latin America, as in the U.S. The demand for athletic programs, equipment and, obviously coaches, is widespread.

This situation presents us with opportunities we should not ignore.



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THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

19 March 1963

MEMORANDUM TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Subject: Format for Periodic Report to the President

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to give you my initial ideas on format for consideration and discussion at the committee meeting on 20 March. I would say that our reports must be brief and to the point, and must serve to inform the President of significant progress accomplished in each of the seven problem areas with which our committee is concerned, and also, of equal importance, to point out frankly any significant lack of progress with a portrayal of obstacles encountered and what is being done to overcome them.

2. The need for brevity seems to rule out the technique of listing every course of action under each major problem area along with what progress, if any, has been made on each. There are almost forty actions for "Movement of Subversive" alone, and merely to list these, plus the actions for the six additional problems, would require many typewritten pages.

3. In view of these considerations, my current feeling is that the report format will be something like that enclosed, although I am eager to hear better ideas at the meeting. The first report on April 1 will, of course, be limited to items approved by the President as of that time.

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Reviewed on

7/30/98

V. H. KUHLEK  
Major General, USMC  
Chairman

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Jan 6/23/98

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First Progress Report

Sub-Committee on Cuban Subversion

1. This is the first report of progress in implementation of decisions taken by the President on 8 March, on combatting Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America. It will be followed by similar reports, keyed to the first day of each month, and including additional decisions as they are made.

2. The report will address the specific problem, state briefly the progress achieved and identify areas of particular criticality which appear in the implementation process.

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Progress in Impeding Legal Travel to and from Cuba

1. The State Department has:
  - a. Requested all Latin American countries to stamp passports "not valid for travel in Cuba".  
— countries have responded favorably.
  - b.
  - c.
2. The U. S. Information Agency has:
  - a. Increased its campaign to publicize Castro-Communist training in Cuba, by . . . . .
  - b.
  - c.
3. The Defense Department has:
  - a.
  - b.
  - c.
4. The Justice Department has:
  - a.
  - b.
  - c.
5. The Central Intelligence Agency has:
  - a.
  - b.

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Progress in Impeding Illegal Travel to and from Cuba

1. The State Department has:
  - a.
  - b.
2. The Defense Department has:
  - a. Initiated a study on establishment of intelligence centers at Caribbean Sea Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier headquarters — completion date \_\_\_\_\_.
  - b. Approved a plan for creation of a coordinated Caribbean Surveillance System.
  - c.
3. The U. S. Information Agency has:
  - a.
  - b.
4. The Central Intelligence Agency has:
  - a. Increased its efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel by \_\_\_\_\_.
  - b.

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[3]



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

SACSA-N 157-63  
14 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs

Subject: The Movement of Arms

Reference: Memorandum Establishing Sub-Committee on Cuban Subversion dated 27 February 1963

Attached is a paper which outlines the problem of the movement of arms to and within Latin American countries, and which presents a sequence of actions contemplated to meet the problem.

For the Sub-Committee

V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC  
Chairman

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO AND WITHIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

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CUBA

DIRECT CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO AND  
WITHIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

I. Introduction

There is presented herein an action program aimed at controlling the movement of arms to and within Latin American countries through inhibitions on movement of arms, restraints on their sale, ownership and fabrication, and controls over the movement of the critical components which are essential to the local manufacture of weapons.

If success is to be achieved in reducing their use for subversive purposes in Latin America, the term "arms" cannot be limited to firearms in the narrow sense. In addition, it must include explosives, fuzes, detonators and demolition equipment; all the weapons of hand-to-hand combat; grenades and mines; underwater demolition equipment; lethal gases, chemicals and instruments for their projection; undercarriages and transportable appendages for automatic weapons, mortars and other heavy weapons; spare parts, special tools and equipment for maintenance of weapons; portable radar and fire control equipment; special sabotage devices; and printed instructional material relating to any of the items listed above, or relating to techniques for their employment in sabotage and demolition.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

Our information regarding traffic in arms between Cuba and the remainder of Latin America is extremely limited. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency both conclude that Cuba is probably not now sending significant quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents. Rather the Cubans appear thus far to have followed common guerrilla practice in the matter of firearms supply, instructing the subversive trainees who attend indoctrination in Cuba to obtain weapons by theft in their own countries, or to fabricate them locally, rather than to rely upon supplies provided from Cuba or elsewhere.

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Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to assume that the Castro government will not or cannot export arms to Latin America when to do so will serve its purposes. The very large quantities of US arms furnished to pre-Castro Cuban governments, those weapons collected from the Cuban people in 1961, and the sizeable Bloc arms shipments delivered to Cuba since that time, provide the Castro regime with large stocks which are available for transfer to subversives in other countries, should a decision be made to do so. Moreover, Cuba has a considerable air fleet and a large array of small craft. These unite with Latin America's long, unguarded coasts, numerous isolated landing fields and inadequate local security forces, to make the threat of illicit arms shipment a considerable one.

On the basis of these facts it is concluded that the immediate problems with respect to arms movement are twofold: — to prevent internal assembly of illegal arms and their distribution in and between Latin American countries, while at the same time improving our capability to impede the movement of arms to those countries from Cuba.

It is to be noted that, with respect to a number of Latin American countries, national policy decisions are a precondition to many of the actions proposed below. These countries will have to find the resolution to deal much more firmly with the general problem of Castro-Communist subversive activities than they have in the past if the proposed actions are to be effective.

III. Actions Concerning Legal Arms Movement

For the purpose of this paper, legal arms movement is considered to be the movement of weapons and other instruments of violence or the special materials from which they are made, resulting from overt orders placed by Latin American governments or private groups, and then subsequently shipped openly.

Many of the actions, which have previously been approved with respect to controlling the movement of subversive personnel, will have a direct application



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to the arms control problem. Listed below, in addition, are proposed courses of action contemplated specifically to impede legitimate arms traffic to, within and between Latin American countries for subversive purposes.

1. Intelligence Actions

a. Intensify US intelligence efforts in each Latin American country to determine the final recipients of legal arms purchases and, consistent with our own intelligence requirements, make this information available to the host government.

b. Monitor covertly, suspected sources of local weapons manufacture (machine shops, metal fabricators, foundries). Report positive findings to host government, where appropriate.

2. Political and Administrative Actions

a. Persuade each Latin American country to confirm the accuracy of cargo manifests of all ships and aircraft departing for or arriving from Cuba, and to intensify formal inspection of all cargo, regardless of country or origin, for munitions materials.

b. Provide further US technical assistance to Latin American countries to improve customs procedures and controls for ports, airfields and border stations.

c. Through the US diplomatic mission in each Latin American country, impress upon the appropriate ministries the need for ensuring the bona fides of all legal purchasers, dealers, brokers, and transporters of arms, munitions and explosives, and confirming that they are not communist relay points.

IV. Actions Concerning Illegal Arms Traffic

Listed below are proposed actions designed to impede the illicit fabrication, transportation and distribution of arms, in the broad connotation of the term



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as presented in Section I. By virtue of their specific nature, the actions do not have universal application, and those which may be effective in one country may not be necessary or feasible in another.

1. Training, Orientation, Indoctrination of Latin American Personnel

Offer US assistance to Latin American nations in initiating training programs to educate law enforcement, military, customs, border police, and other officials in the technical aspects of arms control, to include creation of an awareness of the characteristics of all mechanisms of destruction and violence.

2. Intelligence Actions

a. Penetrate subversive elements or groups in each Latin American country to acquire intelligence concerning illicit arms manufacture and movement. Provide the affected governments with this information, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence program. Assist in disrupting such manufacture and movement by covert means.

b. Utilize the resources of the US intelligence community to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic which could be used for arms shipment from Cuba and between other Latin American countries.

c. Propose bilateral arrangements providing for the exchange of information on arms movement among the US and Latin American countries, along the same lines as proposed for other information relating to subversive personnel and propaganda movement.

d. Encourage Latin American countries to utilize their private aircraft in Civil Air Patrol Programs for the purpose of extending in-country surveillance of coasts and borders.

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3. Political and Administrative Actions

a. Urge Latin American countries to intensify application of those internal law enforcement measures which are designed to impede the illicit traffic in arms. Provide US training and technical assistance, as requested.

b. Encourage Latin American countries to offer rewards for information concerning the location of arms caches and for positive identification of persons engaged in illegal arms manufacture or traffic.

c. Induce Latin American countries to expand and intensify port, airfield and border inspection of incoming and outgoing cargo for contraband arms.

d. Request diplomatic missions to bring to the attention of each Latin American state the necessity for employing strict physical security measures and reliable accountability procedures with respect to all arms and ammunition issued to units of the armed forces, militia and law enforcement units.

e. Where applicable, propose bilateral agreements among neighboring Latin American countries concerning establishment of cooperative procedures to prevent illicit arms traffic.

f. Through bilateral or OAS mechanisms, as appropriate, encourage Latin American countries to:

(1) Re-examine and adjust, as necessary, the licensing qualifications and procedures for all companies engaged in the manufacture, transportation and sale of explosives and firearms, to provide a ready basis for controlling their activities.

(2) Establish rigid control procedures for the disposal of surplus and obsolescent arms in use by armed forces and police.

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4. Propaganda Actions

a. Publicize confiscation of communist arms caches, illegal arms movements, apprehension, conviction and punishment of arms smugglers and illicit arms manufacturers. Utilize news media, UN and OAS forums.

b. Continue exposure, in Latin American mass media, of Castro Cuba as the focal point in the international conspiracy to undermine established Latin American governments by means of violence, armed insurgency and terrorism.

5. Military Actions

Exploit the mechanisms of the Caribbean surveillance system, approved by the President in the study on movement of personnel, to impede illicit traffic in arms. This will be supported by the revised military assistance guidance which was also approved in the study on personnel movement.

6. Covert Actions

a. Provide for supply to known indigenous communist groups of specially prepared arms which will malfunction in such a manner as to cause injury to the user, and thus generate both doubts and fears among the communist subversives involved.

b. Apply subtle sabotage to intercepted illegal arms shipments and permit them to proceed to destination.

c. Through agents, attempt to purchase arms from suspected illicit sources in Latin America, in order to expose these sources and to determine facts concerning their method of delivery. Also through agents, attempt to sell arms, to expose illicit purchasers.



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23 JUN 98*



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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

15 March 1963

TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

At their meeting this morning, the Cottrell Committee desired several small alterations in our Arms paper. I am enclosing a page which reflects this change.

*V. H. Krulak*  
V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC

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*Jan 6/23/98*

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4. Propaganda Actions

a. Publicize confiscation of communist arms caches, illegal arms movements, apprehension, conviction and punishment of arms smugglers and illicit arms manufacturers. Utilize news media, UN and OAS forums.

b. Continue exposure, in Latin American mass media, of Castro Cuba as the focal point in the international conspiracy to undermine established Latin American governments by means of violence, armed insurgency and terrorism.

5. Military Actions

Exploit the mechanisms of the Caribbean surveillance system, approved by the President in the study on movement of personnel, to impede illicit traffic in arms. This will be supported by the revised military assistance guidance which was also approved in the study on personnel movement.

6. Covert Actions

a. Where favorable circumstances arise, provide for supply to known indigenous communist groups of specially prepared arms which will malfunction in such a manner as to cause injury to the user, and thus generate both doubts and fears among the communist subversives involved.

b. Apply subtle sabotage to intercepted illegal arms shipments and permit them to proceed to destination.

c. Through agents, attempt to purchase arms from suspected illicit sources in Latin America, in order to expose these sources and to determine facts concerning their method of delivery. Also through agents, attempt to sell arms, to expose illicit purchasers.



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Reviewed on 9/2/93 WASHINGTON JLS

March 12, 1963

TO: Mr. Bundy  
FROM: Mr. Dungan

The attached report together  
with the caveats of the Costrell  
Committee were accepted and  
approved by the President, March 8,  
1963.

both  
doubtful { IV 3 d p 17  
IV 3 a p 13

Can they be used?  
worth it?

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On 6/23/98



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INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
OF CUBAN AFFAIRS COMMENT ON PRO-  
POSED ACTIONS TO CONTROL TRAVEL  
TO CUBA

---

There follow the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee's comments on the recommendations contained in the paper entitled "Cuba - The Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees:"

(a) Item C (1) page 10:

Although prohibition of the resumption of air service to Cuba by United States carriers might provide a favorable example to other nations, considerations of effecting the release of the imprisoned Americans, intelligence requirements, and regaining our posture as a haven for the oppressed militate against taking this action at this time.

(b) Item G (2) page 10:

Expanding shipping restrictions now would contradict the recent EXCOM decisions to apply only one of the four proposed shipping regulations.

(c) Item C (3) page 10:

This proposal goes beyond current United States practice, which we believe should be maintained for the time being.

(d) Item A (1) page 11:

also p 13.  
While rupture of remaining diplomatic relations between Latin American nations and Cuba would impede travel to Cuba, this objective is currently unattainable and would run counter to existing goals of maintaining communications with and obtaining intelligence on the Castro regime.

(e)



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- 2 -

(e) Item D (1) page 12:

Efforts to persuade Mexico to refuse introduction of Soviet-made aircraft in the Habana-Mexico City route have already been undertaken..

(f) Item D (3) page 12

Negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, and Spain are underway.

(g) Item 3 page 13:

An additional consideration bearing upon the invitation of OAS action is the status of removal of Soviet military personnel from Cuba.

(h) Item B (3) page 15:

The feasibility and desirability of establishing intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier require further study, which is being undertaken on a priority basis.

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES  
AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

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CUBA

THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES

I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin American countries. Execution of any one or more of the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation; execution of them all will not completely solve it. The practical problems involved are too numerous and complex.

With respect to diminishing legal travel to Cuba, we face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes of those Latin American countries through which the subversive traveller must pass. From the viewpoint of these nations the direct actions required have strong political and sometimes legal implications - implications which cannot be overcome easily, even when the leaders of these countries choose to do so.

In the matter of clandestine travel, we are confronted not only with the great depth of communist guile, born of two generations of experience in the international movement of subversives, but with the inexperience, ineptitude and lack of awareness in these same matters on the part of the Latin American community.

In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside with the communists. Cuba's insular character imposes certain sharp limitations upon personal movement. Cuba has no frontiers with other states; everyone who enters the country must do so either by water, or air. There can be no slipping through the barbed wire.

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On the other hand, this same geographic situation makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple. There are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpatrolled Central American coastline, within 175 to 850 miles from Cuba. There are at least 93 airfields, other than ours, within 700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft indigenous to the Caribbean, and capable of supporting the subversive ebb and flow, number well into the thousands.

Even in the face of these unfavorable factors, a program of direct restraints, selected from among the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable effects. Under the proposed steps some travel would be stopped completely. More - probably much more - would be rendered difficult. Some hitherto legal movement would be driven underground. Previous clandestine movement would be impeded, complicated and harassed to the point where it becomes more costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus, hopefully, less extensive.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

We do not know enough about the movement of subversive trainees, into Cuba and - more important - out of Cuba. We do not know enough about the volume of travel, or the media employed. This is particularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where our knowledge is extremely limited.

Regarding legal travel to Cuba, CIA presents the following estimate:



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Legal Travel Into Cuba

Country	No. of Legal Travellers	Country	No. of Legal Travellers		
	1962	Jan-Feb 1963	1962	Jan-Feb 1963	
Mexico	4912*	969	Argentina	500	Unk
Guatemala	80	Unk	Uruguay	115	Unk
El Salvador	100	8	Paraguay	60	Unk
Nicaragua	50	Unk	Brazil	400	Unk
Costa Rica	216	10	Honduras	92	21
Venezuela	200	Unk	British Guiana	40	Unk
Colombia	400	Unk	Panama	56	1
Ecuador	208	Unk	Trinidad	Unk	Unk
Peru	181	Unk	Jamaica	593	Unk
Bolivia	500	Unk	Dominican Republic	None	Unk
Chile	551	85	Haiti	Unk	Unk

\* In transit, including about 300 Mexicans

While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico. On the most conservative basis, then, it will be seen that there cannot have been fewer than 4,912 travellers to Cuba during 1962, while the average monthly number passing through Mexico for the first two months of 1963 is even higher than the 1962 monthly average.

Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central Intelligence Agency estimates that at least 1,500, and perhaps as many as 2,000, have received ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many

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of these are still in Cuba. Others have returned to their homelands; some by legal means; some probably by illicit means. There is no reason to presume, moreover, that the travel to Cuba of the remaining 3,000-3,500 was entirely consistent with the best interests of the hemisphere.

Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commercial airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered Cubana flights. Some travelled to Trinidad or Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or KIM flights to Havana. Others travelled to Mexico, and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial flights to Havana. With the cessation of service to Cuba by Pan American, KIM, Mexicana, and Iberia airlines in October, the regular Cubana service between Mexico City and Havana remained the sole direct and regular airline connection between Cuba and the remainder of Latin America.

The Cubana service between Havana and Mexico is scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only a single flight is completed per week. Aircraft now employed are British Britannias - an obsolescent model. Cubana has requested, but has not yet received, Mexican approval to substitute Soviet IL-18 transports for the old Britannias. Delay by the Mexicans in granting this approval can have the favorable effect of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in poor condition. If, in addition, the British and Canadians can be induced to suspend delivery of spare parts, the planes will soon become inoperative.

Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly flights from Madrid to Havana on 11 February. This flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching Havana.

KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba from the Netherlands Antilles. However, it is now considering doing so. In this regard it is concluded that resumption of scheduled flights by a United States carrier could serve as an encouragement to KIM and others to do the same.

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Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not stop regularly at any other Latin American country, though the Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally sought and received permission from Brazil to land at Recife, enroute to Cuba. Some Latin Americans may have travelled to Cuba on these infrequent flights and, should Brazil permit this arrangement to become regularized, the movement of subversives could achieve a new order of magnitude.

A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying both material and personnel. The Canadians have been unresponsive to our efforts to obtain identification of the passengers.

There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers operating between Latin America and Cuba. However, a number of trainees from British Guiana have travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant vessels engaged in transporting rice from Guiana to Cuba.

Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves illicit procedures. The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel out of and into Mexico. This procedure is obviously designed to impede any effort by the other Latin American governments subsequently to identify the travellers and to exercise surveillance over their activities upon their return.

Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of travel by legal means. This must be countered directly. Beyond this, and perhaps of greater importance, is the problem of illicit movement both into and out of Cuba, which will undoubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed, and about which our intelligence is at present most limited. Elimination of this intelligence void must be accorded high priority.



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III. The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations

Success of many of the overt actions proposed in the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the Latin American nations within whose borders the restraining actions must take place. Presented briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected from the various sectors of Latin America in terms of participation in a coordinated program of travel control.

As a general matter, the imposition of controls on travel is not popular with the public in any Latin American country. This, coupled with their current lack of full awareness of the danger represented by Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the willingness of some governments to impose controls unilaterally. This is especially true since they recognize that unilateral restraints will have little effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not also taken. It is likely, however, that most of the Latin American countries would respond favorably -- albeit in varying degrees -- to US leadership in seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for ideological or subversive training.

The Central American countries are more acutely aware of the danger posed by Cuban-inspired subversion than is Latin America at large, and can be expected to react favorably to proposals for reducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might present at the San Jose Presidential meeting. However, their ability to carry out commitments which they may make will be limited by domestic legal and political considerations, as well as by their countries' technical incompetence in such matters.

Since Mexico is currently the principal hemisphere transit point for legal travel of subversives to and from Cuba, its attitude is of great importance. Mexico, to date, has taken several significant steps with respect to travel between Mexican cities and Cuba. It has instituted close



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surveillance over travellers, to include stamping passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition, the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA). These actions all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even further cooperative steps, particularly on an unpublicized, bi-lateral basis, wherein the political hazards of taking a public OAS position are not involved. In this regard, the Central American Presidents would probably agree individually to seek the participation of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico in specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow of persons to Cuba through that country.

Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered public resistance, and are not enforced. The Dominican Republic prohibits such travel. Haiti has no established policy, but passports and exit permits are reportedly issued only on the personal approval of President Duvalier. Colombia could legally impose restrictions by executive decree, but has shown no inclination to do so. Other countries, such as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central American nations, plead the existence of legal or constitutional barriers which preclude the prohibition of travel to Cuba, but thus far, they have made little effort to remove these barriers.

Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to the left and gives little evidence of modifying its tolerant attitude toward the Castro government. Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises no restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct or via third country.

The elimination of all legitimate passenger service to Cuba from Latin America could be



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achieved through invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree to do so in the absence of some major crisis similar to that involving the Soviet missiles or a case of direct Cuban intervention in another Latin American country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to develop a full awareness of the danger represented by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would probably create a growing willingness to take action oriented in this direction. In this connection, however, it is concluded that resumption of regular passenger service to Cuba by United States companies would render more difficult our efforts to persuade Latin American and other free world countries to take a grave view of the situation, and to participate in dynamic action.

Virtually, all the Latin American countries would be willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives upon their return to home countries, once they put their new training to use. The efforts of these nations will not be dramatically effective, however, since, in the area of internal security, all of them suffer from deficiencies in technical skill, training, equipment and sometimes from a lack of a sense of urgency. The United States can provide essential leadership in eliminating all of these deficiencies.

IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel

Listed below are specific actions contemplated to impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba. Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose, as travel on recognized public carriers, openly arranged and involving travel documents which are presumed to be in proper order. Certain of the actions, it will be noted, are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the OAS - wholly or in part - by its Special Consultative Committee on Security.



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1. Immediate Impact Actions

The following actions offer promise of producing early, visible and effective results.

a. Administrative Actions

(1) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, induce each Western Hemisphere country to:

(a) Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals "not valid for travel to Cuba."

(b) Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any national of a third country who cannot produce a valid permit issued by his own country for travel to Cuba.

(c) Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which is not an integral, non-detachable part of the travel document issued by the country of which the traveller is a citizen.

(d) Require accurate manifests of all carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions of other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected.

(2) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition to photographing, all persons leaving for or arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the parent country of the nationals involved.

(3) Make covert arrangements with police and other security and administrative officials in countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba to impose administrative impediments and harassment on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the difficulty of travel and thus discourage prospective travellers.

b. Intelligence Actions

(1) Intensify U.S. intelligence efforts in each country to identify persons who have travelled,



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or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected information promptly to the host government, as consistent with our own intelligence program, and the requirement to protect our sources.

(2) Intensify current efforts to introduce covert, U.S. - controlled agents from each country into the Cuban training program.

c. Actions Related to Common Carriers

✓ 2  
(1) Prohibit resumption of air service to Cuba by U.S. carriers, in order to provide a favorable example to other nations.

2  
(2) Expand current restrictions on foreign shipping engaging in commerce with Cuba by closing United States ports to all ships of any shipping line which continues to send any ships to Cuban ports.

2  
(3) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to prohibit ships arriving from or departing for Cuba from embarking or disembarking passengers in their ports.

(4) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to deny their ports to ships of Cuban registry.

d. Propaganda Actions

Pursue a hemisphere-wide publicity campaign to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training of the nationals of other countries for subversive purposes, in order to discourage prospective trainees and impress the governments and the peoples concerned with the urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to Cuba.

2. Longer Range Actions

The following actions should also be undertaken without delay. Their ultimate results may be of far-



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reaching importance, but probably will be longer in realization.

a. Political Actions

*oil*  
(1) Renew and intensify bilateral negotiations with the five Latin American governments which have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

(2) Through bilateral negotiations press countries with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such travel and providing severe penalties for evasion. Recommend that rewards be offered for identification of evaders.

(3) In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, reiterate the need for full and effective cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bilaterally among the several states, in the interchange of information concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive activities.

(4) Propose periodic regional or sub-regional meetings of ministers of Government of the American Republics to review the implementation of steps taken by them to combat movement of subversives in the Caribbean.

(5) Urge other Latin American nations to negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to enlist cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba.

b. Intelligence Actions

Intensify our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence program.



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c. Administrative Actions

(1) Encourage Latin American governments to institute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of passengers to Cuba.

(2) Request governments of Latin American countries which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel documents by Cuban embassies or consulates, and take punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as requested.

(3) Intensify technical assistance to Latin American countries in improving immigration and customs controls.

d. Actions Related to Common Carriers

(1) Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines service. If unable to do so, seek to persuade Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made aircraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds. This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling into disrepair.

(2) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and any other potential supplier that they cut off the supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft.

(3) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally providing terminal service for any of the airlines involved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure.



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e. Propaganda Actions

(1) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discrediting the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers and develop popular opposition to such activities.

(2) Identify returned trainees who are dissatisfied with their Cuban training experience and exploit their capabilities for provision of intelligence and propaganda material for exposing and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities.

(3) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout Latin America, not attributable to the United States, which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities for movement of persons of other countries to and from Cuba for subversive purposes.

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions

In view of the important political, psychological, and, hopefully, material benefits to be derived from any success achieved through the OAS in combatting Cuban subversive activity, the following measures should be undertaken by the United States in that body, at times and under circumstances which give regard to the need to preserve hemispheric solidarity, and give recognition to the fact that progress will probably be slow.

a. Pursue adoption by the OAS of a resolution calling upon all member states to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba, thus impeding the travel of subversives to Cuba by legal means, and at the same time, creating serious obstacles to other related Cuban subversive activities.

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b. Propose recommendations by the OAS to member governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals in the report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific recommendations set forth herein.

c. Once the initial comprehensive program in b. above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consultative Committee on Security.

d. Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution, binding upon all member states, to terminate regular air and maritime carrier traffic with Cuba.

V. Actions Concerning Illegal Travel

As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, one of the results will be to force the hitherto legal travel into clandestine channels. It may, therefore, be expected that measures to impede illegal movement will acquire steadily increasing importance.

The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the preceding section, in terms of immediate impact projects which promise early and visible results, and longer range projects which, while of great importance, cannot be expected to mature as rapidly.

1. Immediate Impact Actions

a. Intelligence Actions

(1) Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and



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determine routes and methods employed. Report selected information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our own intelligence program, to host government.

(2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence obtained to persuade governments concerned to institute surveillance and other control measures.

b. Surveillance and Reporting Actions

(1) Continue current US sea and air surveillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba.

(2) Continue the development, at high priority, of US communications in Latin America, in order to improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities.

(3) Establish intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemination to countries concerned via the American Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement of subversives.

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Surveillance Actions

(1) Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving:

(a) Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by US forces.

(b) A US military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American



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Ambassadors to countries concerned through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command.

(c) A unilateral surveillance and interception effort by each country in its own territorial waters.

(d) US assistance in final interception in territorial waters, upon request by the country concerned.

b. US Military Assistance Actions

(1) Establish Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected countries, especially in the Caribbean and Central American area, with the necessary small patrol craft, training and logistical support, including fuel for operations if required, to enable these countries to establish an effective patrol of their own coasts. Provide necessary funds in addition to present programs.

(2) Provide US Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard training assistance, as required, to develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military forces. This may take the form of a Canal Zone training activity, employment of mobile training teams, or a combination of both.

(3) Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces and police forces in Latin American countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at preventing clandestine departures and apprehending returned trainees. Provide equipment, training and advice as required.



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SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

29 March 1963

TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS

1. Here is the third working draft on actions to impede the transfer of funds from Cuba to and within Latin America.

2. Please submit any comments you might have by 1600, 1 April 1963.

*Krulak*

V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC  
Chairman

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THIRD WORKING DRAFT

CUBA

DIRECT CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS TO AND  
WITHIN LATIN AMERICA

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to recommend measures which will impose direct controls upon the flow of funds from Cuba to and within other Latin American countries.

We possess evidence that Cuba is providing financial support to subversive campaigns in other Latin American countries, but the full dimensions of the problem, in terms of amounts involved and methods used, are not known. We need more information. The difficulty with which this information is procured underscores the problems of counter-measures, since funds can be transferred internationally or acquired locally in many ways, all

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difficult to detect and harder to prevent. While we may be able to diminish the flow through some channels and increase the difficulty of Castro's subversive financial operations in others, we cannot hope to succeed in stopping them altogether, and even if this were feasible, the possibility of financial support of subversion by other Bloc nations would remain.

Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that the impediments recommended herein are of insufficient importance to warrant their imposition. Impediments on the movement of funds can be imposed at little cost to the United States, and they will have some effect in interfering with Castro's pursuit, through subversion, of his basic objective of gaining communist allies in Latin America. This effect could be very significant when added to others that we hope to achieve through our overall anti-subversion program.

In examining this problem, it quickly became evident that the most effective countermeasures are to be found in the area of reducing the capability of Cuba to acquire reserves of free world convertible currencies, such as U.S. dollars, Canadian dollars, Pounds Sterling, Swiss francs, etc.

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Cuban pesos are usable only in Cuba. They are not convertible to any other currency and are therefore of little if any value elsewhere in the world. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange, moreover, have been steadily diminishing and are now estimated to stand at not more than \$25 million to \$50 million. If we are willing to intensify our efforts to weaken the Cuban economy, these foreign exchange reserves can be reduced further. However, it must not be overlooked that the Soviet Union can provide foreign exchange for Cuban use.

While of transcendent importance, this question of diminishing Cuba's foreign exchange through economic measures is properly related to the larger objective of weakening the economic position of Castro-Communist Cuba, and thus advancing further toward the goal of causing the downfall of the Communist government. As progress is realized in this broad endeavor, there will be a reduction in Castro's ability to finance subversive operations in the Hemisphere.

The matter of intensifying our economic warfare against Cuba is regarded, however, as beyond the purview of this committee. Therefore, the program of actions recommended in this paper has been directed to the transfer of funds. This includes physical transfers, transfers through bank transactions and transfers by subterfuge in connection with trade.

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## 2. Nature and Scope of the Problem

a. The Castro regime may transfer convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries by four general methods:

(1) Introduction by hand, by legal or illegal travellers.

(2) Transfers through international banking institutions.

(3) Introduction by Cuban or Bloc diplomatic personnel, including couriers.

(4) The practice of subterfuge in connection with international business transactions.

These methods are discussed in following paragraphs, along with steps which might be undertaken to diminish the effectiveness of each.

### b. Introduction of Funds, by Hand, by Individual Travellers

This is the least convenient and least dependable method in terms of the hazard of theft, loss, misappropriation, confiscation or extortion. Nevertheless, we have evidence that this technique is employed. Funds can be introduced by legal travellers, where there are no effective controls, or they can be introduced by smuggling. With respect to smuggled funds, it is noted that the measures previously approved for control of illegal travel will likewise be effective in impeding

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the illegal movement of funds by such persons. In like manner, the measures previously approved for control of legal travel will affect the movement of funds by persons in that category.

Additional restrictions on the introduction of funds by legal travellers might be adopted by Latin American countries, in the form of limitations on amounts or administrative requirements for declaration of sums in hand. However, recommendation on our part to institute such controls would be contrary to our established policy of encouraging the Latin American nations to maintain free exchange systems. These countries need foreign exchange, and would consequently be hesitant to adopt any actions which would limit their means of acquiring it. Additionally, the adoption of controls on the importation of foreign exchange by Latin American nations would impose an undesirable burden on legitimate business travel from the United States, as well as from other friendly nations.

Thus, in the category of movement of funds by travellers, it is concluded that little more should be done at this time than is currently in motion.

c. Transfers through Banking Institutions

In addition to physical transfers of currency, Cuba can transfer funds to subversives in Latin America through banking institutions, either by cable or by mail. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange are held

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principally, in the State Bank of Russia, the Moscow Narodny Bank in London, the Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord (a Communist owned institution) in Paris, the Bank Intra of Switzerland, the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Bank of Canada. Funds from these deposits are transmitted on order of the National Bank of Cuba, which controls all of the accounts.

U.S. dollars are the principal currency used in Latin America. The transfer of dollars from these overseas accounts to subversives in Latin American countries can be impeded, in a significant degree, through the institution by the United States of blocking controls against Cuba, under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This blocking action would prohibit all transactions with Cuba by persons or institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and would effectively interrupt Cuban movement of U.S. dollars to Latin America through any U.S. bank.

Movement by Cuba of dollars through banks of third countries would also be greatly diminished by this action. It is known and generally accepted in international banking circles, that it is standing U.S. policy that any foreign bank which transfers dollars through U.S. banks in behalf of a blocked country is subject to having its own U.S. accounts blocked.

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Because of the importance of U.S. banks in international trade, foreign banks cannot afford such a restriction. This policy has been effective in the past, having deterred foreign banks, even those of Communist countries, from engaging in dollar transactions on behalf of Communist China, which have been blocked by the U.S. for over twelve years.

With U.S. dollar channels blocked, other, less desirable, avenues would remain open to Cuba for bank transfer of convertible currencies such as Sterling, Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, etc. If the British and Canadians could be persuaded to prohibit remittances in their currencies in behalf of Cuba, the latter's capability to move funds through banking channels would be further curtailed, and transfers in other currencies, such as Swiss francs, would be relatively easy to detect and monitor. While it is unlikely that British and Canadian cooperation would be forthcoming in this degree, these countries could still make a valuable contribution to the campaign against Castro-Communist subversion by providing intelligence concerning major transactions in their currencies by Cuba.

d. Transfers by Diplomatic Personnel

We know that convertible currencies have been carried to Latin American countries illegally by

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diplomatic representatives and couriers of both Cuba and the Bloc countries, under the protection of their diplomatic immunity. This form of transfer can be diminished through the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba by those countries in Latin America which have not already taken such action. However, the diplomatic facilities of other Bloc countries would probably remain available to Cuba in some Latin American nations.

e. Transfers Through Trade Subterfuge

An effective method of disguising transfers of funds for subversive purposes is to give such transfers the appearance of legitimate payments for items received in trade. In one technique, goods may be sent to a Cuban addressee by a subversive in the export-import business in a Latin American country bearing an erroneous invoice. A shipment having an actual value of \$10,000 can be invoiced and paid for at \$12,000, thus achieving a direct transfer of \$2,000 from Cuba to the Latin American country whence the shipment originated. Such transfers of funds could be eliminated only by the interruption of all trade between Cuba and other Latin American countries. And even if this were achieved, the same technique could be used, although at greater cost and with much more difficulty, to transfer Cuban

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funds to Latin America via France, for example, through a third party French Communist import-export firm.

Another commercial technique for transferring funds from Cuba directly to Latin America, through trade, is by means of uncompensated exports. As an example, a Cuban source might send \$5,000 worth of Cuban publications to a leftist bookstore in Chile. The bookstore would not pay Cuba for the publication, but instead would use the proceeds of the sale for subversive purposes. This method also could be fully controlled only by an interruption of trade with Cuba.

f. Relative Importance of Transfer Methods

All of the above mechanisms are usable, and probably all are employed now. However, since large sums can now be transferred readily through banking institutions, with small risk of loss or exposure, this method is considered to be the most significant and is deserving of the greatest attention in an action program. Next in importance probably is the transfer of currencies by diplomatic personnel - a procedure involving small risk of loss or exposure. Transfers by legal or illegal travellers are considered to be less important in view of the risks involved, the physical limitations on amounts which can be carried by individuals and the availability of other means. Trade subterfuge would



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presently appear to be of least significance, since such arrangements involve more difficulties than any of the other available methods.

3. Actions Recommended

a. The actions proposed herein, when added to those already proposed for controlling the movement of subversive persons, propaganda and arms, will serve to inhibit directly Cuba's effectiveness in financing subversion in Latin America. It must be acknowledged however, that Cuba's efforts to provide convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries cannot be rendered wholly ineffective by these measures alone. Complementary steps designed to reduce the ability of Cuba to acquire foreign exchange will also be required to constitute a full attack on the problem.

b. The following actions involving relatively little cost to the U.S. are recommended as promising to have some significant effect:

(1) Establish regulations blocking

(a) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars to Cuba;

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(b) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars directly or indirectly from Cuban accounts to free world countries; and

(c) all other unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals, or transactions involving property in which there is a Cuban interest. These actions should be taken only following the development of detailed implementing instructions by the State and Treasury Departments and their final evaluation in light of other considerations which bear on the matter.

(2) Seek opportunities to persuade Latin American nations which have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

(3) Increase intelligence efforts to gain information concerning:

(a) the size and location of Cuban accounts in free world banking institutions;

(b) transfers of funds from these accounts to recipients in Latin America; and

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(c) Cuban movement of currencies to other Latin American countries by legal and illegal travelers, including diplomatic personnel.

(4) Where locally feasible, encourage Latin American nations to impound funds of known Castro-Communist organizations.

(5) Encourage Latin American countries to enlist the cooperation of their financial institutions in detecting suspicious accounts and in exposing transfers of funds for subversive purposes.

(6) Seek, using appropriate means, to induce Canada, Great Britain, and other NATO countries to provide information on the direct or indirect transfer of significant amounts of their currencies by Cuba or Cuban nationals to other Latin American countries.

(7) As applicable, persuade Latin American countries to sever all direct or indirect trade relations with Cuba, except those involving sale to Cuba of foodstuffs and medicines.

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(8) Encourage Latin American countries to establish surveillance of known or suspected Communist controlled businesses to inhibit transfers of funds to subversives through such establishments.

(9) Encourage Latin American countries to expose and publicize illegal transfers of funds for subversive purposes.

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CONTROL OF SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENT

Summary of Proposed Actions

I. Control of Legal Travel

1. Immediate Impact Actions

a. Administrative

(1) Induce Western Hemisphere countries to: (a) invalidate passports for Cuba travel; (b) refuse exit permits to third-country nationals lacking authority from parent country for Cuba travel; (c) refuse to honor visas not integral to basic travel document; (d) require submission of manifests by carriers enroute to Cuba and provide copies to diplomatic missions of countries affected.

(2) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint travellers enroute to and from Cuba.

(3) Make covert arrangements with officials in countries now used for legal transit to impose impediments and harassment on Cuba-bound travellers.

b. Intelligence

(1) Intensify covert efforts to identify subversive travellers. Report selected identifications to governments concerned.

(2) Intensify covert efforts to penetrate Cuban training programs.

c. Actions Relating to Common Carriers

(1) Prohibit resumption of U.S. air service to Cuba, as an example to other nations.

(2) Close U.S. ports to vessels of any commercial line which sends ships to Cuba.

(3) Request Latin American countries to prohibit embarkation or debarkation of passengers from ships arriving from or departing for Cuba.

(4) Request Latin American countries to deny their ports to ships of Cuban registry.

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d. Propaganda

Pursue an overt hemisphere-wide publicity campaign exposing the scope and true purpose of Cuban subversive training.

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Political

(1) Persuade the five Latin American governments which have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

(2) Urge Latin American countries to enact laws, where necessary, enabling prohibition of Cuban travel.

(3) Urge Latin American countries to cooperate among themselves and with OAS in exchange of information on subversive travel.

(4) Propose periodic regional meetings of ministers of Government to review implementation of counter-subversive travel programs.

(5) Press Latin American nations to seek cooperation of Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, Bolivia and Chile in preventing movement of third-country personnel through their countries to Cuba.

b. Intelligence

Intensify U.S. actions to determine extent, nature and implications of activities of subversive trainees. Make selected information available to countries affected.

c. Administrative

(1) Encourage Latin American Governments to employ routine administrative procedures to delay and complicate the movement of persons to Cuba.

(2) Request Latin American countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to seek out and expose the falsification of travel documents by Cuban embassies or consulates.

(3) Increase U.S. assistance in improving Latin American immigration and customs controls.

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d. Actions Related to Common Carriers

(1) Induce Mexico to refuse certification of Soviet-made aircraft, now required by Cubana Airlines because of disrepair of current equipment.

(2) Urge Great Britain, Canada, and other suppliers to deny sale of aircraft parts to Cubana.

(3) Persuade the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada and Spain to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial flights to Cuba.

e. Propaganda

(1) Intensify USIA and CIA propaganda input in Latin American media, attacking Cuban training and exposing and discrediting trainees.

(2) Identify dissatisfied returned trainees and exploit their intelligence and propaganda potential.

(3) Initiate non-attributable publicity campaign focussing unfavorably on illegal use by Cuba-bound travellers of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian and Chilean transit facilities.

3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions

a. At such time as other political factors justify, seek adoption of resolution calling for rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba by all member countries.

b. Propose recommendation by the OAS to member countries on travel controls, utilizing proposals of the Special Consultative Committee on Security, and those herein.

c. Use OAS bodies to pursue implementation of agreed controls.

d. Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution calling for termination of air and maritime traffic with Cuba.

II. Control of Illegal Travel

1. Immediate Impact Actions

a. Intelligence

(1) Increase intelligence efforts to identify illicit travellers, illicit routes and travel methods. Report selected information to governments concerned.



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(2) Determine facts about clandestine air and surface traffice. Use evidence to induce governments involved to institute controls.

b. Surveillance and Reporting

(1) Continue U.S. air-sea surveillance.

(2) Continue, at highest priority, improvement of U.S. communications in Latin America.

(3) Establish centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier for dissemination of intelligence to countries concerned, via American Ambassadors.

2. Longer Range Actions

a. Surveillance

(1) Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving: (a) continued U.S. surface and air surveillance; (b) a U.S. military alerting system; (c) unilateral surveillance and interception by each country in territorial waters; (d) U.S. assistance in interception in territorial waters, upon request.

b. U.S. Military Assistance

(1) Establish a program to provide selected countries with patrol craft and logistical support for effective patrol of own coasts.

(2) Provide U.S. training assistance to improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American armed forces.

(3) Assist in accelerated improvement to internal security and police forces, to support intensified patrol and intelligence efforts.

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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

13 March 1963

TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

This is our final working draft on the paper on propaganda. I have sought to work in your contributions wherever feasible. Please submit your views by 1700 today.

V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC

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## SECOND WORKING DRAFT

### CUBA

#### MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

##### I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the movement of Communist propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. Actions contemplated to control the movement of propaganda are closely related to, and in many cases identical with, those which control the movement of persons and arms. As noted in the earlier paper which addressed the problem of movement of subversive trainees to and from Cuba, the successful execution of all the proposals expressed below will materially reduce the flow of propaganda materials but will not eliminate it entirely.

Communist Cuba has many legitimate outlets through which propaganda materials flow. As these legitimate outlets are blocked by the initial steps herein proposed, it will be necessary for the Cuban propagandists and their sympathizers elsewhere to turn from the mass exportation of materials, and to rely more heavily upon production and dissemination of the same materials in a clandestine environment within each Latin American country. Of the two threats, the illicit production of propaganda materials in each country will be by far the more difficult to abate.

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## II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

While the Castro image has faded somewhat in Latin America, by virtue of his own imprudent actions, the susceptibility of the Latin American people to communist propaganda remains high. The basic social and economic factors which have made this true in the past have not greatly altered, and the variety and quantity of propaganda materials with which the Latin Americans are now beset are impressive, as exemplified in the one hundred million dollars which the communists are estimated to be investing in the project annually. It is a large program and it presents a continuing threat to the tranquility of Latin America.

For the purpose of this paper, propaganda materials include radio program scripts, tapes and recordings, printed materials, (posters, pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, books, newspapers, news service output), motion pictures, duplicating or reproducing equipment, electronic communications equipment, and printing resources, particularly paper stockpiles. To be complete, moreover, "movement of propaganda materials" must extend to small quantities of selected publications which are hand-carried into a country by legal or illegal travellers for subsequent reproduction. It must also include materials transmitted through Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomatic channels, shipments via postal channels, quantities introduced through smuggling operations, oral transmission of

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propaganda guidelines by individual travellers or by Radio Havana, and the dissemination of slanted news by Prensa Latina, the official Cuban news agency, for pick-up and reproduction by local outlets. Finally to be considered are thematic guidance which can be reproduced and exploited locally by returning trainees, front groups and sympathetic publications and, in some countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay, the products of those commercial establishments which regularly print or broadcast pro-Castro materials as a matter of policy or ideological conviction.

#### Press and Publications

There are 326 Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and periodicals in Latin America. Beyond this, infiltration of the democratic press, coupled with the non-critical attitudes of some newspapermen gives wider diffusion to the Cuban propaganda line. In addition, there are 228 communist oriented publishing houses and bookstores in Latin America, serving as outlets not only for 30 different Cuban periodicals, but for a large variety of other Communist printed material. Every Latin American country except the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela permits these bookshops to operate. Many of them offer publications at very low prices or even give away two or three books with the purchase of one, and easy credit terms are available.

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Excluding TASS and New China News Agency (NCNA), Prensa Latina is the principal Communist news agency in Latin America. It operates openly, but not entirely without restriction, in ten countries -- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. Although its users are chiefly leftists or overt Communists, in some countries there is fairly extensive un-attributed use of Prensa Latina releases, especially in radio.

All of this is essentially overt. However, decrees banning Communist activity and propaganda have not prevented the clandestine publication and distribution of a number of periodicals, books and other printed materials in some countries, notably Argentina, and propaganda materials continue to seek undetected entry through the mails. In Panama, for example, postal and customs authorities destroy an average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda per month. Another ten tons, from the unknown quantity which enters Costa Rica each month, is identified in the post office or the airport and destroyed.

Radio

Short wave radio is the principal direct mass audience medium used by Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin America. The Castro regime has constantly increased Radio



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Havana's short wave broadcasts to Latin America to a current level of 115:30 hours per week.

Cultural Activities

Penetration under the guise of "cultural" activities is a favored Communist propaganda technique in Latin America. There are 64 Cuban binational centers and Friendship Societies in the area.

Films

Feature films and short documentaries produced by the Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry (ICAIC) play a direct propaganda role. These films are shown primarily in binational centers, pro-Communist labor and student groups, and in private or clandestine meetings.

It will be seen from this brief review that Latin America is the target of a broad scale propaganda program, comprising not only propaganda materials but including also the ideas, the knowledge and the resources which are necessary to make those materials effective.

III, Direct Actions to Impede Legal Movement of Propaganda Materials.

Presented below is a summary of actions contemplated to impede the legal movement of propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. For the purpose of this paper, legal movement is defined as movement by recognized private and governmental carriers and communications, as well as postal systems and diplomatic pouching.

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These actions offer promise of achieving early and effective results in some Latin American countries. They do not have universal application and that those which are feasible in one country may not be so in another.

1. Political Actions

- a. Induce newspapers in countries in which Prensa Latina operates to cancel their subscriptions to the service, on the basis of its subversive character.
- b. Persuade those governments which receive Cuban and Bloc diplomatic missions to maintain close surveillance over the propaganda activities of the Communist embassies with a view toward prohibiting abuses of diplomatic privilege for subversive purposes.
- c. As applicable and feasible, induce Latin American countries to:
  - (1) Adopt adequate internal security legislation which would provide severe penalties for any person engaging in dissemination of Cuban Communist propaganda which inspires terrorism or proposes the overthrow of the legal governments by force and violence.
  - (2) Preclude attendance of Cuban delegates at international meetings held in Latin America. (Delegates are propaganda disseminators.)

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2. Intelligence Actions

a. Continue U.S. intelligence efforts in each country to identify individuals, organizations and facilities involved in propaganda importation, reproduction and/or dissemination; make available to each country selected intelligence concerning these individuals, organizations and their activities.

b. Encourage each country in which the Communist Party is illegal to offer rewards for information leading to interception of Castro Communist propaganda and conviction of persons supplying or disseminating materials considered dangerous to the country's tranquility.

c. In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, urge full and effective cooperation with the appropriate organs of the OAS, and bilaterally among the several nations, in the interchange of information concerning movement of propaganda materials.

d. Persuade Latin American countries to report promptly to the diplomatic mission of the country concerned, the identity of any national of that country who arrives from Cuba and who is discovered to have been carrying Communist propaganda materials.

3. Covert Actions

a. Cause disruption in the reproduction and distribution of propaganda materials, and in the



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procurement and delivery of related supplies and equipment.

b. Induce Latin American printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misprint Castro Communist propaganda in the process of reproduction.

c. Disrupt Castro Communist sponsored labor and youth congresses, industrial and agricultural exhibits in Latin American countries.

d. Maintain or increase economic pressures on media owners, local advertising agencies and film producers and/or distributors who accept Communist materials.

e. Modify texts of Communist propaganda, inserting anti-Castro/Communist material into the distribution chain.

f. Dissuade U.S. and local business firms from advertising in Latin American media which carry pro-Communist materials; prepare and circulate to U.S. firms, for information, lists of such media in order to encourage their support of a non-Communist press.

g. Inhibit the spread of Cuban and Bloc binational centers and Friendship Societies in Latin America by an active program to expose their subversive activities and objectives.

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h. Provide selective financial support to non-Communist newspapers or press services in order to make them economically competitive with Communist-aligned publications.

1. Organize surveillance over in-country sources of newsprint and related supplies, and deny or inhibit the use of these supplies for printing Communist materials.

4. Military Assistance Action

Obtain and make available, through U.S. Military Groups, U.S. materials on the realities of Communist propaganda, suitable for use in Latin American troop education programs.

IV. Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement of Propaganda Material.

As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, movement of propaganda materials will be forced into clandestine channels. Although many of the actions outlined in Section III will serve to restrict illegal movement, additional measures to impede this clandestine traffic will acquire increasing importance.

1. Intelligence Actions

a. Use penetration and other intelligence techniques to identify efforts to move propaganda materials from Cuba to and/or within Latin American countries; determine routes and methods employed; report selected information,



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consistent with requirements for protecting our own intelligence program, to governments concerned.

b. Utilize the U.S. intelligence community to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean and Central American area, with special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and Dominican Republic. Use the evidence obtained to induce governments concerned to initiate surveillance and other control measures aimed at interception of propaganda materials.

2. Surveillance and Reporting Action

Exploit the mechanism of the Caribbean surveillance system approved by the President in the study on movement of personnel, for discovering and impeding the movement of propaganda materials by illicit means.

3. Political Action

Where legally feasible to do so, induce each Latin American country to improve police procedures to seek and destroy the subversive Communist propaganda apparatus in that country, and to detect and eliminate corrupt officials who permit illicit shipment of propaganda materials.

4. Technical Assistance Action

a. Provide technical assistance to enable local officials to locate clandestine transmitters.



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b. Assist Latin American governments, which so desire, to develop a jamming capability against Communist radio broadcasts.

5. Military Action

Assist in the accelerated improvement of Latin American internal security forces, especially patrol and intelligence activities aimed at preventing clandestine propaganda activities. Provide equipment, training and advice as required.

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

15 March 1963

TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

At their meeting this morning, the Cottrell Committee desired several small alterations in our Propaganda paper. I am enclosing page changes which reflect those changes.

*V. H. Krulak*  
V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)  
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CUBA

MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the movement of Communist propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. They complement the basic actions relating to control of movement of subversive trainees to and from Cuba, which actions are generally applicable in the solution of this problem as well. As in the companion measures for control of the movement of subversive trainees, successful execution of the actions proposed below will reduce the flow of propaganda materials but will not eliminate it entirely.

Communist Cuba has many legitimate outlets through which propaganda materials flow. As these legitimate outlets are blocked by the initial steps herein proposed, it will be necessary for the Cuban propagandists and their sympathizers elsewhere to turn from the mass exportation of materials to the production and dissemination of the same materials in a clandestine environment within the several Latin American countries. Of the two threats, the illicit production of propaganda materials in each country will be by far the more difficult to abate.

In combatting these threats, one of the most powerful factors is the influence of our own information and counter-propaganda efforts, which USIA and CIA have increased greatly during the past two years. This paper, however, is concerned wholly with direct actions; actions designed to impede the movement of propaganda materials to and within Latin America.

II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

While the Castro image has faded somewhat in Latin America, and the attraction of Cuba as a model has diminished, the susceptibility of the Latin American people to communist propaganda remains high. The basic social and economic factors which have made this true in the past have not greatly altered, and the variety and quantity of propaganda materials with which the Latin Americans are now beset are impressive, as exemplified in the many millions of dollars which the communists are estimated to be investing in the project annually. It is a large program and it presents a continuing threat to the tranquility of Latin America.

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Films

Feature films and short documentaries produced by the Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry play a direct propaganda role. These films are shown primarily in binational centers, pro-Communist labor and student groups, and in private or clandestine meetings.

It will be seen from this brief review that Latin America is the target of a broad-scale propaganda program, comprising not only propaganda materials but including also the ideas, the knowledge and the resources which are necessary to make those materials effective.

III. Direct Actions to Impede the Legal Movement of Propaganda Materials

Presented below is a summary of actions contemplated to impede the legal movement of propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. For the purpose of this paper, legal movement is defined as movement by recognized private and governmental carriers and communications, as well as postal systems and diplomatic pouching.

These actions offer promise of achieving early and effective results in some Latin American countries, but they do not have universal application, and those which may be feasible in one country may not be necessary or feasible in another.

1. Political Actions

a. Induce news media to diminish the utilization of Prensa Latina.

b. Persuade those governments which receive Cuban and Bloc diplomatic missions to maintain close surveillance over the propaganda activities of the Communist embassies with a view toward prohibiting abuses of diplomatic privilege for subversive purposes.

c. As applicable and feasible, induce Latin American countries to:



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b. Seek opportunities to induce Latin American printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misprint Castro-Communist propaganda in the process of reproduction.

c. Disrupt Castro-Communist sponsored labor and youth congresses, industrial and agricultural exhibits in Latin American countries.

d. Maintain or increase pressures on media owners, local advertising agencies and film producers and/or distributors who accept Communist materials.

e. Dissuade US and local business firms from advertising in Latin American media which carry pro-Communist materials; provide informally to US firms, for information, lists of such media in order to encourage their support of a non-Communist press.

f. Inhibit the spread of Cuban and Bloc binational centers and Friendship Societies in Latin America by an active program to expose their subversive activities and objectives.

g. Where it can be determined that expenditure of the funds is clearly justified, provide financial support to selected non-Communist news media requiring assistance in order to compete with Communist-aligned publications which have significant circulation or impact.

h. Induce Latin American countries to organize surveillance over in-country sources of newsprint and related supplies, and deny or inhibit the use of these supplies for printing Communist materials.

IV. Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement of Propaganda Material

Many of the actions outlined in Section III related to the legal movement of materials will serve also to restrict illegal movement. Additional measures designed specifically to impede clandestine traffic are enumerated below.



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

CM-300-63  
18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Congressional Testimony re Cuba

1. In preparing for the meeting with you on the above subject at 1730 today, I have reviewed my notes on the Congressional questioning bearing upon Cuba. It would appear to me that we need to develop coordinated responses on the following topics. There may be some additional ones which I have overlooked.

a. To what extent is Cuba today a threat to the United States and/or Latin America?

(1) as an air/missile base;

(2) as a submarine base;

(3) as a political base for the exportation of Communism and the subversion of Latin American republics?

b. To what extent is the presence of 17,000 Soviet military a threat to the United States, and what are we going to do about getting them out?

c. Are we sure that all Soviet offensive weapons are out of Cuba?

d. Why were we so long in detecting the presence of Soviet personnel and equipment? Why were there so few U-2 flights in September and early October? In retrospect, what could we have done to improve our intelligence procedures and detection efforts?

e. How effective now is our air surveillance of Cuba? Why don't we fly more low-level reconnaissance?

f. Why did we do nothing when Major Anderson was shot down by a Soviet SAM-2? What are we going to do today if one of our planes is shot down?

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Reviewed on 7/30/98 *ajr*

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*aa 4/6/98*

OSD: NO OBJECTION  
24 JUN 98

Doc 268



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2. We should also discuss how to handle questions relating to the Bay of Pigs. I have taken the position that my report to the President is a privileged document which I am unable to discuss. I do not expect to have difficulty in holding this position, but what about other government officials and ex-officials who have contributed to this report? Should they or should they not respond to questions on the Bay of Pigs?

  
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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CLASSIFICATION : SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
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COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State.



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SUBJECTS : CUBA PLANNING  
  
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OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Requires review from ~~OSD~~, CIA and State.



MESSAGE SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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FROM: JCS

*Cuba* *Auth*

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7/20/98  
*Chase*

SECRET JCS 9517 From JCS.

DATE 17	TIME 0915
MONTH Apr	YEAR 1963

WRITER	SYMBOL JCS (J-3)		RELEASED	SIGNATURE <i>Walter M. Turner</i>		
	TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) Capt. H. B. Stark, USN			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE WALTER M. TURNER		
	PHONE 73477	PAGE 1		NR. OF PAGES 3	Lt. Colonel, USN	
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET			Chief, Implementation Division		

JCS 9517

171454Z Apr 63

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DOC 269



Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:  
Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees (C)

1. On 8 March 1963, the President approved comprehensive US program dealing with movement of subversives and subversive trainees to and from Cuba.

2. Actions within the primary responsibility of the JCS are:

a. Continue current US sea and air surveillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba.

b. Continue development of US communications in Latin America.

c. Study feasibility and desirability of establishing intelligence centers at CINCARIB and CARIBSEAFRON headquarters for rapid dissemination of intelligence on the movement of subversives.

d. Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving:

(1) Continued US close-in surveillance of Cuba.

(2) A US military alerting system, upon completion of study referred to in subparagraph 2 c, above.

(3) US assistance in final interception in territorial waters, upon request by country concerned.



MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

3. List of other actions assigned within the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies of the US Government being furnished separately to action addressees.
4. Future actions should be consonant with the program.

Gp-4.

DISTR:

JCS 9517

CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-3, J3-5, J4-2, J5-1, J6-3, SACSA-1,  
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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10123  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : CYRUS R. VANCE  
TO : MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS  
TITLE : ICCCA: MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES  
DATE : 03/15/63  
PAGES : 28  
SUBJECTS : SUBVERSIVES AND TRAINEES, MOVEMENT TO AND FROM CUBA  
  
CUBAN EXILES, MILITARY USE  
  
POLITICAL/MILITARY ACTION IN CUBA  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
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COMMENTS : Taylor Papers, Box 7, Folder 13. Memo from Vance to SecDef, SecNav, SecAir, CJCS and ASD (International Security Affairs). Letter from Adm Dennison to Gen Taylor.





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

**TOP SECRET**

5212  
Ser 09B35/50  
12 Aug 98

**TOP SECRET** (Unclassified upon removal of Enclosures (2), (3) and (4))

Mr. Douglas P. Horne  
Assassination Records Review Board  
600 E Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Horne:


In response to your letter of August 4, 1998, Navy has reviewed the enclosed documents provided by your office and the following items should be noted.

First, during the declassification process for these documents, Navy identified one page classified as SECRET within document record number 198-10007-10076 (overall classification of TOP SECRET), that should not be declassified. This page has been marked with a pink tag. Navy has no objection to the declassification of the remaining files forwarded as enclosures to this letter.

Enclosure (1) contains a list of all classified documents reviewed by the Navy declassification team.

Please contact me at commercial (202) 433-4217 or e-mail at Greene.Steven@hq.navy.mil if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

  
S. E. GREENE  
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy  
Navy Records Manager

Navy Records Branch (N09B35C)  
901 M Street, SE  
Washington Navy Yard  
Washington, DC 20374-5071

Enclosures

**TOP SECRET**



JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS DECLASSIFICATION DOCUMENT LIST

<u>Document Number</u>	<u>ID Form Date</u>	<u>Document Classification</u>
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198-10007-10100	5/6/98	TS
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198-10007-10073	5/6/98	S
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198-10007-10092	5/6/98	S
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198-10007-10086	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10083	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10087	5/6/98	S
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198-10007-10067	5/6/98	S
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198-10007-10040	5/6/98	S

Enclosure (1)



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198-10007-10039	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10038	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10065	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10064	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10062	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10063	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10061	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10060	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10059	5/6/98	S
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198-10007-10047	5/6/98	S
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198-10007-10045	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10044	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10043	5/6/98	S
202-10002-10123	4/28/98	S
198-10007-10071	5/6/98	S
198-10008-10005	5/1/98	S
198-10007-10145	5/11/98	S
198-10007-10135	5/11/98	S
198-10007-10127	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10126	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10125	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10122	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10121	5/6/98	S
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198-10007-10118	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10117	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10116	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10115	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10109	5/6/98	S
198-10007-10101	5/6/98	S
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198-10007-10124	5/6/98	C



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198-10007-10036	5/6/98	C
198-10007-10042	5/6/98	C
198-10007-10106	5/6/98	U
198-10007-10104	5/6/98	U
198-10007-10058	5/6/98	U
198-10007-10057	5/6/98	U
198-10007-10056	5/6/98	U



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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
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TO : MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS  
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DATE : 03/15/63  
PAGES : 28  
SUBJECTS : SUBVERSIVES AND TRAINEES, MOVEMENT TO AND FROM CUBA  
  
CUBAN EXILES, MILITARY USE  
  
POLITICAL/MILITARY ACTION IN CUBA

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COMMENTS : Taylor Papers, Box 7, Folder 13. Memo from Vance to SecDef, SecNav, SecAir, CJCS and ASD (International Security Affairs). Letter from Adm Dennison to Gen Taylor.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: MULTI STATEDate: Starts 15 MAR 63Subject: Memo from Vance - Interdepartmental Coordinating CommitteeOriginal Level of Classification: SThird Agency Equities: ~~NSA~~ CIA ~~NSC~~ Navy NSARemarks: ~~DCS~~ ~~NSC~~ NSC/LMS - no objection 7/22/97

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 26-81-77 AW

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NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
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ASL:ed  
DATE: OCT 07 1997

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MONTH 8 DAY 6 YEAR 97  
AUTHORITY: JFK Act

No objection to release



**UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY**  
**OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL**  
**DECLASSIFICATION UNIT**



**THIS AGENCY HAS DECLASSIFIED ALL OF  
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AUTHORITY: JFK Act  
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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DATE OF DOCUMENT

15 Mar 63

SUBJECT: Socy, Navy - Cyrus R. Vance

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees

The above-described document has been received in this office. Circulation of this document will be limited to individuals indicated below. The document will be returned to the Administrative Office for record prior to dispatch to another office, or other disposition. TIC'S FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

[illegible]

File 0



~~SECRET~~

March 15, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

**SUBJECT:** Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees

**References:** (a) NSAM No. 213 dated January 8, 1963  
(b) Memo for McGeorge Bundy from DepSecDef dated January 10, 1963, subj: Interdepartmental Organization for Cuban Affairs

The attached Program on the Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees to and from Cuba was approved by the President on March 8, 1963.

For implementation in the Department of Defense, the Program has been divided under two major headings:

- A. Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of the Department of Defense, and
- B. Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of a Department or Agency Other Than the Department of Defense.

Assignments of actions within the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense are made below. The Department of

OSA, ASG Control No. 627C

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Defense should assist and support, as necessary, the implementation of those portions of the Program within the primary responsibility of other Government departments and agencies to insure that those portions of the Program are carried out effectively.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for actions A. 1, A. 2, A. 3, A. 4(a), A. 4(b) and A. 4(d) of the attached Program. The study required under action A. 3 should be completed and submitted to me, as Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs for the Department of Defense, by April 5, 1963. Proposals with respect to the military alerting system required under action A. 4(b) should be submitted to me by April 5, 1963, under alternative assumptions that (a) intelligence centers at the Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters will be established, (b) such intelligence centers will not be established, and (c) that only one intelligence center at the Caribbean Command supported by the Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters will be established.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is responsible for actions A. 4(c), A. 5 and A. 7 of the attached Program. With respect to action A. 4(c), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) should prepare proposals to support the State Department in persuading Latin American countries to establish unilateral surveillance and interception actions in their own territorial waters. With respect to action A. 5, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) should take the necessary steps to increase the Fiscal Year 1964 appropriation request funds for Military Assistance Programs keyed to the Cuban subversion problem and the attached Program.

The Departments of the Navy and Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), are responsible for action A. 6 with the exception of that portion which applies to the Coast Guard. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is responsible to contact and work with the Coast Guard in implementing the Coast Guard portion of action A. 6.

In implementing the actions which fall within the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) should follow established procedures to obtain the support, advice and coordination of the appropriate components of the Department of Defense.

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Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, has the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the attached Program on behalf of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs.

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrus R. Vance

Attachment



**SECRET**

**PROGRAM ON THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES  
AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT  
ON MARCH 8, 1963**

**A. Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of the Department  
of Defense**

1. Continue current U. S. sea and air surveillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba.
2. Continue the development, at high priority, of U. S. communications in Latin America, in order to improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities.
3. Study, on a priority basis, the feasibility and desirability of establishing intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemination to countries concerned, via the American Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement of subversives.
4. Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving:
  - a. Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U. S. forces.
  - b. A U. S. military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors to countries concerned (contingent upon the decisions made as a result of the study under A. 3, through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command).
  - c. A unilateral surveillance and interception effort by each country in its own territorial waters.
  - d. U. S. assistance in final interception in territorial waters, upon request by the country concerned.



5. Establish Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected countries, especially in the Caribbean and Central American area, with the necessary small patrol craft, and training and logistical support, to enable these countries to establish an effective patrol of their own coasts. Provide necessary funds in addition to present programs.
6. Provide U. S. Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard training assistance, as required, to develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military forces. This may take the form of a Canal Zone training activity, employment of mobile training teams, or a combination of both.
7. Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces and police forces in Latin American countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at preventing clandestine departures and apprehending returned trainees. Provide equipment, training and advice as required.

**B. Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of a Department or Agency Other Than the Department of Defense**

1. Intensify U. S. intelligence efforts in each country to identify persons who have travelled, or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected information promptly to the host government, as consistent with our own intelligence program, and the requirement to protect our sources.
2. Intensify our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature and implications of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence program.



3. Utilize U. S. intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence obtained to persuade governments concerned to institute surveillance and other control measures.
4. Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and determine routes and methods employed. Report selected information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our own intelligence program to host government.
5. Intensify current efforts to introduce covert, U. S. -controlled agents from each country into the Cuban training program.
6. Both through the OAS and bilaterally, induce each Western Hemisphere country to:
  - a. Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals "not valid for travel to Cuba."
  - b. Refuse exist permits for Cuba to any national of a third country who cannot produce a valid permit issued by his own country for travel to Cuba.
  - c. Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which is not an integral, non-detachable part of the travel document issued by the country of which the traveller is a citizen.
  - d. Require accurate manifests of all carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions of other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected.



~~SECRET~~

7. Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition to photographing, all persons leaving for or arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the parent country of the nationals involved.
8. Make covert arrangements with police and other security and administrative officials in countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba to impose administrative impediments and harassment on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the difficulty of travel and thus discourage prospective travellers.
9. Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to deny their ports to ships of Cuban registry.
10. Pursue a campaign to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training of the nationals of other countries for subversive purposes, in order to discourage prospective trainees and impress the governments and the peoples concerned with the urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to Cuba.
11. Through bilateral negotiations press countries with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such travel and providing severe penalties for evasion. Recommend that rewards be offered for identification of evaders.
12. In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, reiterate the need for full and effective cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bilaterally among the several states, in the interchange of information concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive activities.
13. Propose periodic regional or sub-regional meetings of ministers of Government of the American Republics to review the implementation of steps taken by them to combat movement of subversives in the Caribbean.

~~SECRET~~



**SECRET**

14. Urge other Latin American nations to negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to enlist cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba.
15. Encourage Latin American governments to institute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of passengers to Cuba.
16. Request governments of Latin American countries which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel documents by Cuban embassies or consulates, and take punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U. S. technical assistance as requested.
17. Intensify technical assistance to Latin American countries in improving immigration and customs controls.
18. Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines service. If unable to do so, seek to persuade Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made aircraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds. This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling into disrepair.
19. Request again of Great Britain, Canada and any other potential supplier that they cut off the supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft.
20. Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally providing terminal service for any of the airlines involved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure.

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21. Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discrediting the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers and develop popular opposition to such activities.
22. Identify returned trainees who are dissatisfied with their Cuban training experience and exploit their capabilities for provision of intelligence and propaganda material for exposing and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities.
23. Initiate a publicity campaign throughout Latin America, not attributable to the United States, which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian and Chilean transit facilities for movement of persons of other countries to and from Cuba for subversive purposes.
24. Propose recommendations by the OAS to member governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals in the report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific recommendations set forth herein.
25. Once the initial comprehensive program in 24 above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consultative Committee on Security.

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DOCUMENT NUMBER  
Ltr to Gen Taylor

COPY NUMBER  
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DATE OF DOCUMENT  
11 Mar 63

SUBJECT: from Adm Dennison, CINCLANT  
Outline Concept of Views on the Training and Use of Cuban Nationals

The above-described document has been received in this office. Circulation of this document will be limited to individuals indicated below. The document will be returned to the Administrative Office for record prior to dispatch to another office, or other disposition. THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

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THE ATLANTIC COMMAND  
AND  
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET

11 MAR 1963

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Dear Max:

As you requested during Rear Admiral Leverton's briefing on the 316 OPLAN, my views on the training and use of Cuban nationals are presented for your consideration. Essentially, they represent an expansion of the ideas contained in my letter to you of 7 March 1963 in which I proposed a schedule of activities to include the use of Cuban nationals.

In general, I feel that we can make good use of all Cubans that are made available to us. Besides any actual military value, they are bound to be a definite psychological asset. In an unconventional warfare role their ability to blend into the country, in comparison with US nationals, is obvious.

I recognize that in utilizing these people there are certain difficulties. Obviously we will have to utilize them in such a manner as to avoid taking unacceptable security risks or creating easy intelligence targets for the communists.

In summary, my convictions are that we should adopt a plan of action that makes maximum use of all available Cuban

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nationals and get it started right away. With these thoughts in mind, the attached outline concept for their utilization is forwarded for such use as you and the Joint Staff desire.

With kindest personal regards,

  
ROBERT L. DENNISON  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Encl:

(1) Outline Concept

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Department of Defense  
Washington 25, D. C.

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Outline Concept

1. General. The use of Cuban nationals for operations in Cuba is both desirable and plausible. The utilization of the maximum number of Cubans in a practical plan, that is commensurate with their abilities and the requirements of the situation, should prove to be a significant contribution in achieving US/OAS goals in Cuba.

2. Unconventional Warfare (UW) Operations.

a. The numbers of personnel who may be used in a covert role is limited due to the security risks involved. Cuban refugees who are true patriots and possess the characteristics needed for unconventional warfare operations may have relatives in Cuba that would be the basis for subjecting them to undue pressures from the communist regime and thereby invalidate their utility for this purpose. Above and beyond this consideration is the largely unsolvable problem of being able to check individuals sufficiently for sensitive tasks to be absolutely sure they are not communist agents. Expedited action to determine the security status of all Cuban nationals in the military service would be most helpful in establishing the number available for sensitive missions.

b. Training for covert operations can not be closely held for long periods of time. These activities are vulnerable to communist efforts of observation and infiltration as any significant group of Cubans will become an inviting communist intelligence target. Any course of action adopted must provide reasonable safeguards against these dangers. However, we believe these problems can be resolved and at the appropriate time Cuban nationals may be utilized for covert UW operations, for raids or integrated into existing US Special Forces detachments, Seal Teams and Air Commando detachments that have been tabbed for operations in Cuba. Since any US sponsored forces conducting UW operations would be involved not only in sabotage but in seeking opportunities to generate or support revolts, uprisings and guerrilla activity, these Cuban nationals should be very advantageous to us in carrying out these missions. However, to use them piecemeal outside the framework of an over-all plan would represent inefficient utilization of limited resources.



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c. As practical, the Military Services should initially form their Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units in order to maximize security, facilitate training, develop esprit de corps, and facilitate scrutiny by US counter-intelligence agencies. They should be given UW type training less those subjects which are obviously unnecessary, such as language and area orientation.

### 3. Conventional Force Operations.

a. There are a number of possible uses for Cuban nationals; however, their greatest potential is related to those military roles for which the Army has responsibility, as follows:

(1) Initial consideration should be given to the development of ranger type companies for use as externally trained guerrillas. Their successful infiltration, under US UW control could prove to be the basis for instigating a revolt or uprising which would pave the way for ultimately applying conventional US/OAS forces to the overthrow of the Castro Communist Government. The use of US UW forces is considered essential as all intelligence data indicates that the Cuban people will require tangible evidence of US support before any significant uprising can be generated. Disclosure of their ultimate use need not be made to the Cubans significantly in advance of their employment.

(2) Other uses for Cuban nationals are in psychological warfare units, as guides and interpreters in assault units and in support of Civil Affairs operations. After these requirements have been satisfied the remaining Cubans should be trained and, at the proper time, organized into a force suitably identified to prove to the world that Cubans are fighting shoulder to shoulder with US/OAS forces to establish a "Free Cuba" that can once again take an honorable place among the American States.

b. The principal requirement for Cuban nationals within the Navy and Air Force in conventional operations is for use as guides, interpreters and liaison personnel. The early integration of these nationals into fighting elements of the Navy and Air Force is limited due to long lead times in training. However, within the naval forces, consideration should be given to the development of an all Cuban raider/commando unit for harassment operations. Such a force could be employed in conjunction with underwater demolition operations, utilizing personnel familiar with the beaches and surrounding terrain.

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Ser: 00072 /J581A

7 MAR 1963

From: Commander in Chief Atlantic  
To: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Concept for Political/Military Action in Cuba (TS)

Encl: (1) Calendar of Events  
(2) Concept for Cover Plan  
(3) Proposed Preliminary Requirements and Task Assignments

1. The purposeful application of US force last fall met with apparent success in frustrating Russia's attempt to establish a military offensive system in Cuba. Our concern over the communist influence in Cuba, however, still remains. Continued domination of the Castro Government, primarily by the USSR, but potentially by Communist China, is increasingly unacceptable to United States interests in Free World leadership, Western Hemisphere orientation to democratic principles and military security. We are still faced with the problem of supplanting the present communist dominated Government of Cuba with a government friendly to the United States and compatible with the aims and principles of the Organization of American States.

2. Resolution of the problem through an overt military invasion, while militarily feasible, would at this time jeopardize those US interests other than military security. Further, it appears unlikely that, without overt US military support, an internal revolt could achieve more than a fleeting success in light of the efficacy of communist control over the Cuban Government and military forces. It is also unlikely that any one, or group, of Latin American countries would provide the degree of support needed to assure success of a purely internal Cuban revolt.

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3. A Cuban revolt well conceived, timed, executed, and supported overtly by US military forces could destroy the Cuban Government in being and establish in its stead a government friendly to the US. The requisite conditions of timing and execution suggest that they can be assured best by US initiation and control of the enterprise by covert means.

4. Operations in accordance with the general concept presented herein are designed to create the conditions under which the US could participate in Free Cuban revolutionary activities and ultimately initiate overt large scale military operations in Cuba without subjecting the US to unacceptable censure. To achieve the desired result, however, activities of CIA, State, DOD and USIA must be coordinated in an over-all plan.

5. General Concept. The calendar of events in enclosure (1) will bring these operations to fruition in about 18 months. The program could be compressed to about 15 months provided that initial decisions and initial actions required to coordinate the activities of all concerned agencies were expedited.

a. CIA would begin as soon as practicable to introduce assets into Cuba to develop intelligence required for successful UW operations.

b. Concurrently, State would initiate action to ensure the organization of Cuban factions into a single, cohesive political organization, and establish a Free Cuban Government in Exile, preferably in a Latin American country.

c. DOD (The Military Services) in conjunction with CIA and CINCLANT would train Cuban nationals for operations with US UW forces.

d. USIA would develop and execute a propaganda plan to support the US program.

e. DOD (CINCLANT) would initiate CINCLANT 380-63 on/about 15 January 1964 by infiltrating UW forces into Cuba for area assessment, establishing guerrilla bases, developing military assets, establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would accelerate subversive operations to create conditions favorable to establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for employing conventional forces.

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f. DOD would provide necessary support to establish the Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil on about 15 July 1964. Once established, even tenuously, the Free Cuban Government would request US assistance.

g. CINCLANT on about 15 July would begin mobilizing forces for US conventional operations in Cuba (see cover plan in enclosure (2)).

h. CINCLANT OPLAN 312-63 would be executed on about 26 July 1964, followed by D-Day of OPLAN 316-63, or other approved military plan, on about 3 August 1964.

i. JCS would prepare and execute a cover plan for the over-all operation. It is suggested that the items in enclosure (2) be included therein.

6. This conceptual plan would provide for:

a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion, unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and finally full-scale invasion, in that order, if necessary.

b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point in the process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government favorable to US interests.

c. An ambiguous atmosphere during the critical phases in its development which would not present the Soviets with a direct confrontation of power until events would preclude timely action on their part to prevent our intended result in Cuba.

d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban Government in Exile and the final, decisive military action.

e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements in the US for political and military support without depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success of the plan.

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f. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all US military posture, until the final decisive stages of the plan are ready for execution, thus reducing maldeployment time.

g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish the defeat of Castro communism.

h. A definite time scale of events culminating in the defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing the groundwork for the installation of a government compatible with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October 1964.

7. If this concept is approved, I intend to proceed with the preparation of detailed military operational plans. As a prerequisite to the planning, answers to the following questions are required:

a. Can CIA provide timely intelligence on Cuba and develop the assets necessary for UW operations to be initiated on 15 January 1964?

b. Can the State Department take the steps necessary to effect the organization of a Free Cuban Government in Exile and establish that government in Latin America in sufficient time to fulfill the requirements of the time scale illustrated in enclosure (1)?

8. In the event that 7. a. and 7. b. above are considered feasible and those agencies are authorized to proceed with the necessary actions, enclosure (3) is proposed as a preliminary planning basis for task assignments for those and other agencies' participation in the over-all plan.

*Robert L. Garrison*

ROBERT L. GARRISON

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QUICK  
KICK VI  
Fyco Cuban  
Armed Forces  
OPLAN  
312  
OPLAN  
316  
USIA

CIA  
UW OPLAN 380  
FCCG

Mar 63  
Apr  
May  
Jun  
Jul  
Aug  
Sep  
Oct  
Nov  
Dec  
Jan 64  
Feb  
Mar  
Apr  
May  
Jun  
Jul  
Aug  
Sep  
Oct

Calendar of Events

DEVELOP OPLAN 380

OPLAN 380

ORGANIZE, ESTABLISH GOVT IN EXILE  
Emplace in Cuba  
Recognized by US

Mob  
Ming

ORGANIZE TRAIN  
Operate with US  
Armed Forces (OPLAN 380)  
Land to  
Support FCCG

Develop & Execute: Supporting Propaganda Plan  
for US Program  
(Radio Station in Caribbean)  
Support  
Actions  
(V.O.A.)

Enclosure (1) to CINCLANT  
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Concept for Cover Plan

1. General: The concept for operations in Cuba is based on an assumption that overt military operations against Cuba at this time would be inimical to US international political interests. The US will resort to overt military operations only in a favorable political climate.

2. Objectives: The objectives in this plan are to:

a. Create a political climate suited to initiating US overt military operations.

b. Provide a cover for unconventional warfare operations in Cuba.

c. Provide a cover for the mobilization of forces for large scale conventional operations in Cuba.

3. Concept: It will be necessary, in order to safeguard US objectives and interests, that US covert military operations be conducted behind the facade of an apparently strong, independent Free Cuban Government in Exile.

a. Establish Free Cuban Government.

(1) Action: Provide strong political support to organization of the Free Cuban Government.

(2) Cover: Publicly disavow any association with the Free Cuban Government although expressing sympathy with its aims.

b. Develop Military Force.

(1) Action: Provide facilities, equipment and training for a Free Cuban Government military force.

(2) Cover: Decry violations of US Neutrality Act.

(3) Action: Provide funds necessary to support development of military force.

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(4) Cover: Approve a fund raising campaign by a Free Cuban Government organization to provide a credible explanation for wealth required for self-evident assets used in training and maintaining the force.

c. Establish Free Cuban Government in Latin America.

(1) Action: Develop factual chronology of communist subversive activities in Latin America and solicit OAS support for military operations against Cuba.

(2) Cover: None.

(3) Action: Select a Latin American country amenable to the suggestion and suited to US interests and encourage that country to spearhead anti-Castro movements and provide a base for operations of the Free Cuban Government and its military force.

(4) Cover: Because of repeated violations of US Neutrality, encourage Free Cuban Government to leave the US.

(5) Action: Continue active support of Free Cuban Government military training, operations and logistics.

(6) Cover: Increase the Military Assistance Program for the Latin American country supporting the Free Cuban Government.

(7) Action: Provide a trained US Army composed of Cuban nationals for UW operations with Free Cuban Government or US forces.

(8) Cover: Discharge Cuban nationals from US military forces after having completed an honorable tour of military duty.

d. Mobilization of US Military Force for Large Scale Conventional Operations.

(1) Action: Mobilize forces needed for timely execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63 (or other selected operation).

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(2) Cover: Adjust FY 1965 Exercise Schedule to provide for execution of QUICK KICK VI on 15 July. OPLAN for QUICK KICK VI will provide for a full scale exercise of all forces programmed for use in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63. Give wide publicity to lessons learned from earlier Command Post Exercises and announce need for full scale exercise.

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Proposed Preliminary Requirements and Task Assignments

Implementation of the concept requires close cooperation and direct liaison between State, DOD, JCS, the Military Departments, CIA, USIA, CINCLANT, CINCARIB and CINCSTRIKE in developing plans, assets and for timely initiation of necessary actions. Some of these are listed below.

STATE

- a. Identify principal Cuban refugee factions and leaders. Coalesce these factions and effect formation of a Free Cuban Government in Exile either within the US or preferably in a Latin American country.
- b. Urge OAS recognition of the Free Cuban Government thus formed.
- c. Encourage the early organization of Free Cuban armed forces drawn from refugee elements to be located in some sympathetic Latin American country for training.
- d. Provide a front organization of Cuban refugees ostensibly as a fund collecting agency to support the Free Cuban Government in Exile and to account for the armed forces assets.
- e. Arrange for the recognition of the Free Cuban Government and provide for timely and overt assistance for Free Cuban Government armed forces by the US.

DOD

- a. Provide budgetary assistance, planning direction and support of the military departments for their participation in this program.
- b. Provide assistance to the CIA in its support role in the plan.
- c. Maintain liaison between military commands and other government agencies involved in supporting this plan.
- d. Supervise research, development and test of new equipment and techniques.

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JCS

- a. Provide over-all military guidance for the CINCs in execution of the plan.
- b. Allocate forces and funds to CINCLANT, CINCARIB and CINCSTRIKE, as required. Assign training responsibilities among the services for the Free Cuban armed forces.
- c. Provide intelligence information and coordination for covert aspects of the program including cover and deception.
- d. If necessary, and at the appropriate time, provide forces and authorize execution of contingency plans for overt US action in Cuba.
- e. Direct other unified and specified commanders to prepare supporting plans and provide assistance to CINCLANT as appropriate.

Military Departments

a. Army:

- (1) Train and provide UW forces for operations in Cuba.
- (2) Develop techniques and equipment for guerrilla warfare (UW).
- (3) Train army components of Free Cuban armed forces.
- (4) Maintain close liaison with the CIA and USIA.
- (5) Train and provide forces as directed by JCS in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.
- (6) Provide as required for training Free Cuban Government military forces.
- (7) Provide propaganda materials.

b. Navy:

- (1) Train and provide SEAL, UDT, BJU and other special units as required.

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- (2) Maintain close liaison with CIA and USLA.
- (3) Train naval components of Free Cuban armed forces.
- (4) Provide sea and undersea lift and airlift (if required) for Special Forces.
- (5) Develop equipment and techniques for special operations and UW at sea.
- (6) Defend GTMO Naval Base.
- (7) Train and provide forces as directed by JCS in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.

c. Air Force:

- (1) Train and provide Air Commando forces.
- (2) Provide airlift for army UW forces.
- (3) Maintain close liaison with CIA and USLA.
- (4) Train air force components of Free Cuban armed forces and provide aircraft.
- (5) Develop equipment and techniques for UW.
- (6) Train and provide forces as directed by JCS in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.

d. Marine Corps:

- (1) Train and provide forces for amphibious warfare in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.
- (2) Develop equipment and techniques for UW.
- (3) Maintain close liaison with CIA.
- (4) Train marine units of Free Cuban armed forces.

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CIA:

- a. Develop and provide assets in Cuba preparatory to introduction of UW forces.
- b. Provide intelligence to DOD and armed forces as appropriate for Cuban matters.
- c. Conduct subversion and sabotage in Cuba as directed and within capabilities of resources.
- d. Maintain close liaison with those elements of US armed forces as specified herein.
- e. Maintain close liaison with the State Department and assist in locating and identifying those elements among Cuban refugee groups who are reliable and those whose political motivations would be inimical to this plan.
- f. Provide assistance to the military departments training Cuban armed forces units.
- g. Develop CIA indigenous assets in Cuba as directed, to support a general uprising.
- h. Develop equipment and techniques in support of these tasks.

USIA:

- a. Maintain close liaison with State, CIA, DOD, JCS, CINCLANT and CINCARIB.
- b. Develop and execute propaganda and information programs in consonance with and responsive to the general needs of the over-all plan and specific requirements of the other participating agencies.
- c. Develop equipment and techniques in support of these tasks.

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CINCLANT:

- a. Plan and execute the military operational tasks of the plan as directed by the JCS (OPLANs 380, 312, 316).
- b. Maintain close liaison with CIA, USIA, CINCARIB and CINCSTRIKE.
- c. Exercise control of those forces assigned by the JCS in support of the resultant plan.
- d. Coordinate the timing and efforts of CIA, USIA and CINCARIB.
- e. Advise the JCS on the status of military actions in Cuba as appropriate and recommend necessary changes in schedule and concept of employment of forces.

CINCARIB:

- a. Plan and coordinate training of Free Cuban armed forces in the selected Latin American country.
- b. Administer the military assistance program (MAP) in support of Free Cuban Armed Forces training.
- c. Maintain close liaison with CIA and CINCLANT in all matters related to this program. Support CIA establishments in Latin America as directed by JCS in support of this program.

CINCSTRIKE:

- a. Train and deploy forces as assigned by the JCS in support of the resultant plan.
- b. Maintain close liaison with State, CIA, USIA, CINCARIB and CINCLANT.

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TO : DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
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to Director, Joint Staff re: proposed examination of  
the pros and cons of an invasion of Cuba.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

202-10002-10142

Originator: VCSDate: 29 MAY 63Subject: ACTIONS RELATED TO CUBAOriginal Level of Classification: TOP SECRETThird Agency Equities: STATE / NSCRemarks: RG 218, NND 941071  
BOX 2/8

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OFDATE: NSCAPR 01 APR 16 1998NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LMS 4-7-98

The Department of State has no objection to the  
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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 30298 W





~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CM-605-63

29 MAY 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF *cy 1-2*

SUBJECT: Actions Related to Cuba (U)

1. In connection with study of the courses of action related to Cuba, I would like the Joint Staff as a matter of priority to make an examination of the pros and cons of an invasion of Cuba at a time controlled by the United States in order to overthrow the Castro government. The report should develop conclusions for submission to the Secretary of Defense.

2. Concurrently, I would like the Joint Staff to develop and submit an outline plan for the preliminaries leading up to such an invasion. Included therein should be (a) a proposed date for D-Day, (b) a possible sequence of incidents out of which the invasion could develop, and (c) the requirements that would have to be satisfied to make any cover plan plausible.

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Distr:

SJCS *cy 4*

J-5 *cy 4*

CM File *cy 3*

File O *cy 5*

*cy 7* *8-10* *X* *idea*

GROUP - 1  
Excluded from automatic  
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Page 1 of 1 Pages



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10144  
RECORDS SERIES : NARA RG 218 JCS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : L. L. LEMNITZER  
TO : GENERAL TAYLOR  
TITLE : NARRATIVE OF THE ANTI-CASTRO OPERATION ZAPATA  
DATE : 06/07/61  
PAGES : 13  
SUBJECTS : OPERATION ZAPATA - CUBA  
  
ANTI-CASTRO OPERATIONS - OPERATION ZAPATA  
  
CONTINGENCY PLANS - OPERATION ZAPATA - CUBA  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/08/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : NARA RG 218 JCS "W/D ITEMS 921150." Memo from  
Lemnitzer to Taylor re: narrative of the anti-Castro  
Operation Zapata.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

202-10002-10144

Originator:

TCS (LENNITZER)

Date:

JUL 18, 1961

Subject:

NARRATIVE OF ANTI-CASTRO OPERATION

Original Level of Classification:

TOP SECRET

ZAPATA

Third Agency Equities:

NSC, CIA

Remarks:

"RG 218 W/D ITEMS

921150"

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

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4/8/98

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENT CV

DATE:

NSC, CIA

APR 06 1998

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on

8 Apr 98

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JUN 6 4-8-98



JUL 1 8 1961

091 Cuban  
7 Jan 61

Attached for your information and file is a copy of a memorandum I sent to General Taylor in which I commented on one of the near-final drafts of his report to the President on the Cuban operation.

CM 235-61

←  
JWW

Since it contains important information of interest to the JCS, I thought it would be useful for future reference purposes.

(Sgd) L. L. LEMNITZER  
L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

7/18/61

Cy of this memo sent  
to each Chief ~~of Staff~~ JSCC.  
Gen. Gray, JSCC ~~received~~ received  
CM 235-61 but not above memo.

10545 01-24



#1 *Gen. Shoup*  
 #2 *Gen. White*  
 #3 *Gen. Decker*  
 #4 *Gen. Shoup*  
 #5 *Gen. Decker*  
 #6 *Gen. Shoup*  
 #7 *Gen. Shoup*

CM-235-61  
 7 June 1961

*filed*

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR - *cy #1*

SUBJECT: Narrative of the Anti-Castro Operation Zapata

1. I understand that you and Admiral Burke have made available to General Decker, General White, and General Shoup, as well as to me, a copy of the fourth draft, subject as above.

2. I also understand that in making this paper available to the Chiefs you had no thought of obtaining our agreement to it but rather you wished to give the Chiefs an opportunity to check for factual accuracy and to offer any final suggestions they might have for changes or additions to it. It is in this context that the comments as hereafter stated are submitted. I discussed these with you orally on 5 June, but have set them down herein in order to assist you in finalizing your report in event shortage of time prevents further discussion with you or your Committee.

3. With minor exceptions, which I will cover below, I think that the report is an accurate, extremely well organized account of the military aspects of the Cuban operation. However, the political aspects and the development of internal resistance within Cuba, which were extremely important features of the plan have not been as fully treated. Since much valuable experience was gained and many lessons learned in these fields it would appear desirable to accord them appropriate treatment. I refer to such activities as:

- a. Program to develop support of other countries.
- b. Assessment of free world reaction.
- c. Restrictions on military actions for political reasons.
- d. Development of a government in exile.
- e. Plans for recognition.
- f. Covert propaganda plans.

100-235-61  
 10 JUN 1961

3 MAR 1969

NO OBJECTION TO  
 DECLASSIFICATION: DATE  
 REQUIRES CONCURRENCE  
 205-CIA

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TOP SECRET

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*Page 1 of 12 pages*



- g. Internal subversion.
- h. Defections of key individuals.
- i. Internal intelligence in Cuba.
- j. Underground apparatus.
- k. Development of guerrilla groups.
- l. Covert supply operations.
- m. Sabotage.

4. I am fully aware of the strong responsibility you bear to determine the facts for the President. I appreciate the care you have taken to weave into the narrative the underlying motivations that prompted certain decisions. I am also appreciative of the opportunity you have afforded us to comment on the report. Fundamentally, I am concerned only that the report reflect at each stage, and in every particular, the facts as we know them. Based on our experience of the past, either paragraphs or sentences of this report will find their way into public print. If not carefully worded, an important excerpt, taken out of context, can be extremely damaging and given an interpretation never intended. Therefore, I feel I must comment on particular words or phrases which might ordinarily be considered minor but which could be important, particularly if a sentence or paragraph is quoted alone.

5. In paragraph 24, page 9, you have included the time of briefing, "20 minutes" in referring to the presentation of this evaluation to the JCS. Since no effort is made at any other place in the paper to determine how long any important official considered any aspect of the operation, the implication of singling out this particular timing is that the Chiefs did not give sufficient consideration to the concept. This disregards the fact that the Chiefs were by this time fully conversant with the over-all aspects of the operation and had been pre-briefed on it. Personally I had spent actually hours studying on the map all of the proposed solutions and discussing these with my principal Joint Staff advisers. As you know, under such circumstances a well organized military briefing can cover much detail in twenty minutes. In this particular instance the issues were clear cut and the time allotted was sufficient to determine that none of the alternatives were as feasible as Trinidad, but that of the three alternatives, Zapata was the most feasible.

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Also, at this time, Zapata was just an alternative. The record is clear that once Zapata was decided upon the Chiefs considered the Zapata concept for longer periods and as often as was necessary. Since the formal briefing time was not the controlling factor in making the decision on the evaluation, and since an erroneous conclusion may be drawn from their inclusion, I recommend that the words "20 minutes" be deleted.

6. Of all the paragraphs in this report, I believe paragraph 25, page 10, is the most likely to be quoted out of context, or its contents paraphrased and leaked. Therefore, I believe it must be factually correct in minute detail. I have previously submitted suggestions on this paragraph, and note that you have accepted them in large part. However, I am still concerned about this paragraph, more than any other aspect of your report.

7. Use of the word "plan." Throughout paragraph 25 the word "plan" is used in a manner that is not entirely accurate and could easily be misinterpreted. As you know, the Chiefs initially evaluated an oral concept which was then successively modified and revised, also orally, and finally evolved in a fragmentary manner into the framework of a plan as set forth by Mr. Bissell at a White House Meeting on 12 April. However, an actual plan, in the usual military sense of the word, was not available until 15 April. Therefore, any reference prior to 15 April should be in other terms than "plan." This will avoid misinterpretation in event any sentence of this paragraph is quoted out of context.

8. I frankly consider that the sentence which reads, "However, the record is clear that the Chiefs subsequently took active part in considering changes to the plan as it developed into final form so that there is no question as to their de facto approval," is inaccurate, for the reasons given below, and since this sentence is particularly vulnerable to quotation out of context, I urge you to eliminate the inaccuracy.

a. The Chiefs were asked to appraise the over-all plan not to approve it. All of their considerations were accomplished in this light.

b. The word "approval" implies that the Chiefs had the responsibility to approve the over-all plan, which was not the case. Approval could only be given at the national level. It should be noted that at no time did the Chiefs even recommend approval of the concept to those responsible for it. Such a recommendation was not made because the Chiefs recognized and so stated that "ultimate success will depend upon political factors, i. e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces." The ability to determine that was not the responsibility nor within the means of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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c. The word "approval" likewise carries with it a connotation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the operation had a strong chance of succeeding. The Chiefs never went beyond an appraisal that with control of the air and if surprise were achieved the force could establish itself ashore, but ultimate success would depend on popular support. Specifically in the appraisal of the Trinidad Plan the Chiefs' views were summarized as follows:

"p. In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors; i. e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second and third hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval, and Air Force officers, if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan.

"q. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime."

In appraising the Zapata Plan the Chiefs stated that:

"14. Of the alternative concepts, Alternative III (Zapata) is considered the most militarily feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective.

"15. None of the alternative concepts are considered as militarily feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the original para-military plan."

d. If quoted out of context, the sentence in question could likewise imply that the operation as appraised by the Chiefs was in fact executed, whereas, it differed in two very important respects, namely the D-Day air strikes and the diversionary efforts. The former, as you know, was cancelled without consultation with the Chiefs; the latter were not executed. A suggested revision of paragraph 25 is included as Inclosure 1.

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9. In paragraph 29 on page 22, an assessment of Castro aircraft losses is covered in one sentence, "The Castro combat aircraft had been reduced from 44 to 36 by the following losses:

D-2 Strikes	5
Losses over the beachhead	$\frac{3}{8}$ "
TOTAL	

As you know, this question of damage is a highly controversial one and would be misleading if this sentence were quoted separately as written. Stated separately this could be interpreted to mean that Castro had 36 operable aircraft to use against the beachhead. This statement is misleading because:

- No Air Force has all its aircraft operable.
- The last verified estimate by CIA of Castro's operable aircraft, made in December 1960, was 15%.
- Only eight combat aircraft identified by aircraft serial number used in radio transmission, flew during the period 1 February - 20 March.
- In paragraph 33, page 13, of this report it is stated that "Subsequent photographic studies and interpretation assessed a greatly reduced estimate of the damage, amounting to five aircraft definitely destroyed and an indeterminable number of other planes suffering some damage."

Actually the really important point is not his total inventory, but the number Castro could operate against the beachhead. Here again the exact number cannot be proven, but the preponderance of evidence developed by CIA indicates that at the end of active operations his operable combat capability as compared to his total inventory was extremely small. As you know, these estimates were based on factors, none of which if taken separately is absolutely reliable. For example, aerial photography shows only major visible fuselage and wing damage and not damage to the electric, hydraulic and mechanical parts of the aircraft. Intercept information shows which aircraft actually flew during any period. Eye-witness accounts and pilots' reports always vary as to accuracy, and need to be mutually supporting in order to be accepted. The last attache reports showed an extremely small capability. The crux of the matter is that the number of operable aircraft

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remaining is not accurately determinable, although the preponderance of evidence supports a low capability rather than a high capability. The report should either reflect this preponderance of evidence or should indicate that it is not possible to estimate the number of operable aircraft remaining to Castro at the end of the operation. Since paragraph 33, page 13, already covers this uncertainty of operable aircraft, it is suggested that the first sentence of paragraph 29, page 22, could be added to paragraph 28 and the second sentence omitted altogether. Or, if this is not acceptable, the paragraph be changed as indicated in Inclosure 2.

10. Paragraph 30, page 22, is a critical paragraph in the report since it attempts to answer the question, "Had the ammunition shortage been surmounted, which is to say, had the Castro air been neutralized, would the landing force have accomplished its mission?" This is admittedly extremely difficult to do after the fact in any operation which has not succeeded, since the failure of one element quite often has indeterminable effects on the chances of success of other elements. To answer this question fully it is believed necessary to establish how it was visualized that the over-all operation would develop. It should be remembered that popular support was a key factor. It was expected that the development of popular support would be influenced by the following factors:

- a. The continued physical presence of the CEF in Cuba signaling its initial military success.
- b. The physical evidence of CEF aircraft ranging throughout Cuba attacking military objectives and dropping supplies and leaflets.
- c. The presence of a provisional government in Cuba, its radio broadcasts and the announcement by the U.S. of its sympathy with and support of the objectives of this provisional government (which was planned by State Department).
- d. The full impact of the propaganda program, i. e., 62 hours daily of radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, drops of transistor radios, etc.
- e. Key defections which were in prospect but did not have the chance to develop.
- f. Organized groups that were requesting arms even on D+2.
- g. Sabotage which was in full swing on D-2 and was apparently not exterminated as it is now developing again.



h. The psychological impact of external moral support that was beginning to generate in many countries.

i. Difficulties with the militia that were expected to develop as the operation progressed.

j. Additional volunteers that would have been available had the beachhead been held.

Even if the initial landing had been successful it would not be possible to determine how fully and effectively all of the above factors would have developed. At least they formed a reasonable basis for evaluating a fair chance of ultimate success and, in view of the alternative of living with Castro, a basis for proceeding with that chance. However, if initial success had been achieved by surmounting the ammunition shortage and neutralizing the Cuban Air Force, it is at least reasonable to assume that these factors would have operated to the extent that the conditions in Cuba would have been sufficiently unsettled to permit the development of an organized internal resistance movement. Likewise, given initial success, the CEF could have been withdrawn on a planned basis for insertion into other areas as guerrillas with only one element remaining in Zapata as a guerrilla force. With respect to breaking out of the beachhead I agree that the possibilities are less clear. Certainly with neutralization of Castro's air force and development of popular support the militia would have been less able to seal off the beachhead, but I would not wish to predict that such a breakout would have succeeded under such conditions. However, despite the presence of these imponderables and the many "ifs" involved, it is suggested that a better feel for the chances of success might be obtained if this paragraph were expanded to provide a fuller treatment of the critical factors involved. A revised paragraph is included as Inclosure 3.

(Sgd) L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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## INCLOSURE 1

### SUGGESTED REVISION OF PARAGRAPH 25

"25. An important question developed in the course of this study is the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the Zapata concept as it developed into final form. The action on March 15th merely indicated a preference for the Zapata concept as opposed to the two other concepts considered (neither of which was the original Trinidad Concept). However, while the record is clear (see Annex 9) that the Chiefs did not approve the plan, it is clear that they took an active part in the consideration of changes to the military portion of the operation as it developed into a final plan, and did not object to this plan as it evolved, which, however, differed from the operation as actually executed in two important respects, i. e., the D-Day air strikes and diversionary operations. They recognized the risk involved, as later brought out in paragraph 34 of this report, and also stated that ultimate success would depend upon popular support. As a body they considered preparations for the operation and changes to the concept four times after 14 March while the plan was in the formative stage, but did not review the plan in its final form because of the shortness of time between the submission of the written plan to the JCS Working Group, April 15, and the actual landing. In fact, on 15 April the CEF was already embarked and en route to the landing area, so any changes to the plan at that time would have been impractical. While the individual Chiefs gave it considerably



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more personal attention than the above record suggests, they were unable to give the development of the plan the same meticulous study which a commander could give to the development of a plan for which he was personally responsible. Also, individual Chiefs had differing views as to important aspects of the operation which in turn differed from those held by senior officials."

Inclosure 1

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**INCLOSURE 2**

**SUGGESTED REVISION TO PARAGRAPH 29, PAGE 22**

"29. These sorties ended the action of the invasion Air Force, which began standdown activities thereafter with a total of 21 aircraft still in commission. The summary of Castro combat aircraft losses at the end of the operation was as follows:

Losses over the beachhead	3
Definitely destroyed on D-2 strikes	5
Damaged on D-2 strikes	Unknown

Thus, although Castro's total inventory of combat aircraft was definitely reduced from 44 to at least 36, it is not known how many of the remaining 36 were already inoperable for maintenance reasons or lack of spare parts, or became inoperable due to damage from the D-2 strikes (undetectable by photo interpretation)."

**Inclosure 2**

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INCLOSURE 3

SUGGESTED REVISION OF PARAGRAPH 30, PAGE 22

"30. It may be asked how near the landing ever came to success. Had the ammunition shortage been surmounted, which is to say, had the Castro air been neutralized, would the landing force have accomplished its mission? Considering their lack of experience, the Cubans ashore fought well and inflicted considerable losses on the Castro militia while they had ammunition. It seems reasonable to believe that with control of the air they could have maintained themselves for some days, although the vastly superior Castro forces which appeared quickly on the scene made a break-out unlikely by such a small landing force. The limited number of B-26 crews, if forced to continue to operate from Nicaragua, would have been strained to provide continuous daylight air support to the beachhead. How close the primary objective of the landing came to success cannot be answered precisely, leaving for consideration the question of the alternative objective of establishing itself as a guerrilla force. The ability to exercise a guerrilla option was predicated on control of the beachhead, control of the air, and the development of organized internal resistance. The guerrilla options as planned visualized either a break-out, or part of the force remaining in the Zapata peninsula while the remainder were withdrawn by sea for reinsertion in other areas. An attempt by the landing force to exercise the first guerrilla option and take



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to the hills would have been virtually impossible because of the presence of the encircling Castro forces and of the instructions which the Cuban invasion units received to fall back on the beaches in case of a penetration of the beachhead. Under the conditions which developed we are inclined to believe that the beachhead could not have survived long without substantial help from the Cuban population or without overt U.S. assistance. With respect to the second option, if control of the air had been achieved, the beachhead could also have been controlled. Likewise, under such circumstances organized internal resistance might well have developed, since even under the existing conditions requests for arms by dissidents were received by CIA as late as D+2. Given these circumstances it is believed that the CEF could have deliberately planned and executed a partial withdrawal by sea and reinsertion elsewhere to strengthen the internal resistance movement."

Inclosure 3

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12	12



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10151  
RECORDS SERIES : NARA RG 218 JCS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSC  
FROM : MCGEORGE BUNDY  
TO : GENERAL TAYLOR  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM TO: GENERAL TAYLOR  
DATE : 02/19/63  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : CONTINGENCY PLANS - CUBA

## CUBAN TASK FORCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
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CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/08/98  
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Page # of Postponement

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NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
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NSC  
DATE: APR 06 1998

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
LMS 4-8-98



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY : JCS  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : JULIAN J. EWELL  
TO : DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
DATE : 02/21/63  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : OPLAN 316-63 - PREPOSITIONING, SHIP REQUISITIONING

CUBAN TASK FORCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
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COMMENTS : NARA RG 218 JCS "NND 941071 BOX 4/8." Memo from Ewell  
to the Director, Joint Staff re: response to  
Presidential request for details of prepositioning,  
ship requisition, etc. for better implementation of  
OPLAN 316-63.



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Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

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DATE: APR 06 1998

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
hms 4-8-98





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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

CM-318-63

FEB 21 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Response to Presidential Request

1. General Taylor desires to respond to the attached memorandum from Mr. Bundy by a memorandum for the President which outlines the prepositioning, ship requisitioning and other actions which could be taken to reduce the presently planned reaction time for the implementation of OPLAN 316. The memorandum should also estimate the dollar costs of these various steps should it be decided that the readiness times were to remain appreciably reduced over an extended period.

2. General Taylor suggests that this problem be discussed with the CINCLANT team during its visit to brief the Joint Chiefs of Staff on OPLAN 316-63.

*Julian J. Ewell*  
JULIAN J. EWELL  
Colonel, USA  
Executive to the Chairman

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~~TOP SECRET~~

61 7 16 45  
19-7-71



THE WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: General Taylor

The President notes in a Cuban Task Force report on contingency planning for Cuba that it would take 18 days from the moment of alert to make an invasion of the island, and he told me to ask you for a comment on this delay and on the ways and means which might be available for shortening it. His impression is that the principal problem is shipping, but he would be glad to have an up-to-date account from you.

McGeorge Bundy

*Gen C. v. d. gort*

*Maj. Smith has action*

*Copy - J-3 + J-5 + Dir Joint Staff*  
*have copies*  
*PK*

~~TOP SECRET~~



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY  
FROM : CYRUS R. VANCE  
TO : CJCS  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - A  
CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA  
DATE : 12/30/63  
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COUP IN CUBA

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/26/97  
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COMMENTS : Taylor papers, Box 7. Memo from Vance to CJCS re:  
attached paper concerning response to potential coup  
in Cuba.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

TAYLOR, BOB D

202-10002-10166

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Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

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26-81-77 *HW*

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~~15 JAN 98 ON RACIAL MATTER STRAP?~~

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
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REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

AS LISTEDDATE: JUL 22 1997







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DEC 30 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

Reference: JCSM 809-63, Subject as above, dated October 21, 1963

Enclosed herewith are three copies of the plan on the above subject which has been prepared jointly on a restricted basis by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan, which has been revised to reflect generally the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference, provides a conceptual basis for US response to a Cuban military coup and has been approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency as a basis for appropriate detailed planning. Mr. McGeorge Bundy has been advised of the foregoing and requested to inform the President of the existence of the plan on a suitable occasion. It is anticipated that the Secretaries of State and Defense may subsequently be requested to brief the President on its outline.

*This has gone to Joint Staff for appropriate action.*  
In accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph 8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans be revised as necessary to reflect the concept of military operations described in the plan and that you advise me when this has been accomplished.

In accordance with paragraph 8b, page 22 of the plan, representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordination with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense will develop a plan for the introduction of the "Special Team" into Cuba which will subsequently be circulated for appropriate action and further detailed planning by agencies concerned.

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

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Enclosure (3 cys)  
As Stated

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A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA

1. Problem. To provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain information to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.

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c. US intervention would be based on:

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS approval), or

(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or

(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable, recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the situation existent at the time:

(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.

(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation



which could be used as a pretext for such action.

(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage unorganized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANS 312 and 316.

3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time.

(In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering information made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a pre-arranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:



(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty-four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained <sup>American</sup> observers in Cuba would be of great value to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT, would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Government if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervene.)

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source intelligence assessment including the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision because, once made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth,



the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These actions would include:

(1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba.

(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the US delayed public announcement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active US involvement in Cuba.

(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta del Este meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC established a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph 7.a. below).



(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316.

d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and reconnaissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support. At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces required for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, as required.

4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea



approaches to the island. The security and military forces are sizeable, well-ordered, and effective. The number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba is apparently being reduced. At present, about 5,000 to 7,000 of these personnel of all kinds remain on the island. Castro remains the dominant figure in Cuba. The regime is organizing a State party which may ultimately have a base of 60,000 members. A militant minority of the Cuban people supports Castro; the majority submits passively to the regime. Internal active resistance is limited, uncoordinated, and badly equipped.

Even though a coup in this environment seems unlikely at this time, it appears to be one of the most probable variants of insurgent action as well as the type most likely to succeed without US intervention. However, depending upon the nature of the coup and the amount of indigenous military support it would attract, very substantial US support, possibly as much as all the forces required by CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, may be required, the provisions of other US support notwithstanding.

5. Basic Considerations. There are a number of problems which confront the United States in considering its response to the contingency of an uprising.

a. Criteria Affecting US Response. For purposes of military and political contingency planning, the situation in Cuba at the time of US intervention should be generally as follows:



(1) Fidel Castro (and possibly Raul Castro, President Dorticos, and Che Guevara) has been neutralized by the insurgents.

(2) The insurgents have seized and are in control of a significant area of Cuba, preferably including Havana with a number of key government buildings and a major radio station.

(3) The action should have triggered revolts in several additional strategic locations throughout Cuba. (Neither the Air Force nor the Navy may yet have joined in the fighting but probably the former tends to side with the regime while the latter might be predominantly sympathetic to the insurgents. Many military commanders in all services will probably be dragging their heels in order not to get caught on the wrong bandwagon. Most of the population will probably remain passive but generally in sympathy with the insurgents. A few civilian groups may have risen in resistance although such resistance must be deemed of minor significance in the present context.)

(4) The Soviets, having been warned repeatedly by the US of the consequences of their intervention in an internal Cuban conflict, would have either withdrawn to their own compounds and not be participating actively in the fighting except to provide advice and encouragement to the Castro/Communist supporters or intervened, in which case OPLANs 312 and 316 would have been implemented.

(5) While fighting was going on, the insurgents would have announced via radio and other means the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and the establishment of a Provisional Government. They would



have appealed to the US and/or OAS for recognition and support. The insurgents simultaneously would have declared that Soviet nationals will not be harmed if they remain in their compounds while awaiting repatriation to the Soviet Union.

b. Military Criteria Affecting US Response.

(1) The JCS have examined criteria affecting US support to a spontaneous uprising. Their views, paraphrased in part, are of value in judging the circumstances in which US support of a coup should be risked:

"Optimally, support to resistance elements prior to invasion would be confined to logistic, UV, and fire support which would detract from the combat power of the invasion forces to the smallest extent possible and not alter materially the location or timing of operations planned in OPLANs 312 and 316.

"Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental commitment of US forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

"a. The uprising gives promise of success if U.S. aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

"b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the U.S.

"c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

"d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piece-meal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

"e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk."

(2) The JCS also have pointed out that the "best military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT



OPLANS 312-316." It should be noted, however, that in the absence of a request for help following Soviet intervention, a full-scale US invasion would be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view. Such an invasion would raise the spectre of US interventionism in Latin America, could poison our future relations with Cuba and Latin America and would be difficult to justify in light of previous Presidential pronouncements. However, a well-planned and successful "rescue" of a revolt could be made politically acceptable. Further, a measured execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 (air strikes) could make the difference of life or death to a revolt under some conditions.

(3) A coup is likely swiftly to encounter serious difficulties, require prompt US help, and lack any clear outline as to the extent of forces involved and their location, especially if it were triggered without US knowledge. JCS study has been given to results which might be anticipated from execution of "portions of OPLAN 312 (air) including its UN (unconventional warfare) provision." Concomitant with the provision of such support, the US (CINCLANT) could, during the period, hereinafter called the first phase, between the time the decision to intervene is made (when establishment of the blockade would be announced) and public announcement of the US intent to commit other military forces in support of the insurgents, introduce small groups for the purposes of reconnaissance, communications, and liaison with the revolutionary forces, and could provide unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine.



Provision of this assistance would be in such manner as to minimize public knowledge of US involvement in the coup. These first phase actions would have the purpose of assuring the insurgents of forthcoming military assistance as well as providing information as to the military desirability of the incremental introduction of balanced forces. Commencing seventy-two hours after the alerting of these groups (at the time the special team is introduced into Cuba), an initial increment would be ready for introduction into Cuba. Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, introduction of balanced forces could be effected on an incremental basis if considered militarily advisable and desirable under the circumstances. Once the US was openly committed to support the Provisional Government, it is estimated that air support, both tactical and logistical, is the type of overt help which a group of insurgents would most likely need and which, at the same time, would bear the least political onus. The actual amount of help would be dependent upon the extent of participation by indigenous armed forces in the insurgency and their degree of success.

c. Implications of Soviet Military Action.

(1) Action by Soviet troops to suppress a revolt would, more than any other single development, call for US intervention. A military response by the US under such circumstances, however, could immediately bring about a direct, local US-Soviet confrontation, either because we



already had moved to support the uprising or because the Soviet intervention in itself would have created a requirement for US intervention. Therefore, an especially important objective would be to deter the Soviets from acting. The chances of Soviet intervention might be reduced by (1) a private warning to them not to intervene, (2) the speed and obvious determination with which the US was acting, and (3) the avoidance of attacks on Soviet personnel and installations in Cuba, unless there is an indication of a clear Soviet intention to intervene.

(2) Any US action would also have to be considered in light of the desirability of avoiding, if possible, a direct challenge to the USSR. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any US action in support of opponents of the Castro regime is bound to impinge on Soviet interests and thus raise in a rather direct fashion the problem of a US-USSR confrontation. In addition, military action such as a full blockade, or an attack on the SAM defenses and Soviet combat formations on the island, would immediately and directly challenge the USSR. The questions thus become: are we prepared to accept this risk, what do we estimate to be its probable consequences, and how would we propose to contain and minimize the degree of Soviet involvement?

(3) In connection with the military risk, the military inferiority of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean area remains; the relative overall military balance between the US and USSR likewise remains unchanged and in US favor. If the sympathy of the Cuban people was demonstrably on the side of the insurgents, the United States would have a solid moral



basis for action. The greatest potential danger lies in those regions where the USSR may consider itself to possess a local advantage, e.g., Berlin. The Soviets might hope to make gains there while our attention was focused on Cuba. Carried to the extreme, concern over Soviet harassment or threats to the safety of Berlin could paralyze any resort to arms elsewhere by the West to preserve its vital interests. Therefore, if it were to intervene in Cuba, the US would have to recognize the possibility of Soviet exploitation of their position in such peripheral areas and to be prepared to counter Soviet action in those areas. The support of our European allies for forceful US action in Cuba is highly desirable and would assist in deterring any untoward Soviet action in Europe. Because of the nature of our proposed actions, the US should make every effort to seek allied support for a decision to assist overtly the insurgents with military means.

(4) On the level of military action, to the extent that circumstances permit, the US should conduct operations so as to leave to the Soviet Union the choice of whether to become directly involved with our armed forces. The blockade is inherently such an action, but our air and ground forces would have to be given explicit instructions at the time on the conditions under which they would engage Soviet forces in Cuba. This point should be made quite clear to the Kremlin. US planning provides, for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time, for the possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba.



d. The Decision. The considerations discussed above point up the number of complex, inter-acting factors which would be brought to bear on the US during the decision-making period. It is very likely that the Government would lack essential, evaluated information, regardless of the manner by which a coup were initiated, but would, at the same time, be under heavy pressure to respond quickly. In the case of a pre-arranged CIA-insurgent plan, the President may not have enough information without the special team's report to determine whether the coup was successful enough to merit US support and, then, to decide what degree of support should be rendered and at what point in time to announce overt support for the dissidents. In the event of a coup which came as a surprise to the US, the dilemma which would confront the Government would be of even greater proportions. In the midst of rapidly changing developments, more time would probably be required for the US to determine whether the revolt should be supported and, if so, in what manner.

6. Concept of Military Operations.

a. The foregoing considerations point toward a concept of US military operations, after the decision to intervene is made, in one or two phases: a first phase, if necessitated by political considerations, oriented primarily toward intelligence and reconnaissance operations, followed, as required, by a second (overt) phase. It cannot be determined now whether, in the event of a coup, time and other considerations would permit or require implementation of the first phase operations prior to rendering overt support or vice versa. In the application of military



force, the basic political principle to be followed is that of support to the insurgents and of helping them to liberate Cuba themselves. However, the US Government must be clear that, once our criteria were adequately met and our support initiated, we would commit sufficient force to insure success, including execution of parts or all of OPLANS 312 and 316. It should be made equally clear to potential insurgents, on the other hand, that US support for a revolt initiated without our prior knowledge or concurrence would be contingent upon the circumstances existent at that time. From a political viewpoint, it is important, in either case, that the revolt appear genuine and not open to the charge of being a facade for a forcible US overthrow of Castro.

b. If the Soviets should intervene against the insurgents, with whatever ground capability remained at that time, the first phase might turn out to be extremely short or non-existent. At the point of Soviet intervention, the US would side openly with the insurgents. However, the more rapidly the US can move to incisive overt intervention under any circumstance, while avoiding actions that risk the more direct and immediate stimulation of Soviet response, the less danger of Soviet armed involvement in Cuba or of Soviet response elsewhere.

c. During the first phase, if there should be one, the US would announce immediately the establishment of an air and sea blockade and would establish further contact with the revolt by deploying small groups while positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316. Although the US could implement the first phase promptly



after a Presidential decision to intervene, either intervention by the Soviets or an appeal for help from the Provisional Government would establish the necessary political basis for announcing a US decision overtly to intervene.

d. In the event of a coup initiated with US approval, the first phase would probably be of short duration, if it occurred at all. If a US aircraft were shot down during this phase, the US should then either (1) declare openly for the insurgents with the opening measure of its overt support being against selected or all air defense targets or (2) retaliate overtly against the offending element of the air defense without admitting assistance to the insurgents. From a political point of view, the latter choice could be justified only with difficulty, although we might seek to justify our actions on the basis that the aircraft shot down was on a reconnaissance flight. In the event of a coup initiated without US knowledge, the provision of any support would be delayed because more time would be required for special team operations, thus increasing the danger of later losing an aircraft to an alerted air defense, if those forces did not join the insurgents.

e. After the United States had decided that overt armed assistance constituted the appropriate response or the Soviets had taken forcible action against either our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would render sufficient direct assistance to the insurgents to permit them to continue to operate and to extend their span of control, and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as necessary to insure



success of the operation. The US Government would initially place main reliance on the psychological impact of the blockade, on the abandonment of the Castro regime by the Cuban people in the face of the clear evidence of decisive US actions to bring down the regime, and on logistical and air support of the revolt in the hope that these factors would be sufficient to bring down the Communist regime.

f. During the second (overt) phase of operations, the US would suppress or eliminate those air defenses which might endanger the air movement of US troops into the area and be prepared to conduct other air operations as required. Following the elimination of hostile Cuban fighter aircraft and SAM defenses, US forces would have the capability to isolate most areas of Cuban territory during daylight by interdiction of military vehicles and troop concentrations, and to make such movement difficult at night.

g. It is important that we have an estimate of the overt support which would be required and which could be introduced in a time-phased manner to sustain the revolt. This estimate of overt support, and time-phasing of its application into Cuba, will be predicated upon a commitment to utilize whatever force is necessary to sustain and exploit the uprising. Following completion of such initial air attacks as may be necessary, provision will be made for the rapid, incremental introduction of balanced forces, to include full-scale invasion if such becomes necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed CINCLANT to look into these matters.



7. Concept of Political Operations.

a. When the decision is made to support the Provisional Government, the President would send a message to Khrushchev informing him of the decision to insure the success of the coup, expressing the expectation that he will not intervene in this Cuban affair and specifically requesting the Chairman to comply with the sea and air blockade to be effected at (time) and to order Soviet troops to specified concentration points to minimize Soviet loss of life. (The latter not to be included in Soviet forces already are actively committed in support of the Castro regime.)

b. After the Provisional Government had issued a public call for help, and the United States had decided that armed assistance constituted the appropriate response, or the Soviets had taken forcible action against our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would consider the following actions:

(1) Cease to recognize the Castro Government and recognize the insurgents as the Provisional Government.

(2) Request the convocation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics under Article 39 of the OAS Charter or, particularly if the Soviets intervene, of the Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty (it would be preferable to have this request preceded by an appeal from the Provisional Government to the OAS) and recommend (i) OAS sanction for and joint participation in the blockade, (ii) the furnishing of all necessary military help to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Assistance Command," even though the US might be the only supplier of forces (in any case, the Command would



be pro-forma and would actually be controlled by the US), and (iii) that the OAS Secretary General and the governments provide all necessary technical assistance to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission."

(3) Dispatch Presidential emissaries to Ottawa, London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome to consult with heads of government and the NAC.

(4) Insure that the OAS informs the United Nations Security Council under Article 54 of the UN Charter of the action taken in the OAS. Forestall Soviet moves in the UN.

(5) Seek the cooperation of selected Cuban exile leaders whose aims are compatible with those of the insurgent group within Cuba.

(6) Convoke a joint session of Congress which would be asked to announce, presumably in the form of a Joint Resolution, US determination to commit all necessary resources in support of the new government.

c. Should the time arrive when, as a result of US air attacks, blockade, etc., it might have become apparent from the standpoint of military power that Castro was finished, the Provisional Government, preferably with the OAS Assistance Command, or, less acceptably, the US, acting as Executive Agent for the OAS, should jointly issue a political ultimatum. This action should be taken while awaiting the earliest point in time at which CINCLANT OPLAN 316 could be implemented, and after the Cuban insurgent chief of the armed forces had been requested to declare martial law. The ultimatum should include the following elements:

(1) A demand that key Castro/Communist personalities, to be



named, be turned over to the custody of the Provisional Government.

(2) An announcement that the OAS will send representatives to the island to assist the Provisional Government in preparing for and conducting free elections.

(3) An appeal to all Cubans to avoid the inevitable bloodshed of invasion by cooperating with the Provisional Government in effecting the removal of the remnants of the Castro dictatorship and the Soviet presence.

d. Working closely with the OAS-SYG the US should help him select and send civilian personnel, comprising an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," to Cuban territory as soon as major military operations had ceased. (US Government personnel should be made available for this purpose in order to have an interdepartmental staff in Cuba.) The OAS should be strongly encouraged to designate an OAS Special Representative to head this Mission who would be a Latin American of considerable stature, demonstrated competence and known cooperativeness with the US. His Deputy should be an American and the actual operating head of the OAS Mission. Once ashore, the Deputy would be recognized by US agencies and officials as the senior US civilian officer in Cuba until such time as a US Ambassador is designated; he would be the link between the OAS Special Representative and the US military commander heading the "OAS Assistance Command," if one had been established, while the commander exercised military responsibilities prior to turning over his functions to Cuban officials. If the revolt gained rapid success prior to the overt introduction of US military



forces on the ground in Cuba, the US should accredit an Ambassador to the Provisional Government who, when so directed by the President, would become the senior US Representative in Cuba. If the revolt grew beyond its original limits only slowly and if relatively large numbers of overt military forces were committed, the arrival of the "Technical Assistance Mission" and diplomatic representatives should be deferred until such time as their activities would be effective after major military operations had been completed.

c. The immediate objectives which the Senior US civilian Representative in Cuba (whether the deputy head of the OAS Mission or the Ambassador) would seek, with the assistance of the "OAS Assistance Command" and the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," are:

- (1) To assist the Provisional Government in maintaining law and order and train and equip Cuban military and police forces as rapidly as possible.
- (2) To provide necessary administrative and technical support to ensure an orderly and efficient maintenance of governmental operations at the national, provincial and municipal levels.
- (3) To assist in the organization of national elections at the earliest suitable date and in the supervision of those elections.
- (4) To lend assistance in the reconstruction of Cuba and in the development and execution of economic development plans.
- (5) To facilitate the speedy departure of any remaining Soviet forces from the island, including protection and assistance in evacuation.



f. The US military commander, under the full operational command of CINCLANT, would continue to be responsible for any residual combat operations. He would also continue to render such civil affairs type assistance to the Provisional Government and/or the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission" as the situation might require.

8. Recommendation. Approve this plan as a basis for development of detailed planning by governmental departments and agencies concerned which would include the following implementing actions:

a. CIA would, as appropriate and with Presidential approval, deal with the potential leaders of a coup in Cuba.

b. CIA, State, and DoD jointly would organize and make ready a special team and establish procedures for its rapid introduction into Cuba when required.

c. Pertinent CINCLANT plans would be revised to reflect the concept of military operations described herein.

d. The Department of State would develop detailed plans to implement the concept of political operations.

e. The Department of State would review and revise, as necessary, the series of papers developing policy recommendations on the host of problems connected with a post-Castro regime.



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COMMENTS : Taylor papers, Box 7, Folder 10. Memo from Vance to  
CJCS re: special operations against Cuba. Attached are  
various associated memos and papers including  
contingency plan for coup in Cuba and proposed sabotage  
operation.



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DOCUMENT NUMBER  
Memo from Sacy Vance

COPY NUMBER  
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SUBJECT:  
Special Operations

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1	EXECUTIVE	<i>OK</i>	
2	SPECIAL ASSISTANT (Policy)	<i>JS</i>	
3	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP	<i>Smith</i>	
	MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA)		
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2 OCT 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**SUBJECT:** Special Operations

**Reference:** Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (JCSM-696-63), subject as above, dated September 11, 1963

As the Defense Department Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs, I have reviewed subject memorandum and its attachment containing an outline plan encompassing a covert program of externally launched raids and harassments against Cuba. The plan represents a valuable addition to the growing inventory of military actions against Cuba from which we can draw at an appropriate time.

I am in full agreement that the Special Group (5412/2) would be an appropriate body for considering this plan at such time as conditions favor an intensification of covert activity against Cuba which prove to be beyond the means or competency of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). I should appreciate your periodic advice as to the appropriate time to submit this plan to the Special Group (5412/2). Pending arrival at this point in the program, necessary coordination with the CIA will be held in abeyance.

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

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DATE OF DOCUMENT  
1 Oct 63

Memo fr S/Army, Cyrus Vance Cys 1-3 w/cys 5-6 attach

SUBJECT:

Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (8)

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TO	NAME	INITIAL	REMARKS
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1	EXECUTIVE	OT	
2	SPECIAL ASSISTANT (Policy)		
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	SECRETARY TO CHAIRMAN		

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1 OCT 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**SUBJECT: Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup  
in Cuba (S)**

As part of the development of a series of State-Defense contingency plans for Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided comments (JCSM-358-63, JCSM-458-63 and JCSM-548-63) on drafts of a State-Defense paper on "US Course of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba."

Review of JCS comments and of comments by other agencies has led to the conclusion that there should be separate contingency plans for each of the possible variants of revolt -- e.g., a military coup, a military revolt which does not neutralize the top leadership, an insurgency movement, and a mass uprising.

Analysis of the situation in Cuba and of current US plans and programs indicates that the military coup is one of the most promising variants of revolt in Cuba for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, there has been developed first, the attached draft plan for that contingency. Draft plans for other types of revolt will follow.

This paper has endeavored to bridge complex problems. There is a need to make quite clear the military requirement that once a US decision has been made to support a coup in Cuba, all action required, including implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, if necessary, is to be authorized. On the other hand, there is a political requirement that US intervention on behalf of the coup be made as palatable to the world as is consistent with the military requirement. A coup must meet certain criteria in order to satisfy these conflicting military and political requirements. The interdepartmental group which prepared the attached draft

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contingency plan has concluded that the only way to be certain that these criteria have been met without undue loss of time is to have CINCLANT introduce a special CIA/DOD/State team within twenty-four hours of the first report of the coup. It is proposed that this special team would operate as indicated in the attached plan.

JCS comments are requested by October 21, 1963.

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

**Cyrus R. Vance**  
**Secretary of the Army**

**Attachment**  
**As Stated**



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30 September 1963

A STATE - DEFENSE CONTINGENCY  
PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA

1. Problem. To determine whether a coup in Cuba meets the criteria for U. S. support and to provide for sufficient US assistance to an anti-communist coup in Cuba to assure the replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: the leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain the information on which to base a decision to support the insurgents; if the US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.

c. US intervention would be based on:

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS approval), or

(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or

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(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

d. A coup must meet the following criteria to be supportable:

(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.

(2) Establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time. (In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering information made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a prearranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:

(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information essential to making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, under the direction of CIA and composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by

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CIA within twenty-four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained American observers in Cuba are essential to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the success of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT, would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Government if the US intervened, and would report to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervene.)

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPIANS 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision because, once made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth, the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These actions would include:

(1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba.

(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the US delayed public announcement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active US involvement in Cuba.

(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government and request

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US and OAS assistance in order to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade to become effective in forty-eight hours. The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta del Este meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC established a collective basis for the blockade as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See paragraph 7.a. below)

(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

a. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and reconnaissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support while generating and positioning forces required for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of

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the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, as required.

4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the island. The security and military forces are sizeable, well-ordered, and effective. The number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba is apparently being reduced. At present, about 5,000 to 9,000 of these personnel of all kinds remain on the island. Castro remains the dominant figure in Cuba. The regime is organizing a State party which will ultimately have a base of 60,000 members. A militant minority of the Cuban people supports Castro; the majority submits passively to the regime. Internal active resistance is limited, uncoordinated, and badly equipped.

Even though a coup in this environment seems unlikely at this time, it appears to be the most probable variant of insurgent action as well as the type most likely to succeed without US intervention. However, depending upon the nature of the coup and the amount of indigenous military support it would attract, very substantial US support, possibly as much as all the forces required by CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, may be required, the provision of other US support notwithstanding.

b. Policy Considerations. US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation which could be used as a pretext for such action.

(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage unorganized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too

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easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANs 312 and 316.

5. Basic Considerations. There are a number of problems which confront the United States in considering its response to the contingency of an uprising.

a. Criteria Affecting US Response. For purposes of military and political contingency planning, the situation in Cuba at the time of US intervention would be generally as follows:

(1) Fidel Castro (and possibly Paul Castro, President Dorticos, and Che Guevara) has been neutralized by the insurgents.

(2) The insurgents have seized and are in control of a significant area of Cuba, preferably including Havana with a number of key government buildings and a major radio station.

(3) The action should have triggered revolts in several additional strategic locations throughout Cuba. (Neither the Air Force nor the Navy may yet have joined in the fighting but probably the former tends to side with the regime while the latter might be predominantly sympathetic to the insurgents. Many military commanders in all services will probably be dragging their heels in order not to get caught on the wrong bandwagon. Most of the population will probably remain passive but generally in sympathy with the insurgents. A few civilian groups may have risen in resistance although such resistance must be deemed of minor significance in the present context.)

(4) The Soviets, having been warned repeatedly by the US of the consequences of their intervention in an internal Cuban conflict, would

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have either withdrawn to their own compounds and not be participating actively in the fighting except to provide advice and encouragement to the Castro/Communist supporters or intervened, in which case OPLANS 312 and 316 would have been implemented.

(e) While fighting was going on, the insurgents would have announced via radio and other means the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and the establishment of a Provisional Government. They would have appealed to the US and/or OAS for recognition and support. The insurgents simultaneously would have declared that Soviet nationals will not be harmed if they remain in their compounds while awaiting repatriation to the Soviet Union.

b. Military Criteria Affecting US Response.

(1) The JCS have examined criteria affecting US support to a spontaneous uprising. Their views, paraphrased in part, are of value in judging the circumstances in which US support of a coup should be risked:

"Optimally, support to resistance elements prior to invasion would be confined to logistic, UW, and fire support which would detract from the combat power of the invasion forces to the smallest extent possible and not alter materially the location or timing of operations planned in OPLANS 312 and 316.

"Although the commitment of forces blindly to support the revolutionaries must be avoided, a rapid incremental commitment of US forces might be desirable. Such action would be justified under some or all of the following conditions:

"a. The uprising gives promise of success if U.S. aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among the armed forces and the people.

"b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable to the US.

"c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

"d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piece-meal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

"e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk."

(2) The JCS also have pointed out that the "best military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT

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OPLAN 312-316." It should be noted, however, that in the absence of a request for help following Soviet intervention, a full-scale US invasion would be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view. Such an invasion would raise the spectre of US interventionism in Latin America, could poison our future relations with Cuba and Latin America and would be difficult to justify in light of previous Presidential pronouncements. However, a well-planned and successful "rescue" of a revolt could be made politically acceptable. Further, a measured execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 (air strikes) could make the difference of life or death to a revolt under some conditions.

(3) A coup is likely swiftly to encounter serious difficulties, require prompt US help, and lack any clear outline as to the extent of forces involved and their location, especially if it were triggered without US knowledge. JCS study has been given to results which might be anticipated from execution of "portions of OPLAN 312 (air) including its UW (unconventional warfare) provision." Concomitant with the provision of such support, the US (CINCLANT) could, during the period, hereinafter called the first phase, between the time the decision to intervene is made (when establishment of the blockade would be announced) and public announcement of the US intent to commit other military forces in support of the insurgents, introduce small groups for the purposes of reconnaissance, communications, and liaison with the revolutionary forces, and could provide unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. Provision of this assistance would be in such manner as to minimize public knowledge of US involvement in the coup. These first phase actions would have the purpose of assuring the insurgents of forthcoming military assistance as well as providing information as to the military desirability of the incremental introduction of balanced forces. Commencing seventy-two hours after the alerting of these groups (at the time the special team is introduced into Cuba), an initial increment would be ready for introduction into Cuba. Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, the first incremental introduction of balanced forces (airborne

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divisions) could be effected if considered militarily desirable under the circumstances. Once the US was openly committed to support the Provisional Government, it is estimated that air support, both tactical and logistical, is the type of overt help which a group of insurgents would most likely need and which, at the same time, would bear the least political onus. The actual amount of help would be dependent upon the extent of participation by indigenous armed forces in the insurgency and their degree of success.

c. Implications of Soviet Military Action.

(1) Action by Soviet troops to suppress a revolt would, more than any other single development, call for US intervention. A military response by the US under such circumstances, however, could immediately bring about a direct, local US-Soviet confrontation, either because we already had moved to support the uprising or because the Soviet intervention in itself would have created a requirement for US intervention. Therefore, an especially important objective would be to deter the Soviets from acting. The chances of Soviet intervention might be reduced by (1) a private warning to them not to intervene, (2) the speed and obvious determination with which the US was acting, and (3) the avoidance of attacks on Soviet personnel and installations in Cuba, unless there is an indication of a clear Soviet intention to intervene.

(2) Any US action would also have to be considered in light of the desirability of avoiding, if possible, a direct challenge to the USSR. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any US action in support of opponents of the Castro regime is bound to impinge on Soviet interests and thus raise in a rather direct fashion the problem of a US-USSR confrontation. In addition, military action such as a full blockade, or an attack on the SAM defenses and Soviet combat formations on the island, would immediately and directly challenge the USSR. The questions thus become: are we prepared to accept this risk, what do we estimate to be its probable consequences, and how would we propose to contain and

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minimize the degree of Soviet involvement?

(3) In connection with the military risk, the military inferiority of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean area remains; the relative overall military balance between the US and USSR likewise remains unchanged and in US favor. If the sympathy of the Cuban people was demonstrably on the side of the insurgents, the United States would have a solid moral basis for action. The greatest potential danger lies in those regions where the USSR may consider itself to possess a local advantage, e.g., Berlin. The Soviets might hope to make gains there while our attention was focused on Cuba. Carried to the extreme, concern over Soviet harassment or threats to the safety of Berlin could paralyze any resort to arms elsewhere by the West to preserve its vital interests. Therefore, if it were to intervene in Cuba, the US would have to recognize the possibility of Soviet exploitation of their position in such peripheral areas and to be prepared to counter Soviet action in those areas. The support of our European allies for forceful US action in Cuba is highly desirable and would assist in deterring any untoward Soviet action in Europe. Because of the nature of our proposed actions, the US should make every effort to seek allied support for a decision to assist overtly the insurgents with military means.

(4) On the level of military action, to the extent that circumstances permit, the US should conduct operations so as to leave to the Soviet Union the choice of whether to become directly involved with our armed forces. The blockade is inherently such an action, but our air and ground forces would have to be given explicit instructions at the time on the conditions under which they would engage Soviet forces in Cuba. This point should be made quite clear to the Kremlin. US planning provides, for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time, for the possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba.

d. The Decision. The considerations discussed above point up the number of complex, inter-acting factors which would be brought to

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bear on the US during the decision-making period. It is very likely that the Government would lack essential, evaluated information, regardless of the manner by which a coup were initiated, but would, at the same time, be under heavy pressure to respond quickly. In the case of a pre-arranged CIA-insurgent plan, the President would have to await the special team's report to determine whether the coup was successful enough to merit US support and, then, to decide what degree of support should be rendered and at what point in time to announce overt support for the dissidents. In the event of a coup which came as a surprise to the US, the dilemma which would confront the Government would be of even greater proportions. In the midst of rapidly changing developments, more time would probably be required for the US to determine whether the revolt should be supported and, if so, in what manner.

### 6. Concept of Military Operations.

a. The foregoing considerations point toward a concept of US military operations in one or two phases: an initial phase, if necessitated by political considerations, oriented primarily toward intelligence and reconnaissance operations, followed, as required, by an overt phase. It cannot be determined now whether, in the event of a coup, time and other considerations would permit or require implementation of the first phase operations prior to rendering overt support or vice versa. In the application of military force, the basic political principle to be followed is that of support to the insurgents and of helping them to liberate Cuba themselves. However, the US Government must be clear that, once our criteria were met and our support initiated, we would commit sufficient force to insure success, including execution of parts or all of OPLANs 312 and 316. It should be made equally clear to the potential insurgents, on the other hand, that US support for a revolt initiated without our prior knowledge or concurrence would be contingent upon the circumstances existent at that time. From a political viewpoint, it is important, in either case, that the revolt appear genuine and not open to the charge of

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being a facade for a forcible US overthrow of Castro.

b. If the Soviets should intervene against the insurgents, with whatever ground capability remained at that time, the first phase might turn out to be extremely short or non-existent. At the point of Soviet intervention, the US would side openly with the insurgents. However, the more rapidly the US can move to incisive overt intervention under any circumstance, while avoiding actions that risk the more direct and immediate stimulation of Soviet response, the less danger of Soviet armed involvement in Cuba or of Soviet response elsewhere.

c. During the first phase, if there should be one, the US would announce immediately the establishment of an air and sea blockade and would establish further contact with the revolt by deploying small groups while positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316. Although the US could implement the first phase promptly after a Presidential decision to intervene, either intervention by the Soviets or an appeal for help from the Provisional Government would establish the necessary political basis for announcing a US decision overtly to intervene.

d. In the event of a coup initiated with US approval, the first phase would probably be of short duration, if it occurred at all. If a US aircraft were shot down during this phase, the US should then either (1) declare openly for the insurgents with the opening measure of its overt support being against selected or all air defense targets or (2) retaliate overtly against the offending element of the air defense without admitting assistance to the insurgents. From a political point of view, the latter choice could be justified only with difficulty, although we might seek to justify our actions on the basis that the aircraft shot down was on a reconnaissance flight. In the event of a coup initiated without US knowledge, the provision of any support would be delayed because more time would be required for special team operations, thus increasing the danger of later losing an aircraft to an alerted air defense, if those forces did not join the insurgents.

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e. After the United States had decided that overt armed assistance constituted the appropriate response or the Soviets had taken forcible action against either our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would render sufficient direct assistance to the insurgents to permit them to continue to operate and to extend their span of control, and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316, as necessary to insure success of the operation. The US Government would initially place main reliance on the psychological impact of the blockade, on the abandonment of the Castro regime by the Cuban people in the face of the clear evidence of decisive US actions to bring down the regime, and on logistical and air support of the revolt in the hope that these factors would be sufficient to bring down the Communist regime.

f. During the overt phase of operations, the US would suppress or eliminate those air defenses which might endanger the air movement of US troops into the area and be prepared to conduct other air operations as required. Following the elimination of hostile Cuban fighter aircraft and SAM defenses, US forces would have the capability to isolate most areas of Cuban territory during daylight by interdiction of military vehicles and troop concentrations, and to make such movement difficult at night.

g. It is important that we have an estimate of the overt support which would be required and which could be introduced in a time-phased manner to sustain the revolt. This estimate of overt support, and time-phasing of its application into Cuba, will be predicated upon a commitment to utilize whatever force is necessary to sustain and exploit the uprising. Following completion of such initial air attacks as may be necessary, provision will be made for the rapid, incremental introduction of balanced forces, to include full-scale invasion if such becomes necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed CINCLANT to look into these matters.

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7. Concept of Political Operations

a. When the decision is made to support the Provisional Government, the President would send a message to Khrushchev informing him of the decision to insure the success of the coup, expressing the expectation that he will not intervene in this Cuban affair and specifically requesting the Chairman to comply with the sea and air blockade to be effected at (time) and to order Soviet troops to specified concentration points to minimize Soviet loss of life. (The latter not to be included if Soviet forces already are actively committed in support of the Castro regime.)

b. After the Provisional Government had issued a public call for help, and the United States had decided that armed assistance constituted the appropriate response, or the Soviets had taken forcible action against our aircraft or the insurgents, the US would consider the following actions:

(1) Cease to recognize the Castro Government and recognize the insurgents as the Provisional Government.

(2) Request the convocation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics under Article 39 of the OAS Charter or, particularly if the Soviets intervene, of the Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty (it would be preferable to have this request preceded by an appeal from the Provisional Government to the OAS) and recommend (i) OAS sanction for and joint participation in the blockade, (ii) the furnishing of all necessary military help to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Assistance Command," even though the US might be the only supplier of forces (in any case, the Command would be pro-forma and would actually be controlled by the US), and (iii) that the OAS Secretary General and the governments provide all necessary technical assistance to the Provisional Government, preferably under the form of an "OAS Technical Assistance Mission."

(3) Dispatch Presidential emissaries to Ottawa, London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome to consult with heads of government and the NAC.



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(4) Insure that the OAS informs the United Nations Security Council under Article 54 of the UN Charter of the action taken in the OAS. Forestall Soviet moves in the UN.

(5) Seek the cooperation of selected Cuban exile leaders whose aims are compatible with those of the insurgent group within Cuba.

(6) Convoke a joint session of Congress which would be asked to announce, presumably in the form of a Joint Resolution, US determination to commit all necessary resources in support of the new government.

c. Should the time arrive when, as a result of US air attacks, blockade, etc., it might have become apparent from the standpoint of military power that Castro was finished, the Provisional Government, preferably with the OAS Assistance Command, or, less acceptably, the US, acting as Executive Agent for the OAS, should jointly issue a political ultimatum. This action should be taken while awaiting the earliest point in time at which CINCLANT OPLAN 316 could be implemented, and after the Cuban insurgent chief of the armed forces had been requested to declare martial law. The ultimatum should include the following elements:

(1) Key Castro/Communist personalities to be named would be turned over to the custody of the Provisional Government.

(2) Announcement that the OAS will send representatives to the island to assist the Provisional Government in preparing for and conduct of free elections.

(3) An appeal to all Cubans to avoid the inevitable bloodshed of invasion by cooperating with the Provisional Government in effecting the removal of the remnants of the Castro dictatorship and the Soviet presence.

d. Working closely with the OAS-SYG the US should help him select and send civilian personnel, comprising an "OAS Technical Assistance

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Mission," to Cuban territory as soon as major military operations had ceased. (US Government personnel should be made available for this purpose in order to have an interdepartmental staff in Cuba.) The OAS should be strongly encouraged to designate an OAS Special Representative to head this Mission who would be a Latin American of considerable stature, demonstrated competence and known cooperativeness with the US. His Deputy should be an American and the actual operating head of the OAS Mission. Once ashore, the Deputy would be recognized by US agencies and officials as the senior US civilian officer in Cuba until such time as a US Ambassador is designated; he would be the link between the OAS Special Representative and the US military commander heading the "OAS Assistance Command," if one had been established, while the commander exercised military responsibilities prior to turning over his functions to Cuban officials. If the revolt gained rapid success prior to the overt introduction of US military forces on the ground in Cuba, the US should accredit an Ambassador to the Provisional Government who, when so directed by the President, would become the senior US Representative in Cuba. If the revolt grew beyond its original limits only slowly and if relatively large numbers of overt military forces were committed, the arrival of the "Technical Assistance Mission" and diplomatic representatives should be deferred until such time as their activities would be effective after major military operations had been completed.

e. The immediate objectives which the Senior US civilian Representative in Cuba (whether the deputy head of the OAS Mission or the Ambassador) would seek, with the assistance of the "OAS Assistance Command" and the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission," are:

(1) To assist the Provisional Government in maintaining law and order and train and equip Cuban military and police forces as rapidly as possible.

(2) To provide necessary administrative and technical support to ensure an orderly and efficient maintenance of governmental operations at the national, provincial and municipal levels.

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(3) To assist in the organization of national elections at the earliest suitable date and in the supervision of those elections.

(4) To lend assistance in the reconstruction of Cuba and in the development and execution of economic development plans.

(5) To facilitate the speedy departure of any remaining Soviet forces from the island, including protection and assistance in evacuation.

f. The US military commander, under the full operational command of CINCLANT, would continue to be responsible for any residual combat operations. He would also continue to render such civil affairs type assistance to the Provisional Government and/or the "OAS Technical Assistance Mission" as the situation might require.

8. Recommendation. Approve this plan as a basis for development of detailed planning by governmental departments and agencies concerned which would include the following implementing actions:

a. CIA would, as appropriate and with Presidential approval, deal with the potential leaders of a coup in Cuba.

b. CIA, State, and DOD jointly would organize and make ready a special team and establish procedures for its rapid introduction into Cuba when required.

c. Pertinent CINCLANT plans would be revised to reflect the concept of military operations described herein.

d. The Department of State would develop detailed plans to implement the concept of political operations.

e. The Department of State would review and revise, as necessary, the series of papers developing policy recommendations on the host of problems connected with a post-Castro regime.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

CM-715-63

SEP 26 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Preliminary Planning on DOD Support of CIA Covert Operations Against Cuba (TS)

1. In response to your memorandum of 23 September 1963, subject as above, the Joint Staff initiated planning with Mr. Joseph A. Callahan, Jr., personnel of CIA, and CINCLANT representatives.

2. An outline support plan was developed for the raid planned for 23-24 September 1963. However, at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting 25 September 1963, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, of the CIA, advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the CIA did not intend to ask for military support for this raid. In view of this statement, no further action is being taken with respect to this specific operation.

(Signed)

CURTIS E. LEMAY  
Acting Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Col. Wyman of SACIA  
Cys 3-9 are file SACIA

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CM-715-63/26 Sep 63



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DOCUMENT NUMBER  
Memo from Secy Cyrus Vance

COPY NUMBER  
Cys 1-3

DATE OF DOCUMENT  
23 Sept 63

SUBJECT:

Preliminary Planning on DOD Support of CIA Covert Operations  
Against Cuba (TS)

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2	SPECIAL ASSISTANT (POL)	
3	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP SMITH	
	MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA)	
	MILITARY ASSISTANT (L&C)	
	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	
	SECRETARY TO CHAIRMAN	

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File O PK



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23 SEP 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF****SUBJECT:** Preliminary Planning on DOD Support of CIA Covert Operations Against Cuba (TS)**Reference:** Secretary of the Army Memorandum, subject: DOD Support of Covert Operations Conducted by the CIA Against Cuba (TS), dated September 23, 1963

By reference memorandum I have requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the desirability of prearranging DOD air or surface support for the protection of CIA raiding craft in the event such craft are subjected to hot pursuit in international waters by Cuban aircraft or surface vessels. In the event an affirmative decision is subsequently made on this policy question, CIA may request DOD support for the sabotage operation approved by the Special Group on September 5, 1963, which provides for the sabotage of a lumber mill at Marabi in northern Oriente. This operation was originally scheduled for September 25, however, I am informed it will now be conducted on the night of September 28-29, 1963.

In view of the possibility that DOD will be directed to support this operation on short notice and since detailed preliminary planning and coordination with CIA is essential, I am convinced that we must initiate this planning today if we are to be prepared to provide support for this operation. The short span of time presently available already reduces our flexibility for providing effective support.

In order to get this planning underway without delay, may I suggest that appropriate representatives of the Joint Staff be designated to work with Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr. (extension 79235) in developing

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a support plan which can be implemented on short notice if directed. Mr. Califano has advised General Krulak and his staff of the nature of this problem and CIA is prepared to meet with DOD representatives to accomplish necessary coordination.

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army



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DOCUMENT NUMBER

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Memo from Cyrus Vance,

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CLASSIFICATION

DATE OF DOCUMENT  
23 Sept 63

SUBJECT: Secretary of the Army

Department of Defense Support of Covert Operations Conducted by the  
Central Intelligence Agency Against Cuba (TS)

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TO NAME INITIAL

REMARKS

CHAIRMAN, JCS

EXECUTIVE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT (Policy)

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP

MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA)

MILITARY ASSISTANT (L&L)

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SECRETARY TO CHAIRMAN

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23 SEP 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**SUBJECT: Department of Defense Support of Covert Operations  
Conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency Against  
Cuba (TS)**

A program of covert operations against Cuba conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with assets under their control was approved some time ago by highest authority. Externally launched operations already conducted under the program have not included Department of Defense (DOD) support during the actual operational phases nor is such support provided for under the approved program. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the CIA will in the immediate future raise the issue of prearranged DOD support, on a contingency basis, in the event CIA controlled raiding vessels are subjected to hot pursuit in international waters by either Cuban aircraft or surface vessels. Under existing Rules of Engagement, the prearrangement of DOD support of this type will require approval by the highest authority.

The presentation of a DOD position on this sensitive policy question will probably be required at the next meeting of the Special Group (NSC 5412/2) on September 25, 1963. As the DOD Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs, it would be most helpful to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this urgent matter by the close of business on September 24, 1963 so that these views can be fully considered in the development of the DOD position.

In consideration of this policy issue the limitations imposed by currently approved national policy should be adhered to as far as possible. First, there is a continuing requirement to prevent attributability in sabotage operations against Cuba. Second, the provision of DOD support on the contingency basis outlined, should be viewed

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within the scope and pace of the CIA program already approved and under way. Within these parameters, I would appreciate the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following specific questions:

- a. Would it be desirable to prearrange DOD air or surface support for the protection of CIA raiding craft of U. S. registry in the event such craft are subjected to hot pursuit in international waters by Cuban aircraft or surface vessels?
- b. Is such prearranged support desirable for CIA controlled raiding craft of foreign registry?

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

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23 SEP 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Proposed Sabotage Operation Against Cuba (TS)

I am enclosing a request from the Central Intelligence Agency for Department of Defense views regarding a proposed CIA controlled sabotage operation off the coast of Cuba. It is requested that you obtain the views of the appropriate military authorities and submit them to me by the close of business Thursday, September 26, 1963.

Because of the highly sensitive nature of this matter, this paper should be controlled on an absolutely "need-to-know" basis and a formal access list should be maintained.

(Signature of Cyrus R. Vance)

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

Enclosure  
As Stated

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DATE: 7 Oct 97

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20 Sept 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
General Counsel  
Department of the Army

SUBJECT: Proposed Sabotage Operation  
Against Navigational Aids on  
North Coast of Pinar del Rio

1. We are considering proposing to the Special Group the following sabotage operation to be conducted during October: the destruction of navigational aids including buoys and lighthouses on the coast of Pinar del Rio province in Cuba with the objective of limiting night navigation along the coastal routes. The target locations are at:

Cayo Arenas, 22° 50' N, 83° 39' W  
Cayo Jutias, 22° 43' N, 84° 01' W  
Cayo Buena Vista, 22° 24' N, 84° 26' W  
Las Calabazas, 22° 10' N, 84° 45' W

The operations will be conducted by two raider teams placing demolition charges. All four locations will be attacked on the same night.

2. Because of the nature of the target and possible ramifications to the Navy, I would appreciate being advised of the Defense Department's position regarding the proposal. I would be glad to personally discuss the operation with the appropriate Navy officials if you so desire. After such discussion, in the event the Defense Department takes a negative position, I will withdraw the proposal without referring it to the Special Group.

*Desmond Fitzgerald*  
Desmond Fitzgerald

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DATE: 1 Oct 97

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DATE: 100197

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 530-63 dated July 17, 1963, Subject: Special Operations

*Attached*

The Secretary of Defense has referred subject memorandum to me for reply as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in JCSM 530-63 and its dissemination will be most helpful in finalizing the Army study and will be carefully considered in the revisions to the study which are currently under way.

I agree with the conviction expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the program outlined in the Army study cannot of itself produce positive results. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff note in the Appendix to your memorandum, the primary objective of the proposed program is to contribute to the disruption of political and economic stability in Cuba. I also agree that there should not be introduced in the implementation of such a program handicaps which are designed to insure non-attributability but which actually condemn the program to failure at the outset.

I believe it is important that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be kept fully informed of activities in the Cuban area concerned with covert intelligence collection, internal and external sabotage, organization of a resistance framework and psychological operations. To accomplish this, I have instituted the following procedures:

a. Periodic briefings will be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by a responsible official of the Central Intelligence Agency designed to keep them fully apprised of covert activities and plans of the Agency via Cuba.

b. A biweekly report prepared by my office and outlining the military support being rendered to the Central Intelligence Agency for covert operations against Cuba will be furnished to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army for transmittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A copy of this report will also be furnished to the Special Assistant for Counterintelligence & Special Activities.

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Normal procedures, pertaining to b. above provide that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) be responsible for the Defense relationship with CIA covert operations. Nevertheless, the DOD Executive Agent arrangement for Cuban affairs, and the requirement that the DOD point of contact for covert operations against Cuba is thoroughly cognizant of the full range of U. S. plans and policies for this area, favor the special procedures outlined below. These procedures are established with the DOD Executive Agent to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations).

This office will serve as the point of contact with CIA for covert operations against Cuba and will coordinate the Department of Defense responsibility for all CIA requests for military support for such operations. A consideration of this arrangement is the continuing requirement that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), the Joint Staff and the Service points of contact keep this office fully informed of any CIA requests of this type which they might receive.

I believe that the above arrangements will constitute a valuable contribution to the close liaison essential to the development of a sound covert program. In addition, these arrangements should provide the basis for a determination of the level of covert activity at which the Department of Defense must assume responsibility under the provisions of NSAM 57. Finally, these procedures should facilitate the development by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a program of carefully launched raids and harassment of graduated intensity.

Cyrus Vance





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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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JCSM-530-63

JUL 17 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**Subject: Special Operations (U)**

1. In response to a request by the Defense Representative on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, the Department of the Army Study on "Capabilities and Employment of Selected Cuban Resources for Special Operations Against Cuba and a Concept of Operations (TS)" has been reviewed.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favor a program such as that envisioned in this study, providing it will form part of a comprehensive campaign embodying a full range of intensified actions against the Castro-communist regime in the political, economic, psychological, intelligence, and unconventional warfare fields, which will be prosecuted resolutely in every aspect. While recognizing that the program envisioned in the study can contribute to the disruption of political and economic stability in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mindful of the limited success of similar programs which have been attempted during the past three years, are of the opinion that the program cannot of itself produce decisive results.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recognize that the operations envisaged in this program cannot be conducted on a completely nonattributable basis. They are of the opinion that the United States should be willing to accept the probability that some operations will be publicly attributed to this country and should not allow these considerations to cause the introduction of handicaps which will condemn the program to failure at the outset.
4. The paper has been examined in the light of the convictions expressed above. This examination has led to the following conclusions:

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a. The activities described in the concept which are concerned with covert intelligence collection, internal sabotage, organization of a resistance framework, and psychological operations are largely outside the purview of the military, and, while the pursuit of such activities is favored as part of a broad program, it is not within the province of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to judge the provisions of the concept which relate to their execution. However, since these activities will have results of military significance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be kept fully informed, through a liaison arrangement, of these aspects of any program which may be undertaken.

b. Externally launched raids, if properly organized and vigorously executed, offer considerable promise of effective contribution to an over-all program designed to disrupt political and economic stability in Cuba.

5. The heart of the Department of the Army study is at Tab 20, "Concept of Operations," which is expressed in terms so general as to leave some question as to the scope and magnitude of the sabotage operations contemplated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff interpret the Concept as envisaging a graduated spectrum of externally launched raids and harassment incursions, commencing with a very modest program of external sabotage attacks, and continuing with plans for incrementally intensified operations readily at hand for activation should circumstances dictate their approval.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledge that the very small dimension sabotage attacks, at the lower end of the intensity spectrum, may well be wholly within the competence and capability of the CIA to execute, and that in these efforts the military role would be confined to provision of support only, involving neither military preparation nor validation of the detailed CIA plans.

7. However, because the full program of external raids, for which we should be prepared, must flow naturally from these initial, small-scale efforts, they are necessarily of great interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since, at some point in a graduated evolution of such a program, the task may exceed the means of competence of the CIA, in which case the military will be obliged to accept responsibility for the task.

8. For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the preparation of an outline plan, encompassing a covert program of externally launched raids and harassments of graduated intensity, defining clearly each increment -- from an initial very limited enterprise to a highly intensified succession of covert raids. From this outline plan, resource requirements

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may readily be calculated, and a logical assignment of responsibilities for planning, training, and operational advice will evolve. At an appropriate time, the outline plan will be coordinated with the CIA. Successful execution of this program could prove to be an effective preliminary to the initiation of other, more comprehensive, plans which are now in being and are related to elimination of the Castro-communist regime.

9. This plan will be forwarded to you when completed. Meanwhile, changes to Tab 20 (Concept of Operations) of the study, designed to clarify its intent in accordance with the foregoing, are attached as the Appendix and Annex hereto.

**For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Attachments**

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## APPENDIX

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE CONCEPT  
(TAB 20 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STUDY)1. General


The concept at Tab 20 of the study approaches the problems of organization, command and control, bases, training, equipment and leadership essentially as these problems have been approached previously in the operations of 1960-62 which for many reasons, some beyond the scope of this study, did not achieve the results desired. In considering renewed similar operations, it would be prudent to consider these experiences of the past in order to determine what differences in approach may now be required. To this end, it would be desirable to include a new section in the study underscoring significant problems encountered in the past, and drawing conclusions which will provide the rationale for the new approach to these problems which should be taken in a revised concept. The Annex hereto would be appropriate for this purpose. It should be inserted in the study as a separate section immediately preceding the concept.

2. Specific Comments and Recommendations

Comments and recommendations for changes in the concept, made in the light of US experience in previous similar operations, are presented below. Corresponding changes would be required in other portions of the study for consistency.

a. Page 113, Objective

The second paragraph of this section is not relevant to the heading.

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Recommendation. Delete the second paragraph, and rewrite the first as follows:

"The objective of the operations envisaged in this concept is to contribute to the disruption of political and economic stability in Cuba."

b. Page 117, Types of Operations, first paragraph.

A clear distinction should be made between covert intelligence, psychological, and internal sabotage and resistance activities conducted by assets inside Cuba and a graduated program of expanding, externally launched raids and harassments. It is essential that CIA continue its primary responsibility for the former, and it is appropriate that CIA initiate the initial, small scale externally launched incursions with DOD support as required. However, at some point, as this program expands in intensity, the military resource requirements, in terms of planning, training, materiel, support, and professional direction of operations, will assume such magnitude as to require assumption of these responsibilities by the Department of Defense under the terms of NSAM 57.

Recommendation. That the first paragraph be rewritten as follows:

"This concept envisions five distinct types of operations - each different in nature, but related and, to some degree interdependent. These are:

- Intelligence collection
- Sabotage by internal resources
- Organization of a resistance framework
- Psychological Operations
- Externally launched raids of graduated intensity

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"Primary responsibility for the first four types of operations listed will be assigned to the CIA, as will the responsibility for initiating small-scale externally launched raids and harassment incursions in the first phase of the graduated program, with DOD support as required. The Department of Defense will assume responsibility for training, organization, equipping and providing operational advice to Cuban raider units in subsequent phases at such times as the program expands to the point where its magnitude exceeds the capabilities of the CIA."

c. Page 118, Externally Launched Sabotage Operations

(1) In order to be consistent with the revision proposed above, the heading of this paragraph should be changed and the paragraph itself shifted to a position following the discussion of psychological operations which now appears on page 120.

(2) Whereas this paragraph states that operations would be conducted by Cuban resources, the performance of Cuban leaders in past similar operations indicates that Cuban units engaging in externally launched incursions may require some degree of American leadership.

(3) Past experience also indicates that US naval personnel and ships of various types may be needed to launch and recover Cuban raiding parties at such time as raids are conducted against targets remote from the operating base. For successful raids against targets located in all areas of the Cuban littoral, as are

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envisaged to be part of a fully matured program, sophisticated, professionally commanded operations at sea will be required, involving movements over long distances with precise navigation and timing. There will also be a requirement for protection of ships and small craft in international waters near Cuba, since the Castro Government has demonstrated its willingness to attack unprotected ships and craft in international waters.

(4) The concept is expressed in terms so general as to leave some question as to the scope and magnitude of the externally launched sabotage operations contemplated. If these operations are to produce significant effects, the concept should envisage a graduated spectrum of externally launched raids and harassment incursions, commencing with a very modest program of external sabotage attacks, and continuing with plans for incrementally intensified operations readily at hand for activation should circumstances dictate their approval. The concept should be clarified in this regard.

Recommendation. That this paragraph be deleted and the following substituted after the discussion of psychological operations on page 120:

"Externally Launched Raids"

"A graduated spectrum of externally launched raids and harassment incursions will be initiated, commencing with a very modest program of external sabotage attacks, and continuing with plans for incrementally intensified operations readily at hand for activation should circumstances dictate their approval.

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"Raids will be conducted by small, specially organized, trained and equipped units of Cuban personnel to destroy selected targets located on or near the Cuban coast. For targets near to operating bases, raiding parties may utilize small craft for movement to the target area and return. For larger attacks on targets more distant from the operating base, it may be necessary for raiding parties and their small craft to be covertly launched and recovered at sea near the Cuban coast by the US Navy.

"While Cuban leaders will be employed as far as possible, it may be necessary in some cases to supply skilled and tested American leadership.

"Targets will be destroyed by use of appropriate weapons, such as recoilless rifles, mortars, machine guns, incendiaries, explosives and similar munitions.

"Attacks against shipping in Cuban harbors will be carried out by underwater swimmers and other methods as feasible.

"Parachute and other aerial techniques may be employed in some cases for introduction of raiders into the target area, with recovery to be accomplished by sea."

d. Page 120. Command and Control.

(1) This section does not differentiate between CIA and DOD responsibilities for command and control. Apart from the CIA responsibilities in all of the areas falling within its proper province, the responsibility for planning, training and operational advice of Cuban

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raider units in the later, expanded phases of the graduated raid program should reside in a military commander operating within command channels of the Department of Defense.

(2) The most desirable arrangement for command and control of raider programs, would be to establish a joint task force within an appropriate unified command. The task force would include CIA representation in order that these covert raids would be coordinated with all of the related activities conducted by the CIA.

(3) The recommendation of policies governing unconventional warfare operations does not appear to be a proper function of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs. More properly, policy should be recommended by the activity having primary responsibility for the conduct of operations. These recommendations should be considered by the Special Group (5412) and/or the Standing Group or the National Security Council and submitted to the President for approval, with any significant divergencies of opinion clearly isolated and defined for the President's consideration.

Recommendation. That the present section on command and control be deleted and the following substituted:

"Command and Control"

"Covert activities by the CIA can best be planned and executed by a field headquarters. This headquarters would function under the direct control of CIA, and would include representatives of the Department of Defense in a liaison capacity. .

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"The initial phase of the externally launched raid program will be under the direction of CIA. Subsequently, at such time as the expanded program exceeds the capabilities of the CIA, the responsibility for organization, planning, support and operational advice of units engaging in later phases of expanded raider operations will be assigned to a joint task force within command channels of the Department of Defense. This task force would include a CIA element, in order that these operations may be coordinated with all of the related activities conducted by CIA.

"Policy to govern the conduct of raid operations and covert activities envisioned herein should be considered by the Special Group (5412) and/or the Standing Group or the National Security Council and approved by the President, or as the President may direct."

e. Page 123. Bases.

(1) No mention is made of bases for training. The most satisfactory procedure would be to use US military facilities for training of raider units since they are available, adequate, logistically supportable and relatively secure in comparison to non-military facilities, although maintaining the security of covert training at these bases will involve difficult problems. Use of US bases will diminish the security risks and political complications which arise in connection with bases in foreign countries. Moreover, the pattern of

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existing US military training programs for Cubans at US bases would provide cover for training and rehearsal.

(2) Operational bases in US-controlled territory are preferable from the standpoint of efficiency, control, logistical support, and avoidance of political complications.

(3) Since the British have consistently refused similar requests in the past, it would be politically unwise to approach the British with a request to use territory such as the Bahamas until it can be convincingly shown that such action would be in the British interest.

(4) Bases in Central America have proved to be too distant from the target for efficient covert air or maritime operations by Cuban units, and are difficult to support logistically on a covert bases. No truly suitable maritime facility is available in Guatemala or Nicaragua, the two countries most likely to cooperate. Haiti would be an excellent area for bases due to its proximity to Cuba; however, current strained US relations with the Duvalier government would appear to preclude the possibility of using Haitian territory at present. The Dominican Republic would also be a suitable geographical area for bases, but it is unlikely that the government of that country would cooperate at this time.

Recommendation: That the section on bases be rewritten as follows:

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE"Bases"

"Experience has shown that bases on US soil, either in the United States or outlying possessions, are most suitable from the standpoint of availability, adequacy, efficiency, control, security, logistical support, and avoidance of political complications with foreign countries.

"For covert raider training, US military and naval installations may be utilized as necessary.

"For covert raider operations, bases in the Continental United States and overseas possessions should be used where to do so contributes to security or enhances the likelihood of success. All raider operational bases will be under US control, and may include existing military and naval facilities.

"For the covert activities under its cognizance, the CIA will utilize training and operational bases in US territory to the maximum extent feasible. Military facilities will be made available for use when required."

f. Page 123.

It would be desirable to insert a section on raider training after the section on bases. There are specialized aspects of this training which need to be exposed in the concept.

Recommendation: That the following be inserted:

"Raider Training"

"Under the cover of the existing US military training programs for Cuban personnel, Cuban raider units to be employed in the several sequential phases

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of the graduated raid program will receive highly sophisticated infantry and other specialized training. Included in the program will be such subjects as advanced individual training, weapons, special devices, demolitions, small unit tactics, communications, amphibious raids, and small craft operations. Selected personnel will be trained as underwater swimmers and parachutists."

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## ANNEX

## ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE

GENERAL

During 1960-1961, prior to the landing in Cuba of Cuban Brigade 2506, operations similar to those envisioned in this study, but with less emphasis on externally launched incursions, were conducted against Cuba. Such operations were again attempted during the period February-October 1962, and some are being conducted now. In the course of these experiences, problems have been encountered which have been carefully considered in developing this concept for, planning and conducting an unconventional warfare program designed to contribute to the disruption of political and economic stability in Cuba. These earlier experiences are recited below, along with conclusions drawn therefrom.

CUBAN INTERNAL SECURITY

Communist-style internal security measures were progressively introduced by the Castro regime in 1960-1961 with the result that it became difficult for agents or guerrilla groups in the country to survive, let alone perform with great effectiveness. A number of US-controlled agents were captured and executed, guerrilla groups were either destroyed or dispersed, and thousands of citizens were imprisoned. Since that time, the Castro government has had further opportunity to improve the internal security system under Bloc guidance, and has established stringent controls over all activities of the populace.

In view of the current effectiveness of the communist style internal security system, it is unlikely that effective



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sabotage and other underground operations will be accomplished on a large scale by internal agents or groups. They have not been accomplished heretofore, even during times when Castro's security measures were less well developed.

#### CONCLUSION

In the case of Cuba, externally launched raids and harassment incursions probably offer better prospects for accomplishing significant results than sabotage operations by internal assets.

#### NON-ATTRIBUTABILITY

It was exhibited in Cuban operations of 1960-1961 that paramilitary operations of any appreciable scope and magnitude cannot be conducted on a completely non-attributable basis. Strict adherence to the non-attributable rule served to cripple operations and often to render them ineffective, but did not succeed in avoiding public attribution of the operations to the United States by both enemy and friendly public information media. Also damaging to the effectiveness of operations were the limitations on the use of US soil for bases and the employment of US personnel as pilots and leaders.

#### CONCLUSION

a. It is most unlikely that the operations envisaged in this concept can be conducted on a completely non-attributable basis.

b. Acknowledging the probability that some operations will be publicly attributed to this country, these



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considerations should not be allowed to cause the introduction of handicaps which will condemn the operations to failure at the outset.

#### TRAINING BASES

Efforts were made in 1960-1961 to obtain bases for training Cuban personnel in third countries and avoid use of US soil. The major training bases ultimately employed, which were in Central America, proved to be inadequate due to limitations of terrain, climate, space, needed facilities, and the extreme difficulty encountered in providing logistical support on a covert basis. Moreover, the use of bases in third countries introduced security risks and a multiplicity of delicate political complications.

On the other hand, in those exceptional cases when training was conducted at military or naval installations on US soil, the training was more effective, logistical support was simpler and more efficient, security and control were better, and fewer difficulties in general were experienced.

#### CONCLUSION

Training can best be conducted at US military and naval installations, in the United States and outlying possessions.

#### TRAINING

Cuban personnel did not receive sufficient professional military training for execution of difficult externally launched paramilitary operations. Performance in actual externally launched operations reflected the lack of professionalism.

#### CONCLUSION

Sophisticated individual and small-unit training in infantry and amphibious raid techniques, and other



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specialized subjects, by highly qualified professional military instructors, will be required to prepare Cuban units for raiding operations as envisaged in this concept.

#### OPERATIONAL BASES

In the interest of conducting operations in such a manner as to be non-attributable to the United States, or plausibly deniable, US policy in 1960-1961 prohibited the use of bases on US soil for unconventional warfare operations against Cuba. As a result, operations were severely handicapped. Bases employed were at too great a distance for optimum air and maritime operations against Cuba and did not embody adequate maritime facilities. Logistical support, on a covert basis, of operations from these bases was very difficult.

One exception to the rule against use of US soil was made in the case of small-craft operations, a number of which were successfully conducted from civilian-owned facilities in the Florida Keys. Difficulty was experienced in maintaining security due to the accessibility of the area to civilians, including the Cuban exile community.

#### CONCLUSIONS

a. It is desirable to use operational bases which are close enough to the target for efficient operations.

b. Bases on US soil, under US military control, are most suitable from the standpoint of efficiency, logistical support, control and security, although difficult problems will be involved in maintaining the security of any bases employed.

#### MARITIME OPERATIONS

One of the most difficult problems was that of covertly obtaining suitable craft on the civilian market and

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reconditioning them in a timely and satisfactory manner. LCI's were purchased from civilian owners for use in raids, infiltration of personnel, arms and equipment, and other paramilitary operations. Months were required before these vessels were reconditioned by civilian yards and ready for sea. In actual operations, they proved to be too small, too slow, too unseaworthy and generally unsuitable for the purpose. Difficulties arose in obtaining qualified Cuban crews, especially captains, and their performance at sea left much to be desired. In order to improve operations of these vessels, it became necessary to employ American contract advisors who, for all intents and purposes, were in command. More recently, an additional complicating factor has been introduced by the demonstrated willingness of the Castro government to attack unprotected ships and craft in international waters.

CONCLUSIONS

a. To achieve optimum success in raids against targets located in all areas of the Cuban littoral, sophisticated, professionally commanded operations at sea will sometimes be required, involving movements over long distances with precise navigation and timing. There may also be a requirement for protection of ships and craft in international waters near Cuba.

b. US naval personnel, ships of various types, and aircraft may be required for launch, recovery and protection of Cuban raiding parties at such time as raids are conducted against targets remote from the operating base.



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#### AIR CREWS

Although skilled Cuban pilots, some with thousands of hours in commercial airline flying, were involved in overflights of Cuba in 1960-1961, their operations were largely unsuccessful. US Air Force trainers attributed these poor results primarily to deficiencies in personal military characteristics and lack of the military background required to produce seasoned discipline.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Cuban pilots cannot be relied upon to perform with a high degree of effectiveness in hazardous unconventional warfare overflight missions.

#### CUBAN LEADERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS

Cuban personnel engaging in the operations of 1960-1961 tended generally to be excitable, individualistic, and lacking in security consciousness and appreciation of the need for team play and subordination to authority. The individual Cuban was apt to demonstrate admirable personal bravery, but many tended to be wanting in tenacity and resolution when under stress. The Cubans have not proved to be the best clandestine agents, whether in the field of intelligence, sabotage, underground organization or related activities, particularly where leadership is involved. In the past, difficulty has been encountered in identifying leaders acceptable to those being led and who possessed satisfactory leadership qualities plus adequate professional background. On the other hand, the Cubans have responded more favorably when accompanied and led by American personnel.

#### CONCLUSIONS

a. It will probably be difficult to obtain a sufficient number of Cuban leaders who can, even though thoroughly trained, effectively direct complex unconventional warfare operations in the face of strong opposition.

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Annex

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b. For effective raider operations by Cuban groups on any appreciable scale, it will probably be necessary to employ some degree of skilled and tested American leadership.

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Annex

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Memo frm Sec/Army Vance

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SUBJECT: Special Operations (Study on Capabilities and Employment of Selected Cuban Resources for Special Operations Against Cuba & a Concept of Operations (TS)

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REMARKS

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GILMAN, JCB

## EXECUTIVE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT (Policy)

CHAIRMAN: STAFF GROUP

MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA)

MILITARY ASSISTANT (L&amp;I)

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SECRETARY TO CHAIRMAN

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cy w/encl - Smith  
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File 0



SEP 3 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF****SUBJECT:** Special Operations

**References:** a. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 530-63 dated July 17, 1963, subject as above  
b. Secretary of the Army Memorandum dated August 16, 1963, subject as above

Pursuant to reference b, revisions to the Army study entitled "A Study on Capabilities and Employment of Selected Cuban Resources for Special Operations Against Cuba and a Concept of Operations," have been completed and I have dispatched a copy of the revised study to the Central Intelligence Agency this date. The study, together with a copy of the memorandum of transmittal to CIA, are attached.

In finalizing the Army study we have incorporated the majority of the comments provided by reference a with the following significant exceptions:

a. The Annex entitled "Analysis of Previous Experience," has not been included as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Appendix to reference a. Although this Annex highlights problems encountered in the past, it is this very experience which contributed to the form and content of the present study. Further, it is felt that inclusion of the Annex could prove counter-productive to the results sought in providing this study to the CIA.

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b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended wording for revision of the "Concept of Operations" of the plan has not been fully incorporated into the plan. Rather, the objectives have been modified and assumptions have been added at the beginning of the Concept Section (Tab 20) which more clearly delineate the scope and nature of the covert operations contemplated and the objectives sought thereunder. These objectives coincide with those approved by the Standing Group of the National Security Council and Higher Authority in June 1963.

(S)(conf) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

Attachments  
As Stated

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DATE: 7 Oct 97

SEP 3 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DESMOND FITZGERALD  
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: A Study on Capabilities and Employment of Selected  
Cuban Resources for Special Operations Against  
Cuba and a Concept of Operations (TS)

Enclosed is a study on the above subject which was prepared by the Department of the Army and which includes the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the factual data in the plan is current as of May 30, 1963, appropriate updating can be accomplished with moderate effort.

The Army plan is forwarded for your use in the planning and conduct of special operations of the scope and nature outlined in the program approved by the Standing Group of the National Security Council and Higher Authority in June 1963. The initial phases of the approved program, which have already been completed with considerable success, suggest the value of developing a complete inventory of covert actions which are geared to specific target areas within Cuba. The targets selected should be of such diversity as to encompass political, military, economic and psychological objectives.

The purpose of compiling such an inventory would be the provision of a spectrum of actions which could be undertaken after a timely assessment of the situation following successive operations and which should be designed to form an unpredictable pattern of action while retaining essential momentum. It is contemplated that this planning effort will contribute to the ultimate objectives of the approved covert policy which seeks "to encourage dissident

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elements in the military and other power centers of the Regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro-communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba."

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

Attachment  
As Stated

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THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR  
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

(16 July 63)

PK B

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL GOODPASTER

Subject: Covert Activities Against Cuba

1. The memorandum attached would serve to bring to the attention of the Standing Group, National Security Council, the proposals for covert activity we discussed earlier.

2. I am enthusiastic about both of the proposals; however, I have reservations concerning the advisability of discussing them in the broad forum of the Standing Group. It would be more appropriate, in my view, to submit the proposals to the NSC Special Group (5412/2), which is more secure and, in any case, is the agency charged by the National Security Council with responsibility for policy approval of CIA proposed covert programs.

V. A. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC  
SACSA

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16 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE STANDING GROUP,  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to propose for consideration by the Standing Group two forms of covert action; both possible of accomplishment at relatively small cost and both capable of contributing to the disruption of tranquility in Cuba. The actions contemplated are:

- a. The introduction of counterfeit currency, and
- b. The introduction of small arms and ammunition.

2. The widespread dissemination of counterfeit currency among the Cuban populace would serve to degrade the value of genuine currency and would generate grave problems for Cuban governmental authorities. They would be compelled either to call in and replace all currency in circulation, a most expensive and troublesome procedure, or, alternatively, to impose penalties for possession of the illegal bills and accept the consequent enforcement problems. In either case, there would be an adverse effect upon the economic life of the country, and thus, upon its internal stability.

3. With respect to small arms, it is noted that one of Castro's early acts in 1959 was totally to disarm the private citizenry, thereby removing a critical threat to his totalitarian regime. Since that time he had had relatively little to fear from internal violence. If now we were covertly to introduce quantities of small and simple weapons and ammunition in many areas of Cuba, some would come into the possession of people who have a willingness to use them, although it is recognized that many of the weapons so introduced would fall into the hands of the Castro government. Nevertheless, as more individual Cubans come to possess a weapon, the internal threat to functionaries of the Castro government would grow, as problems of investigation, enforcement and discipline. Incidents of assassination of oppressive officials and other armed action might be expected to increase. Castro would be faced with the requirement to buy up the arms or to engage in enforcement activities, in which latter case conditions

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might reach such levels of severity as to alienate progressively greater segments of the citizenry. In either event, the net effect of introducing quantities of small arms would be to disturb internal tranquility and provide a growing base of discontent among the people.

4. It is recommended that a program involving the actions described be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency.

15/ A. J. Goodpastor

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GM-738-63  
15 July 1963

CHAIRMAN'S FLIMSY

SUBJECT: US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C)  
JCS 2304/201

The following changes should be made in JCSM-525-63:

- a. Cover Memorandum, paragraph 2, line 6. Change to read:  
"... course of action from a political point of view. For example,  
US fear of accusation of aggression would be significantly reduced or  
eliminated if any US overt actions were preceded by a call for help  
from the Cuban insurgents. ~~an appeal for help by Cuban insurgents or~~  
Also, a serious..."
- b. Appendix, Page 5, subparagraph 1. Substitute "blockade"  
for "quarantine" as appropriate and throughout ISA/State paper.
- c. Appendix, Page 5, lines 18-20. Change to read:  
"... decisive US actions to bring down Castro, on US-conducted UW  
operations, and on logistical support, ~~UW operations,~~ and air support  
of the uprising."
- d. Appendix, Page 5, lines 27-28. Change to read:  
"... to sustain the uprising, and to provide for the possible incremental  
commitment of balanced forces to exploit any uprising that gives pro-  
mise of success if US aid can be provided rapidly, assuming little  
prior warning."

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-525-63

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-35752/63, dated 24 June 1963, subject as above.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the revised draft State-Defense plan transmitted by the reference and have concluded that although it is generally compatible with their views, specific changes as indicated in the Appendix hereto are necessary. One change recommended is to recognize that a US invasion would not invariably be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view; an appeal for help by Cuban insurgents or a serious Castro-communist provocation could provide political justification for US invasion. For the most part, the other changes are designed to eliminate any ambiguity concerning the concept of overt military operations. The concept should be clear that once the United States is committed to overt support of a revolt in Cuba, the principal course of action should be prompt and orderly execution of preplanned operations in areas of our own choosing and with appropriate forces. Interim operations to sustain the revolt should be considered as ancillary to, and not a substitute for, the principal course of action. Moreover, the objective of all US operations should be the establishment of a government in Cuba acceptable to the United States.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the changes in the Appendix be incorporated in the draft State-Defense plan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Attachment

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## APPENDIX

The following changes are recommended in the revised draft State-Defense plan, dated 24 June 1963:

a. Page 1, paragraph 1. Revise as follows:

"1. Problem. To provide for sufficient US assistance to an anti-communist revolt in Cuba to assure ~~its success~~ the replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States."

REASON: To clarify the objective.

b. Page 1, paragraph 2. Revise as follows, commencing with the third sentence:

"Once the insurgents have issued a formal call for help and the US has announced its intention to support them, the US will fully commit itself to ultimate success of the ~~uprising~~ operations. At that point, the US would immediately establish a full air and maritime quarantine of Cuba and step up Unconventional Warfare, logistical and air support to the insurgents as required. It is unlikely, although possible, that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime. ~~Should this not prove to be the case, Therefore,~~ the US would introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and, if necessary, move toward a full-scale invasion should be prepared to implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANs 312-316 as necessary."

REASON: Completeness, clarity and consistency with subparagraph 6 b of the draft plan.

c. Page 6, subparagraph 5 a. Revise as follows:

"a. The JCS point out that the 'best military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANs 312-316.' In the absence of a request

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Appendix

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for help by the insurgents, or of a Castro-communist  
 provocation sufficiently serious to justify such action,  
 a A-full-scale US invasion not-only-would-take-18-days  
 ....under-present-plans-to-put-into-motion, but is also the  
 least desirable course of action from a political point  
 of view. Such an unjustified invasion would raise the  
 spectre of US interventionism in Latin America, could  
 poison our future relations with Cuba, and would be  
 difficult to justify in light of previous Presidential  
 pronouncements. However, an-adroitly-structured a well-  
planned and successful 'rescue' of a. . . ."

REASON: Completeness, clarity, and accuracy.  
 Political acceptability of a "rescue" would depend upon  
 its success. To remove the implication that a minimum of  
 18 days is required to implement CINCLANT OPLAN 316. The  
 time required can be reduced, depending on the amount of  
 forces prepositioned.

d. Page 7, subparagraph 5 b, third sentence. Revise as  
 follows:

"As-a-result, Following the elimination of Cuban  
fighter aircraft and SAM defenses, it is considered  
 that US forces have the capability to isolate any-area  
most areas of Cuban territory during day-light by inter-  
 diction of military vehicles and troop concentrations,  
 and to make such movement difficult at night."

REASON: The Cuban Air Force Mig 21 aircraft and the  
 SAM sites are factors that must be considered realistically.  
 These first-line Cuban defenses must be destroyed before  
 the United States can count on uncontested movement over the  
 island of Cuba.

e. Page 7, subparagraph 5 b, fourth sentence. Revise  
 as follows:



"We estimate that air support, both tactical and logistical, is the type of overt help which a group of insurgents is most likely to need . . ."

REASON: Clarity and accuracy.

f. Page 7, subparagraph 5b, penultimate sentence. Revise as follows:

"The US could also provide covert logistic support to the rebels by airdrop or submarine."

REASON: Clarity. This and the above change are required because this paragraph mixes covert and overt actions indiscriminately.

g. Pages 7 and 8, subparagraph 5b. Delete last two sentences commencing with "Within 72 hours . . ." and substitute:

"Commencing within 72 hours, or sooner if previously alerted, the United States could provide an initial increment of unconventional warfare forces to establish contact with the insurgents. The entire complement of UW forces will be available for commitment in eight days."

REASON: To state actual capability in the absence of an alert.

h. Page 9, subparagraph 5d, last three lines. Revise as follows:

". . .respond as outlined in paragraph 3b 4b above will assist us in forming a conclusion on the minimum uprising which would ~~permit-us-to-insert-forces-incre-~~mentally justify the commitment of US forces."

REASON: The factors entailed in this paragraph, i.e., the size and durability of the uprising, will determine the larger problem of whether or not US military intervention, per se, is justified. They will not, of themselves, determine whether the piecemeal commitment of US forces is justified.



1. Page 11, third sentence, first paragraph. Revise as follows:

"~~But-as-long-as-Germany-is-not-united,-Berlin-will~~  
~~always-be-a-vulnerable-point-in-the-Western-position-and,~~  
~~carried-to-the-extreme,~~ Undue concern over Soviet harass-  
ment or threats to the safety of Berlin could paralyze  
any resort to arms by the West elsewhere to preserve its  
vital interests. Therefore, it is incumbent on the United  
States and the West to recognize the possibility of Soviet  
exploitation of their position in such peripheral areas  
and to be prepared to counter Soviet movement in such  
areas."

REASON: The liberation of Cuba should not necessarily  
be tied to the safety of Berlin, or to a reunited Germany.

j. Page 11, second paragraph. Revise as follows:

"The support of our European allies for forceful US  
action in Cuba is ~~an-essential-requirement-for~~ highly  
desirable and would assist in deterring any untoward  
Soviet action in Europe. Because of the nature of our  
proposed actions, ~~it-would-be-much-more-essential-now~~  
~~than-in-October-for~~ the US to should make every effort  
to seek allied support for an overt decision to assist  
the insurgents with military means."

REASON: Making US overt military action against the  
Castro government responsive to agreement by and among our  
European Allies would tend toward ultimate acceptance of  
the status quo in Cuba. West German chariness over pushing  
the Soviets, French intransigence, and the poor political  
situation in Britain indicate little possibility of obtaining  
Allied backing for an overt US move to liberate Cuba.

k. Page 12, subparagraph 6 a. Revise the first sentence  
as follows:



"a. During the covert phase, the US would establish contact with the uprising by deploying unconventional warfare assets in order (i) to obtain the information essential to making a decision openly to intervene and (ii) to render all possible clandestine covert assistance to the insurgents."

REASON: Accuracy.

1. Page 13, paragraph 6 b. Revise as follows:

"b. During the overt phase the US would (i) establish a full air and maritime quarantine and (ii) render sufficient direct assistance to the insurgents to permit them to continue to operate and to extend their span of control, and (iii) implement portions, or all of CINCLANT 312 and 316 as necessary. The US Government would initially place main reliance on the psychological impact of the quarantine, and the abandonment of the Castro regime by the Cuban people in the face of clear evidence of decisive US actions to bring down Castro, logistical support, UW operations, and air support of the uprising. ~~and-would-avoid-if-possible-a-full-scale invasion-or-virtually-unlimited-assistance-which-would scarcely-be-distinguishable-from-an-invasion-either from-the-point-of-view-of-the-Cuban-people-or-of-other countries.~~ It is important that we have an estimate of the ~~various-packages-of-balanced-initial-force~~ support which would be required and which could be introduced in a ~~time-phased~~ timely manner to sustain the uprising, assuming little prior warning, ~~and-how-rapidly-an initial-force-could-be-built-up-in-the-ensuing-days.~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed CINCLANT to look into these matters."

REASON: To encompass all types of support.



m. Page 14, subparagraph 6 c, first line. Revise as follows:

"During either the covert ~~ex-overt~~ phase, if the SAM. . . ."

REASON: To eliminate possible conflict with subparagraph 6 e.

n. Page 15, subparagraph 6 e. Revise as follows:

"During the overt phase of operations, the US would be-prepared-to suppress or eliminate, as necessary those air defenses which might endanger the air movement of US troops into the area and conduct other air operations as required."

REASON: Changes m and n together provide necessary latitude for air operations.

o. Page 17, subparagraph 7 b (7), seventh line. Revise as follows:

". . . ment over the Island and the extent of the incremental covert and overt support. . . ."

REASON: Clarity and unity of context with subsequent sentences.



~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

16 July 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

17

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES  
to the  
HOLDERS OF DRAFT JCSM-525-63

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

Holders of Draft JCSM-525-63 (attached to CM-738-63, dated 15 July 1963) are requested to insert the attached revised page 4 of the Appendix and to destroy the superseded page in accordance with security regulations.

M. J. INGELIDO  
R. C. FORBES  
Joint Secretariat

UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachment

Copy 11/10/63  
to 11/10/63  
to 11/10/63  
to 11/10/63  
to 11/10/63

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1st Corrig to Draft JCSM-525-63

~~TOP SECRET~~



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## CHAIRMAN'S FLIMSY

CM-724-63  
8 July 1963SUBJECT: US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (G)  
JCS 2304/201

The following changes should be made in JCS 2304/201:

- a. Enclosure A, page 1110, lines 13-17. Change to read:  
 "...be prompt and orderly execution, as necessary, of preplanned operations in areas of our own choosing and with appropriate forces. Interim operations to sustain the revolt should be considered as ancillary to, and not a substitute for, the principal courses of action required for success of US operations. Moreover, t The objective of all US operations...."
- b. Appendix, page 1, line 18. Change to read:  
 "...insurgents as required. It is unlikely, although possible, that this level of assistance...."
- c. Appendix, page 1, lines 23-24. Change to read:  
 "...as required to sustain the uprising and, if necessary, move toward a full-scale invasion should be prepared to implement...."
- d. Appendix, page 4, lines 13-14. Change to read:  
 "...of balanced initial forces support, to include the incremental commitment of balanced ground and air units, which would be...."

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Classified by 1045  
 Declassify on: OADR  
 Date of Review: 10/1/93  
 Authority: 1045



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10169  
RECORDS SERIES : NARA RG 218 JCS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST  
THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT  
DATE : 03/21/64  
PAGES : 2  
SUBJECTS : COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS - CUBA

PROPAGANDA - CUBA

ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS - CUBA

SABOTAGE - CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/07/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : NARA RG 218 NND 941071 BOX 4/8. Memo from Taylor to the  
President re: possible actions against Cuba  
including: covert collection of intelligence;  
propaganda actions, economic denial actions and  
sabotage operations.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

202-10002-10/69

Originator: JCSDate: 21 MAR 64Subject: POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST CASTROOriginal Level of Classification: TOP SECRET

GOVT

Third Agency Equities: NSC / STATERemarks: RG 218 NND 941071  
BOX 4/8Page # of PostponementReason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK ActNO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF  
NSC/STATEDATE: APR 06 1998NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WRS 4-7-98

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 3 Apr 98 W





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**SENSITIVE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-253-64

21 MAR 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Subject: Possible Actions Against the Castro Government (C)**

1. At your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 4, 1964, you directed them to concentrate their attention on possible ways of obtaining greater support from the Organization of American States (OAS) in carrying out a program directed at the eventual overthrow of the Castro government. Also, you asked that they examine additional ways of bringing pressure upon Castro beyond those presently authorized.

2. With regard to possible actions by the OAS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States Government should seek the cooperation of the other OAS members in obtaining the complete isolation of Cuba from other American States. Further, the United States should, if possible, secure broad authority for a wide range of actions under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, including the possible use of armed force against Cuba, should OAS members, individually or collectively, deem such action necessary to prevent further intervention and aggression by Castro. With these possible objectives for OAS action in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the text of the proposed OAS resolution which the United States has suggested that the Venezuelan Government propose for the consideration of the OAS member states. They consider that if such a resolution is adopted essentially in its present form, the United States Government will have sufficient basis for action directed at the further isolation of Cuba and for military action against Castro in case of further aggression on his part. Hence, for the time being, they have nothing additional to suggest in this field.

3. With regard to measures designed to put additional pressure on Castro beyond those presently authorized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend a resumption of the program (which is presently approved but on which no actions are currently being taken) involving the employment of covert assets to conduct interdependent operations, including

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**SENSITIVE**

the covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions, economic denial actions, and externally mounted sabotage operations against Cuba. As this program unfolds, they would favor expanding and intensifying it while maintaining a continuing evaluation of the reactions of Castro, the communists, and the Free World. Concurrently, they favor the development and conduct of a hard-line propaganda campaign, integrated with the foregoing actions, to estrange the Castro regime from the Cuban people and the remainder of the Free World.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate United States objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. However, they have difficulty identifying promising actions against Castro which have not been previously considered, and in some cases tried. It is a hard fact that little remains which offers promise of real effectiveness in removing Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military action up to or including invasion. They will keep this problem under continuing review and advise you should any new and promising courses of action be uncovered.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

**MAXWELL D. TAYLOR**  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**TOP SECRET**

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10171  
RECORDS SERIES : NARA RG 218 JCS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
TO : DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF - CUBA  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
DATE : 04/10/64  
PAGES : 1  
SUBJECTS : CONTINGENCY PLANS - CUBA  
  
DJSM 584-64  
  
OPLAN 312  
  
OPLAN 316  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/07/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : NARA RG 218 JCS "NND 941071 BOX 3/8." Memo from Taylor  
to Director, Joint Staff re: Cuba contingency planning  
and the need for analysis weighing the pros and cons  
in overthrowing of the Castro government.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

202-1002-1071

Originator: TCSDate: 10 APR 64Subject: CUBA CONTINGENCY PLANNINGOriginal Level of Classification: TOP SECRETThird Agency Equities: STATE / NSCRemarks: R6 218NND941071BOX 3/8

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OFNSC, State

DATE:

APR 06 1998NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILlms 4-7-98

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 3 Apr 98 md



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CM-1305-64

10 APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

*Cy 1-3*

Subject: Cuba Contingency Planning

DJSM 584-64 included a brief summary of the implications of the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANs 312 and 316. The discussion, however, did not lay out the pros and cons of such actions, and did not examine in sufficient detail some possible major implications of the actions contemplated. I would therefore like a more definitive analysis weighting the advantages accruing from the overthrow of the Castro Government through the implementation of OPLAN 312 and 316 against such disadvantages as:

- a. Loss of American lives.
- b. Loss of lives of Cuban civilians.
- c. International criticism that would result from such a US attack.
- d. Possible direct confrontation with USSR.
- e. Increase in Latin American fears of "Yankee intervention."
- f. Costs of reconstruction of Cuba.
- g. Maintenance of an occupation force in Cuba for an extended time.

In addition to the above considerations, others may be included, as appropriate.

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

*cy 4 - Goodpastor/Rogers*  
*5 - Smith*  
*6 - Walters*  
*7 -*  
*8 -*  
*9 - CIN File*  
*10 - File 2*

*cy 9 of 10*

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10173  
RECORDS SERIES : TAYLOR PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
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## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : DIA  
FROM : HAROLD G. GREYTS  
TO : COLONEL ROGERS  
TITLE : DIA-CIA ASSESSMENT OF STATUS OF SOVIET MILITARY  
PERSONNEL IN CUBA  
DATE : 10/24/63  
PAGES : 5  
SUBJECTS : SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/10/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Taylor Papers, Box 7. Memo from Greyts to Rogers re:  
attached memos concerning the status of the Soviet  
military presence in Cuba including: ground troops,  
SAMs, FROGs, cruise missiles, etc.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

202-10002-10173

Originator: DIA  
Date: 24 OCT 63  
Subject: DIA - CIA Assessment  
Original Level of Classification: S  
Third Agency Equities: CIA DIA  
Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Page # of PostponementReason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

*No DIA objection to declassification  
and release.*

*for 10 Feb 98*

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT







OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

24 October 1963

MEMO FOR Colonel Rogers, Executive to  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: (U) DIA-CIA Assessment of Status of  
Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

A similar memorandum has been furnished to the  
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

  
HAROLD G. GRISTIS  
Colonel, USAF  
Executive





**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25X D.C. 20301

24 OCT 1963

S73,309/P2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: (U) DIA-CIA Assessment of Status of Soviet  
Military Personnel in Cuba

1. In response to a Presidential requirement levied by Mr. McGeorge Bundy on 23 October, we have collaborated with CIA in a new assessment (attachment) of the status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Prime conclusions follow:
2. Since the October crisis of 1962, the Soviets have been engaged in a continuing program of withdrawing military personnel from Cuba. Most of the Soviets still in Cuba are advisers and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans, and in operating and controlling the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. We believe that no organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba and that the only Soviet ground forces personnel remaining are those advising Cuban military units. Based on our continuing appraisal of Soviet activity, we estimate Soviet military strength in Cuba at present to be about five to seven thousand, although it may be even lower.

*Joseph F. Carroll*

JOSEPH F. CARROLL  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

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DIA-CIA Assessment (S)

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OCI No. 3158/63  
24 October 1963

JOINT CIA-DIA MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Assessment of Status of Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

Summary

1. Since the October crisis of 1962, the Soviets have been engaged in a continuing program of withdrawing military personnel from Cuba. Most of the Soviets still in Cuba are advisers and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans, and in operating and controlling the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. We believe that no organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba and that the only Soviet ground forces personnel remaining are those advising Cuban military units. Based on our continuing appraisal of Soviet activity, we estimate Soviet military strength in Cuba at present to be about five to seven thousand, although it may be even lower.

2. Of the Soviet weapons introduced into Cuba during the military buildup last year, all--with the exception of the surface-to-air missiles, and possibly the coastal defense cruise missiles and FROGS--have either been withdrawn from the island or transferred to Cuban control. The present trend involves continuing efforts to improve Castro's independent military capabilities. By mid-1964, Cubans probably will be trained to operate all remaining Soviet weapons, including the surface-to-air missiles. As Cuban proficiency increases, additional reductions in Soviet military personnel probably will take place until only a Soviet military assistance and technical advisory establishment remains.

Withdrawal of Soviet military personnel

3. Since our last assessment in early October, at least 1,000 probable Soviet military personnel have departed. At least 13,000 and probably closer to 16,000 Soviet military personnel have departed since October 1962. Most of these have been withdrawn since February. We continue to lack verifiable evidence of the arrival of more than a few hundreds of Soviet military personnel since last October.

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Status of Soviet weapons under Cuban control

4. Cubans are currently being trained in the use of all Soviet weapon systems remaining on the island. At least 20 Cuban pilots have achieved a limited combat proficiency in the MIG-21 jet fighters, and additional pilots are being trained. These aircraft were recently transferred to Cuban control and most of the Soviet personnel associated with the MIGs have been withdrawn. Cuban personnel assumed control of the 12 Komar guided missile patrol boats in August, at which time Soviet personnel associated with these vessels left Cuba, except for a small number of advisers and technicians.

5. Most Soviet ground forces personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba. Those ground forces personnel remaining--probably between 1,500 and 2,500--are involved in training Cuban units throughout the island. Available evidence suggests that the four armored camps have been transferred to Cuban control. The Soviet T-54/55 tanks and other equipment at the camps, with the possible exception of FROGs, have been turned over to the Cubans and some of the equipment moved to Cuban training installations and operational units.

6. The Cubans probably began training in cruise missile operations some months ago and it is possible that the Soviets may have transferred this weapon system to Cuban control. There are probably no more than five hundred Soviet personnel remaining in Cuba associated with the cruise missiles and the number may be substantially lower if the Cubans have in fact assumed some degree of responsibility for the system.

The surface-to-air missile and air defense system

7. The Soviet SAM and air surveillance system in Cuba is currently manned and controlled by about three to four thousand personnel. A large number of Cubans are now receiving classroom training in surface-to-air missile operations and are scheduled to begin operational field training in November. By mid-1964, enough Cubans probably will have been trained to operate the entire SAM system including all of its radar and communications components.

8. A major reorganization of the air defense system is now in progress in Cuba. Since mid-September one third of the SAM sites have been relocated. The pattern of relocations indicates a shift from an island-wide SAM coverage to point defense of major Cuban cities and military installations. In the process, the SAM guidance radar previously in use is being exchanged for older radar equipment, signifying an intent on the part of the Soviets to transfer the system to Cuban control.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
February 23, 1961 -- 5:30 PM

Others present: General Lemnitzer  
General Dacker  
Admiral Burke  
General White  
General Shoup  
Mr. Rostow  
General Goodpastor  
General Clifton

Some of the representatives of TIME-LIFE Films, Inc. were taking pictures of the President and they followed him into the room with their cameras and microphones. While they were in the room, General Lemnitzer gave a brief report on the meeting in Puerto Rico with the Latin American representatives of their Armed Forces. In connection with this (but later in the meeting), the President asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to get a report from all Services on the number of Latin American military personnel whom we educate in our military schools in this country -- by country, by service, and by school.

The President also instructed General Lemnitzer to make an effort in the next few days to find out how these military Latin Americans feel about Castro; from a military viewpoint, what would they do from their countries to offset his regime; and does Castro represent a threat to their countries? The President instructed the Chiefs to do this quietly and unofficially. They assured him they could get information of this kind within the next few days while our escort officers are still with the Latin Americans.

The President indicated he wanted to take up two subjects: the guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, and the nuclear weapons. He mentioned the Hollifield Report, indicating that he expected them to read it and be prepared to discuss it as well as other facets of atomic weapons "command control." He made reference to the fact that the report indicated that the local control of nuclear weapons is not adequate in Greece, Turkey, and some other countries.



In the discussion on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, the President asked several questions which General Decker and others answered:

How many are in training in the Special Forces of the Army? Decker: 1100 at Fort Bragg, 346 in Germany, 364 in Okinawa.

How do we intend to use these forces -- in what kind of war? Decker: In all kinds of war -- cold war, limited war, and even in general war, if it occurred.

How many people in our MAAG in Viet-Nam are skilled in guerrilla warfare operations? Decker: There are three officers in the MAAG in Viet-Nam who include this kind of training with their more general training. We had a team of 30, but the MAAG Chief had requests for the team to pull out. Our program was based on training Vietnamese who, in turn, trained others. General Decker made the point that in some areas we don't have authority to train the military personnel and we have to have the host government invite us to participate in this training.

In response to questions, it was stated that we are putting 75 more people into the Laotian training program. We have already trained 7000 Laotians. Altogether, we have trained 14,000 people in the Southeast Asian area. We now have a team with each of the 21 Laotian battalions. In addition, there are 1200 Meo tribesmen in the hills who have been trained by our people.

The President asked General Decker's judgment, in line with Khrushchev's speech, on what our course of action (as far as training is concerned) should be in Iran and in Viet-Nam.

A general discussion then brought out the following points: That we now respond, in the military assistance program, to country requests as to what kind of training and what kind of equipment they want. The country requests are screened thoroughly by the "country team" and then, back here, before we furnish them the equipment or the training. It was stated that certainly more emphasis can be given to guerrilla and counter-guerrilla training. We can also examine our programs carefully to see that more light equipment is put into the program -- the kind that a man can carry with him. In regard to equipment,



General Decker pointed out that one of our most valuable contributions is radio direction-finding equipment in order that guerrillas can be located. Usually, guerrilla teams have some sort of radio communication, and we can locate them promptly if we have teams trained with this direction-finding equipment. This is vital to counter guerrilla operations because guerrillas are in small groups and move so rapidly.

In response to the President's questions, General Decker showed him some pictures of our Special Forces and described their organization. An "A" team has 12 men. "B" and "C" teams are organized to control the "A" teams. General Decker finally estimated that we have approximately 100 "A" teams in the three Special Force centers. The "A" teams include linguists, communications, intelligence, and medical personnel. Their jobs are to train anywhere up to 500 men each, and that the "B" and "C" teams then help control the "A" teams and the trained guerrillas.

In response to the President's questions, the JCS emphasized that the teams in Germany are essential; they are aimed at the satellites in case of a war where guerrillas would be trained to operate against Soviet lines of communication.

The President asked them to study carefully and give him some idea of whether or not we could use more teams in South Viet-Nam -- for training of men who can be inserted into North Viet-Nam and operate as Vietnamese guerrillas, and in South Viet-Nam as counter-guerrillas. He directed that they find out what the South Vietnamese are doing about anti-guerrilla preparations in their own country, and what they are doing in South Viet-Nam to infiltrate North Viet-Nam. In this connection, he brought to their attention the Lansdale Report.

General Decker pointed out that in the MAP program an additional 20,000 strength was being considered for South Viet-Nam. General Lamnitzer added that approximately 6,000 of the 20,000 are to be used in this unconventional warfare approach. The President asked General Decker to get in touch with the Military Assistance group in Viet-Nam and find out, from their viewpoint, what the situation is in regard to additional training.



The President brought up the subject of a rather large-scale Communist effort in Ecuador and indications that Castro was probably the source of some of this activity. He asked: "What are we doing to help Ecuador train and prepare to offset this?"

Responses from the group brought out that the State Department has to negotiate for additional people to be introduced into these countries. General Decker said that a first "must" was to teach the people counter-intelligence operations, and secondly, then help them train their own forces in these matters. General Decker added that guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations have not been emphasized in our Latin American MAAG efforts.

The President then directed that the JCS make "a sort of analysis" of what we can do around the world in building anti-guerrilla forces. He especially wanted comments on each Latin American country. He pointed out that each year as we go to Congress on military aid, he would get more support if we emphasized this type of activity -- "giving friendly nations the kind of military assistance they are most likely to need."

General White suggested that the JCS take a look at our guidance to our Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Latin America. In his discussion, he cited Colombia.

Returning to the discussion of Castro in Cuba, and the opinions of the Latin American military people whom they had just talked with, Admiral Burks said that the consensus of the military was that their governments are really moving too slowly in countering the Communist activities in Latin America. The present governments, he said, are not too eager to go into this training large-scale, because they are afraid of dissident groups in their own countries rising up and taking over the government when they are well-equipped and trained. General Lemnitzer commented that our engineer equipment had made a considerable contribution to these countries in repairing roads, bridges, and airfields -- in effect, although it is not contemplated in our military assistance, it is most helpful in improving the economies and communications of the countries, and ultimately leads to stability. He commented that we might review our military aid program to see that more of this kind of material is usefully provided.



Admiral Burke commented that a great deal of local pride is involved and we should emphasize items that help their local prestige. For example, we are helping them build a naval academy in Ecuador. Its cost is only \$30,000. The Ecuadorans are doing most of the work and are very pleased with this kind of contribution.

General White discussed what the Communists are doing in these areas. He mentioned a small thermo-generator being given wide distribution -- a little generator that can light one single lamp bulb or run a radio -- and that the Communists are getting great credit for this small physical improvement. He felt we could examine our own efforts in this line.

General Decker mentioned the school that is opening in the Canal Zone in June for Latin American countries and stated that we would see that the guerrilla and counter-guerrilla training would be emphasized.

General Lemnitzer mentioned that many of our escort officers and briefers spoke in Spanish. General White pointed out that the A-2, an Air Force general, gave his whole briefing in Spanish. The President asked if he mentioned Castro at all. General Lemnitzer said that he would check on this.

It was at this point that the President asked them to take a reading on how the Latin American military people felt about the Castro threat.

Turning to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the President asked him for a brief resume of their activities in this field. General Shoup stated that the Marines had a different approach to this problem: The Marines felt that we should be allowed to go in and be guerrillas by direct action; that the Marines are always ready to go in and blow up bridges and tear up the countryside and then, if necessary, they can go into action to teach other guerrillas. Fundamentally, he stated, the Marines don't want to train someone else. They would rather go in and do the job themselves, and then take on indigenous help and, finally, train them to do likewise. General Shoup made it clear that the Marines have no such mission of training other people, but that they would gladly do it if so directed.

The President pointed out that it is not always possible for us to take direct action and that, for most of the problems that face us now, we



- 6 -

will have to satisfy ourselves with training the people of these various countries to do their own guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations, "realizing, of course, that this would disappoint the Marine Corps, but that into each life, some disappointment must fall."

General Shoup then discussed the force-reconnaissance company, the reconnaissance battalion in each division, their missions and training. He pointed out that in the Philippines the Marines have a radio that only exposes itself for 30 seconds to communicate with other forces. He added that the Marines work very successfully with submarines and can invade other areas without discovery. He explained the language training of the Marines and that the linguists are added to the force as the mission is assigned.

The President then mentioned that Ambassador Thompson told him that it is his opinion that, in the future, no Soviets will actually cross their own borders to enter into these operations and, therefore, for the time being, we will have to prepare other forces to protect themselves. The President added that we will have to do more to help those countries (with whom we are associated) to do more for themselves. He mentioned the threat that 15,000 men from North Viet-Nam will be enough to overwhelm South Viet-Nam, and that Viet-Nam "will fall this year." The President felt that, if this threat had any basis of realization, certainly we must face up to it promptly.

The President turned to a discussion of the SEATO meeting and what we should do about discussing guerrilla and counter-guerrilla training and operations with our SEATO friends. General Shoup mentioned that Admiral Felt is our representative and he requested an opinion from him on whether or not we should discuss this question at the SEATO meeting. He promised that he would give the President a report on this subject very promptly.

Admiral Burke stated frankly that some of our troubles came from the Ambassadors in these areas who head the "country teams." He felt that there is frequently resentment about the U.S. team's military activities. He said that the Ambassadors generally are working undercover going on in their areas as things that they cannot face publicly; and that the MAAG people then feel suppressed and, finally lose heart and enthusiasm. Admiral Burke felt that we must change this. The



President then asked what can we do about SEATO in this connection. He stated that he would talk to Secretary Rusk and see if that would be a channel which could interest the State Department in furthering this effort. He pointed out that the Malayan example was a very successful one and might be applied to some of our trouble spots. Again, he mentioned Cuba, Viet-Nam, and possibly Iran.

General Lemnitzer volunteered that they might work out a joint State-Defense message to all Ambassadors to get their reaction and thoughts -- country by country -- on this new approach. He also volunteered that they would get a report from Iran in this field; and they would hold discussion on what kind of proposals could be made at the SEATO conference.

The President asked where this sort of training and activity was centered in the Pentagon. General Decker responded that it is handled in the Organization and Training Division of Army Operations under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and he has recently appointed General Heintges, who has been in Laos for the last year and a half, as the director of this activity in the Army Staff.

The President then requested that they give him a report concerning Viet-Nam. He wanted them to specifically indicate how many people we could and should train and by what date these people could be effective. They were to consider whether we should make a direct approach to Viet-Nam, or propose this at a SEATO conference.

On the subject of atomic weapons, there was a discussion of two major command and control areas, including the Hollnfeld Report, and the JCS assured him that they were preparing briefings on both subjects and would be asking him for time to present such briefings.

The President then asked them to discuss Berlin -- including the steps that the East Germans and the Soviet Union might take, and what we should do to counter them. Again, the JCS told him that they would present to him a briefing of all our contingency plans, and urged that this be done rather soon so that he would be prepared in his analysis of the situation.

The President then asked about the military situation in Laos and what our next steps should be. The JCS reported that the situation is now stable. They pointed out that the loyal government would like to take Plaines des Jarres, but that it was pretty slow going.



Turning to the presentation by Secretary McNamara on an increased budget for defense, he asked if it was essential that we have an additional 13,000 personnel -- "Can't we get them elsewhere?"

The JCS outlined the personnel problems in some detail, mentioning the needs in SAC, and the POLARIS crews; and Admiral Burke outlined some of the steps the Navy is taking to meet these new requirements. The new attack transport (ship) was discussed, and the President was told why the World War II type transport was no longer adequate. In addition, the strain on personnel caused by RB-47 wings, missile commands, nuclear submarines, and support forces, were discussed. The President inquired about the level of manning of the Marine divisions and the use of reserves.

The final discussion led by the President was on intelligence and the differences between the Army, the Air Force, and the Dulles conclusions based on the same intelligence. He wanted to know on what basis these differences arose. General Lemnitzer responded with a discussion of the intelligence problem, pointing out that, in the last analysis, the course of action, based on the intelligence estimates, had to be a Presidential decision.

The President concluded the meeting by indicating that at the next session he would like to discuss the atomic weapons problems that were scheduled for this agenda. Mention was made of the AEC-Defense paper that was already being worked on with Mr. Bundy, but the Chiefs agreed that they would prepare such briefings for the next meeting with the President.

C. V. CLIFTON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Defense Liaison Officer

Note: Attached is a copy of the notes of the meeting which resulted from the meeting.



SECRET

February 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Essential points arising from JCS meeting with the President on Thursday, February 23, 1961.

1. The President wishes to have the maximum number of men trained for counter-guerrilla operations put into the areas of immediate concern.
2. He wishes to have the matter of operations in Vietnamese territory pressed.
3. The JCS ought to review policy guidance on Latin America and orient it towards a deterrence of guerrilla operations and counter-guerrilla operations.
4. The Departments of State and Defense ought to consider new instructions to the relevant ambassadors on the urgency of counter-guerrilla operations.
5. The JCS should insure that the MACVs are orienting their work in the relevant areas towards counter-guerrilla operations, using maximum influence on the local military.
6. State and Defense should look into the character of forces in Iran and decide whether they are appropriate to the military dangers which may arise.
7. The SEATO meeting should be oriented around this problem; the matter should be discussed with Mr. Rusk.
8. The JCS should read the Hollfield report and be prepared to discuss the problem of nuclear weapons control.

SECRET



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10177  
RECORDS SERIES : NARA RG 218 JCS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :  
-----

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : COLONEL J. HAWKINS  
TO :  
TITLE : TALKING PAPER FOR USE OF THE CJCS AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE  
COMMITTEE MEETING...  
DATE : 03/29/63  
PAGES : 10  
SUBJECTS : CUBAN EXILES

PARAMILITARY RAIDS - CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/09/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : NARA RG 218 JCS "NND 941071 BOX 4/8." JCS memo from  
Hawkins re: concerns over raids in the Cuban area by  
Cuban exiles which may complicate US/USSR relations.  
Attached are two associated draft letters and  
memorandums.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

202-10002-10177

Originator:

JCS (COL. HAWKINS)

Date:

MAR 29, 1963

Subject:

CUBAN EXILE PARAMILITARY RAIDS

Original Level of Classification:

SECRET

Third Agency Equities:

NSC / STATE / OSD

Remarks:

RG 218 JCS / NND 941071

BOX 418

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

OSD

DATE: APR 06 1998

NO OBJECTION  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
hms 4-7-98

No objection

No objection  
OSD 9 Apr 98  
mThe Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 3 Apr 98



SECRET

Talking Paper for Use of the Chairman, JCS at the NSC  
Executive Committee Meeting, Friday, March 29 at 12:30 P.M.

Subject: Cuban Exile Paramilitary Raids

Background - On 28 March 1963, the Department of State, as a preliminary to discussion at a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee, circulated a proposed letter from the Secretary to the President expressing concern regarding recent raids in the Cuban area by Cuban exiles. The prime apprehension underscored in the draft relates to possible resultant complications in our relations with the USSR.

- The draft letter proposes five actions to deter further attacks:

- a. Increased efforts to gain intelligence of projected raids.
- b. Intensification of on-going action by Customs and Coast Guard to stop and search suspected vessels.
- c. Action to inform suspected exiles of our intention to intensify enforcement which relates to such raids.
- d. Location and closing down of illegal radio transmitters which may be used in connection with the raids.
- e. Provision of information to the British concerning our plans to control the raids, with an implied suggestion that they too intensify their countermeasures.

Discussion - On 11 March the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs provided the National Security Council with a talking paper prepared by the Secretary of State, in which the Secretary reaffirmed that it is our determination to diminish the strength of the Castro regime. Thus, the draft letter should not be viewed as questioning our current convictions concerning the continuing desirability of doing damage to the Castro-Communists or whether raids per se are either good or bad, but rather to raising a two-fold question in another area:

- a. Whether actions should be taken to prevent ungoverned and illegal use of our territory by exiles for paramilitary raids on Cuba and,

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SECRET

b. Whether the measures suggested in the draft are advisable and suitable for the purpose.

- With respect to the first question, it is reasonable to conclude that both friend and enemy will assign responsibility for the exile raids to the U.S., disclaimers notwithstanding. While this may result in some applause from friends, the balance is adverse.

- The raids, usually poorly conceived and awkwardly executed, are not of substantive value. The experience of the past three years shows that little more than nuisance effect can be expected from such exile activities. On the other hand, considerable damage to the U.S. can result in terms of propaganda disadvantage where the efforts abort or fail. It has consistently been U.S. policy to prevent paramilitary activity of this kind against Cuba by exile groups based in the United States, even in the case of groups which accept U.S. control and direction. To the extent that such raids are conducted, they should be conceived and executed under full U.S. control, in terms which give full discount to all of the factors involved.

- The answer to the first question is therefore affirmative; we should prevent the illegal use of our territory by exiles for this purpose.

- With regard to the second question -- the merits of the control measures proposed -- it is noted that none, with the possible exception of the last, are new. All are in keeping with past practices, and all are considered suitable. Absent among them is any mention of press action to exhibit our distaste for these raids. This omission is a desirable thing. No amount of public protestation will alter significantly the convictions, as to our liability, of anyone. In this regard it is also noted that only on one occasion has JCS issued instructions to CINCLANT on the subject of Cuban exile raiders. These instructions (message attached), dated 28 October 1962, were: "SECDEF desires you maintain careful lookout for ALFA 66 units and prevent any operations by this organization against Cuba at this time." At the time, the US and the USSR were negotiating the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

Recommendations - It is recommended that the Chairman:

a. Concur in the desirability of instituting, or intensifying as the case may be, the control measures proposed in the draft letter.

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SECRET

b. Suggest that there be no intensive public denial campaign, that any public pronouncements on the subject be made in a moderate vein and avoid indicating that any such raids have been launched from bases on U.S. soil.

Approved by           K           SACSA

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Vice Director, Joint Staff                                  (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Prepared by: Colonel J. Hawkins, USMC  
              Programs & Review II  
              Extension 56507/sw

SECRET



SECRET

FM  
TO

JCS  
CINCLANT

JCS 7075

SECDEF desires you maintain careful lookout for ALFA 66 units and prevent any operations by this organization against Cuba at this time.

SECRET

282217Z Oct 62



CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

*General Taylor*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Draft letter to the President  
from the Secretary regarding  
the problem presented by  
Cuban refugee groups

The President has called an NSC Executive Committee Meeting for Friday, March 29 at 12:30 p.m. to discuss the problem posed by Cuban refugee groups.

The Secretary has asked me to make available to you the attached proposed letter from him to the President which will serve as a basis for discussion at tomorrow's meeting. The letter has not yet been signed by the Secretary but presumably will go to the President in its present form. If any substantive changes are made at the time of signature I shall so inform you.

*W. H. P.*  
William H. P. [Signature]  
Executive Secretary

**Attachment:**

As stated.  
S/S-4580

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment



CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
Washington

Group I  
Excluded from  
automatic down-  
grading and de-  
classification  
S/S-4580

DRAFT LETTER

TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE  
COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m.

Dear Mr. President:

I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

CONFIDENTIAL

March 28, 1963



## Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10128  
RECORD SERIES :  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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**June 10, 1998**

**Status of Document: Postponed in Part**

**Number of Postponements: 2**

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

In the margin next to each postponement a letter is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

**Board Review Completed: 06/04/98**

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A. Operational Details

B. Name of Person

C. Source/Asset

D. Identifying Information Pertaining to Protect the Privacy of an Individual

E. Location

F. Country/Nationality

G. Name of Organization

H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer

I. No Suitable Substitute Language



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10128  
RECORDS SERIES :  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : NND 941071

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
TO : THE RECORD  
TITLE : MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH THE PRESIDENT  
ON 28 FEBRUARY 1963  
DATE : 03/01/63  
PAGES : 3  
SUBJECTS : CUBA INVASION PLAN

REACTION TIME FOR LATIN AMERICA CONTINGENCIES

CINCPAC COMMAND RELATIONS

US ARMY TROOP STRENGTH IN BERLIN

NATO MATTERS

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

STRATEGIC VALUE OF OKINAWA

THE NATO MULTILATERAL FORCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/06/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : NARA RG 218, Box 4 of 8. Memo from Taylor for the  
Record re: meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with  
the President on 28 February 1963.



## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: OTCS  
 Date: 1 MAR 63  
 Subject: 28 Feb 63 MTE of JOINT CHIEFS of STAFF  
W/ PRESIDENT  
 Original Level of Classification: TOP SECRET  
 Third Agency Equities: OSD / STATE (OTCS)  
 Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Page # of PostponementReason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

OSD: NO OBJECTION SUBJECT TO  
 REVIEW BY JOINT STAFF  
 3 APR 98

JCS exemptions: b(1)(c) — APR 06 1998

In the Department of State has no objection to the  
 release or declassification of this document in full  
 under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
 Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7 Apr 98 WD

NARA RG 218 JCS  
 " NND 941071  
 BOX 4/8"



~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

CM-351-63  
1 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President on  
28 February 1963

All the Chiefs were present at the above meeting which lasted from 5:30 p.m. to 6:45 p.m. The following subjects were the principal topics of discussion.

a. The Cuba Invasion Plan.

(1) The Chiefs discussed the time-space factors in the implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 512 and 516 using the chart attached as Annex 1. The President was shown why it would take approximately 18 days from decision to D-Day from present troop and ship dispositions. In order to reduce this time to something like [redacted] considerable prepositioning would be required in order to get Army/Marine units to the East Coast and to assemble the necessary cargo shipping. The Chiefs expressed the view that it was unlikely that a period of tension would not precede a decision to invade Cuba which would allow ample time for preparatory measures; hence, it was undesirable to make permanent changes of station of Army and Marine units which would upset the present disposition of strategic reserve forces. [A] 601X9

(2) The President expressed particular interest in the possibility of getting some troops quickly into Cuba in the event of a general uprising. He was told that only the airborne troops could arrive with little delay, that the first Marine elements would require [redacted] before landing. He asked the Chiefs to develop specific plans in anticipation of the need for this kind of quick reaction. [A]

b. Reaction Times for Latin America Contingencies. The Chairman explained to the President the nature of CINCARIB's 2-61 and discussed the time of reaction for the force deployments under the Venezuela Contingency Plan (See Annex 2 attached). The effect of a DefCon 1 situation in comparison to a DefCon 5 was discussed. The President was shown the

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Page 1 of 3 pages.



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601(c)

composition of the [redacted] which CINCARIB planned to use in varying situations requiring military intervention. The Chiefs made the point that very little could be done to reduce the reaction time shown in the presentation. [A]

c. CINCPAC Command Relations. The President showed interest in the command relationships existing between the headquarters of Admiral Felt and General Harkins. He had formed the opinion that Admiral Felt controls the details of operations in South Vietnam and doubts that CINCPAC should stand between General Harkins and the Joint Chiefs of Staff except perhaps for administration and logistical matters. He was told that the Joint Staff is at work on this matter and will report to the Chiefs by March 15th. The President expressed the view that Admiral Felt and General Harkins should be allowed to express their personal views on reorganization directly to the Chiefs. The Chairman indicated that such will be the case.

d. US Army Troop Strength in Berlin. General Wheeler explained the problems arising from a possible cancellation of Operation Long Thrust and the probable impact upon the Berlin garrison of bringing back the two reinforcing battle groups currently present in Western Europe as the result of Long Thrust. The President did not reject the idea of replacing the three battle groups in Berlin by three ROAD battalions but urged the Chiefs to go easy at this time because of political reasons. He was told that the Chiefs had not yet made a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense but that any action bearing on the Berlin situation would be carefully coordinated with State and would be brought to the President for concurrence.

e. NATO Matters. The discussion of Berlin led to broader considerations of the strength of US forces to be maintained in Europe in the long term. The President repeated the view which the Chiefs had previously heard of the need to reduce US forces if our Allies did not increase their conventional strength in NATO. He has been impressed by the argument that it makes no sense to give the US forces the logistical support necessary to fight indefinitely when neighbors on the right and left cannot remain in combat more than a few days or weeks. He expressed interest in a statement that the United States was bearing indirectly logistical support costs for other nations and asked to see the figures. He indicated that he hoped that a decision could be reached on future US strength in Europe by the time of the NATO Ministerial meeting in May.

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Page 2 of 3 pages.



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~~TOP SECRET~~

The President expressed interest in having the Chiefs discuss NATO defense matters with the German military authorities. He was informed of General Foertsch's visit to Washington early in May.

At one point he expressed the view that it was more important to support the military defense of India than that of Western Europe where he considers it highly unlikely that the USSR would deliberately initiate an attack with conventional forces. He concedes, however, that continuance of the Berlin situation makes it difficult for the United States to reduce forces substantially at this time.

f. Rules of Engagement. The President referred to the rules of engagement transmitted by the JCS to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCSAC, and CINCONAD (number 8756 dated 22 Feb 63). After some discussion with the Chiefs, he directed that the phrase on hot pursuit contained in line 11 of sub-paragraph 1a be changed from [REDACTED] [A] Following the meeting the Chairman transmitted this decision to the Director, Joint Staff for transmission to the field. (6)(c)

g. Strategic Value of Okinawa. General Wheeler led a discussion of the Chiefs' views on the continued strategic essentiality of Okinawa to the US military posture in the Pacific. The President expressed no disagreement, indicating that he had no intention of giving up the island.

h. The NATO Multilateral Force. The Chairman mentioned Ambassador Merchant's call on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the discussion of ways in which the Chiefs might assist the Merchant Mission. The President stated that he recognized that the multilateral force might be stillborn but that it deserved fair consideration by our NATO allies. If the plan failed of adoption it should result from a European decision uninfluenced by any US doubts. The Chiefs expressed recognition of their duty to support the proposition at appropriate places and times.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Page 3 of 3 pages.

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~~TOP SECRET~~



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10132  
RECORDS SERIES : TAYLOR PAPERS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

-----  
DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS  
FROM : MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
TO : DOD EXEC. AGENT FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS  
TITLE : COVERT ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA  
DATE : 10/21/63  
PAGES : 6  
SUBJECTS : COVERT ACTIONS - CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL  
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/22/97  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Taylor Papers, Box 7. Memo from Taylor to the  
Department of Defense Executive Agent for Cuban  
Affairs re: Covert Actions Against Cuba.



TAYLOR BOX 7

Declassification Review/Postponement Form 202-10002-10132

Originator: JCS  
Date: 21 OCT 63  
Subject: Class Title  
Original Level of Classification: TS  
Third Agency Equities: CIA ~~to be removed~~  
Remarks: JCS SON

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

AS LISTED

DATE: JUL 22 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

(K)

21 OCT 1963

CM-949-63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE  
AGENT FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Covert Actions Against Cuba (TS)

*Orig + 1 to Secy State*

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to propose for consideration two forms of covert action; both possible of accomplishment at relatively small cost and both capable of contributing to the disruption of tranquility in Cuba. The actions contemplated are:

- a. The introduction of counterfeit currency, and
- b. The introduction of small arms and ammunition.

2. The widespread dissemination of well made, difficult-to-recognize counterfeit currency among the Cuban populace would serve to degrade the value of genuine currency and would generate serious problems for Cuban governmental authorities. They would be compelled either to call in and replace all currency in circulation, an expensive and troublesome procedure, or, alternatively, to impose penalties for possession of the illegal bills and accept the consequent enforcement problems. In either case, there would be an adverse effect upon the economic life of the country, and thus, upon its internal stability.

3. With respect to small arms, it is noted that one of Castro's early acts in 1959 was totally to disarm the private citizenry, thereby removing a critical threat to his totalitarian regime. Since that time he has had relatively little to fear from internal violence. If now we were covertly to introduce in many areas of Cuba quantities of small and simple weapons and ammunition, including pistols and disguised lethal devices easily concealed on the person, some would come into the possession of people who would have a willingness to use them, although it is recognized that many of the weapons so introduced would fall into the hands of the Castro Government. Nevertheless, as more individual Cubans gained possession of a weapon, the internal threat to functionaries of the Castro Government would grow, as would problems of investigation, enforcement and discipline. Incidents of assassination of oppressive officials and

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~~SENSITIVE~~

*Copy Cuba (21 Oct 63)*



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


MEMORANDUM

Date 14 October 1963

To: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba

It is recommended that you approve, sign and forward the attached memorandum to the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs.

  
V.H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

*I concur in this recommendation.  
At the last Standing Group meeting,  
when I mentioned these possible  
measures for action in Cuba, CIA  
representative said that a plan was laid.*



DRAFT

CM - 949 - 63

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE AGENT  
FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba (TS)

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2. The widespread dissemination of well made, difficult-to-recognize counterfeit currency among the Cuban populace would serve to degrade the value of genuine currency and would generate <sup>serious</sup> grave problems for Cuban governmental authorities. They would be compelled either to call in and replace all currency in circulation, a <sup>very</sup> most expensive and troublesome procedure, or, alternatively, to impose penalties for possession of the illegal bills and accept the consequent enforcement problems. In either case, there would be an adverse effect upon the economic life of the country, and thus, upon its internal stability.

3. With respect to small arms, it is noted that one of Castro's early acts in 1959 was totally to disarm the private citizenry, thereby removing a critical threat to his totalitarian regime. Since that time he has had relatively little to fear from internal violence. If now we were covertly to introduce in many areas of Cuba quantities

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

of small and simple weapons and ammunition, including pistols and disguised lethal devices easily concealed on the person, some would come into the possession of people who <sup>would</sup> have a willingness to use them, although it is recognized that many of the weapons so introduced would fall into the hands of the Castro Government. Nevertheless, as more individual Cubans gained possession of a weapon, the internal threat to functionaries of the Castro Government would grow, as would problems of investigation, enforcement and discipline. Incidents of assassination of oppressive officials and other armed action might be expected to increase. Castro would be faced with the requirement to buy up the arms or to engage in extensive enforcement activities, in which latter case conditions might reach such levels of severity as to alienate progressively greater segments of the citizenry. In either event, the net effect of introducing quantities of small arms would be to disturb internal tranquility and provide a growing base of discontent among the people.

4. Introduction of counterfeit currency should be accomplished gradually over an extended period by maritime infiltration, utilizing the available agent network. Random scattering of currency from the air, while feasible, would lessen the effectiveness of the operation, since the Castro Government would be immediately alerted and could take prompt countermeasures. Small weapons and ammunition, on the other hand, could best be distributed widely by means of aircraft, piloted by Cubans, which, in a series of aerial forays throughout

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Cuba, would drop quantities of individually packaged weapons attached to small parachutes. Weapons could also be introduced by sea.

5. These operations can be conducted in such a way as to be plausibly deniable by the United States. Cover would be provided by the widespread and highly publicized anti-Castro activities of refugee groups based in Latin America. In this regard, it has already been reported in the press that U.S. Treasury officials recently arrested certain Cuban refugees in this country who were engaged in printing counterfeit Cuban currency. This would support future denials by the U.S. of responsibility for any counterfeiting activity.

6. It is recommended that a program involving the actions described herein be <sup>developed a brief</sup> undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency. It is further recommended that the results of the Agency analysis be forwarded to the appropriate inter-agency group for consideration as to the feasibility and desirability of early implementing actions.

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~